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Full text of "The Katyn Forest Massacre : hearings before the Select Committee to Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, Eighty-second Congress, first[-second] session, on investigation of the murder of thousands of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, Russia .."

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THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 


HEARINGS 

BEFORE  THE 

SELECT  COMMITTEE  TO  CONDUCT  AN 

INVESTIGATION  OF  THE  FACTS,  EVIDENCE, 

AND  CIECUMSTANCES  OF  THE 

KATYN  FOEEST  MASSACEE 

EIGHTY-SECOND  CONGKESS 

SECOND  SESSION 
ON 

INVESTIGATION  OF  THE  MURDER  OF  THOUSANDS  OF 

POLISH  OFFICERS  IN  THE  KATYN  FOREST 

NEAR  SMOLENSK,  RUSSIA 


PART  7 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Select  Committee  To  Conduct  an  Investigation 
of  the  Facts,  Evidence,  and  Circumstances  of  the  Katyn  Forest  Massacre 


JUNE  3,  4,  AND  NOVEMBER  11,  12,  13,  14,  1952 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 


HEARINGS 

BEFORE  THE 

SELECT  COMMITTEE  TO  CONDUCT  AN 

INVESTIGATION  OF  THE  FACTS,  EVIDENCE, 

AND  CIECUMSTANCES  OF  THE 

KATYN  FOEEST  MASSACEE 

EIGHTY-SECOND  CONGRESS 

SECOND  SESSION 

ON 

INVESTIGATION  OF  THE  MURDER  OF  THOUSANDS  OF 

POLISH  OFFICERS  IN  THE  KATYN  FOREST 

NEAR  SMOLENSK,  RUSSIA 


PART  7 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Select  Committee  To  Conduct  an  Investigation 
of  the  Facts,  Evidence,  and  Circumstances  of  the  Katyn  Forest  Massacre 


JUNE  3,  4,  AND  NOVEMBER  11,  12,  13,  14,  1952 


UNITED  STATES 
GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
93744  WASHINGTON  :   1952 


SELECT  COMMITTEE  TO  CONDUCT  AN  INVESTIGATION  OF  THE  FACTS, 
EVIDENCE,  AND  CIRCUMSTANCES  OF  THE  KATYN  FOREST 
MASSACRE 

RAY  J.  MADDEN,  Indiana,  Chairman 
DANIEL  J.  FLOOD,  Pennsylvania  GEORGE  A.  DONDERO,  Michigan 

FOSTER  FURCOLO,  Massachusetts  ALVIN  E.  O'KONSKI,  Wisconsin 

THADDEUS  M.  MACHROWICZ,  Michigan       TIMOTHY  P'.  SHEEHAN,  Illinois 
John  J.  Mitchell,  Chief  Counsel 
ROMAN  C.  PuciNsKi,  Chief  Investigator 
II 


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rji.>. 


CONTENTS 


Statement  of —  Page 

Bi.ssell,  Gen.  Clavton 1839,  1864,  2298 

Brown,  Ben  H.,  jr 2056,  2218 

Carter,  John  F 2246 

Cranston,  Alan 2174,  2272 

Davis,  Elmer 1979 

Earle,  George  Howard 2196 

Epstein,  Julius 2266 

Harriman,  W.  A 2103 

Holmes,  Julius  C 2226 

Hopkins,  James  F 2008 

Jackson,  Justice  Robert  H 1945 

Kreutz,  Jan  Marion 2012 

Lane,  Arthur  Bliss 2216,  221» 

Lan,^,  Josepli 2002,  201 9- 

Lantaff,  Hon.  William  C 1827 

Lyon,  Frederick  B 2241 

Meeres,  Mildred 1833 

Melby,  John  F 2149 

M ikolajczyk,  Stanislaw _ _' 2155 

Mortimer,"  Kathleen  H 2132 

Olshansky .  Boris ^_  1939 

Phillips,  Joseph  B 2255 

Richards,  Robert  K . 2035 

Shea,  Mrs.  Hilda 2022 

Simon,  Arthur 2007,  201 9 

Soron,  Casimer .  2020 

Standley,  Adn  iral  William  H ._   2042,  2060 

Welles,  Hon.  Sumner 2075 

Yeaton,  Col.  Ivan 1916,  2293 

EXHIBITS 

1.  Letter  to  Mr.  Madden  from  Gen.  J.  Lawton  Collins 1826 

2.  Metnorandum  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense  from  Maj.  Gen.  Clayton 

Bissell ' 1  _  _  _  1839 

3.  Memorandum  from  General  Bissell  (Roger  Kent,  general  counsel  for 

Charles  A.  Coolidge) 1840 

4.  Lett<3r  from  General  Bissell  to  Julius  C.  Holmes.  Assistant  Secretarv  of 

State ;_ .  _  1867 

5.  Letter  from  Julius  C.  Holmes  to  Generfl  Bissell 1894 

6.  Statement   by    Mr.  Justice  Robert  H.  Jackson  to  the  congressional 

committee 1971 

7.  Letter  to  Mr.  Justice  Jackson  from  Polish  Government  in  Exile  in 

London 1 975 

8.  Mr.  Elmer  Davis'  radio  broadcast  of  May  3,  1943--- 1987 

8A.  State  Department  memorandum,  with  stamp  mark,  showing  it  had 

been  deli\ered  to  Mr.  Berle  on  April  22,  1943 _    _  . 198S 

9.  Telegram  from  Ambass?.dor  Standley  to  Department  of  State 2045. 

10.  Portion    of    message    from    Secretary    of    State    Hull    to    American 

Ambessador  at  Kuibyshev  of  August  19,  1942 2046. 

11.  Portion  of  message  from  Secretary  of  State  to  American  .Ambassador 

dated  September  5,  1942 2048 

12.  Portion  of  mess.^ge  from  American  Ambassador  to  State  Department 

dated  Sertember  10,  1942 2052: 

13.  Report  from    A-nerican    Ambassador   Pt    Moscow   regarding  Willkie's 

convers:  tion  with  Stalin  concerning  the  Poli.sh  situation- 2054 

nx 


IV  CONTENTS 

14.  Letter  and  one  enclosure  forwarded  to  State  Department  by  American  Page 

Ambassador  to  Moscow  on  February  17,  1942,  detailing  search  for 

Polish  officers.. L . 2057 

15.  Telegram  from  Moscow  dated  April  26,  1943 2062 

16.  Stalin's  personal  letter  to  President  F.  D.  Roosevelt 2063 

17.  Message  from  President  Roosevelt  to  Stalin  dated  April  26,  1943 2064 

18.  Telegram  from  Ambassador  in  Moscow  to  Department  of  State 2066 

19.  Telegram  from  Ambassador  in  Moscow  to  Department  of  State 2068 

20.  Letter  from  Under  Secretary  Sumner  Wells  to  President  Roosevelt —  2076 

21.  Letter  to  General  Watson  from  Under  Secretary  Welles 2082 

22.  Report  and  evidence  compiled  by  Poles  regarding  discovery  at  Katyn 

forwarded  to  Under  Secretary  Sumner  Welles  by  Ambassador  Biddle 

on  May  20,  1943 2092 

23.  Message  from  Mr.  Harriman  to  Stalin  dated  November  7,  1941 2112 

23A.   Mr.  Harriman's  dispatch  to  Washington 2112 

23B.  Stalin's  reply  to  Mr.  Harriman 2113 

23C.  Stalin's  second  reply  to  Mr.  Harriman 2113 

23D.  Polish  Embassy  letter  to  Ambassador  Harriman 2113 

24.  Telegram  to  United  States  Embassy  in  Moscow  dated  January  25, 

1944 2124 

25.  Ambassador  Harriman's  letter  forwarding  reports  on  their  ^•isits  to 

Katvn  bv    Mr.  Harriman's  daughter  and  an  Embassy  attache  in 

January  1944 2132 

26.  Ambassador  Earle's  letter  to  President  Roosevelt  dated  June  11, 1944.  .  2199 
26A.   Mr.  Roosevelt's  reply 2200 

27.  Mr.  Roosevelt's  letter  to  Ambassador  Earle 2202 

28.  President  Truman's  letter  to  Ambassador  Earle 2210 

29.  Ambassador  Lane's  letter  to  Mr.  Justice  Jackson  at  Nuremberg  dated 

December  16,  1945 2218 

30.  Ambassador  Lane's  letter  to  State  Department  official 2220 

31.  General  Holmes'  letter  of  June  9,  1945,  to  General  Bissell 2228 

32.  Colonel  Van  Vliet's  statement  regarding  his  treatment  at  Katyn  by 

the  Nazis 2230 

32 A.  Memorandum  from  Mr.  Carter  regarding  the  Katvn  Massacre  pre- 
pared on  May  31,  1944 J 2252 

33.  Letter  to  Mr.  Stone  from  Mr.  Epstein 2267 

34.  Letter  to  Mr.  Epstein  from  Charles  W.  Thayer,  Chief,  International 

Broadcasting  Division 2267 

35.  Letter  from  Epstein  to  Mr.  Allen 2268 

36.  Letter  from  Mr.  Kohler  to  Mr.  Epstein 2269 

37.  (Appendix)    Excerpt   of   House    Un-American    Activities    Committee 

hearing 23-'^  1 

38.  (Appendix)  Teheran- Yalta-Potsdam  agreements 23  9 

39.  Major  General  Bissell's  diary  certificate 23  2 

40.  Major  General  Bissell's  commendations 23l5 

41.  Message  sent  to  Department  of  State  by  Ambassador  Harriman  (see 

Mr.  Harriman's  testimony) 2350 

42.  Dispatches  describing  Polish-Soviet  relations . 2357 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACEB 


TUESDAY,   JUNE  3,    1952 

House  of  Representatives, 
The  Select  Committee  on  the  Kattn  Forest  Massacre, 

Washhigton,  D.  C. 

The  select  committee  met  at  10  a.  m.,  pursuant  to  call,  in  room  336, 
House  Office  Buildino;,  Hon.  Ray  J.  Madden  (chairman)  presiding. 

Present:  Messrs.  Madden,  Flood,  Furcolo,  Machrowicz,  Dondero, 
O'Konski,  and  Sheehan. 

Also  present :  John  J.  jNIitchell,  chief  counsel  to  the  select  committee. 

Chairman  Madden.  The  select  committee  will  come  to  order. 

I  might  say  for  the  record  that  tliis  meeting  of  the  Select  Committee 
on  the  Katyn  Forest  Massacre  is  the  sixth  in  a  series  of  hearings  which 
the  committee  has  held.  The  committee  returned  a  few  weeks  ago 
from  hearings  in  England,  where  it  heard  the  testimony  of  32  wit- 
nesses, and  also  from  Germany,  where  it  heard  the  testimony  of  28 
witnesses. 

As  far  as  the  testimony  is  concerned,  the  proceedings  of  the  com- 
mittee to  determine  the  responsibility  as  to  who  committed  the  Katyn 
massacre  are  practically  concluded.  The  testimony  today  will  lead 
up  to  the  committee's  desire  to  try  and  determine  what  happened  to 
certain  reports  that  were  submitted  to  the  Government  departments 
regarding  the  Katyn  massacre. 

The  record  may  also  show  that  all  members  of  the  committee  are 
present. 

Counsel  may  now  j^roceed.  Have  you  a  statement  that  you  wish  to 
make  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes,  sir. 

You  will  recall  that  sometime  ago  you  requested  the  Army  Depart- 
ment Counselor,  Mr.  Francis  Shackelford,  to  obtain  a  statement  from 
General  of  the  Army  J.  Lawton  Collins,  the  Chief  of  Staff,  relative 
to  his  interview  with  Col.  John  H.  Van  Vliet,  Jr.  Yesterday  after- 
noon, at  approximately  5  :  15  p.  m.,  I  received  that  statement,  which  is 
addressed  to  you,  and  I  herewith  hand  it  to  you. 

Chairman  Madden.  This  is  a  letter  dated  June  2,  1952,  addressed 
to  the  chairman  of  this  committee  and  signed  bj^  J.  Lawton  Collins, 
Chief  of  Staff  of  the  United  States  Army. 

Will  the  counsel  please  read  the  letter  for  the  record  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  The  letter  is  headed  "United  States  Army,  the  Chief 
of  Staff."   The  letter  is  dated  June  2, 1952.    [Reading :] 

Dear  Mr.  IMadden  :  Referring  to  your  conversation  witli  Mr.  P.  Sliackelford, 
Department  Counselor,  Department  of  the  Army,  I  am  submitting  herewitli  my 
recollection  of  the  facts  concerning  Lt.  Col.  John  H.  Van  Vliet's  passing  visit  to 
my  headquarters  early  in  May  1945.  At  that  time  I  vpas  the  commanding  general 
of  the  Seventh  Corps,  with  headquarters  at  Leipzig,  Germany.  My  corps  was  still 
in  action  and  in  contact  with  the  enemy  along  the  Elbe  River. 

1825 


1826  THE   KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Colonel  Van  Vliet  had  been  released  or  had  escaped  from  a  German  prison 
camp  and  happened  to  reach  our  lines  on  the  front  of  one  of  my  divisions.  I  had 
known  him  when  he  was  a  boy  at  Fort  Benning.  When  he  heard  that  I  was  in 
command  of  the  Seventh  Corps,  he  asked  to  see  me. 

Colonel  Van  Vliet  showed  me  his  pictures  of  Katyn  and  told  me  in  a  broad 
way  the  conclusions  he  had  come  to  as  a  result  of  his  visit  to  the  graves  of  Polish 
officers  at  Katyn.  As  I  recall  it,  he  told  me  he  was  anxious  to  get  home  and  report 
to  the  War  Department.  I  suggested  that  he  proceed  at  once  to  Headquarters, 
First  Army,  so  that  he  could  make  appropriate  reports.  Accordingly,  I  made  the 
necessary  arrangements  to  send  Colonel  Van  Vliet  back  to  First  Army  Head- 
quarters, which  was  then  at  Weimar,  Germany. 

Colonel  Van  Vliet  at  no  time  made  any  written  or  formal  statement  to  me, 
and  I  have  no  personal  knowledge  of  any  report  he  made  in  Washington. 
Sincerely  yours, 

J.  Lawton  Collins. 

The  letter  is  addressed  "Hon.  Ray  J.  Madden,  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives." 

Chairman  Madden.  Hand  it  to  tlie  reporter  and  have  it  marked 
"Exhibit  1." 

(The  document  referred  to  above  was  marked  "Exhibit  1"  and  made 
a  part  of  the  record.     Exhibit  1  is  as  follows :) 

Exhibit  1 

United  States  Army, 

The  Chief  of  Staff, 

June  2, 1952. 
Hon.  Ray  J.  Madden, 

House  of  Representatives. 
Dear  Mk.  Madden  :  Referring  to  your  conversation  with  Mr.  F.  Shackelford, 
Department  Counselor,  Department  of  the  Army,  I  am  submitting  herewith  my 
recollection  of  the  facts  concerning  Lt.  Col.  John  H.  Van  Vliet's  passing  visit  to 
my  headquarters  early  in  May  1945.  At  that  time  I  was  the  commanding  general 
of  the  Seventh  Corps,  with  headquarters  at  Leipzig,  Germany.  My  corps  was 
still  in  action  and  in  contact  with  the  enemy  along  the  Elbe  River. 

Colonel  Van  Vliet  had  been  released  or  had  escaped  from  a  German  prison 
camp  and  happened  to  reach  our  lines  on  the  front  of  one  of  my  divisions.  I 
had  known  him  when  he  was  a  boy  at  Fort  Benning.  When  he  heard  that  I 
was  in  command  of  the  Seventh  Corps,  he  asked  to  see  me. 

Colonel  Van  Vliet  showed  me  his  pictures  of  Katyn  and  told  nie  In  a  broad 
way  the  conclusions  he  had  come  to  as  a  result  of  his  visit  to  the  graves  of 
Polish  officers  at  Katyn.  As  I  recall  it,  he  told  me  he  was  anxious  to  get  home 
and  report  to  the  War  Department.  I  suggested  that  he  proceed  at  once  to 
Headquarters,  First  Army,  so  that  he  could  make  appropriate  reports.  Accord- 
ingly, I  made  the  necessary  arrangements  to  send  Colonel  Van  Vliet  back  to  First 
Army  Headquarters,  which  was  then  at  Weimar,  Germany. 

Colonel  Van  Vliet  at  no  time  made  any  written  or  formal  statement  to  me,  and 
I  have  no  personal  knowledge  of  any  report  he  made  in  Washington. 
Sincerely  yours, 

J.  Lawton  Collins. 

Mr.  ]V[iTCHELL.  Mr.  Chairman,  the  first  witness  this  morning  is 
Hon.  William  C.  Lantaff,  a  Representative  in  Congress  from  the 
Foni-th  District  of  Florida. 

Chairman  Maddex.  Cono;rpssninn,  do  yon  solemnly  swoar  the  testi- 
mony you  will  give  licre  in  the  hearing  now  being  conducted  will 
be  the  truth,  the  whole  ti'iith,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you 
God? 

Congressman  Lantaff,  I  do. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1827 

STATEMENT  OF  HON.  WILLIAM  C.  LANTAFF,  A  REPRESENTATIVE 
IN  CONGRESS  FROM  THE  STATE  OF  FLORIDA 

Mr.  Mitchell.  CoiigTessiiiun,  will  you  state  your  full  name  for  the 
record,  please '( 

Congressman  Laxtaff.  William  C.  Lantaff. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  And  your  present  address? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  House  Office  Building,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Will  you  tell  the  conmiittee  what  3'our  official  posi- 
tion was  in  the  Office  of  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2,  during  the 
years  19M  and  1945,  to  the  best  of  your  knowledge? 

Congi-essman  Lantaff.  I  was  assigned  as  Chief  of  the  G-2  Secre- 
tariat in  the  Office  of  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2,  War  Depart- 
ment, General  Staff.  I  was  on  duty  as  Chief  of  the  Secretariat  in 
May  of  1945. 

My  cUities  there  in  that  office  were  essentially  administrative  in 
nature,  to  administer  the  administrative  Office  of  the  Assistant  Chief 
of  Staff.  G-2,  and  to  comply  with  certain  other  missions  which  had 
been  assigned  to  me  in  that  office.  As  such,  I  was  on  duty  when 
Colonel  Van  Vliet  reported  to  the  office  of  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff', 
G-2,  in  May  of  1945. 

Of  course,  it  is  rather  difficult  at  this  time,  some  7  years  later,  to 
recall  everything  that  transpired ;  but,  as  I  recall  it,  and  to  the  best 
of  my  recollection.  Colonel  Van  Vliet  wanted  to  report  to  General 
Bissell,  and  upon  inquiry  as  to  the  nature  of  his  visit  and  why  he 
wanted  to  see  General  Bissell 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Congressman  Lantaff',  may  I  interrupt  you  for  a 
moment  ? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  jNIr.  Chairman,  in  part  2  of  the  hearings  held  in 
Washngton,  D.  C.  on  February  4,  5,  6,  and  7, 1  refer  you  to  page  48. 

Mr.  Lantaff',  I  would  like  to  read  something  here  for  the  record 
now.    Mr.  Flood  is  asking  the  question.    [Reading:] 

Mr.  Flood.  Were  you  directed  by  anybody  ovei'seas  to  report  to  the  office  of 
G-2  or  did  you  from  your  Army  experience  decide  that  was  where  you  should 
report? 

Colonel  Van  Vliet.  That  is  where  I  decided  to  go.  I  went  to  the  Office  of  G-2 
and  told  enough  of  my  story  to  convince 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  To  whom? 

Colonel  Van  Vliet.  Sir.  I  don't  remember.  It  was  in  one  of  the  outer  oflSces 
of  G-2.  I  don't  know  wiiom  I  spoke  to.  It  was  one  or  two  down  from  the 
G-2. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  AVhat  was  his  rank,  a  colonel? 

Colonel  Van  Vliet.  I  believe  it  was  a  lieutenant  colonel,  sir ;  but  I  am  unable 
to  say  who  or  what.    They  said  I  should  see  General  Bissell 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  You  mean  to  tell  me  when  you  came  in  there  he  did  not 
introduce  himself  to  you  or  tell  who  he  was?  He  did  not  tell  you  what  his 
position  was,  nor  did  you  inquire? 

Colonel  Van  Vliet.  His  position  was  known* to  me  at  the  time,  sir;  but  that 
has  been  7  years  ago.  and  it  wasn't  at  the  time  important  to  me  to  remember 
whom  I  talked  to  in  that  office.    I  am  sorry  I  don't  remember. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Isn't  it  customary  in  military — 


1828  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Congressman,  I  would  like  to  ask  yon  at  this  time:  Were  you  that 
lieutenant  colonel  ? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  I  believe  I  was;  yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Could  you  proceed  with  your  statement  from  there, 
please  ? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  As  well  as  I  recall  it,  Colonel  Van  Vliet 
told  me  enough  of  the  incident  that  he  had  observed  while  a  prisoner 
of  W'ar  that  1  determined  that  he  should  see  General  Bissell  and,  ac- 
cordingly, took  him  in  to  see  General  Bissell.  I  don't  recall  whether 
General  Bissell  was  in  the  office  at  that  time ;  but,  as  well  as  I  recall  it, 
it  was  the  same  day  that  he  reported  that  I  took  him  in  there. 

After  some  time — exactly  how  long  I  don't  recall — General  Bissell 
told  me  to  arrange  for  a  stenographer  to  take  down  the  testimony  of 
Colonel  Van  Vliet  and  to  arrange  for  quarters  for  him  to  do  it  in. 
Accordingly,  I  arranged  for  stenographic  assistance  and  for  a  space 
for  him  to  dictate  his  statement  about  the  Katyn  Massacre. 

After  that  was  completed,  the  report  was  taken  by  the  secretary 
to  General  Bissell. 

As  I  recall.  Colonel  Van  Vliet  and  General  Bissell  had  a  further 
conference  on  that  report,  and  that  is  about  all  I  remember  about 
the  incident  about  which  Colonel  Van  Vliet  has  testified. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  recall  the  name  of  the  stenographer? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  I  do  now.    It  was  Mrs.  ISIeeres. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  recall  if  Colonel  Van  Vliet  showed  you  any 
photographs  that  he  had  of  Katyn  ? 

Congi-essman  Lantaff.  I  recall  seeing  one  or  two  photographs,  to 
the  best  of  my  memory. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  know  if  they  were  attached  to  his  report  or 
not'^ 

Congressman  Lantaff.  I  do  not  recall  for  a  certainty,  but  I  believe 
they  were. 

Mr.  IMitchell.  Did  you  ])ersonally  see  such  a  report  and  read  it? 

Congressman  LanTxVff.  I  personally  saw  the  report. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  read  it  ? 

Congi-essman  Lantaff.  As  well  as  I  re.call,  I  read  the  report  or  I 
had  seen  it,  because  I  think  the  notes  were  returned  to  me  for  safe- 
keeping prior  to  the  time  Colonel  Van  Vliet  had  planned  such  a 
report. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Then  there  Avas  such  a  report? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  I  recall  the  report. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  At  the  time  that  the  secretary  returned  the  report, , 
did  she  return  it  to  you  or  did  she  return  it  to  Colonel  Van  Vliet  and 
you  and  General  Bissell  ?    Do  you  recall  the  details  ^ 

Congressman  Lantaff.  I  don't  recall  specifically.    To  the  best  of 
my  recollection,  when  the  report  was  finished,  (\)l()nel  Van  Vliet  re- 
viewed it.    Whether  he  did  it  in  my  office  or  the  office  that  I  had  made 
available  for  him,  I  don't  recall;  but,  to  the  best  of  my  memory,  after 
the  report  was  transcribed,  he  took  it  in  to  General  Bissell. 

Mr.   Mitchell.  He   personally   delivered   it   to   General  Bissell? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  As  well  as  I  recall.  I  think  that  he  was  to 
review  tlie  re])ort  and,  as  I  recall,  sign  it. 

Ml".  MrrciiKi.L.  Do  you  recall  wlio  was  iu  tl\e  imiuediate  office  of 
General  Bissell  at  that  time? 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1829 

Congressman  Lantaff.  I  know  who  was  assigned  in  the  immediate 
office. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Will  you  give  the  connnittee  the  names  of  those  in- 
dividnals. 

Congressman  Lantaff.  Yes.    There  was  a  Lt.  Col.  Jack  Earman. 

]\Ir.  Mitchell.  How  do  you  spell  it? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  E-a-r-m-a-n. 

There  was  General  BisselPs  secretary,  Mrs.  Doris  Jepson.  There 
was  a  warrant  officer,  Carulli.  Then  there  were  several  other  per- 
sonnel assigned  to  the  office  but  who  were  not  in  the  immediate  office 
next  to  the  general,  and  the  other  personnel  would  have  no  knowledge 
of  this  incident. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  recall  if  General  Bissell  had  a  safe  in  his 
office  ( 

Congressman  Lantaff.  Yes.  There  was  a  safe  just  outside  of 
General  BisselPs  office,  alongside  of  Mrs.  Jepson's  desk.  Then,  of 
course,  there  were  numerous  combination  file  cabinets,  with  combina- 
tion locks. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Then  Mrs.  Jepson  was  not  located  in  the  office  with 
General  Bissell,  nor  was  the  safe  ? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  No. 

I  say  "safe.*-  I  don't  recall.  I  think  it  was  one  of  these  combination 
lock  safes,  three  combination  safes,  which  were  prescribed  for  the 
storage  of  "Top  secret"  papers. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Was  this  document  or  report  of  Colonel  Van  Vliet's 
labeled  "Top  secret,"  to  your  knowledge? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  As  well  as  I  recall  it,  it  was.  I  could  not 
swear  to  that,  though. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Is  there  any  other  individual  who  was  connected 
with  the  Office  of  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2,  at  that  time,  from 
whom  a  statement  should  be  taken  by  this  committee? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  I  think  those  are  the  only  people  in  the 
office  who  would  have  had  any  knowledge  of  this  incident. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  To  your  personal  knowledge,  do  you  know  if  any- 
body had  access  to  this  safe  or  combination  safe  which  was  the  prop- 
erty of  General  Bissell,  other  than  his  secretaiy  and  himself? 

Congi'essman  Lantaff.  Everyone  in  the  immediate  office  did. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  The  individuals  you  have  named  ? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Earman,  Jepson  and  Carulli  ? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  That  is  correct,  and  myself. 

Mr.  jMitchell.  Did  yon  see  this  report  at  any  time  after  Colonel 
Van  Vliet  had  signed  it? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  I  don't  recall  that. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Was  it  customary  for  General  BisselPs  office  to  keep 
a  log  of  all  documents  that  were  sent  out  of  that  office  ? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  All  documents  that  came  in  through  the 
mailroom  or  cable  section,  which  were  retained  in  the  office,  were 
signed  for  by  either  Colonel  Earman  or  myself,  including  Joint  Chiefs 
of  Staff  papers  and  Combined  Chiefs  of  Staff  papers.  All  those 
papers  were  logged  in  and  recorded;  and,  of  course,  if  they  left  the 
office,  were  logged  out  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Who  did  the  logging  out  ? 


1830  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

Congressman  Lantaff.  That  was  done  by  various  personnel 
assigned  to  the  office  under  a  captain. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  recall  the  captain's  name  ? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  I  don't  recall  his  name. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  recall  ever  having  logged  out  the  Van  Vliet 
report  to  any  other  division  of  G-2  or  to  any  other  governmental 
agency  or  department? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  No.  It  was  not  logged  in  because,  actually, 
the  report  originated  in  the  office  of  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2, 
and  I  don't  recall  ever  having  logged  it  out. 

JNIr.  Mitchell.  But  the  report,  even  though  it  originated  in  General 
Bissell's  office,  if  it  had  left  the  office,  the  standard  procedure  was  for 
it  to  be  logged  out  ? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  Not  necessarily;  no.  General  Bissell  could 
have  originated  a  "Top  secret"  paper  and  could  have  taken  that  paper 
to  another  office  or  to  an  authorized  recipient,  and  have  left  that  paper 
with  that  particular  individual. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  recall  whether  there  was  one  copy,  or  just 
the  original,  or  several  copies  of  this  Van  Vliet  report? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  I  only  recall  an  original. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  all,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Madden.  Did  I  understand  you  to  say  that  this  original 
report  was  placed  in  this  safe  in  Bissell's  office  ? 

Congressman  Lx\ntaff.  As  well  as  I  recall  it.  I  don't  recall  having 
seen  this  particular  report  after  Colonel  Van  Vliet  reported  in  to 
General  Bissell  with  the  report  to  review  it  with  him  and  to  sign  it. 
But  it  could  very  well  have  been  placed  in  that  particular  safe. 

Chairman  JMadden.  Did  the  other  employees  in  the  office,  including 
those  that  you  named  in  your  testimony,  have  access  to  the  safe  where 
the  secret  files  were  kept  ? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  Those  four  people  had  access  to  all  docu- 
ments in  the  office  of  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2,  because  it  was 
our  function,  of  course,  to  work  there  whenever  General  Bissell  was 
there;  and  General  Bissell  would  be  there  from  early  in  the  morning 
until  late  at  night.  Many  times  there  would  be  only  one  of  us  there 
in  the  office  with  him.  So,  the  people  that  were  assigned  to  his  imme- 
diate office  had  the  combinations  of  all  the  safes. 

Chairman  Madden.  Are  there  any  questions? 

Mr.  DoNDERo.  Can  you  fix  the  time,  Congressman,  when  Van  Vliet 
came  into  the  office  to  dictate  that  report  ? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  I  think  it  was  in  the  morning,  but  that  is 
as  well  as  I  remember. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  1  mean,  the  day,  the  month,  and  year. 

Congressman  Lantaff,  No,  I  cannot. 

Mr.  DoNDEKO.  Was  it  in  1945? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  May  of  1945,  as  well  as  I  recall  it. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Congressman,  did  I  understand  you  correctly  to  say 
that  you  did  review  Van  Vliet's  report  before  he  signed  it. 

(/ongi'ossman  Lantaff.  No.  Colonel  Van  Vliet  came  into  the  office 
and  wanted  to  see  General  Bissell.  Before  I  would  let  him  see  the 
general  I  wanted  to  know  what  he  wanted  to  see  him  about. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  After  he  dictated  it  to  Mrs.  Meeres,  did  you  see  the 
report  ? 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1831 

Cono^ressnian  Lantaff.  I  don't  recall.  I  believe  that  I  did,  but  I 
don't  remember. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  There  was  something  said  about  his  turning  over 
some  notes  to  you. 

Congressman  Lantaff.  As  I  recall,  I  had  Mrs.  Meeres  bring  back 
her  stenographic  notes  and  the  portion  she  transcribed,  to  me,  to  put 
in  the  G-2  safe  that  night. 

Mr.  Sheehax.  But  were  they  put  in  separate  from  the  original 
report,  or  were  they  put  in  with  the  general's  report  ? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  That  was  before  the  original  report  was 
completed.  It  is  a  security  measure.  I  had  Mrs.  Meeres  bring  them 
back  and  kept  them  under  our  control. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Congressman,  I  have  another  thought.  You  men- 
tioned before  they  had  a  system  of  logging  out  reports  in  the  office, 
and  you  said  it  could  be  possible  for  General  Bissell  to  take  the  top- 
secret  report  out  of  the  office,  to  vour  knowledge,  over  to  some  other 
dej^artment  or  some  other  Government  agency. 

Congressman  Lantaff.  It  would  be  very  possible.  I  did  not  say 
other  Government  agencies. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Or  some  other  department  of  the  Army,  say.  Well, 
let  us  say  that  he  could  take  it  out  of  the  office,  as  you  understood. 

Congressman  L\ntaff.  Yes. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  "Was  there  anything  in  the  Army  regulations  that 
required  him  to  get  a  receipt  under  such  a  procedure,  or  could  he  just 
take  it  out  under  his  own  free  will  ? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  Under  the  ARCs,  the  file  receipts  were, 
of  course,  to  be  taken  for  top-secret  documents. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  That  is  what  I  mean.  In  other  words,  if  General 
Bissell  had  taken  out  the  report  and  turned  it  over  to  someone  else, 
he  should  have  a  receipt,  under  Army  regulations? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  I  think  you  will  find  considerable  dispute 
about  that  even  today  in  the  Department  of  the  Army,  as  to  what 
is  required  with  reference  to  the  handling  of  top-secret  documents. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Congressman,  when  this  report  came  into  your  di- 
vision and  General  Bissell's,  there  was  pretty  good  evidence  that 
here  was  a  case  that  involved  the  murder  of  almost  15,000  Allied 
soldiers.  Could  yoa  give  us  any  hint  as  to  what  discussion  or  what 
impression  that  created?  Was  there  any  discussion  about  that 
ghastly  crime  after  the  report  was  made,  or  was  it  just  passed  off 
as  another  report? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  I  don't  know.  If  there  would  have  been 
such,  it  was  beyond  the  scope  of  my  duties  in  that  office  to  evaluate  it 
or  to  discuss  it. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  I  understand. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Congressman,  you  were  not  in  any  way  connected 
with  the  evaluation  of  intelligence  reports  or  responsible  for  the 
evaluation  of  intelligence  reports  in  that  assignment  that  you  had, 
were  you  ? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  No.  I  would  say  that  my  assignment  there 
was  comparable  to  that  of  an  administrative  assistant  in  one  of  our 
offices. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Congressman,  were  you  there  during  the  entire 
period  of  General  Bissell's  regime  as  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for 
G-2? 


1832  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Congressman  Lantaff.  No,  I  was  not.  I  was  ordered  to  duty 
there  after  he  had  been  designated  as  ACofS.  G-2,  and  I  was  dis- 
charged from  the  service  prior  to  the  time  that  he  was  succeeded. 

Mr.  JNIrrcHELL.  In  other  words,  you  left  before  he  was  relieved 
of  the  responsibility  of  the  G-2  assignment? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Mitciip:ll.  Thank  you,  sir.     I  have  no  furtlier  questions. 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Furcolo. 

Mr.  FuRCOLo.  Wliere  was  the  report  physically,  the  last  time  you 
ever  saw  it,  if  you  remember  who  had  it  and  where  it  was  ? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  Congressman  Furcolo,  it  is  hard  for  me  to 
say  for  a  certainty.  As  I  recall — I  am  trying  to  remember  what  hap- 
pened 7  years  ago — the  last  time  I  saw  the  report  was  when  it  went 
in  with  Colonel  Van  Vliet  to  General  Bissell's  office.  If  there  was 
some  way  I  could  refresh  my  memory,  it  could  very  well  have  been 
that  that  report  was  in  the  safe  there  in  General  Bissell's  office.  But 
I  am  not  certain  about  it. 

Mr.  FuRCoi-o.  In  your  best  recollection,  have  you  ever  seen  the  repoit 
itself  since  that  time? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  No.    Since  May  of  1945  I  have  not  seen  it. 

Mr.  FuRcoLO.  In  other  words,  your  best  recollection  would  be  that 
the  last  time  you  saw  that  report  physically  was  in  the  hands  of 
Colonel  Van  Vliet  walking  into  the  office  of  General  Bissell? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  As  well  as  I  can  recall — the  reason  why  I 
have  some  reservation  is  that  I  know  that  I  saw  the  report  and  read 
the  report,  and  I  don't  recall  whether  I  did  it  before  he  took  it  in,  or 
afterward. 

Mr.  Furcolo.  Would  it  be  safe  to  say  that  the  last  time  you  physi- 
cally saw  that  report,  it  was  in  the  G-2  offices  there  ? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  Tliat  is  correct. 

Mr.  Furcolo.  With  reference  to  the  notes,  the  shorthand  notes, 
where  were  they  the  last  time  that  you  saw  them,  if  you  did  see  them? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  I  don't  recall  that.  With  reference  to  the 
notes,  Mrs.  Meeres  can  testify  better  than  I  can,  but  I  would  pi-esume 
that  they  were  destroyed. 

Mr.  Furcolo.  And  from  that  time  on,  your  best  recollection  is  that 
you  have  not  physically  seen  the  report  or  the  notes  ? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  No.  There  were  many  documents  which 
were  in  possession  of  the  G-2,  which  were  kept  m  his  personal  pos- 
session. 

Mr.  Furcolo.  At  any  time,  did  you  ever  discuss  the  report  with 
General  Bissell  in  any  way,  or  with  any  superior  of  yours  there? 

Congressman  Lantaff.  No. 

Mr.  Furcolo.  That  is  all  I  have. 

Cliairman  Madden.  Congressman  Lantati',  on  behalf  of  the  com- 
mittee, we  wish  to  thank  you  for  coming  here  this  morning  to  testify. 

Congressman  Lantaff.  Is  that  all  ? 

Chairman  Madden.  That  is  all. 

Mrs.  Mi  hired  Meeres. 

Mi's.  Meeres,  will  you  just  stand  and  be  sworn,  please? 

Do  you  solenndy  swear  that  in  tlie  lioaring  now  being  hekl  you  will 
tell  the  trutli,  tlie  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you 
God? 

Mrs.  Meehes.  Yes,  I  do. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1833 

TESTIMONY  OF  MILDRED  MEERES,  WASHINGTON,  D.  C,  ACCOM- 
PANIED BY  F.  SHACKELFORD,  COUNSELOR,  DEPARTMENT  OF 
THE  ARMY 

Chairman  Madden.  Just  state  your  name  to  the  reporter. 

Mrs.  Meeres.  Mrs.  Mildred  Meeres. 

Chairman  Madden.  And  vour  address  ? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  2012  O  Street  NW,  Washington. 

Mr.  IMiTCHELL.  Mi-s.  Meeres,  how  long  were  you  assigned  in  G-2 
of  the  Army '(  Wlien  did  the  period  begin,  and  how  long  were  you 
connected  with  G-2  of  the  Army  'I 

Mrs.  Meeres.  From  1941  to  1948. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Will  you  tell  the  committee  what  your  position  was 
in  the  Army  during  1944  and  1945  in  the  G-2  division? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  I  worked  for  Captured  Personnel  and  Material.  I 
was  secretary  to  Col.  J.  Edward  Johnston,  who  was  Chief  of  the  X 
section  in  that  division. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Could  you  describe  to  the  committee  what  the  X 
section's  duties  were  ? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  The  X  section  was  a  secret  committee,  and  I  did 
secretarial  work  along  with  the  secret  work  that  I  did  for  Colonel 
Johnston. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Mr.  Chairman,  if  it  was  a  secret  committee,  I 
think  she  probably  should  be  excused  from  any  further  answers  to 
that  question. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Will  you  tell  the  committee  what  connection  you 
had  with  the  report  given  by  Lt.  Col.  John  H.  Van  Vliet,  Jr.,  in  May 
1945  i 

Mrs.  Meeres.  Colonel  Van  Vliet  dictated  the  repoit  to  me. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Will  you  describe  in  detail  to  the  committee  how 
you  were  selected,  where  your  office  was  physically  located,  as  con- 
nected with  General  Bissell's  office  ? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  We  were  about  two  corridors  down  the  hall  from 
General  Bissell's  office,  and  it  was  Captured  Personnel  and  Material, 
which  has  to  do  with  prisoners  of  war.  So  General  Bissell's  office 
called  to  have  a  girl  come  up  to  take  a  statement  from  a  returning 
prisoner  of  war,  and  I  was  asked  to  go  up  and  take  the  statement. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Who  did  you  first  see  when  you  went  to  General 
Bissell's  office? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  I  saw  Colonel  Lantaff. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  did  Colonel  Lantaff  say  to  you? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  He  briefed  me  on  security  and  told  me  I  was  to  take  a 
top-secret  report. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Will  you  tell  the  connnittee  what  happened  after 
you  were  briefed. 

Mrs.  Meeres.  Then  he  took  me  into  General  Bissell's  office  and  intro- 
duced me  to  Colonel  Van  Vliet,  and  then  Colonel  Van  Vliet  and  Colonel 
Lantaff  and  I  went  across  the  hall,  and  Colonel  Lantaff  left  us  there 
alone  and  locked  the  door  and  Colonel  Van  Vliet  dictated  the  state- 
ment to  me.  Then  I  took  the  report  back  to  my  own  office  and  typed 
it  up.  And  then — my  memory  is  a  little  hazy  on  it — I  believe  I  took 
the  report  back,  and  I  believe  that  both  General  Bissell  and  Colonel 
Van  Vliet  dictated  to  me  further,  in  General  Bissell's  office.     But  I 


1834  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

specifically  remember  taking  the  report  and  a  letter  up  to  General 
Bissell's  office. 

But,  apparently,  I  hadn't  completed  the  job,  because  I  remember 
locking  the  papers  up,  or  giving  them  to  Colonel  Lantaff  to  lock  in 
his  safe  at  night,  and  got  them  again  the  next  morning.  So  I  can't 
remember  exactly  whether  I  finished  the  report  that  night,  that  after- 
noon, or  the  next  morning. 

Mr.  INIiTCHELL.  Does  the  committee  desire  to  ask  any  questions  at 
this  point? 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Dondero. 

Mr.  Dondero,  Did  you  make  any  copies? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  I  have  been  trying  to  remember.  I  don't  recall  mak- 
ing any  copies,  and  I  don't  think  I  did,  because  I  did  it  in  draft  and  it 
was  top  secret,  and  usually  a  top  secret  is  only  one  copy,  until  its  final 
form. 

Chairman  Madden.  Until  what? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  Until  it  is  typed  in  its  final  form. 

Mr.  Dondero.  What  did  you  do  with  your  stenographic  notes? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  I  put  them  in  double  envelopes,  and  all  my  mistakes 
and  everything,  the  paper  that  had  to  be  destroyed,  and  returned 
everything  to  Colonel  Lantaff  when  I  was  finished  with  the  job,  the 
notes  and  everything. 

Mr.  Dondero.  To  whom  did  you  hand  the  report  after  it  was 
written  ? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  I  think  I  handed  it  to  Colonel  Lantaff,  but  I  am  not 
exactly  sure,  sir,  whether  I  took  it  into  General  Bissell's  office,  or  not. 

Mr.  Dondero.  Did  you  see  it  after  that? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  The  report  ? 

Mr.  Dondero.  Did  you  see  it? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  No  ;  I  never  saw  the  report  after  that. 

Mr.  Dondero.  You  were  not  present  when  it  was  signed  ? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  I  don't  remember  that. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  take  any  other  dictation  from  either  Colonel 
Van  Vliet  or  General  Bissell,  or  Colonel  Lantaff  ? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  From  General  Bissell,  I  believe,  and  Colonel  Van 
Vliet. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  show  you  an  exhibit  on  page  51  of  the  part  2 
hearings  of  the  committee  of  February  4.  There  is  a  letter  of  the 
War  Department  General  Staff,  Military  Intelligence  Division,  G-2, 
Washington.     Could  you  identify  this  letter  for  the  committee,  please  ? 

Mrs.  ]\Ieeres.  Yes,  sir.  I  believe  I  typed  that  memorandum.  It 
was  dictated  to  me  by  General  Bissell  in  his  office. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  point  out  that  this 
letter  is  the  letter  that  Colonel  Van  Vliet  specifically  requested  from 
General  Bissell  relative  to  his  keeping  silent  in  connection  with  the 
report  he  had  rendered  to  G-2.  The  witness  this  morning  has  said 
that  General  Bissell  dictated  this  letter.  And  also  the  part  2  of  the 
hearings  held  on  February  4  will  reveal  that  Colonel  Van  Vliet  him- 
self specifically  requested  such  a  letter. 

Tluit  is  to  clarify  the  record. 

Chairman  Madden.  On  what  page  of  part  2  is  that  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Page  51. 

Mr.  FuRcoLo.  AAHiat  did  the  witness  say  that  General  Bissell 
dictated  ? 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    IVIASSACRE  1835 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mrs.  Meeres  just  stated  tliat  General  Bissell  dic- 
tated tliis  letter  to  lier. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Mrs.  Meeres,  you  typed  other  top-secret  reports,  did 
you  not  ? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  O'KoxsKi.  Was  there  anything  unusual  about  this  particular 
report?  Was  there  more  furore  or  was  there  more  of  a  tendency  to 
create  an  impression  on  you,  as  to  this  particular  report,  that  it  must  be 
top  secret  ?  Was  it  handled  with  a  little  more  flush  and  flurry  than 
any  other  top-secret  report  that  was  made  ? 

Mrs.  ]VIeeres.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  O'KoxsKi.  In  other  words,  it  sort  of  struck  you  that  here  was 
a  report  that  had  great  significance  because  it  was  impressed  upon 
you  more  than  any  other  top-secret  report  that  you  typed  that  this 
was  something  unusual,  something  different,  that  really  must  be  top 
secret ;  was  that  the  impression  that  you  got  ? 

Mrs.  ]\Ieeres.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Siieeiiax.  Mrs.  Meeres,  you  stated  before  that  in  a  top-secret 
document,  you  only  typed  one  copy,  and  you  said  something  about 
"until  it  is  typed  for  final  form."  AMiat  did  you  mean  by  "final 
form"  ? 

Mrs.  Me:erj!:s.  Well,  this  was  a  statement  that  I  took  verbatim  from 
Colonel  Van  Vliet,  and  usually  a  statement  of  that  type  is  corrected 
and  written  in  final  form  after  it  is  corrected. 

Mr.  Sheeiian.  Do  you  mean  that  usually  your  procedure  was  that 
it  was  corrected,  to  do  it  over? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  And  in  this  particular  instance  you  never  got  it  back 
to  do  it  over  ? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  That  is  right. 

]Mr.  Sheehan,  And  in  previous  documents  that  you  had  typed  and 
returned  to  you  with  corrections,  what  was  the  procedure  on  the 
number  of  copies  that  you  would  make  ? 

Mrs.  JSIeeres,  It  would  depend  on  the  report  and  how  many  were 
needed. 

Mr,  Sheehan.  Did  you  ever  before  make  a  single  copy  and  never 
any  more  ? 

Mrs.  Meeres,  Oh,  yes,  sir. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Dondero. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  Whatever  became  of  your  stenographic  notes?  What 
was  the  procedure  in  the  office  ? 

Mrs,  Meeres.  On  this  particular  job,  I  returned  my  stenographic 
notes  to  Colonel  Lantaff.  But  when  I  was  working  in  my  own  office, 
we  had  our  own  security  there,  where  it  was  burned  by  our  own  security 
officer. 

Mr.  Mitchell,  Will  you  explain  to  the  committee  what  the  secu- 
rity procedure  was  in  your  office  relative  to  stenographic  notes  ? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  Well,  after  our  notes  were  finished,  we  saved  them  in 
the  top-secret  safe  for  a  little  while  in  case  we  would  have  to  refer  to 
them,  and  then  they  were  burned.  We  had  a  regular  procedure  for 
that.    The  security  officers  took  care  of  it. 

Chairman  Madden.  Are  there  any  further  questions  ? 


1836  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  Mrs.  Meeres,  you  said,  as  I  understood  you,  that  after 
Colonel  Van  Vliet  had  dictated  to  you,  you  took  the  report  and  a  letter 
up  to  General  Bissell's  office.    Did  1  undeistand  that  correctly  i 

Mrs.  Mei:res.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  Then  I  understood  you  to  say  tliat  you  did  not  knt)\v 
if  it  was  finished  or  not.    Is  that  right  ? 

Mi-s.  MiiERES.  That  is  right,  sir. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  Ordinarily,  if  any  person  dictated  something  to  you, 
would  you,  after  it  had  been  coin})leted,  not  show  it  to  that  person,  or 
would  the  ordinary  procedure  be  to  take  it  to  General  Bissell  ^ 

Mrs.  Meeres.  Well,  I  never  did  a  job  just  like  this  before.  This  was 
out  of  my  regular  routine.    So  I  took  it  back  to  General  BisselFs  office. 

Mr.  FuRCOLo.  Was  Colonel  Van  Vliet  in  the  office  at  that  time  { 

Mr.  Meeres.  Well,  that  is  what  I  can't  remember. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  You  brought  the  report  physically,  the  typed  report, 
to  the  best  of  your  knowledge,  the  only  copy ;  is  that  right. 

Mrs.  Meeres.  Yes,  sir;  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge. 

Mr.  FuRCOLo.  You  brought  that  sole  re})ort  to  General  Bissell's 
office  ? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  I  don't  know  whether  I  gave  it  to  Colonel  Lantaif  and 
he  brought  it  in,  or  whether  I  brought  it  in. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  Your  best  recollection  is  that  the  last  you  saw  of  that 
report,  where  was  it? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  I  can't  recall  where  it  was,  because  I  am  not  sure 
whether  I  gave  it  to  Colonel  Lantaff  or 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  Would  youi-  best  recollection  be  tiiat  the  last  you  saw 
of  that  report,  it  was  either  in  the  hands  of  CoU)nel  Lantatl'  or  in  the 
hands  of  General  Bissell? 

You  see,  what  we  are  trying  to  do  is  trace  this  report  down  as  best 
we  can. 

Mrs.  Meeres.  Yes,  I  know. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  And  we  do  not  want  any  more  than  your  best  recol- 
lection. 

Mrs.  Meeres.  Yes,  sir. 

I  am  positive  it  was  in  that  office.    I  am  positive  I  left  it  up  there. 

Mr.  FuRCOEO.  Where,  and  with  whom  ? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  I  gave  it  to  either  Colonel  Lantatf  or  Colonel  Van 
Vliet,  or  General  Bissell. 

Mr.  FuRCoLo.  In  other  words,  you  are  reasonably  certain  that  the 
last  you  saw  of  that  report,  you  left  it  with  one  of  those  three  men. 
Colonel  Lantaff,  Colonel  Van  Vliet,  or  Geneial  Bissell? 

Mi's.  Meeres.  Yes,  sir;  that  is  right. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  Did  you  evei",  at  any  time  from  that  day  to  this,  see 
that  I'eport  again  ^ 

Mrs.  Meeres.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  With  reference  to  yom-  note-:,  1  nnderstood  you  to 
say  that  your  best  recollection  is  tliat  you  U'ft  those  with  Colonel 
Lantaff  or  someone  there;  is  that  right? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  PuRCOLO.  At  the  present  time  are  you  emi)Ioyed  by  any  de- 
I)ai-tment  or  agency  of  the  United  States  Government^ 

Mi-s.  Meeres.  Yes,  sir;  I  am;  the  Interior  Department. 

Mr.  FuRcoLO.  I  just  want  to  ask  you  one  moie  question. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1837 

I  jiatlier  from  your  testimony  tliat  apparently  this  was  the  first 
time  yon  had  been  ca-lled  in  for  a  job  or  some  work  for  General  Bis- 
sell,  or  that  office. 

Mi-s.  Meeees.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  FuRCOEO.  Was  there  any  reason  for  that,  that  yon  know  of '^ 

Mrs.  Meeres.  The  only  reason  was  that  we  v.ere  the  prisoner  of 
war  branch,  and  it  had  to  do  with  onr  branch.  We  handled  all  the 
woi-k  in  connection  with  ])risoners  of  war. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  In  other  words,  do  I  understand  that  Colonel  Van 
Vliet  Avas  retnrnino;  as  a  former  prisoner  of  war  ^ 

Mrs.  Meeres.  That  is  what  I  understood  at  the  time. 

Mr.  Furc'Olo.  Let  me  ask  you  this  questioii :  Assuming  that  Colonel 
Van  Vliet  did  return  as  a  jn-isoner  of  war,  would  there  be  anything 
umisual  about  your  de})artment's  handling  it  rather  than  some  otlier 
de[)artment '. 

^Irs.  Meeres.  I  believe  that  usually  our  department  would  have 
handled  it,  except  that  he  went  to  General  Bissell  instead. 

Mr.  FuRcoLO.  I  think  you  partially  answered  this  in  answer  to  a 
question  of  Congressman  O'Konski,  but  I  would  be  interested  in  get- 
ting your  general  opinion  as  to  whether  there  was  anything  at  all 
about  this  case,  right  from  the  very  begining,  that  impressed  itself 
upon  your  mind  as  being  handled  any  differently  than  the  ordinary 
to]>-secret  case  Avould  be  handled  ^ 

Mrs.  Meeres.  Xo,  sir.  I  don't  think  it  was  handled  any  differ- 
ently, except  that  I  was  the  one  to  do  it.  I  wouldn't  ordinaiily  do 
a  job  for  treneral  Bissell. 

Mr.  FuRroLo.  This  connnittee  is  extremely  interested  and  we  in- 
tend to  track  down,  of  course,  an}-  evidence  that  there  may  be  indicat- 
ing that  there  was  some  sort  of  a  cover-up  or  a  hushing  up  of  any  facts 
in  connection  with  this  entire  case.  xVre  you  aware,  in  any  way  at  all, 
of  any  acts  or  statements  on  the  part  of  anyone  to  try  and  cover  up 
or  hush  n]>  something  in  connection  M-ith  this^ 

Mrs.  ]\Ieeres.  Xo,  sir.  In  fact,  evei-  since  the  investigation,  I  have 
Ijeen  told  to  tell  evei'vthing  I  can  remember  about  the  report.  The 
only  thing  tliat  was  top  secret  was  the  content  of  the  report,  at  the 
time. 

Mr.  FuRcoLO.  That  is  all. 

Chainnan  Madde'x.  Do  you  have  any  questions,  Mr.  ISIachrowicz  ? 

Mr.  Maciiroavicz.  Yes,  sir. 

I  believe  you  said  you  had  been  working  for  the  G-2  since  1941? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Maciirowicz.  And  you  were  working  in  a  secret  section  of 
that  G-2? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  MAt'iiowicz.  Had  you  taken  quite  a  number  of  secret  reports 
prior  to  tliis  one  '\ 

]Mrs.  Meeres.  I  took  several. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Were  you  briefed  before  you  went  upon  your 
duties,  as  to  the  security  precautions? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  Well,_  in  that  particular  division,  they  are  very 
security-conscious.  We  Avere  constantly  being  told  and  briefed,  but 
not  for  a  particular  job  like  that,  because 

Mr.  Maciirowicz.  Xot  for  the  particular  job? 

93744— 52— pt.  7 2 


183S  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

Were  you  always  briefed  particularly  before  every  secret  report 
that  you  took  ? 

Mrs,  Meekes.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Maciirowicz.  You  were  not? 

Mrs.  Meekes.  Ko. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  In  this  case,  I  believe  a'Ou  testified  that  you  were 
briefed  specially  ? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  Yes,  sir, 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  that  impress  upon  you  the  particular  im- 
portance given  to  these  reports,  as  compared  to  the  others  in  which  you 
were  never  briefed  separately  ? 

Mrs.  Meeres,  No,  sir,    I  didn't  think  much  of  that. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Were  there  any  special  security  precautions  given 
to  you  on  this  report  that  were  not  given  to  you  in  the  others? 

Mrs,  Meeres,  No.     It  was  just  the  same  as  the  others. 

Mr.  Machrow^icz.  But  this  is  the  only  report  that  you  know  of, 
from  the  time  you  were  in  the  G-2,  where  you  were  given  special, 
particular  security  precautions? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  For  a  particular  job. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  This  is  the  only  particular  job  in  the  course  of 
your  experience  at  G-2  where  you  were  given  the  special,  particular 
precautions? 

Mrs.  Meeres,  No. 

May  I  take  that  back,  sir,  because  I  told  you  I  worked  with  the  X 
section,  and  I  did  some  jobs  there  also  that  I  was  specially  briefed  on. 
I  just  forgot.    You  just  recalled  it  to  my  mind, 

Mr,  MACIIR0w^cz.  Can  you  recall  any  special  precautions  that  were 
given  to  you  in  this  case  that  were  not  given  in  other  cases? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  No,  sir;  I  can't. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  That  is  all. 

Mr.  DoNDERO,  When  you  returned  your  stenographic  notes,  were 
they  in  the  form  of  the  ordinary  stenographer's  notebook? 

Mrs,  Meeres.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  DoNDERo.  And  you  simply  handed  the  book  over? 

Mrs,  Meeres,  I  believe  I  tore  my  notes  out  of  the  book. 

Mr.  Dondero.  And  then  they  were  put  into  an  envelope? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  I  put  them  in  a  double  envelope. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  They  were  put  in  an  envelope? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Dondero.  Did  you  ever  see  those  notes  again? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  DoNDERO,  Do  you  know  what  was  done  with  them  ? 

Mrs,  Meeres.  I  assume  that  they  w^ere  burned ;  but  I  don't  know. 

Mr.  Dondero.  Was  that  the  procedure? 

Mrs.  Meeres.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Dondero.  To  burn  the  notes? 

Mrs.  Meeres,  Yes,  sir, 

Cliairman  Madden.  Are  there  any  further  questions?  Mrs.  Meeres, 
on  behalf  of  the  committee,  I  thank  you  for  coming  here  to  testify. 

Mivs.  Meeres.  Thank  you. 

Chairman  Madden,  Major  General  Bissell. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE  1839 

General  Bissell,  do  you  solemnly  swear  that  in  the  hearing-  now 
being  held  you  will  tell  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but 
the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  CLAYTON  L.  BISSELL,  MAJOR  GENERAL,  USAF 
(RETIRED),  ACCOMPANIED  BY  F.  SHACKELFORD,  COUNSELOR, 
DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  ARMY 

Chairman  Madden.  Just  state  your  full  name  to  the  reporter, 
General. 

General  Bissell.  ISIaj.  Gen.  Clayton  L.  Bissell,  Air  Force,  United 
States,  retired. 

Chairman  AIaddeint.  And  your  present  address? 

General  Bissell.  Signal  Mountain,  Tenn. ;  102  River  Point  Road. 

Chairman  JNIadden.  Will  counsel  proceed? 

General  Bissell.  With  your  permission,  I  would  like  to  hand  you 
two  letters  at  this  time.  I  am  handing  the  counsel  two  letters  at 
this  time  because  I  think  I  should  do  it  at  this  moment.  You  judge 
whether  you  want  them,  or  not. 

Chairman  Madden.  Yes. 

I  have  here  a  letter  dated  May  21,  1952,  written  by  Clayton  L. 
Bissell,  major  general,  USAF,  retired,  to  the  Chief  of  Staff,  United 
States  Air  Force. 

Will  you  have  the  reporter  mark  it  "Exhibit  2"  ? 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  2"  and  made  a 
part  of  the  record  as  follows :) 

Exhibit  2 

Signal  Mountain,  Tenn.,  May  21,  1952. 
Memorandum  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense. 
Through :   Chief  of  Staff,  United  States  Air  Force. 

Subject :   Testimony  for   Select  Committee  of  the  House  Investigating  Katyn 
Massacre. 

The  United  Press  about  May  16,  1952,  stated  that  Chairman  Roy  J.  Madden 
of  the  select  committee  of  the  House  currently  investigating  the  Katyn  massacre 
announced  that  I  would  be  the  first  witness  l)efore  the  committee  on  June  3, 
1052,  at  a  public  hearing  in  Washington. 

I  will  be  very  glad  to  cooperate  fully  with  the  committee.  Published  reports 
of  the  committee  hearings  indicate  that  not  only  the  Katyn  matter  itself  but 
matters  directly  or  indirectly  related  to  Katyn  may  become  the  subject  of  ques- 
tioning. There  are  many  asi^ects  of  the  matter  that,  as  of  the  date  of  my  retire- 
ment, were  still  classified.  Since  my  separation  from  the  service,  I  have  had  no 
means  of  knowing  which,  if  any,  of  these  matters  have  been  declassified. 

Written  instructions  are  requested  as  to  what  matters  I  may  and  may  not 
testify  about  in  connection  with  the  Katyn  affair,  and  what  action  it  is  desired 
I  should  take  in  answering  questions  relating  to  State  or  Defense  Department 
material  the  classification  of  which  I  am  no  longer  aware. 

If  called,  and  the  committee  follows  its  usual  procedure,  it  is  expected  they 
will  ask  me  if  I  have  received  any  instructions  from  National  Defense  or  other 
sources  as  to  what  I  should  or  should  not  testify.  If  such  a  question  is  asked, 
and  there  is  no  olijection,  I  should  like  to  lay  liefore  the  committee  a  copy  of  this 
letter  and  its  reply.     If  no  instructions  are  received,  I  will  have  no  alternative 


1840  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

but  to  lay  this  letter  before  the  committee  and  so  state,  thereafter,  answeriiifx 
auy  questions  asked  without  regard  to  security  classification  of  material  of 
which  I  naturally  cannot  now  be  aware. 

Clayton  L.  Bisseix, 
Major  General,  USAF  (Retired). 
A  certified  true  copy  : 

Frederic  H.  Miller,  Jr., 

Colonel,  USAF. 

Chairman  Madden.  I  have  liere  a  letter  headed  "Memorandum  foi- 
Chiyton  L.  Bissell,  major  general,  USAF  (retired)''  written  by  Roger 
Kent,  general  counsel  for  Charles  A.  Coolidge,  in  the  Office  of  the 
Secretary  of  Defense.  This  letter  is  dated  June  2,  1952,  and  is  in 
answer  to  the  letter  set  out  as  exhibit  2. 

Will  you  have  the  reporter  mark  this  '"Exhibit  3"  ? 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  3*'  and  made  a 
part  of  the  record  as  follows:) 

Exhibit  3 

Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense, 

Washington,  D.  C,  June  2,  1952. 
Memorandum  for  Clayton  L.  Bissell,  major  general,  USAF  (retired). 
Subject:    Testimony  for  Select  Committee  of  the  House  Investigating  Katyn 
Massacre. 
In  answer  to  your  memorandum  of  May  21,  1952,  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense, 
I  can  advise  you,  after  consultation  with  the  Department  of  State,  that  neither 
the  Department  of  State  nor  the  Department  of  Defense  knows  of  any  matters 
connected  with  the  Katyn  massacre  which  now  need  to  remain  classified.  These 
Departments,  therefore,  know  of  no  reason  why  you  should  not  testify  freely  as 
to  all  matters  connected  with  the  Katyn  affair.     In  doing  so,  you  should  not 
disclose  sources  of  intelligence  which  from  your  general  experience  you  will 
realize  would  thereby  be  jeopardized. 

Testimony  concerning  official  matters  not  connected  with  the  Katyn  massacre, 
the  curreut'security  classification  of  which  you  may  not  be  aware,  will  be  with- 
held pending  determination  of  its  current  classification  status. 

Roger  Kent, 
General  Counsel  for  Cliarlen  A.  Coolidge. 

Chairman  Madden.  Proceed,  Mr.  Mitchell. 

Mr.  MrrcnELL.  Genei-al.  where  were  you  born? 

General  Bissell.  In  Kane,  Pa. 

Mr.  MrrniELL.  When  were  vou  born? 

General  Bissell.  July  29,  1896. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Will  you  tell  the  committee  your  educational  back- 
gi'oun.d,  j)lease  i 

(ienoral  Bissell.  liegulai'  grammar  school,  high  school,  law  school. 

Mr.  MrrciiELL.  Where  did  you  go  to  grannnar  school  and  high 
scliool  ? 

(jeneral  Bissell.  (ii-annnar  school  in  Kane,  Pa.,  and  liiuh  scliool  in 
Kane,  Pa.,  ami  Glean,  N.  Y. 

]Mr.  INIrrcjiELL.  Where  did  you  go  to  law  school? 

General  Blssell.  Vali)ai'aiso  TTniversity,  Indiana. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  attend  the  United  States  Military  Academy  ? 

(Joneral  I^lssell.  I  never  attended  Military  Academy. 

Mr.  MrrciiELL.  What  did  you  do  after  law  school  ? 

(leneral  Bissell.  1  left  law  school  j)i'ior  to  graduation,  a  few  months 
before  graduation,  to  enter  the  first  ollicers  training  camp. 

Mr.  AlrrciiELL.  AA'hen  was  this? 

General  Bissell.  1917,  very  early. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1841 

Mr.  Mitchell,.  Were  you  later  admitted  to  the  bar  of  Indiana  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  was. 

I  was  criticized  for  leavino:  the  school  without  finishino;  the  course 
so  close  to  the  end,  but  my  pjrades  were  ^rood  and  they  asked  me  to 
come  back  and  receive  my  diplonla  in  uniform. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  receive  your  diploma? 

General  Bissell.  I  did,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  When? 

General  Bissell.  At  the  orraduation  of  the  class  in  lOlT. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Were  you  admitted  to  the  bar  of  Indiana? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  rig-ht,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  ^Y[\en  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  couldn't  give  you  the  date  because  I  was  back 
in  training  camp,  but  it  went  through  the  usual  procedure.  It  would 
have  occurred  sometime  during  the  next  few  months  after  that,  the 
papers  being  completed  and  my  admission  certified. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Were  you  discharged  from  the  xVrmy  after  your 
service  in  World  War  I  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  stayed  on  until  the  1020  Reorganization  Act 
went  into  etfect,  and  at  that  time  left  the  service  for  a  brief  period 
and  went  to  work  for  the  Galludet  Aircraft  Corp.,  then  located  in 
Connecticut. 

]Mr.  Mitchell.  What  date  was  that  approximately  ? 

General  Bissell.  Sometime  in  the  summer  of  1920,  probably  the 
date  that  the  law  became  effective,  which  was  sometime  in  June,  as  I 
recall,  1920;  probably  June  30  at  the  end  of  the  fiscal  year,  would 
have  been  the  most  normal  period. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  When  did  you  return  to  Army  service  ? 

General  Bissell.  Sometime  late  that  fall.  I  had  met  General 
Mitchell  by  coincidence  in  New  York,  and  he  asked  me  to  come  back 
and  do  a  specific  job. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Were  you  an  aviator  in  World  War  I  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  was  an  aviator  in  World  War  I  on  the  British 
front,  as  a  fighter  pilot,  for  about  51^  months. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  stated  to  the  committee  that  you  returned  to 
military  service  approximately  the  fall  of  1920;  is  that  right? 

General  Bissell.  I  was  out  just  a  few  montlis.  and  I  think  it  was 
either  the  fall  of  1920  or  just  after  the  first  of  the  new  year.  I  think 
I  met  General  Mitchell  at  the  Armistice  Day  dinner  in  Xew  York, 
and  he  wanted  me  to  come  back  and  do  a  certain  job,  and  I  did  go  back. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  On  this  next  question  you  may  refer  to  notes  if 
you  would  like  to. 

Could  you  tell  the  committee  the  various  assignments  you  have  had 
from  1920  until  September  1,  1939?  What  was  your  rank  in  the  fall 
of  1920? 

General  Bissell.  I  was  a  captain  at  the  time  I  left  the  service.  I 
had  been  recommended  for  a  majority,  but  the  promotions  were 
frozen  at  a  certain  period  when  the  winning  of  the  war  was  certain. 
There  was  no  use  commissioning  additional  officers.  Under  the  re- 
organization, not  being  a  West  Pointer,  I  would  have  had  to  accept 
a  first  lieutenancy.  I  did  not  want  to  do  that  because  I  did  not  see 
that  it  was  in  the  national  interest  at  that  time.     I  didn't  think  I  knew 


1S42  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

enough  of  the  military.  I  knew  enougli  of  the  civilian  side  to  go  into, 
that. 

After  I  came  back  in  the  service,  the  job  that  I  was  brought  in  for 
was  to  assist  in  the  setting  up  of  a  school  that  became  known  as  the 
Air  Service  Field  Officers'  School,  subsequently  the  Air  Corps  Field 
Officers'  School,  now  the  Air  War  College. 

No  such  thing  had  ever  existed.  I  had  recommended  it  prior  to  my 
separation  from  the  service ;  and  General  Mitchell,  following  through, 
wanted  me  to  come  back  and  assist  in  getting  it  going.  The  purpose 
of  it  was  to  give  those  considerable  number  of  Regular  officers  who 
did  not  get  overseas  because  of  their  training — they  were  kept  over 
here;  that  is,  training  others,  the  West  Pointers — they  had  missed 
the  combat  side  of  the  war  and  it  seemed  to  me  that  a  school  was  the 
only  opportunity  to  pass  it  on  to  them  while  the  information  was  fresh. 

I  went  to  Langley  Field  for  that  purpose. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  How  long  were  you  there  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  was  connected  with  that  school,  with  short 
breaks,  a  good  deal  of  time.  I  started  in,  I  think,  in  1920  or  early 
1921.     I  w^as  with  it  through  the  formation  period  of  the  school. 

I  was  then  selected  by  General  Mitchell  as  an  aide  to  go  to  Euro])t' 
and  visit  all  European  countries,  testing  and  examining  aircraft.  Wf 
visited  most  of  the  countries  of  Europe  that  had  any  air  forces.  Our 
relationship  became  very  close  during  that  period ;  and  when  I  got 
back — shortly  after  that — I  was  ordered  away  from  the  school  and 
imade  his  aide  and  was  his  aide  for  the  following  4  years,  and  also 
as  a  direct  assistant  as  Assistant  Chief,  Army  Air  Service,  as  it  was 
called  in  those  days. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  When  was  your  first  assignment  in  the  Army  in  con- 
nection with  Military  Intelligence? 

General  Bissell.  When  I  returned  from  World  War  II,  after  2 
years  in  India  with  Stilwell. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  have  any  Military  Intelligence  background 
at  any  period  of  time  from  1917  until  your  return  from  StilwelT- 
theater  ? 

General  Bissell.  Yes;  a  rather  considerable  amount. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Could  you  tell  the  committee  about  it? 

General  Bissell.  Before  setting  up  this  school,  it  was  necessary  to 
determine  what  the  courses  should  be;  and,  naturally,  there  had  to  be 
Intelligence  in  it.  My  specialty  was  operations.  I  didn't  deal  much 
with  Intelligence,  but  I  knew  the  relationship  of  Intelligence  to  Oper- 
ations, and  learned  more  as  the  years  passed. 

When  I  left  the  Air  Corps  school,  I  attended  Leavenworth,  where 
there  was  a  2-year  course.  There  was  a  considerable  amount  of  em- 
phasis on  Intelligence.  And  I  believe  Colonel  Van  Vliet's  father 
taught  the  class  out  there.     I  am  not  sure  of  that. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  But  you  yourself  never  had  a  specific  assignment 
in  the  capacity  as  Military  Intelligence  officer  until  your  assignment 
after  that  with  General  Stilwell  ? 

General  Btssef.l.  Yes:  I  did.  I  had  one  in  Air  Force  immediately 
after  my  return,  with  the  idea  of  expanding  and  reorganizing  the 
Air  Corps  Intelligence.  It  was  the  Air  Corps  Intelligence  at  that 
time. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  When  you  say  "Air  Corps  Intelligence,"  at  that 
time 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1843 

General  Bissell.  It  is  Air  Force  Intelligence  now. 

Mr.  MrrcHELL  (contiiuiing).  It  was  then  part  of  the  Department 
of  the  Army  ? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  correct,  part  of  the  Department  of  the 
Army. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  When  was  that  assignment? 

General  Bissell.  I  left  India  on  the  1st  day  of  September,  with 
instructions  to  visit  various  fronts. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  year  'i 

General  Bissell.  1943. 

And  after  visiting  various  fronts  and  England,  I  arrived  back  here, 
and  probably  within  30  days  took  over  the  duties  as  A-2,  it  was  called, 
or  Air-2  section  of  the  staff,  under  General  Arnold. 

Now,  you  understand,  I  had  Intelligence  oflicers  working  under  me, 
numerous  ones,  in  India,  where  I  commanded  the  Tenth  Air  Force 
and  all  American  aviation  for  a  considerable  period,  as  well  as  initiat- 
ing the  first  work  on  crossing  the  Hump.  I  had  been  with  the  Chinese 
theater  in  charge  at  StilwelPs  headquarters  during  the  time  he  was 
cut  off  in  Burma,  and  I  knew  much  of  intelligence  from  the  practical 
user's  end,  and  I  had  a  little  of  the  school  or  academic  background  on 
the  Intelligence  side. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  was  the  exact  date  on  which  you  took  over 
the  position  to  which  you  have  referred,  in  A-2  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  would  have  to  refer  to  orders.  But  I  would 
say  within  30  to  45  days  after  my  departure  from  India,  which  was 
on  the  1st  of  September  .1943. 

Mr.  Mitchell,  You  say  "30  or  45  days."  That  would  make  it 
approximately  October  15,  1943;  would  it? 

General  Bissell.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  When  did  you  become  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for 
G-2,  or  was  there  any  assignment  in  between  this  A-2  assignment 
and  your  assignment  as  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff? 

General  Bissell.  No.  It  was  effective,  I  think,  by  order  on  5  or 
4  January  1944.  The  thing  that  led  up  to  it  was  that  I  had  worked 
under  General  Strong,  my  G-2  predecessor.  When  he  was  head  of 
the  Ai-my  War  Plans  Division,  I  handled  the  Air  Force  plans  in 
that  office  at  that  time. 

Mr.  ]\Iitciiell.  Who  is  General  Strong? 

General  Bissell.  Gen.  G.  V.  Strong,  deceased,  my  predecessor  in 
G-2  and  a  former  head  of  the  War  Plans  Division,  the  War  Depart- 
ment General  Staff. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Then  you  are  telling  the  committee  that  you  as- 
sumed the  duties  and  responsibilities  of  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff 
of  G-2  on  the  4th  of  January  1944 ;  is  that  correct  ? 

General  Bissell,  Yes;  I  think  that  is  correct.  I  would  have  to 
verify  it  if  I  have  gone  wrong,  but  I  don't  think  I  have.  I  left  India 
in  1943  in  September,  and  the  following  January  the  order  came  out, 

I  would  like  to  make  that  clear,  because  I  think  you  want  some- 
thing— and  I  know  what  it  is — but  I  would  like  to  cover  the  whole 
field, 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  have  the  record  show 
that  I  have  never  talked  to  General  Bissell,  and  I  don't  believe  any 
member  of  the  committee  has  talked  to  him  before. 

General  Bissell.  That  is  correct. 


1844  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  have  never  asked  him  a  question  before  this  par- 
ticular time. 

Chairman  Madden.  Proceed. 

General  Bissell.  The  reas(m  for  my  interrpution — and  I  want  to 
apologize — is  not  any  implication  whatever,  except  that  I  am  trying 
to  give  you  everything-,  and  we  are  moving  rapidly  over  a  lot  of 
territory. 

General  Strong  was  ill.  I  was  in  the  A-2  receiving  a  considerable 
amount  of  Intelligence  through  G-2. 

Chairman  Madden.  What  time  are  you  referring  to  now? 

General  Bissell.  Between  the  period  I  returned  from  India,  in 
1943,  and  the  time  I  took  over  as  head  of  G-2,  in  January  1944. 

In  that  period  I  was  convinced  we  w^ould  never  get,  during  the  war, 
an  effective  Intelligence  organization  in  Air  Forces.  It  started  too 
late;  it  did  not  have  sufficient  experienced  personnel  in  Intelligence, 
and  it  wasn't  going  to  work  too  well,  and  it  was  going  to  be  very  costly 
and  we  would  get  a  good  set-up,  but  the  wnir  Avould  be  over  by  the 
time  we  got  it.  So  I  told  General  Arnold  exactly  how  I  felt  about 
it  and  told  him  I  thought  a  better  working  arrangement  could  be  made 
with  G-2  whereby  we  w^ould  send  Air  Force  officers  down  there  in  some 
numbers  and  they  would  specialize  on  the  Air  Force  end  of  it  and  we 
wouldn't  have  to. 

He  took  that  thought  to  General  Marshall.  General  Marshall  had 
some  contacts  w^ith  General  Strong.  I  think  I  made  the  suggestion 
on  a  Saturday  morning.  I  think  that  afternoon  I  was  informed  that 
I  would  be  the  next  G-2  and  go  see  General  Strong.  I  think  physi- 
cally I  took  over  G-2  the  next  Monday  morning  because  of  General 
Strong's  condition  and  that  he  promptly  went  to  the  hospital  at 
Walter  Reed. 

That  was  not  wdiat  I  had  originally  intended  at  all.  I  had  no 
thought  of  any  such  thing  and  expected  to  go  back  to  o[)erations,  which 
was  my  specialty. 

The  order  confirming  me  in  G-2,  I  think,  is  dated  January,  but  I 
think  I  actually  went  to  work  there  nearly  a  month  earlier,  because 
I  don't  think  General  Strong  was  I'elieved  until  they  had  given  him 
a  thorough  check  at  Walter  Keed  and  determined  it  was  not  expedient 
to  send  him  back  to  G-2.     His  physical  condition  Avould  not  stand  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  was  your  rank  at  that  time,  (jeneral^ 

General  Bissell.  Major  general. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  stated  that  from  the  time  you  left  the  Chiiui- 
Burma-lndia  theater  you  made  several  visits  to  other  stations.  Could 
you  briefly  sketch  for  the  connnittee  some  of  those  visits,  because  it 
covered  the  period 

Mr.  Mac^likowicz.  Just  a  minute,  if  you  will  pardon  me. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  understand  some  of  the  committee  have  unavoid- 
able appointuients  this  afternoon.  AVe  probably  have  other  matters  to 
discuss.  I  think  we  should  leave  Buruia  to  some  other  investigation. 
Let  us  get  to  the  Katyn  matter.  I  do  not  think  it  is  particidarly 
importaut  to  us  whiit  his  other  assiguments  were. 

Mr.  MrrciiKLL.  Katyn  happened  in  April  194;),  it  was  disclosed,  and 
he  evidently  came  from  the  Near  Fast  area. 

('hairinan  Madden.  Does  this  have  some  connection  with  Katyn? 

Mr.  Mttciiell.  Yes,  sir;  my  line  of  questions  has. 

I  will  make  the  qtu^stions  more  direct  if  the  connnittee  so  desire.s. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1845 

In  April  1943,  the  Katyn  affair  was  disclosed  to  the  world  by  the 
Germans.  The  general  left  the  China-Burma-India  theater.  I  be- 
lieve, on  September  1,  1943.  The  Katyn  alfair  had  become  known  to 
the  world  then.  I  do  not  know  how  the  general  returned  to  the 
States,  but  lie  did  state  here  this  morning  that  he  came  through  certain 
areas.  I  vvould  like  to  have  him  now  tell  the  committee  if  he  had 
heard  about  the  Katyn  affair,  at  what  stations.  Colonel  Szymanski 
was  militaiy  attache  in  Cairo,  Egypt,  at  the  time. 

Chairman  Maddex.  Proceed. 

General  Bissell.  I  flew  from  India,  departing  from  Karachi,  in  an 
airplane  which  was  furnished  to  me  to  proceed  as  far  as  Casablanca. 
I  was  directed  to  proceed  by  the  usual  transport  route  to  Cairo,  with 
some  diversions  authorized  to  see  strategic  points  en  route.  I  landed 
at  Cairo  and  had  a  few  days  there. 

I  knew  something  of  Katyn  while  on  duty  in  India  and  loaned 
Polish-speaking  personnel  in  my  command  for  use  of  the  British  in 
India.  There  they  had  families,  I  think,  of  some  of  the  Polish 
Army  housed  somewhere  outside  of  Karachi  under  pretty  terrible  con- 
ditions. It  was  nobody's  fault;  just  there  they  were.  Food  was 
scarce  in  India;  Englishmen  were  scarce,  and  English,  Indian,  or 
American  people  Avho  spoke  any  Polish  were  still  more  scarce.  So, 
w^e  were  very  glad  to  help.  It  was  a  tricky  thing  to  do.  It  was  not 
my  job  to  take  care  of  Polish  refugees  but  to  fight  the  Japanese.  But 
I  felt  that  the  small  number  of  Polish  people  we  had  who  could  be 
of  assistance  wouldn't  hurt  us  and  could  be  of  great  assistance.  So 
that  was  done. 

I  knew  where  they  were  camped  and  saw  it  from  the  air.  While  I 
don't  recall  it  too  much  in  detail,  I  remember  talking  to  one  or  two 
of  my  people  who  were  there,  and  they  painted  a  picture  of  distress 
and  privation  and  poverty  and  suffering  and  broken  families  and 
lives  and  lack  of  homes  and  everythino;  that  was  pathetic.  They 
didn't  know  where  they  were  going.  They  were  worn  out,  and  the 
Britisli  couldn't  move  them  any  farther  because  they  couldn't  then 
stand  more  travel. 

Yes;  I  knew  something  of  Katj-n,  but  not  the  detail  probably  that 
was  available  in  America,  because  our  messages  were  pretty  short. 
I  had  heaid  of  it. 

,  When  I  got  to  Egypt,  I  was  much  more  concerned  with  the  Poleski 
operation,  which  had  just  been  finished.  It  was  one  of  the  brilliant 
Air  Force  operations  of  the  war.  I  was  very  much  concerned  with 
lend-lease  and  supply  arrangements  because  we  in  India  were  sup- 
posed to  get  certain  supplies  to  that  theater,  I  wanted  to  help  Stilwell 
every  way  I  could. 

Mr.  MricHELL.  Did  you  see  Colonel  Szymanski  while  you  were  in 
Cairo? 

General  Bissell.  I  saw  a  lot  of  people  in  Cairo.  I  could  have  seen 
him.  I  liave  no  recollection  of  him.  While  I  have  heard  his  name, 
I  have  never  met  the  man  to  remember  who  he  was.  I  may  have  met 
him  in  Cairo.  He  would  be  the  best  judge  of  that.  He  would  remem- 
ber me  much  better  than  I  would  remember  him,  because  there  were 
not  many  Air  Force  people  passing  through  there  who  had  been  much 
interested  in  Intelligence,  and  I  w^as. 


1848  THE  katyjst  forest  massacre 

Mr.  MiTciiKi.L.  You  are  now  tellin<i-  tlie  comniittee  tlmt  you  had  uo 
specific  discussions  in  Cairo  with  anyone  in  direct  connection  with 
the  Katyn  affair? 

General  Bissell,  Only  that  I  knew  from  discussions  at  headquar- 
ters there  that  there  were  Poles  in  that  area  and  that  formation  of  a 
Polish  Army  was  progressing — not  too  rapidly,  but  progressing — and 
that  problems  of  every  nature  Avere  involved. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  The  problems  of  the  forming  of  the  Polish  Army 
had  no  connection  with  the  Katyn  affair. 

General  Bissell.  No. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  I  would  like  to  know  is  this :  You  had  no 
discussions  at  all  with  anyone  at  the  headquarters  at  Cairo  relative 
to  Katyn ;  is  that  correct? 

General  Bissell,  Not  specifically. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  do  not  recall  anyone? 

General  Bissell.  No,  sir;  not  to  my  recollection.  It  could  have 
happened,  but  I  don't  tliink  so. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  have  just  stated  to  the  committee  that  you 
assumed  the  position  of  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  as  a  major  general 
for  G-2  on  or  about  the  4th  of  Januar}^  1944.  Will  you  now  relate 
to  the  committee  what  happened  when  a  Lt.  Col.  John  H.  Van  Vliet, 
Jr.,  was  brought  to  your  office  in  May  1945? 

General  Bissell.  Yes. 

I  was  told,  probably  on  Monday,  the  21st  of  May,  that  Colonel 
Van  Vliet  wished  to  see  me  but  that,  for  some  reason,  probably  be- 
cause of  my  schedule  that  day,  he  was  not  set  up  for  that  day.  I  had 
a  hearing  up  here,  I  think,  in  this  House,  with  some  connnitt«e,  at 
about  that  time,  and  I  was  preparing  for  that,  and  there  were  many 
urgent  things.  I  had  been  away  from  the  16th,  the  day  before 
Colonel  Van  Vliet  arrived  in  W^ashington,  and  was  away  on  official 
business  until  the  Sunday,  which  would  have  been  the  20th,  as  I  re- 
call, when  I  returned  dead-tired  from  a  very  long,  hard  trip. 

I  used  Monday  on  very  urgent  things  that  had  piled  up  during  my 
absence,  and  on  Tuesday  I  saw  Colonel  Van  Vliet.  I  cannot  tell  you 
who  brouglit  him  into  my  office.  I  lieard  Colonel  Lantaff's  state- 
ment.    He  could  well  have  done  it.     It  would  have  been  normal. 

I  have  prepared  some  notes  which  will  give  in  a  little  more  chrono- 
logical order  what  happened  after  Colonel  Van  Vliet  came  in.  I  will 
talk  from  them,  if  you  wish,  or  I  will  talk  in  answer  to  your  questions 
as  you  present  thenu 

Chairman  Madden.  If  you  care  to  refer  to  your  notes,  that  is  sat- 
isfactory. 

General  Bissell.  I  think  it  will  be  quicker. 

(chairman  Madden.  That  is  all  right. 

General  Bissell.  If  I  digress  or  conunent  on  things  that  you  are  not 
interested  in,  please  sto])  me,  because  I  don't  want  to  take  the  com- 
mittee's time  unnecessarily. 

Mr.  FuiKOLO.  Before  you  start:  When  did  you  prepare  those  notes? 

(Jeneral  Bissell.  I  have  been  working  on  them  since  I  heard  I  was 
to  come  u])  here,  to  get  the  IhiuLTs  down  so  I  would  get  the  chronology 
of  the.  (hing  and  arranged  the  details  that  way. 

Mr.  Fi  KcoLo.  in  other  words,  these  are  not  notes  that  you  pre- 
pared then? 


THE   KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1847 

General  Bissell.  Xo;  only  penciled  notes  bein*^  revised  from  day 
to  day  and  as  I  recall  things. 

Mr.  FuRCOLo.  They  are  not  notes  made  at  that  time? 

General  Bissell.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  FtTJCOLO.  They  are  notes  you  made  in  the  last  2  or  3  weeks? 

General  Bissell.  Some  of  them  were  made  a  little  earlier  than 
that.  All  were  prepared  since  your  committee  was  formed.  There 
was  no  part  prepared  pi'ior  to  that  time  that  is  in  those  notes  at  all. 

You  are  interested  in  1945.  I  have  it  right  here.  I  think  it  will 
be  quicker  to  read  it. 

Colonel  Van  Vliet,  who  had  been  liberated  from  a  German  prisoner- 
of-war  camp  south  of  Berlin  when  it  was  overrun  by  the  Russians, 
reached  the  American  lines  about  May  5,  1945.  He  reported  to  me 
in  Washington  on  May  22,  1945.  In  my  office,  with  only  Colonel 
Van  Vliet  and  myself  ])resent,  he  told  me  the  story  of  the  POW 
visit — that  is,  prisoner-of-war  visit — to  Katyn.  Although  he  showed 
the  effects  of  his  years  of  imprisonment  less  than  many  officers,  he 
was  tired,  tense,  and  thin.  Nevertheless,  he  told  the  story  of  the 
assembly  of  the  American-British  prisoner-of-war  group  and  of  the 
visit  to  Kaytan  in  such  a  calm,  direct,  and  conservative  manner  that 
there  was  iio  doubt  in  my  mind  that  he  was  telling  the  truth  about 
these  events  exactly  as  he  remembered  what  had  occurred  2  years 
earlier. 

As  was  to  be  expected  in  such  a  case,  a  few  of  his  oral  statements 
conveyed  a  somewhat  different  meaning  after  a  few  questions  were 
askecf  than  as  origiPxally  made.  This  is  not  the  slightest  implica- 
tion he  was  not  completely  honest  and  straightforward.  It  was  prob- 
ably because  he  had  lived  with  the  story  and  his  reaction  to  the 
unpleasant  experiences  so  long  that  he  assumed  more  background 
detail  was  known  to  me  than  actually  was  the  case. 

As  I  recall,  this  interview  lasted  about  half  an  hour.  Very  early 
in  his  interview  I  realized  Colonel  Van  Vliet  must  be  given  an  oppor- 
tunity to  put  his  report  in  writing  in  a  way  that  would  be  easiest  for 
him  and  that  he  should  be  afforded  an  opportunity  to  make  such  cor- 
rections, additions,  or  deletions  as  he  considered  essential  for  com- 
plete accuracy.     I  so  informed  him  near  the  end  of  our  first  conference. 

With  Colonel  Van  Vliet's  complete  agreement,  I  arranged  at  once 
for  a  Mi-s.  Mildred  Meeres,  a  competent,  experienced  and  trustworthy 
secretary,  to  take  his  dictation  and  type  his  report.  I  also  arranged 
for  a  private  security  room  where  they  could  work  undisturbed,  to 
be  at  Colonel  Van  Vliet's  disposal.  Either  with  Colonel  Van  Vliet 
present  oi'  i)iomptly  after  my  first  conference  with  Colonel  Van  Vliet, 
I  insured  that  ^Irs.  Meeres  knew  the  security  classification  of  her 
work,  would  be  available  exclusively  to  Colonel  Van  Vliet,  and  would 
receive  no  instructions  from  anyone  that  would  conflict  with  these 
arrangements. 

Thereaftel^  the  preparation  of  the  report  was  handled  entirely  by 
Colonel  Van  Vliet  without  suggestion  or  influence  by  me  or  by  anyone 
else. 

I  then  have  a  reference  here  in  my  notes  which  I  think  will  not  fit 
here.     I  talked  to  someone  in  State  at  that  point. 

Do  you  want  it  as  it  came  ? 

Mr.  Maciirowicz.  Do  you  mean  you  talked  to  someone  in  the  State 
Department  ? 


1848  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

General  Bissell.  Yes.  On  May  23  I  talked  to  Mr.  Fred  Lyon, 
of  the  State  Department,  about  another  matter  in  the  State  Depart- 
ment's interest.  G-2  works  in  very  close  cooperation  with  the  State 
Deparment  on  all  matters  of  joint  interest. 

General  Holmes  and  Mr.  Lyon  were  my  closest  State  Department 
contact  at  this  particular  time.  I  am  not  positive,  but  it  is  my 
impression  that  on  May  23,  1945,  I  told  Mr.  Lyon  of  Colonel  Van 
Vliet's  arrival,  that  the  Colonel  Van  Vliet  report  was  being  pre- 
pared, and  that  I  requested  Mr.  Lyon  to  inform  General  Holmes, 
and  assured  General  Holmes  he  would  receive  the  report  promptly. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Pardon  me,  but  could  you  tell  the  committee  who 
General  Holmes  was,  what  his  position  was  'i 

General  Bissicll.  General  Holmes,  you  will  have  him  identified 
very  accurately  on  the  letter  that  I  wrote  him,  which  describes  his 
position  by  its  exact  name.  But  he  went  over  there  to  head  the 
Intelligence  of  the  State  Department,  and  then  they  gave  him  other 
jobs,  and  he  became  an  Assistant  Secretary.  I  think  he  probably 
was  one  at  that  moment,  but  I  am  not  sure  just  when  his  appointment 
came  through. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  What  is  his  first  name  ? 

General  Bissfxl.  Julius. 

He  had  been  a  general  with  General  Eisenhower.  "\^Tien  I  went  over 
to  England,  I  met  him  there. 

I  may  have  passed  the  information  direct  to  General  Holmes  on 
the  24th  of  May  1945,  when  I  had  one  or  two  conversations  with 
General  Holmes.  But  7  years  have  passed  since  the  occurrence  of 
these  events,  and  I  cannot  say  with  certainty  which  procedure  I  used 
to  inform  General  Holmes.  I  feel  certain  I  took  the  steps  to  inform 
him. 

I  understand  General  Holmes  has  denied  any  recollection  of  the 
Van  Vliet  report.  It  would  be  quite  understandable.  The  volume 
and  pressure  of  work  in  General  Holmes'  State  Department  office  had 
greatly  increased  by  the  ending  of  the  German  war  a  very  short  time 
before  that  and  no  man  in  his  position  could  be  expected  to  remember 
everything  that  passed  through  his  office.  It  is  possible  that  the 
matter  slip])ed  Mr.  Lyon's  mind  and  that  General  Holmes  was  not 
informed.     Mr.  Lyon  was  also  yjushed  to  the  limit  in  those  days. 

I  have  known  both  General  Holmes  and  Mr.  Lyon  over  a  period  of 
years  and  am  confident  they  are  both  loyal,  honest,  and  able  Americans. 
In  my  opinion,  any  implication  that  either  of  them  would  knowingly 
take  any  action  inimical  to  the  United  States  interests  to  assist  com- 
munism or  Russia  is  absurd. 

The  Alger  Hiss-Chambers  incident  makes  it  appear  Ihat  classified 
papers  considered  of  interest  to  (he  Conuuunists  could  and  did  leave 
the  State  Department  without  authority,  record,  or  knowledge  of 
res])onsible  State  Department  authoritu^s.  Disappearance  of  the 
Colonel  Van  Vliet  report  would  have  been  of  interest  to.the  Russians 
Avhether  or  not  thev  were  responsible  for  the  K-.ityn  killings.  As  far 
as  I  know,  the  State  Department  has  made  no  statement  that  Colonel 
Van  Vliet's  report  was  ever  received,  but  only  that  G-2  had  no  receipt 
from  the  Stale  Department  for  it. 

I  am  not  fully  informed  ou  State  Dei)artment  actions  in  this  respect 
because  there  is  lots  going  on  that  I  don't  know  anvthino-  about. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1849 

When  Colonel  Van  Vliet's  report  was  completed,  he  a<»;ain  came  to 
my  office.  He  assured  me  that  he  had  read  over  his  report  carefully 
and  that  he  was  satisfied  that  it  represented,  to  the  best  of  his  recol- 
lection, what  he  knew  of  the  Katyn  matter  and  his  connection  witli  it. 
With  Colonel  Van  Vliet  seated  in  a  comfortable  chair  in  my  office, 
I  read  Colonel  Van  Vliet's  completed  report.  It  was  a  good  report, 
which  I  thought  presented  the  picture  more  clearly  than  his  previous 
oral  report.  Colonel  Van  Vliet's  typed  report  did  not  differ  in  any 
fundamental,  however,  from  the  previous  story  told  to  me. 

I  directed  the  report  be  classified  top  secret.  Colonel  Van  Vliet 
signed  it,  and  it  was  authenticated  by  him  so  that  no  substitution  of 
pages  would  be  possible. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  By  "authenticate,"  do  you  mean  he  initialed  it? 

General  Bissei.l.  Initialed  every  page  with  his  own  initials.  There 
is  nothing  unusual  about  that.  That  is  prescribed  in  the  regidations 
some  place.     It  is  routine. 

But  he  hadn't  done  it,  and  I  understood  why  he  was  a  prisoner  of 
war.  He  wasn't  very  fresh  on  his  regulations,  and  I  saw  to  it  that  he 
went  through  that  procedure.     I  remember  him  initialing  the  pages. 

The  classification  "top  secret"  had  been  authorized  by  the  United 
States  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  in  February  11)44  for  use  in  the  United 
States  Armed  Forces.  It  became  effective  March  15,  1944,  while  I 
was  in  G-2. 

Mr.  MrrcHELL.  Do  you  have  a  definition  of  that  phrase,  "top 
secret" ? 

General  Bissell.  Yes.     It  is  in  the  Army  regulations. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Is  it  the  same  one  in  existence  today  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  will  show  you  a  copy  of  the  one  in  effect,  then,  if 
I  may,  if  you  will  just  make  a  note  and  have  me  come  back  to  it. 

Mr.  IVIiTCHELL.  Surely. 

General  Bissell.  It  was  more  than  a  year  after  Colonel  Van  Vliet 
was  captured  by  the  Germans  in  Tunisia,  in  February  1943,  before  the 
United  States  Armed  Forces  used  the  top  secret  classification  for 
American  military  material  or  documents. 

After  his  liberation  from  POW  camp.  Colonel  Van  Vliet  had  been 
returned  to  the  United  States  with  dispatch.  I  was  not  certain  he 
understood  the  top  secret  classification  in  its  accepted  sense  in  our 
service,  due  to  lack  of  opportunity  for  much,  if  any,  experience  in  its 
use.  As  he  had  been  cut  off  from  much  information  for  2  years  in  a 
prisoner-of-war  camp,  I  could  not  expect  him  to  know  the  possible 
political  significance  of  his  report,  even  though  he  recognizee!  it  had 
political  implications  and  was  of  State  Department  as  well  as  War 
Department  interest. 

It  is  my  recollection  that  at  our  first  contact,  Colonel  Van  Vliet 
asked  me  what  he  should  do  if  questioned  about  Katyn,  and  I  told 
him  to  say  nothing,  that  I  considered  the  matter  very  important  and 
top  secret. 

I  cannot  recall  exactly  when  or  to  whom  I  dictated  my  memorandum 
to  Colonel  Van  Vliet.  I  have  heard  the  testimony  of  INIrs.  Meeres.  I 
wish  the  committee  would  see  if  your  copy  has  on  it  a  number  920.  If 
so,  it  was  done  in  her  section ;  if  not,  I  would  be  interested  to  know. 
You  will  find  that  papers  done  by  her  bear  the  number  920. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  It  is  907. 


1853  THE    KATYN    FOREST    RL\SSACRE 

General  Bissell.  Someone  else  wrote  it,  or  someone  else  (•0})ie(l  it,, 
or  somethin«T. 

JVIr.  Mitchell.  It  is  an  exhibit  on  pn^e  51  of  tlie  i)art  2  hearings. 

General  Bissell.  Her  work  was  020,  if  my  memory  serves  me  cor- 
rectly. I  am  sure  she  is  mixing  something  up,  and  I  wnll  be  glad  to 
answer  your  questions  on  that,  if  you  want  it,  and  I  am  sure  it  was 
inadvertent  on  her  part. 

I  cannot  now  recall  exactly  when  or  to  whom  I  dictated  my  memo- 
randum to  Colonel  Van  Vliet.  It  was  not  dictated  before  our  first 
conference.  It  was  probably  dictated  after  our  conference  as  it  bears 
the  date  of  May  22,  1945.  It  could  have  been  ty])ed  on  the  28d  and 
still  bear  the  date  of  May  22,  1945,  as  it  was  to  confirm  verbal  orders  of 
that  date  and  to  be  binding  therefrom. 

I  believe  either  that  I  dictated  this  memo  in  Colonel  Van  Vliet's 
presence  or  asked  if  he  suggested  any  changes  before  he  signed  it, 
because  my  recollection  is  clear  that  Colonel  Van  Vliet  was  entirely 
satisfied  and  happy  about  the  memorandum. 

For  the  various  reasons  I  have  stated,  it  appeared  to  me  proper, 
prudent,  and  expedient  to  furnish  Colonel  Van  Vliet  with  the  brief 
memorandum  i-eferring  to  his  report  in  language  that  would  be  clear 
and  specific  to  him  but  meaningless  to  anyone  into  whose  hands  it 
might  fall  inadvertenth'.  The  memo  sets  forth  the  restrictions  im- 
posed on  Colonel  Van  Vliet  for  the  security  of  the  information  con- 
tained in  his  report.  It  also  stated  clearly  the  procedure  to  be  fol- 
lowed subsequently  should  he  desire  to  have  the  restriction  removed. 
The  reason  for  imposing  the  restriction  was  included. 

After  reading  the  memorandum  and  indicating  he  understood  it,  he- 
signed  the  memorandum  to  make  his  understanding  a  matter  of  record. 
He  has  complied  with  the  letter  and  spirit  of  his  instructions. 

Also,  I  may  ])ossibly  have  been  infiiienced  to  be  particularly  careful 
with  the  security  of  the  Colonel  Van  Vliet  report  by  the  fact  that  at 
that  time  I  was  pre])aring  for  testimony  before  the  House  Military 
Affairs  Conunittee  investigating  subversive  activities  within  the  Arnnv 
before  Avhich  1  a})peai-ed  on  the  moi'ning  of  ^lay  24,  1945.  Also,  at 
that  time,  United  States  security  agencies  were  threatened  with  Bi 
security  leak  on  anotlier  unrelated  matter  which  was  important.  I 
do  not  know  how  many  copies,  if  any,  other  than  the  original,  were 
made  of  the  Colonel  Van  Vliet  report.  Mrs.  Meeres,  who  typed  the- 
report,  informed  me  in  1950  she  did  not  know^  positively,  but  she 
believed  she  had  made  only  an  original.  I  hope  that  you  will 
secure — well,  you  have  done  it — her  first-hand  statement. 

I  didn't  know  whether  you  would  have  her  come.  If  you  hadn't,. 
I  would  Avant  you  to. 

She  gave  her  reasons  for  believing  she  made  oidy  an  original.  Since- 
you  didn't  ask  her  why,  I  will  tell  you  what  reasons  she  gave  me.. 
She  said  if  she  had  made  copies  she  would  have  remembered  putting 
carbons  in  the  envelo])e  for  destruction,  because  carbons  for  top- 
secret  things  had  to  be  desti'oyed  as  well  as  stenographer's  notes,  and 
she  said  she  had  no  such  recollection. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  say  that  was  in  1950.  On  what  occasion  was- 
it  that  you  were  talking  about  that?  You  were  retired  then,  were 
you  not^ 

(ieneral  liissELL.  I  had  not  tlicn  vet  retired.  I  was  assisting 
Mr.  Shackelfoi-d. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1851 

I  can  give  that  to  you  in  detail,  if  you  like.  I  have  notes  on  that, 
on  whom  I  contacted  and  why  1  saw  Mrs.  Meeres  and  what  I  said 
and  more  of  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  We  can  come  back  to  that  later,  unless  the  com- 
mittee decides  otherwise. 

(Tcneral  Bisseli..  All  right ;  any  time  you  want  to  break  in,  go  ahead. 
She  gave  me  her  reasons  for  believing  why  she  made  only  an 
original.    And  there  were  several  other  reasons.    She  said  she  didn't 
remember  that  her  hands  got  dirty  on  the  job,  and  they  would  have 
if  she  had  been  handling  carbons.    That  was  one  of  the  reasons  the 
original  came  out  so  clean,  that  she  never  corrected  any  carbons,  and 
some  very  minor  corrections  were  made  by  Colonel  Van  Vliet  on  the 
report — made,  as  I  recall,  in  ink  and  initialed.     Those,  of  course, 
would  have  to  be  made  on  the  carbons  had  there  been  any. 
Mr.  FuRCOLO.  When  did  she  tell  you  these  things? 
General  Bissell.    She  told  me  those  in  1950  when  I  was  assisting 
Mr.  Shackelford,  trying  to  help  him  get  in  touch  with  everybody  who 
might  know  anything  about  the  Van  Vliet  re])ort. 

And  those  were  repeated  in  his  office,  as  I  recall.  They  were  told 
to  me  upstairs  when  I  contacted  her.  I  saw  her  in  the  section  she  was 
then  working  and  then  recommended  to  Mr.  Shackelford  that  she 
appear  at  his  office,  whicli  she  did.  I  sat  in  when  he  questioned  her. 
Chairman  Maddex.  We  can  come  back  to  that  later,  if  you  will 
complete  your  statement. 
General  Bissell.   Right,  sir. 

Normally  at  least  one  copy,  plus  the  original,  would  have  been 
made  of  a  report.  There  were  good  reasons  why,  in  this  case,  this 
might  not  have  been  done. 

My  recollection  is  that  Colonel  Van  Vliet's  report  was  dated  May  24, 
1945,  and  that  it  was  on  May  23  or  24,  1945,  when  he  submitted  it  and 
when  I  last  saw  hiuL  1  know  I  saw  Mrs.  Meeres  about  the  report 
and  a  directly  related  matter  on  the  afternoon  of  May  24,  1945.  My 
recollection  is  that  Mrs.  Meeres  was  in  my  office  for  part  of  the  time 
Colonel  Van  Vliet  was  w^ith  me  for  our  second  conference. 

i\ly  normal  procedure  would  have  been  to  afford  an  opportunity 
for  Colonel  Van  Vliet  to  speak  to  me  alone  if  he  wished  and  subse- 
quently have  a  secretary  present  for  the  period  slie  might  be  needed. 
Then  I  have  a  paragraph :  Capt.  Donald  B.  Stewart,  a  Regular 
Army  Artillery  officer,  did  not  report  to  me  in  person  or  make  any 
report  to  me  on  his  ]^artici]:)ation  in  the  ])risoner-of-war  visit  to  Katvn 
with  Colonel  Van  Vliet.  I  did  not  direct  Captain  Stewart  to  make 
a  written  report.  Colonel  Van  Vliet's  reiiort  covered  the  part  taken 
by  Captain  Stewart  because  Colonel  Van  Vliet  stated  Captain  Stewart 
was  in  complete  agreement  wnth  Colonel  Van  Vliet's  statements  and 
conclusion,  because  Colonel  Van  Vliet  stated  that  he  and  Captain 
Stewart  had  talked  about  Katyn  and  Captain  Stewart  ])ossessed  no 
information  mdmown  to  Colonel  Van  Vliet,  and  because  if  the  State 
Department  or  any  other  United  States  Government  agency  wanted 
a  statement  from  or  a  conference  with  Captain  Stewart,  the  War 
Department  could  make  him  available. 

I  had  com])lete  confidence  in  Colonel  Van  Vliet's  integrity  and  hon- 
esty. Had  Captain  Stew^art  reported  to  me  in  Washington,  as  I 
expected  he  would  do,  I  would  have  had  him  prepare  a  written  report. 


1852  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

One  best  learns  from  experience.  I  now  believe  it  wo;  d  have  been 
preferable  had  I  directed  Captain  Stewart  to  report  t.  le  in  Wash- 
ino;ton  upon  his  return  to  the  United  States  from  "World  War  II. 

I  do  not  remember  positively  many  details  of  the  Colonel  Van  Vliet 
report.  I  do  not  recall  whether  it  was  on  long  or  short  sheets,  single- 
or  double-spaced,  how  many  pages  it  contained;  whether  or  not  there 
were  carbon  copies,  whether  Colonel  Van  Vliet  or  Mrs.  ]Meeres  per- 
sonally carried  the  report  into  my  office,  or  specifically  in  whose  hands 
the  report  was  after  Colonel  Van  Vliet  signed  it.  Neither  does  he  or 
Mrs.  Meeres.  All  of  us  at  that  time  were  primarily  interested  in  its 
contents  and  security  rather  than  in  its  format  or  in  its  physical  ctetails. 
I  can  assure  you  its  importance  was  fully  recognized  by  me,  and  my 
intent  was  its  prompt  transmittal  through  a  secure  channel  either  to 
the  activity  handling  war  crimes  data,  or  to  the  State  Department. 

G-2  liacl  been  sending  anything  received  in  connection  with  war 
crimes  or  atrocities  to  the  agency  holding  it  for  the  War  Crimes  Com- 
mission. I  do  not  rememl)er  definitely  to  which  agency  we  sent  such 
material  for  them.  I  know  we  had  some  definite  verbal  instructions 
from  my  predecessor.  General  Strong,  which  we  carried  out  implicitly. 

I  have  a  distinct  recollection  of  having  seen  previously  the  photo- 
gra])hs  which  are  exhibits  3  to  7,  both  inclusive,  of  Colonel  Stewart's 
testimony;  but  if  such  photographs  were  attached  to  the  Colonel  Van 
Vliet  report,  the  Captain  Gilder  report,  or  other  reports  of  Katyn  I 
handled,  I  do  not  remember. 

Chairman  Madden.  You  speak  of  Colonel  Stewart's  testimony. 
What  do  you  mean  by  that  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  read  what  is  in  the  book  when  he  talked  to  you, 
and  he  gave  you  the  pictures  and  I  had  a  chance  to  see  what  the  pictures 
were. 

Chairman  Madden.  Proceed. 

General  Bissell.  I  believe  I  had  previously  seen  the  photographs 
also  that  are  exhibits  1  and  2,  both  inclusive,  of  Captain  Stewart's 
testimony,  but  I  do  not  have  as  distinct  a  recollection  of  those. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  May  I  interrupt  a  minute? 

Mr.  Chairman,  those  exhibits  are  in  part  1.  The  hearing  was  held 
October  11,  1951. 

Mr.  Sheeiian.  Counsel,  the  general  mentioned  the  Captain  Gilder 
report.    What  was  that^ 

General  Bissell.  I  ^;.\.ii^  come  to  it,  if  you  want  me  to,  and  other 
reports  I  mentioned,  if  you  would  like  to,  on  Katyn. 

I  cannot  be  positive  what  happened  to  the  Colonel  Van  Vliet  report, 
but  it  is  my  recollection,  confirmed  by  some  available  documentary 
material,  which  I  believe  has  been  made  available  to  this  committee, 
that  the  letter  of  transmittal  for  the  Colonel  Van  Vliet  report  was 
dated  May  25,  1945,  and  that  it,  the  Colonel  Van  Vliet  report,  and 
the  related  matter  were  transmitted  to  the  State  Department  repre- 
sentative. Brig.  Gen.  Julius  C.  Holmes,  on  May  25,  1945. 

The  available  documentary  material  confirming  transmission  of  the 
first  Colonel  Van  Vliet  re])oi't — [addressing  Mr.  Shackelford]  and  I 
say  first  as  coiuiterdistinguislied  from  tlie  one  that  was  secured  by  your 
auspices — the  one  that  I  i-emeniber  as  the  Hrst  one 

Mr.  Maciiuowicz.   Pardon  me,  })ut  might  I  just  interrupt. 

You  referred  now  to  a  letter  of  transmittal  from  your  department 
to  the  Department  of  State,  which  you  say  also  disappeared.     If  I 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1853 

remember  yd '^^  statement  a  few  moments  before  that,  you,  I  believe, 
said  that  yotvi  tvere  not  sure  whether  you  transmitted  it  orally  or  by 
letter. 

General  Bissell.  No.  I  said  I  didn't  know  where  it  had  gone.  In 
other  words,  State  says  they  didn't  receive  it.  I  can't  say  they  did 
receive  it. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  think  if  you  will  refer  to  the  notes  from  which 
you  read,  you  previously  said  you  are  not  sure  whether  you  referred 
to  it  orally  or  by  transmittal ;  is  that  right? 

General  Bissell.  Of  course;  it  is  in  the  record.  I  would  like  to 
give  it  to  you  again. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  General,  I  have  just  one  question. 

In  your  experience  in  that  particular  position,  do  you  know  of  any 
reports  besides  this  one  disappearing? 

General  Bissell.  I  don't  know  that  this  one  disappeared,  frankly; 
but,  specifically,  what  you  are  after  is  another  case. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  I  use  that  term  advisedly. 

General  Bissell.  No ;  I  don't  believe  I  do. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  As  far  as  you  know,  to  your  knowledge,  in  your 
experience  in  that  department,  this  is  the  only  report  that  you  know 
of  that  cannot  be  located  ? 

General  Bissell.  No.  That  is  not  so.  There  are  thousands  of  them 
that  can't  be  located,  that  have  been  destroyed ;  thousands  of  them. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  But  there  is  a  record  of  them  that  they  have  been 
destroyed. 

General  Bissell.  Sometimes  there  will  be  and  sometimes  there  will 
not. 

And  I  have  that  covered  in  my  notes  here  some  place  and  the  reason 
for  it.     There  was  good  reason  for  it. 

Chairman  Madden.  I  think  we  will  make  better  progress  if  you 
complete  your  statement  and  then  the  members  of  the  committee  can 
cross-examine. 

General  Bissell.  As  you  wish  il,  sir. 

The  available  documentary  confirming  transmittal  of  the  first  Colo- 
nel Van  Vliet  report  is  my  secret  letter  dated  August  21,  1945,  to 
Frederick  Lyon,  Acting  Director,  Office  of  Controls,  room  115,  Depart- 
ment of  State,  Washington,  D.  C,  which  reads : 

Dear  Mb.  Lyon  :  Transmitted  for  the  informatio.^  "^e  of  the  State  Department 
is  a  report  on  Katyn  by  Stanley  S.  ,B.  Gilder,  captain,  EAMC  (Medical  Corps), 
British  officer.  This  report  supplements  the  statement  of  Lt.  Col.  John  H.  Van 
Vliet,  Jr.,  forwarded  to  General  Holmes  25  May  1945,  and  generally  substantiates 
all  material  facts  in  Lieutenant  Colonel  Van  Vliet's  report. 
Sincerely, 

Clayton  Bissell, 
Major  General,  G-2, 
Assistant  Chief  of  Staff. 

The  identifying  reference  on  this  letter  is  700,00061WBA.CSLE. 
This  is  a  decimal  identification  and  a  decimal  file  date. 

The  letter  also  carried  the  identification  MIL920,  which  w^as  a 
G-2  identification.  The  G-2  identification  was  for  the  section  in 
which  Mrs.  Meeres  worked. 

This  communication  shows,  by  State  Department  stamps,  that  it 
was  in  their  Office  of  Controls  August  23,  1945,  in  their  Division  of 
Foreign  Activities  Correlation  on  the  same  date,  in  their  Special  War 

93744— 52— pt.  7 ^3 


1854  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

Problems  Division  on  October  2,  1945,  and  in  the  Office  of  European 
Affairs  on  October  5,  1945. 

Other  entries  on  the  letter  indicate  that  it  was  probably  seen  or 
processed  by  the  individuals  or  activities  in  the  State  Department 
identified  thereon  as  F131.ETB.WHM.AVMF.SWP.CE.EE,  and  that 
the  letter  was  received  in  State  Department  confidential  file  October 
16,  1945,  after  only  5  days  less  than  2  months  of  processing  in  the 
State  Department. 

During  this  entire  period,  I  continued  as  G-2.  Had  the  Colonel 
Van  Vliet  report  not  been  available  in  the  State  Department,  I  woidd 
have  received  a  letter  or  a  telephone  call  asking  for  it.  because,  ob- 
viously, it  would  have  been  impossible  to  compare  the  Gilder  report 
with  the  Van  Vliet  report  had  knowledge  of  the  Colonel  Van  Vliet 
report  not  been  available  in  the  State  Department. 

The  Captain  Gilder  secret  report  referred  to  in  my  August  21,  1945, 
letter,  and  its  enclosure  was  a  British  War  Office  document  identified 
by  the  reference  MI-9/BM/973.  MI-9  means  British  Military  Intelli- 
gence Office,  section  9,  and  the  BM/9T3  was  a  reference  for  Britl^h 
itlentification  and  file  location. 

The  Captain  Gilder  report  was  a  history  of  a  visit  made  to  Katyn 
in  1943,  consisting  of  three  standard-sized  typed  pages,  written  very 
full,  and  divided  into  only  two  paragraphs.  It  is  my  understanding 
that  the  Captain  Gilder  report  has  been  made  available  to  the  com- 
mittee.   If  not,  it  should  be  in  State  Department  files. 

There  is  also  a  notation  placed  in  the  letter  by  the  State  Depart- 
ment. It  is  711.62114-A,  just  written  on  it.  This  was  the  decimal 
file  reference  number  to  the  matter  related  to  Colonel  Van  Vliet's 
report,  to  which  I  previously  referred  and  will  refer  again.  This 
shows  that  State  had  gone  into  the  Katyn  report  carefully  and  thor- 
oughly enough  to  locate  the  related  matter  also.    It  was  tied  together. 

It  has  been  possible  for  me  to  be  so  specific  on  details  about  the 
August  21,  1945,  letter  because  in  the  fall  of  1950,  Mr.  Shackelford, 
then  and  now  Department  Counselor,  Department  of  the  Army,  was 
conducting  an  investigation  into  the  Katyn  affair,  showed  me  my  letter 
which  he  had  secured  from  the  State  Department  files. 

He  (juestioned  me  about  it  and  authorized  me  to  make  a  longhand 
copy  of  the  letter  to  facilitate  the  location  of  the  file  copy  which  should 
have  been  back  in  the  G-2  files. 

Chairman  Maddp:n.  Pardon  me.  Your  letter  that  you  referred  to 
was  the  letter  that  accompanied  tlie  Gilder  report,  was  it  ( 

General  Bissfxl.  The  one  that  carried  the  Ciilder  report,  referring 
to  the  Van  Vliet  report,  and  asked  them  to  compare  the  two  and 
telling  them  there  was  no  fundamental  dill'erence. 

I  was  able  to  locate  the  file  copy  of  my  letter  on  the  Gilder  report — 
it  was  an  identical  carbon  copy — that  is,  it  was  in  the  G-2  files — 
of  the  text,  but,  of  course,  it  did  not  show  the  State  Department 
processing,  because  it  had  never  been  away  from  G-2. 

Mr.  MrrcnKLL.  When  did  you  locale' that  ^     This  is  1950,  is  it  ^ 

Geneial  liissKU..  1950,  yes.  1  went  down,  and  Mr.  Shackelford  had 
the  originnl  letter,  the  one  that  I  sent  to  State. 

ISIr.  MrrciiKLL.  He  got  it  from  Stated 

General  Bisseij..  He  got  it  from  State. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  say  now  that  you  found  the  identical  copy 
of  it? 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1855 

General  Bisseix,.  Yes. 

Mr,  Mitchell.  This  was  September,  1950? 

General  Bissell.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Where  did  you  find  it  ? 

General  Bissell.  In  G-2. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Where  in  G-2  ?  Maybe  we  can  find  the  Van  Vliet 
report  there  yet. 

General  Bissell.  I  hope  so,  but  I  don't  think  you  will,  because  I 
tliink  we  have  tried  every  way  we  could  to  locate  it. 

A  young  man  who  was  a  captain  was  acting  as  a  sort  of  liaison 
officer  between  you  (addressing  Mr.  Shackelford)  and  G-2  at  that 
time.  I  gave  it  to  him  and  then  he  said  it  had  not  enough  importance. 
The  war  was  going  on  in  Korea  at  that  time,  I  went  to  General  Weck- 
erling  at  that  time,  who  had  been  my  deputy  in  G-2,  during  the  war 
and  asked  him  to  put  some  pressure  on  it.  General  Boiling  came  in 
while  we  were  talking  and  I  asked  him  to  put  some  pressure  on  it. 
It  came  up. 

When  it  came  up,  it  carried  the  following  file  information,  that 
had  not  been  on  the  original  Jetter  to  the  State  Department.  It  read : 
"AC  of  S,  G-2/72577,  General  Bissell.  MM.  CPM." 

The  72577  was  a  reference  number.  The  rest  meant  that  the  letter 
originated  in  my  office,  that  I  dictated  it  personally  to  MM,  who  was 
Mrs.  Meeres.  The  (CPM.)  meant  the  "Captured  Personnel  and  Ma- 
terial Section"  to  which  she  belonged. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  Avas  the  date  on  tliat  ? 

General  Bissell.  21  August,  1945. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Thank  you. 

General  Bissell.  It  also  contained  an  entry  "Courier  Service, 
senders  Number  C-601,  date  22  xiugust,  1945".  This  meant  the  letter 
was  hand-carried  to  the  State  Department. 

There  is  also  a  self-explanatory  note  on  the  file  copy,  which  reads, 
"Received  back  in  MIS  Administrative  Records,  August  24,  1945". 

The  significance  of  that  is  to  keep  people  informed  when  the  file 
copy  was  sent  to  somebody  sometime,  and  then  they  got  it  back  and 
made  the  record. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Was  there  any  acknowledgement  of  receipt  by  the 
Department  of  State  ? 

General  Bissell.  That  particular  copy  we  are  talking  about,  this 
file  copy,  never  got  out  of  G-2,  so  there  would  be  no  receipt  any  place. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Was  there  any  indication  in  the  Gilder  report 
that  the  letter  of  transmittal  was  received? 

General  Bissell.  It  wouldn't  be  on  the  letter.  All  that  was  on  the 
file  copy  in  G-2  was  an  indication  how  it  had  been  sent. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Have  you  found  any  acknowledgment  of  re- 
ceipt by  the  Department  of  State  of  the  Gilder  Report  ?  I  am  talking 
about  the  Gilder  Report. 

General  Bissell.  I  didn't  look  for  a  copy  of  a  receipt  from  State 
of  the  Gilder  Report. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Why  not  ? 

General  Bissell.  Because  they  answered  to  that. 

Mr.  Sheehax.  But  you  did  see  the  letter  from  the  State  Depart- 
ment ? 

General  Bissell.  I  saw  the  letter  I  sent  to  State,  my  own  personally 
signed  letter,  which  Mr.  Shackelford  had  gotten  from  them.     That 


1856  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

was  a  clue  how  we  might  have  gotten  some  more  Katyn  data,  maybe 
put  in  our  files.  For  one  thing,  that  would  be  the  right  place.  So  I 
took  a  copy  in  longhand  and  checked  the  files  on  it  through  G-2. 
I  didn't  do  it  physically.  Up  came  the  copy,  and  it  showed  you  how 
the  letter  was  sent  off. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  What  do  you  mean,  it  was  the  right  place?  You 
know  we  had  to  go  to  the  warehouse  in  Alexandria  to  find  the  right 
place  on  the  Szymanski  report. 

General  Bissell.  Yes ;  I  imagine  you  would  have  to  go  a  lot  farther, 
to  Kansas  City  and  other  places,  to  find  a  lot  of  stuff  that  happened 
in  the  war.  The  paper  work  got  too  big  and  they  needed  the  offices 
for  something  else.    They  had  either  to  destroy  it  or  send  it  away. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  On  important  documents? 

General  Bissell.  What  becomes  important  is  a  matter  of  history 
and  development.  No  one  suspected  that  this  one  would  be  of  any- 
thing like  international  significance. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  say  you  recognized  the  importance  of 
the  document? 

General  Bissell.  Yes;  I  did,  you  bet — but  not  the  kind  of  signifi- 
cance it  has  in  today's  world,  because  nobody  could  have  foreseen  the 
situation  that  we  have  today.    I  did  recognize  it. 

I  have  told  you  what  the  mention  of  the  entries  on  the  paper  meant, 
and  what  was  on  it.  I  now  refer  to  the  related  matter  previously  men- 
tioned, which  was  dated  and  directed  to  the  State  Department  May 
25,  1945,  the  same  date.  I  believe  as  Colonel  Van  Vliet's  report.  It 
is  my  letter  to  Brig.  Gen.  Julius  C  Holmes,  Assistant  Secretary, 
Department  of  State,  and  reads : 

Dear  General  Holmes  :  A  Lt.  Col.  John  H.  Van  Vliet,  Jr.,  Infantry,  and  a 
Captain  Stewart,  while  prisoners  of  war  at  Oflat  No.  684,  are  reported  to  have 
been  given  a  letter  by  the  Swiss  Protecting  PovA^er,  dated  about  October  1943, 
which  asked  them  to  reply  to  certain  questions.    These  questions  were : 

1.  Had  Captain  Stewart  and  Lieutenant  Colonel  Van  Vliet  gone  to  Katyn? 

2.  How  had  they  been  treated? 

3.  Were  any  photographs  taken? 

4.  Had  they  made  a  statement? 

Colonel  Van  Vliet  believes  that  a  copy  of  this  letter,  together  with  his  reply. 
are  in  State  Department  files.     It  is  requested  that  this  be  verified,  and  if  the 
records  referred  to  are  in  the  files  of  the  State  Department,  that  copies  be  made 
available  for  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2. 
Sincerely, 

Clayton  Bissell, 
Major  General  GSC, 
Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2. 

Mr,  Machrowicz.  Can  we  get  the  date  of  that  letter? 

General  Bissell.  The  date  of  that  letter  was  May  25. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  1945  ? 

General  Bissell.  Yes. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  May  I  interrupt  just  a  minute  to  ask  a  question,  Mr. 
Chairman  ? 

Chairman  Madden.  Yes. 

Mr.  FuRCoLo.  On  page  67  of  the  hearings,  at  the  bottom  of  the 
page,  it  refers  that  the  only  letter  sent  on  May  25,  1945,  from  General 
Bissell  to  General  Holmes",  was  on  another  ])hase  of  this  subject,  and 
it  contains  no  reference  to  transmitting  the  Van  Vliet  memorandum. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  in  part  II. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE  1857 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  Now,  is  it  your  testimony  that  you  did  transmit  the 
Van  Vliet  memorandum  in  that  ? 

General  Bissell.  No.  I  say  that  this  letter  tends  to  indicate  that 
I  did  one  of  the  two  things  I  intended  to  do  with  it.  Now,  I  didn't 
personally  ever  take  any — well,  yes,  sometimes  I  did  take  papers  and 
deliver  them  myself.  But  all  I  did  in  my  position  there  was  to  make 
decisions,  establish  policies,  and  had  procedures  set  up  so  that  I  didn't 
do  the  things  myself.     Other  people  did  them. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  Wliat  I  am  anxious  to  find  out  if  I  can  is :  From  the 
letter  that  you  have  read,  and  having  in  mind  this  comment  that  was 
made  on  the  bottom  of  page  67,  would  you  be  willing  to  say  that  you 
did  not  transmit  the  Van  Vliet  memgrandum  in  that  letter  ? 

General  Bissell.  Well,  nomenclature  is  causing  a  lot  of  trouble.  I 
think  we  better  get  straight. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  All  right. 

General  Bissell.  The  thing  that  has  caused  most  of  the  trouble  with 
most  of  the  people  that  have  talked  to  the  committee,  in  the  small 
amount  of  testimony  made  available  to  me  in  sections  1  and  2,  have 
not  known  that  there  were  two  Van  Vliet  reports  written  at  the  same 
time  of  the  first  visit. 

The  result  is  they  are  going  in  big  circles.  Now,  one  of  them  will 
call  a  report  a  letter,  another  will  call  it  a  report. 

Mr.  FuRcoLo.  What  I  want  to  find  out  on  this  is :  Did  you  transmit 
any  enclosure  with  this  letter  of  May  25,  1945,  whether  it  is  called 
Report  No.  1  or  2,  or  something  else  ? 

General  Bissell.  This  letter  is  part  of  what  Colonel  Van  Vliet  said 
occurred,  but  I  don't  think  it  was  put  in  his  report  of  Katyn,  because 
it  wasn't  part  of  the  description  of  Katyn. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  Here  is  what  I  am  getting  at.  General — and  I  do  not 
mean  to  be  technical  about  it.  But  I  understand  that  you  sent  a  letter 
of  May  25,  1945.  Now,  was  anything  enclosed  in  that  letter?  I  am 
not  refering  to  the  words  and  body  of  that  letter  of  May  25,  but  did 
you  send  any  enclosure  of  any  kind  in  that  letter? 

General  Bissell.  I  don't  believe  so  because,  had  it  been  done,  there 
would  be  written  on  the  lower  left-hand  corner  what  the  enclosure  was. 
And  the  Van  Vliet  big  report  of  his  story  of  Katyn  wouldn't  be  at- 
tached to.  that  thing,  because  the  purpose  of  this  was  different,  which 
I  will  explain  as  I  go  along. 

Mr.  FuRCOLo.  That  is  the  point  I  was  getting  to.  In  your  letter 
transmitting  the  Captain  Gilder  report,  I  notice  as  you  read  it,  that 
at  the  bottom  you  mentioned  "one  enclosure." 

General  Bissell.  Which  was  the  Gilder  report. 

Mr.  FuRcoLo.  You  also  mentioned  it  in  the  letter. 

General  Bissell.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  FrRcoLO.  I  notice  in  the  letter  of  May  25, 1945,  there  apparently 
is  no  reference  made  to  an  enclosure,  and  also  no  reference  made  at 
the  bottom  of  the  letter  to  an  enclosure. 

General  Bissell.  There  shouldn't  have  been,  because  it  doesn't  men- 
tion an  enclosure  in  the  text. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  Your  testimony  now,  as  I  understand  it,  with  refer- 
ence to  this  letter  of  May  25,  1945,  from  you,  General  Bissell,  to 
General  Holmes  is,  to  the  best  of  your  knowledge,  that  there  was  no 
enclosure  of  any  kind  in  that  letter? 


1858  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

General  Bissell.  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  there  was  not.  You 
have  put  a  thought  in  my  mind  that  had  never  entered  it  before,  and 
that  is  whether  by  accident  or  mistake,  the  Van  Vliet  repoit  could 
have  been  put  there,  but  I  don't  think  it  is  possible. 

But  this  is  the  thing  some  i^eople  speak  of  as  the  Van  Vliet  report, 
in  good  faith,  and  think  they  are  talking  about  the  thing  that  you  have 
been  investigating. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  say  what  people  think — you  are  referring  here 
to  the  letter  concerning  the  Swiss  protecting  power,  are  you  not? 

General  Bissell.  Well,  that  is  the  deal,  yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  In  other  words,  I  never  knew,  to  my  personal  knowl- 
edge since  I  have  been  on  this  investigation,  that  there  were  two  re- 
ports by  Van  Vliet  concerning  Katyn.  I  would  not  phrase  it  that 
way.  I  would  say  there  was  a  report  specifically  concerning  Katyn, 
which  was  rendered  to  you  by  Colonel  Van  Vliet.  This  is  a  subse- 
quent request,  as  I  get  it,  which  may  have  occurred  at  the  same  time, 
which  concerned  a  request  by  the  Swiss  protecting  power,  which  he 
is  merely  reporting  for  your  record,  that  he  was  asked  these  questions, 
about  going  to  Katyn,  and  so  forth.  This  does  not  refer  in  any  way 
to  what  happened  at  Katyn  other  than  there  were  photographs  taken; 
is  that  correct  ? 

General  Bissell.  There  is  quite  a  lot  to  it  more  than  that.  I  would 
like  to  make  my  point  clear,  that  people  have  said  it.  Mrs.  Meeres, 
in  her  testimony  this  morning,  said,  "I  took  two  Van  Vliet  reports." 
Well,  this  is  the  other  one.    She  took  this  letter,  too. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  don't  recall  her  having  said  that — maj^be  she  did. 

General  Bissell.  It  is  in  there — I  think  it  is — that  is  the  way  I 
understood  it. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  For  the  benefit  of  us  members  here,  I  am  confused 
on  this  idea  of  the  two  Van  Vliet  reports.  I  wish  counsel  would  ques- 
tion him  on  it  and  get  it  straight. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  All  right. 

General,  there  was  a  report,  as  I  understand  it,  written  by  Colonel 
Van  Vliet,  at  your  request,  which  concerned  his  visit  to  Katyn  when 
he  was  accompanied  by  Captain  Stewart  and  several  other  Allied 
officers.    Is  that  correct? 

General  Bissell.  There  Avas  such  a  report,  and  this  is  also  the  same 
incident. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  But  there  was  such  a  report? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  w\as  specific  ? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  There  was  no  mention  in  that  rei')ort,  was  there,  of 
anything  received  from  the  Swiss  protecting  power  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  cannot  recall  Colonel  Van  Vliet's  original  report 
well  enough  to  tell  you  whether  this  was  also  mentioned  in  it,  or 
whether  we  handled  it  separately.  I  think  we  handled  it  separately, 
and  I  have  the  reasons  in  my  notes  here,  if  you  want  them. 

Mr.  MrrciiELL.  All  right,  we  have  it  fixed,  then,  Mr.  Sheehan,  that 
there  was  only  one  real  report  at  this  stage  of  the  investigation,  namely, 
the  Katyn  affair,  and  the  visit  by  Captain  Stewart  and  Colonel  Van 
Vliet.  What  he  did  at  Katyn  has  been  related  to  the  committee  by 
both  Captain  Stewart  and  Colonel  Van  Vliet,  and  it  has  always  been 


THE    KATYISr    FOREST    MASSACRE  1859 

my  impression  that  that  was  the  report  that  General  Bissell  ordered 
him  to  document  for  the  record,  as  a  top-secret  document. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  As  of  May  21  or  May  22,  1945? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Right. 

Now,  the  general  is  bringing  forth  another  item  which  specifically 
concerns  the  Department  of  State,  because  it  refers  to  the  Swiss  pro- 
tecting power,  which  was  then  the  power  in  control  of  the  German 
prison  camps  where  Captain  Stewart  and  Colonel  Van  Vliet  were, 
and  I  believe  that  a  subsequent  conversation — the  general  is  trying  to 
tell  the  committee  now  that  Colonel  Van  Vliet  reported  this  item  of 
being  called  in  by  the  Swiss  protecting  power.  And  we  have  never 
considered  that  as  being  a  report. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Did  the  Army  ever  release  that  rejiort  to  us?  It 
should  be  in  their  files. 

General  Bissell.  I  think  you  have  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  don't  believe  we  have  it. 

General  Bissell.  If  you  haven't,  I  can  tell  you  where  to  get  it. 

Mr.  Maciiroavicz.  Do  you  mean  tiie  Gilder  report? 

General  Bissell.  No  ;  this  is  not  the  Gilder  report  we  are  discussing 
now, 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Does  the  SavIss  report  have  anvthing  to  do  with 
Katyn  ? 

General  Bissell.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes,  sir. 

Could  we  have  for  the  record — will  the  general  report  for  the 
record  the  letter,  and  what  the  letter  specifically  refers  to?  I  am 
sure  it  will  clear  it  up  to  the  committee. 

When  Van  Vliet  and  Stewart  returned  from  Katyn,  about  4  or  5 
months  later,  the  Swiss  protecting  power  asked  them  for  some  data 
in  comiection  with  it. 

General  Bissell.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Flood.  Let  me  make  this  observation — this  is  all  veiy  interest- 
ing, the  Swiss  report  and  the  inquiries  the  Swiss  made  of  Van  Vliet 
and  Stewart,  but,  nevertheless,  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  thing 
Ave  all  know  we  are  talking  about.  There  may  be  something  here  we 
do  not  IniOAv  we  are  talking  about,  but  this  investigation  is  concerned 
Avith  the  Katyn  massacre.  The  one  thing  AA^e  do  knoAv  that  Ave  are 
talking  about  is  the  Van  Vliet  report. 

Now,  Ave  have  heard  Van  Vliet,  we  haA^e  heard  everybody  else  that 
Ave  know  about. 

At  this  point  I  want  to  read  into  the  record,  from  part  II  of  our  hear- 
ings, page  67,  this  statement : 

The  Department  of  State  has  no  record  of  haAang  received  the  memorandum 
of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Van  Vliet  on  May  25,  1945. 

I  Avant  to  insert  this  in  parentheses:  That  refers  to  the  Van  Vliet 
report  that  we  all  knoAv  we  are  talking  about. 

General  Bissell.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Flood.  And  the  Department  of  the  Army  has  so  far  found 
no  receipt  for  it  and  no  covering  letter  of  transmittal.  Noav,  that 
refers  to  the  Van  Vliet  report  that  we  all  knoAv  we  are  talking  about. 
The  only  letter  sent  on  May  25,  1945,  from  General  Bissell  to  General 
Holmes,  was  on  another  phase  of  this  subject,  and  it  contains  no  refer- 
ence to  transmitting  the  Van  Vliet  memorandum. 


1860  THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE 

General  Holmes  has  been  contacted  with  reference  to  the  matter, 
and  does  not  recall  having  ever  seen  Lieutenant  Colonel  Van  Vliet's 
memorandum. 

My  parentheses  again  at  this  point  is  Van  Vliet's  memorandum 
is  the  report  that  we  all  know  we  are  talking  about,  although  General 
Bissell  remembers  having  sent  it  to  him. 

My  understanding  is — I  know  exactly  what  everybody  means  by 
Colonel  Van  Vliet's  memorandum  or  Colonel  Van  Vliet's  report.  This 
thing  that  just  came  in  here  now  about  a  second  Van  Vliet  report 
has  to  do  with  this  inquiry  by  the  Swiss,  It  is  very  interesting,  but 
it  is  not  concerned  with  any  mystery  about  the  disappearance  of 
the  Van  Vliet  report  that  we  all  know  about. 

I  do  not  see  why  anybody  has  to  be  mixed  up  or  concerned  or  con- 
fused about  two  Van  Vliet  reports.  The  one  we  are  talking  about 
is  the  one  that  we  all  know  about — which  is  my  phrase  of  identity 
here. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  The  Army  did  not  turn  it  over  to  us ;  that  is  what 
1  am  looking  for. 

Mr.  Flood.  For  the  record,  I  am  having  no  colloquy  with  any  of  my 
friends  in  the  committee. 

If  you  have  any  statements  to  make,  make  them  on  the  record. 
I  understand  what  I  understand.  If  anybody  else  is  uncertain  about 
what  is  going  on,  say  so. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  I  asked  a  question. 

Chairman  Madden.  All  right,  Mr.  Sheehan. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  I  merely  want  to  state  that  I  asked  the  question  for 
the  simple  reason  that  it  is  my  understanding  the  Army  has  turned 
over  all  the  files  they  have  on  Katyn,  and  if  they  have  not  turned  over 
this  report,  apparently  they  have  not  turned  over  all  the  files. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Sheehan,  they  have  not  turned  over  what  is 
referred  to  in  the  quotation  Congressman  Flood  has  just  made  for  the 
record,  which  appears  on  page  67  of  part  II,  under  the  title  "Another 
Phase."  I  have  never  seen  such  a  document.  It  has  never  been  re- 
ceived from  the  Army,  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  and  I  don't  believe 
any  member  of  the  committee,  you  or  I  or  anybody  else,  has  seen  such 
a  document. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Has  the  committee  requested  it  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  believe  we  requested  many  times  of  Mr.  Shackel- 
ford and  everybody  else,  any  paper  connected  with  Katyn. 

Mr.  Flood.  Let  me  say  this  again : 

General,  when  I  say  "the  Van  Vliet  report,"  I  am  not  talking  about 
this  Swiss  business.  You  know  what  I  am  talking  about — the  Van 
Vliet  report  that  we  all  know  about. 

To  your  best  recollection,  a  letter  was  dictated  by  you  to  the  State 
Department,  a  letter  of  transmittal  to  them,  enclosing  or  attaching 
thereto  the  Van  Vliet  report;  is  that  correct?  Did  you  dictate  such 
a  letter  to  the  State  Department? 

General  Bissell.  I  don't  know. 

Mr.  Flood.  Will  you  say  you  did  ? 

(Jeneral  Bissell.  No. 

Mr.  Flood.  Will  you  say  you  did  not? 

General  Bissell.  No. 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  1861 

Mr.  Flood.  Then,  at  this  point  you  do  not  know  Avhether  or  not  you 
ever  dictated  a  letter  of  transmittal  to  the  State  Department,  having 
to  do  with  the  Van  Vliet  report? 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  Let  us  get  your  answer  on  the  record.  You  shook 
your  head. 

Mr.  Flood.  Just  a  moment.    I  will  yield  to  you  in  about  30  minutes. 

Now,  just  a  minute.  General.  You  answered  my  question  that  you 
do  not  know ;  did  you  not  ? 

Geneval  Bissell.  I  previously  answered  also  the  same  thing. 

]Mr.  Flood.  My  colleagues  are  concerned  only  that  your  answer  does 
not  appear  on  the  record,  and  that  you  merely  shook  your  head  in 
the  negative. 

General  Bissell.  I  am  sorry. 

Mr.  Flood.  The  answer  is :  You  do  not  remember  whether  you  did 
or  not  ? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  correct. 

]\Ir.  Flood.  If  General  Holmes  said  or  says  that  he  does  not  recall 
ever  having  seen  a  letter  from  you  or  the  Van  Vliet  report,  you  will 
not  say  that  General  Holmes  is  making  a  misstatement  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  have  previously  made  the  answer  to  that  question 
in  the  record. 

Mr.  Flood.  This  is  out  of  an  abundance  of  caution  and  for  repeti- 
tion and  for  an  emphatic  purpose. 

General  Bissell.  All  right,  sir.  I  consider  General  Holmes  an 
honorable,  forthright,  honest  man,  and  he  would  say  what  he  believed 
to  be  the  truth,  under  any  circumstances. 

Mr.  Flood.  That  is  very  interesting,  and  we  are  glad  to  have  your 
estimate  of  General  Holmes,  but  what  is  the  answer  to  my  question  ? 

Well,  I  will  repeat  it  for  you : 

If  General  Holmes  said  or  says  that  he  does  not  recall  ever  having 
seen  Lieutenant  Colonel  Van  Vliefs  report,  and  if  General  Holmes 
says  that  he  does  not  recall  ever  having  seen  a  letter  of  transmittal 
from  you,  you  will  not  say  that  he  is  wrong,  will  you  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  will  say  that  I  am  convinced  he  is  right  or  thinks 
he  is  right. 

Mr.  Flood.  Now,  there  are  a  number  of  other  things  along  this  very 
detail  I  want  to  ask  you,  but  my  brothers  here  are  very  anxious  on 
that  point,  so  I  yield  to  them,  only  for  the  purpose  of  examining  on 
that  point,  on  what  I  am  leading  to. 

Chairman  Madden.  Before  we  proceed  on  cross-examination,  let 
me  ask  the  general : 

Have  you  completed  your  statement  yet? 

General  Bissell.  No,  sir. 

Chairman  Madden.  You  proceed  with  your  statement,  and  then  we 
will  proceed. 

Mr.  Flood.  Just  a  moment,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  prefer,  if  there  is  no 
violent  objection,  to  clearing  up  this  detail  at  this  moment,  and  I 
want  to  yield  to  any  member  of  the  committee  who  wants  to  examine 
him  on  what  I  just  introduced. 

Chairman  Madden.  We  will  dispose  of  this  detail. 

Mr.  Flood.  I  will  yield  to  the  gentleman  from  Massachusetts,  Mr. 
Furcolo. 


1862  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  General,  perhaps  I  was  confused,  or  did  not  hear  your 
answer  correctly,  but  I  understood  you  just  a  moment  ago,  in  answer 
to  a  question  by  Congressman  Flood,  to  leave  your  testimony,  in  effect, 
that  you  could  not  say  whether  or  not  any  enclosure  had  been  sent 
in  the  letter  of  transmittal — referring  to  the  letter  of  May  25,  194r» — 
from  General  Bissell,  from  you,  to  General  Holmes. 

When  I  was  questioning  you  about  5  or  10  minutes  ago,  I  was  under 
the  impression  that  you  very  definitely  told  me  that  your  best  recollec- 
tion was  that  you  did  not  send  any  enclosure  of  any  kind  in  that  letter. 
My  recollection  is  that  you  and  I  had  some  discussion  about  it,  and 
during  the  discussion  I  pointed  out  that  your  letter  did  not  contain 
any  reference  in  the  body  of  the  letter  to  a  transmittal,  and  also  there 
was  no  notation  at  the  bottom  of  the  letter  referring  to  an  enclosure. 
We  discussed  the  fact  that  in  your  letter  of  transmittal  of  the  Gilder 
report,  there  had  been  a  reference  in  the  bod,v  of  tlie  letter,  and  also 
the  end  of  the  letter  referred  to  an  enclosure.  After  going  over  that, 
I  thought  that  we  had  concluded  the  matter. 

Could  you  finally  leave  it  that  your  best  recollection  is  that  there 
was  no  enclosure  of  any  kind  in  the  letter  of  May  25,  1945  ? 

Now,  I  also  thought  that  your  answer  to  Congressman  Flood  was 
somewhat  at  variance.  I  do  not  want  to  be  unfair  or  confusing  to 
either  you  or  me.  My  mind  is  not  clear  now  on  whether  your  final 
answer  was  that  you  do  not  know  whether  there  was  an  enclosure  or 
not,  or  whether  your  final  answer  is  that  there  was  no  enclosure.  I 
wonder  if  you  could  clear  that  up  for  us  ? 

General  Bisseix.  My  best  recollection  is  that  there  was  no  enclosure 
in  the  letter,  and  none  listed  on  it,  and  there  seems,  in  the  body  of  the 
letter,  no  reason  for  an  enclosure  to  have  been  with  it. 

Mr.  Flood.  I  will  not  yield  any  further  now,  but  1  will  in  a  moment, 
to  Mr.  Machrowicz. 

Pursuing  Congressman  Furcolo's  interrogation  on  the  letter  of  ^lay 
25,  and  enclosure,  that  has  to  do  with  another  phase  of  the  subject, 
that  is,  the  Swiss  thing.    I  am  not  talking  about  that. 

I  am  concerned  only  with  two  or  three  very  simple  details  on  this 
report  and  your  connection  with  it. 

We  know  the  whole  story  about  Van  Vliet  preparing  the  report  in 
your  office  and  that  you  got  it,  and  all  that  kind  of  business — every- 
body understands  that. 

Now,  I  ask  you  if  you  ever  dictated  a  letter  to  the  State  Department 
transmitting  this  Van  Vliet  report  to  them,  to  the  State  Department? 
You  said  you  do  not  remember  whethej-  you  did  or  not.  I  presume 
you  made  a  search  to  find  out  if  there  was  such  a  letter  of  transmittal, 
did  you  not? 

General  Bisseix.  I  asked  G-2  to  do  so.    That  was  in  1950. 

Mr.  Flood.  In  1950  you  asked  (i-2  to  see  whether  or  not  there  was 
any  such  a  letter  of  transmittal  from  you?  Did  G-2  ever  find  it,  so 
far  as  you  know  ? 

General  Bissell.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Flood.  State  so,  one  wa}'  or  the  other. 

General  Bissell.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Flood.  So  G-2  produced  no  co]:)y  of  such  a  letter ;  is  that  correct, 
General  ? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  correct,  sir. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1863 

Mr.  Flood.  General  Holmes  said  that  he  never  saw  such  a  letter 
from  you  and  that  he  never  saw  a  copy  of  the  report.  I  asked  you 
about  that  and  you  said  that  if  he  says  so,  you  would  not  say  he  is 
wrong? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Mr.  Chairman,  in  connection  with  that,  I  have 
only  one  question  that  I  have  been  trying  to  ask,  that  I  think  will  clear 
up  this  whole  point. 

Mr.  Flood.  I  will  yield  to  you  on  it. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Just  one  question :  Are  you  prepared  now  to  tell 
tliis  committee  definitely  that  the  Van  Vliet  report  we  were  discussing 
all  the  time  was  transmitted  by  you  to  the  Department  of  State? 

General  Bissell.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  are  not  ? 

That  is  all. 

Mr.  SiiEEHAisr.  Will  the  gentleman  yield? 

Mr.  Flood.  If  you  want  to  follow  that  up  I  will  yield. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Mr.  Machrowicz  asked  him  whether  or  not  the  State 
Department  had  it.  The  general  said  "No."  But  a  little  while  ago, 
if  you  go  into  the  record,  you  will  see  that  from  the  exchange  of  cor- 
respondence on  other  matters,  that  they  must  have  had  it ;  otherwise 
they  would  have  written  him  asking  where  was  this  report. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  SiiEEHAN.  Did  you  not  say  that,  General. 

General  Bissell.  I  did  say  that. 

Mr.  Flood.  Just  a  minute.  I  am  yielding  to  Mr.  Sheehan  for  a 
question.    Will  you  ask  the  question? 

Mr.  Sheehan.  In  response  to  Congressman  Machrowicz's  question 
as  to  whether  or  not  he  thought  the  State  Department  had  the  Van 
Vliet  report,  the  general  just  said  "No."    Is  that  right  or  wrong? 

Mr.  Flood.  That  is  right. 

Chairman  Madden.  Who  is  testifying  here  now  ? 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Is  that  true? 

General  Bisseix.  I  didn't  know  you  were  asking  me.  I  thought 
you  were  asking  Mr.  Flood.    I  am  sorry. 

Chairman  Madden.  Gentlemen,  can  we  have  a  little  order? 

Mr.  Flood.  I  have  just  yielded  to  Mr.  Sheehan  for  a  question,  or  any 
other  observation  he  wants  to  make  in  connection  with  it. 

Will  you  start  from  this  point? 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Thank  you. 

Following  up  from  the  last  question  Congressman  ]\fachrowicz 
asked  you,  if  my  memory  is  right,  he  asked  you  your  opinion  as  to 
whether  or  not  the  State  Department  received  the  Van  Vliet  report, 
and  you  just  answered  "No."    Am  I  right  or  wrong? 

General  Bissell.  He  didn't  ask  my  opinion. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  did  not  ask  his  opinion. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  What  did  he  ask  you  ? 

General  Bissell.  You  can  get  it  out  of  the  record ;  it  was  an  opinion, 
he  asked. 

Mr.  Flood.  Just  a  minute ;  I  still  have  this  witness. 

Mr.  Sheehan,  if  you  want  the  record  read  after  what  Mr.  Machro- 
wicz said  and  what  the  general  said,  let  us  have  it  read. 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Reporter,  can  you  get  the  question  asked 
by  Congressman  Machrowicz  ? 


1864  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

(The  record  was  read  by  the  reporter  as  follows:) 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Just  one  question:  Are  you  prepared  now  to  tell  this  com- 
mittee definitely  that  the  Van  Vliet  report  we  were  disc-ussiug  all  the  time 
was  transmitted  by  you  to  the  Department  of  State? 

General  Bissell.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Your  understandiii<2:,  then,  General,  is  that  you  did 
not  know  that  this  report  was  transmitted  directly  to  the  Department 
of  State? 

Congressman  Machrowicz  did  ask  the  general  whether  or  not  this 
Van  Vliet  report  was  transmitted  to  the  Department  of  State.  That 
was  his  original  question ;  to  which  he  said  "No,  sir." 

Now,  I  am  pointing  out.  General,  if  my  memory  is  right,  previously 
in  your  statements,  when  you  were  reading  from  your  notes,  you  defi- 
nitely came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  State  Department,  because  of 
various  exchange  of  correspondence,  if  they  did  not  have  it  they 
would  have  asked  you  where  it  was  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  believe — and  I  can  answer  quickly  and  clearly — 
I  stated  I  did  not  know  whether  I  had  sent  the  paper  to  the  war-crimes 
people  or  the  State  Department,  but  I  was  inclined  to  believe  I  had 
sent  it  to  State,  because  of  the  supporting  documentary  evidence 
which  I  have  subsequently  presented. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  That  is  all. 

Mr.  Flood.  That  is  your  deduction. 

General  Bissell.  That  is  just  that  way.  I  think  it  happened  for 
that  reason.    That  is  what  I  said. 

Mr.  Flood.  That  is  all,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Madden.  Does  anybody  else  have  anj^thing  on  this  par- 
ticular point? 

All  right.    Now,  proceed  with  your  statement,  General. 

General  Bissell.  Thank  you,  sir. 

I  had  just  completed  reading  the  signature  on  the  letter. 

Chairman  Madden.  We  will  reconvene  at  2  o'clock. 

(Whereupon,  at  12 :  30  p.  m.,  the  committee  recessed,  to  reconvene 
at  2  p.  m.  of  the  same  day.) 

AFTER  recess 

Chairman  Madden.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 
General  Bissell. 

TESTIMONY  OF  CLAYTON  I.  BISSELL,  MAJOR  GENERAL,  USAF 
(RETIRED),  ACCOMPANIED  BY  F.  SHACKELFORD,  COUNSELOR, 
DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  ARMY— Resumed 

Chairman  Madden.  Before  we  recessed  for  lunch  I  think  you  were 
going  to  proceed  and  complete  your  statement.  Now  if  you  will  pro- 
ceed, unless  some  of  the  members  have  some  particular  question  they 
would  like  to  ask  regarding  some  i)articular  point  in  your  statement, 
I  would  like  to  have  you  complete  your  statement. 

General  Bissell.  Thank  you  very  much. 

For  continuity,  I  had  just  completed  reading  a  letter.  The  letter 
was  also  shown  to  me  in  the  fall  of  1950  by  Mr.  Shackelford,  who  had 
secured  it  from  the  State  Department  hies.  I  believe  its  contents 
have  been  available  to  the  committee. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1865 

Mr.  Mitchell.  May  the  record  show  that  the  contents  have  not  been 
made  avaihible  to  the  committee. 

General  Bissell.  It  bears  the  following  notation :  711.62114A,  5-25- 
45,  which  was  its  decimal  file  number  and  date,  to  which  I  have  pre- 
viously referred.    It  also  bears  the  reference  number  81998. 

]\Ir.  Machrowicz.  What  report  are  you  referring  to  ? 

General  Bissell.  The  letter  I  had  just  read  when  the  questions 
started.  I  had  just  read  the  signature  of  the  letter  and  then  the  com- 
mittee started  asking  questions. 

Mr.  INIachrowicz.  The  letter  of  May  25  ? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Since  there  has  been  a  dispute  between  the  two 
on  whether  it  has  or  has  not  been  made  available,  has  it  or  has  it  not 
been  made  available  to  the  committee  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  said  I  believe  it  had,  but  Mr.  Shackelford  had 
a  copy  right  here  at  the  table  this  morning. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  was  the  one  I  showed  you  a  copy  of  and  the 
reply  by  the  Department  of  State. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Can  you  tell  us  whether  the  letter  of  May  25, 
which  the  general  referred  to  has  been  made  available  to  the  com- 
mittee ? 

Mr.  Shackelford.  I  believe  it  was  made  available  to  the  committee 
through  the  Inspector  General's  report. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  incorrect,  because  there  were  no  exhibits 
connected  with  the  Inspector  General's  report.  That  is  where  it  is 
mentioned.  It  is  referred  to  in  there  by  date.  Mr.  Sheeham  has  the 
Inspector  General's  report.  I  will  have  to  wait  until  he  returns  to  get 
it. 

Mr.  Shackelford.  That  can  easily  be  checked.  Mr.  Machrowicz 
and  Mr.  Mitchell  remember  the  details.  It  was  referenced  in  the  press 
memorandum  that  was  put  out. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  will  see  it  is  made  available  ? 

Mr.  Shackelford.  Yes,  sir. 

JNIr.  Doxdero.  So  there  will  be  no  break  in  the  continuity  of  thought, 
General  Bissell,  the  letter  of  May  25,  1945,  to  which  you  referred  was 
the  letter  of  transmittal  to  General  Holmes?  Is  that  the  one  you 
referred  to  ? 

General  Bissell.  No,  sir.  It  is  the  letter  asking  the  State  Depart- 
ment to  verify  whether  they  have  received  a  letter  Van  Vliet  said 
had  been  forwarded  to  him  by  the  Swiss  at  our  State  Department's 
request. 

Shall  I  proceed,  sir  ? 

Chairman  Madden.  Proceed. 

General  Bissell.  It  also  bears  the  reference  numbers  81998.  State 
Department  stamps  indicate  it  was  in  the  office  of  the  Assistant  Secre- 
tary, Mr.  Holmes,  May  30,  1945 ;  in  State  Department  Special  War 
Probes  Division  May  31,  1945 ;  and  there  was  on  it  an  almost  illegible 
stamp  mark,  apparentlv  of  the  OCE-UR  Unit.  There  is  written  in 
longhand  on  the  letter  "SWP  May  31,  1945,  AH/ABF."  This  would 
indicate  someone  in  the  Special  War  Plans  Division  handled  the  mat- 
ter for  Mr.  Holmes. 

This  is  confirmed  by  another  written  notation  written  on  the  letter 
reading  "Answered  6-5-45,  W.  H.  McCahon/EKG."  This  meant  Mr. 
McCahon  dictated  the  reply  to  EKG,  the  secretary,  on  June  5,  1945, 


1866  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

for  Mr.  Holmes'  signature,  which  was  typed  on  the  letter.  I  do  not 
know  if  General  Holmes  personally  signed  this  letter.  If  the  original 
is  in  G-2  files,  this  point  can  be  clarified. 

State  Department's  reply  under  date  of  June  9,  1945,  was  addressed 
to  me  as  "G-2,  War  Department." 

Mr.  Shackelford  also  showed  me  the  State  Department  copy  of  their 
reply,  and  I  understand  a  copy  has  been  made  available  to  the  com- 
mittee. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  One  moment.  This  committee  has  never  seen  either 
the  original  or  the  copy  of  the  letter  you  are  referring  to  now,  namely, 
the  State  Department  reply  which  is  dated  what  date,  June  G,  194r> '. 

General  Bissell.  June  9,  1945. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  The  committee  or  no  member  of  its  staff  had  seen  the 
original  or  a  copy  of  it  until  this  morning  when  Mr.  Shackelford 
handed  me  a  copy. 

Mr.  Shackelford.  We  will  be  glad  to  supply  it. 

Chairman  Madden.  I  wish  you  would  supply  it  for  the  record. 

Mr.  Shackelford.  Yes,  sir. 

General  Bissell.  The  reply  read,  "Confidential.  In  reply  refer  to 
SWP  711.62114A/5-25/45."     It  is  dated  June  9,  1945.     It  follows : 

My  Dear  General  Bissell  :  The  receipt  is  acknowledged  of  your  letter  of  May 
25,  1945,  concerning  the  report  that  Lt.  Col.  John  H.  Van  Vliet,  Jr.,  and  Captain 
Stewart  while  detained  as  prisoners  of  war  at  Oflag  G4,  received  from  the  protect- 
ing power  a  letter  dated  about  October  1943,  seeking  information  whether  these 
officers  had  been  required  by  the  German  authorities  to  visit  Katyn.  You  ask 
the  Department  to  verify  whether  a  copy  of  such  a  letter  togetlier  with  Colonel 
Van  Vliet's  reply  thereto  is  of  record  in  the  Department  of  State. 

The  records  of  the  Department  reveal  that  in  September  1943,  and  again  in 
December  of  the  same  year,  the  American  Legation  at  Bern  was  informed  that 
reports  reaching  the  Department  indicated  that  Lt.  Col.  J.  H.  Van  Vliet  and 
(\ipt.  D.  B.  Stewart,  both  of  whom  at  that  time  were  apparently  detained  at 
Oflag  9-A/Z,  were  being  taken  to  Katyn.  The  Legation  was  instructed  to  request 
the  Swiss  to  determine  whether  these  officers  actually  had  made  the  journey  and 
if  so  to  learn  what  kind  of  treatment  was  accorded  them,  whether  they  made 
any  statement  with  regard  to  the  Katyn  affair  and  what  use  had  been  made  of 
any  statements  made  or  any  photographs  taken  at  the  time. 

in  February  1944,  the  Department  was  informed  that  Colonel  Van  Vliet  ami 
Captain  Stewart  had  been  transferred  to  Oflag  64,  and  that  the  Swiss  inspector 
at  the  time  of  tlie  next  visit  to  that  camp  would  endeavor  to  obtain  the  informa- 
tion desired.  No  further  communication  regarding  the  matter  has  ever  been 
leceived  in  the  Department.  In  the  circumstances  it  is  considered  likely  that 
Colonel  Van  Vliet's  reply  may  have  been  intercepted  by  the  German  authorities 
and  never  forwarded  to  the  appropriate  officials  of  the  Swiss  Government. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  do  not  know  whether  this  is  intended  or  not  to 
confuse  us.  Again  you  are  not  referring  to  the  original  Colonel  Van 
Vliet  report  ? 

(leneral  Bissell.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Your  answer  to  me  is  not  changed  at  all  by  the 
statement  made  so  far? 

General  Bissell.  No,  sir;  but  you  would  notice  in  the  language  used 
that  they  call  this  second  one  the  report. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Yes,  but  that  is  not  the  report  we  are  talking 
about. 

General  Bissell.  Yes,  that  is  right.  That  is  my  point.  I  have 
caught  it. 

Chairman  Madden.  You  are  confusing  me  a  little  here.  What  has 
this  got  to  do  with  Colonel  Van  Vliet's  original  report? 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1867 

(leneral  Bissell.  A  great  deal,  sir,  because  the  State  Department 
had  considerable  knowledge  apparently  of  this  matter  before  Van 
Vliet  ever  left  Germany.  They  wrote  these  letters  before  I  ever 
took  over  G-2. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Are  you  inferring  now  that  the  State  Depart- 
ment had  information  about  the  Van  Vliet  report  before  Van  Vliet 
came  to  your  office  ? 

General  Bissell.  About  the  Van  Vliet  visit.  They  had  asked  that 
long  ago,  whether  there  was  a  report,  and  Colonel  Van  Vliet  had  made 
a  reply  to  State.  That  is  the  status  as  I  read  it.  There  is  a  little  bit 
more  to  be  given  to  you  on  it,  if  you  want  it. 

Chairman  Madden.  This  is  a  preliminary  report  that  they  are 
referring  to  in  this  letter  when  they  say,  "Concerning  the  report  that 
Lt.  Col.  John  H.  Van  Vliet,  Jr.,  and  Captain  Stewart  while  detained 
as  prisoners  of  war  at  Oflag  64?"  That  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
original  Van  Vliet  report  ?  That  is  not  referring  to  the  original  report 
that  he  signed? 

(xeneral  Bissell.  That  is  not  the  report  that  Van  Vliet  dictated  in 
Washington. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  May  I  put  that  in  as  an  exhibit? 

Chairman  Madden.  Mark  that  as  an  exhibit. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Exhibit  No.  -i. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  4"  and  made 
a  part  of  the  record  as  follows :) 

Exhibit  4 

[Confidentiall 

June  9,  1945. 

My  Dear  Gexeral  Bissell  :  The  receipt  is  acknowledged  of  your  letter  of  May 
25,  1945,  concerning  the  report  that  Lt.  Col.  John  H.  Van  Vliet,  Jr.,  and  Captain 
Stewart  while  detained  as  prisoners  of  war  at  Oflag  64,  received  from  tlie  pro- 
tecting power  a  letter  dated  about  October  1943,  seeking  information  whetlier 
these  officers  had  been  required  by  the  German  authorities  to  visit  Katyn.  You 
ask  the  Department  to  verify  whether  a  copy  of  such  a  letter  together  with 
Colonel  Van  Vliet's  reply  thereto  is  of  record  in  the  Department  of  State. 

The  records  of  the  Department  reveal  that  in  September  1943,  and  again  in 
December  of  the  same  year,  the  American  Legation  at  Bern  was  informed  that 
reports  reaching  the  Department  indicated  that  Lt.  Col.  J.  H.  Van  Vliet  and 
Capt.  D.  B.  Stewart,  both  of  whom  at  that  time  were  apparently  detained  at 
Oflag  9-A/Z,  were  being  taken  to  Katyn.  The  Legation  was  instructed  to  request 
the  Swiss  to  determine  whether  these  officers  actually  had  made  the  journey 
and  if  so  to  learn  what  kind  of  treatment  was  accorded  them,  whether  they  made 
any  statement  with  regard  to  the  Katyn  affair  and  what  use  had  been  made  of 
any  statements  made  or  any  photographs  taken  at  the  time. 

In  February  1944,  the  Department  was  informed  that  Colonel  Van  Vliet  and 
Captain  Stewart  had  been  transferred  to  Oflag  64,  and  that  the  Swiss  inspector 
at  the  time  of  the  next  visit  to  tliat  camp  would  endeavor  to  obtain  the  informa- 
tion desired.  No  further  communication  regarding  the  matter  has  ever  been 
received  in  the  Department.  In  the  circumstances  it  is  considered  likely  that 
Colonel  Van  Vliet's  reply  may  have  been  intercepted  by  the  German  authorities 
and  never  forwarded  to  the  appropriate  officials  of  the  Swiss  Government. 
Sincerely  yours, 

Julius  C.  Holmes,  Assistant  Secretary. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  would  like  to  have  the  Army  supply  the  original, 
if  they  have  it,  please.    This  is  a  copy. 

Chairman  Madden.  Yes,  we  would  like  to  have  the  original. 

Mr.  Shackelford.  Yes,  sir;  we  will  be  glad  to  supply  you  with 
whatever  we  can. 


186S  THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  General,  did  you  in  your  official  capacity  receive 
any  information  from  any  source  affecting  the  credibility  of  Colonel 
Van  Vliet  or  Captain  Stewart  'i 

General  Bissell.  That  is  in  the  next  paragraph  or  two,  and  that 
is  the  reason  for  my  action,  in  order  to  get  some  basis  on  which  to 
evaluate  the  report  they  made  to  me  by  the  only  thing  I  could  pin 
down  as  a  yardstick  to  measure  the  accuracy  of  his  memory  which 
I  thought  was  splendid. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  I  want  you  to  know  of  my  personal  interest  in 
this  man,  because  Captain  Stewart  was  my  personal  appointee  to 
West  Point. 

General  Bissell.  I  am  glad  to  know  of  your  interest. 

The  State  Department  reply  was  very  significant.  It  made  it 
very  clear  as  early  as  September  1943,  months  before  I  was  appointed 
G-2,  the  State  Department  had  reports  of  the  visit  of  Colonel  Van 
Vliet  and  Captain  Stewart  to  Katyn.    They  say  so. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  That  should  not  be  very  surprising  to  you.  The 
whole  w^orld  knew  it.    The  Germans  broadcast  it. 

General  Bissell.  They  never  broadcast  the  thing  about  the  Van 
Vliet  visit.  They  said  that  American  and  British  personnel,  I  think, 
had  been  taken  there  or  w^ould  be  taken  there,  but  no  names  were 
mentioned  in  anything  I  ever  saw  or  know  about.  I  can  be  wrong- 
on  this.  There  is  an  awful  lot  of  stuff  that  did  not  reach  G-2  on 
this  matter. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  To  clarify  that  point,  sir;  Colonel  Van  Vliet  in 
his  testimony  in  part  2  specifically  set  forth,  and  so  did  Captain 
Stewart  w^ien  he  testified,  that  to  their  knowledge  their  names  had 
never  been  revealed  by  the  Germans  about  their  visit  to  Katyn. 

General  Bissell.  It  is  also  clear  that  the  instructions  from  our 
State  Department  to  the  American  Legation  at  Bern  was  responsible 
for  the  letter  Colonel  Van  Vliet  stated  he  had  been  given  by  the 
Swiss  protecting  power  about  October  19i3,  because  the  questions 
Colonel  Van  Vliet  said  were  in  the  letter  he  received  are  almost 
exactly  the  questions  our  State  Department  had  directed  our  Bern 
Embassy  to  submit.  The  slight  difference  in  phraseology  was  prob- 
ably due  to  the  requirement  for  paraphrasing  anything  that  had  been 
sent  classified,  so  that  your  code  cannot  be  touched  by  putting  it  out 
afterward  for  somebody  who  had  copied  the  code. 

The  channel  through  which  the  questions  reached  Colonel  Van  Vliet 
was  the  one  our  State  Department  had  directed  to  be  used  by  our 
Bern  Legation,  and  the  time  factors  fitted  perfectly.  Our  State  De- 
partment instructions  issued  in  September  1948  apparently  had  re- 
sulted in  the  delivery  to  Colonel  Van  Vliet  while  he  was  a  prisoner 
at  Oflag  64  of  the  questions  our  State  Department  wanted  answered. 
Colonel  Van  Vliet  stated  that  he  replied  to  them.  I^nless  Colonel 
Van  Vliet  was  in  error,  either  as  to  the  date  he  gave,  about  October 
1943,  or  about  where  he  was  then  held  prisoner  at  OHag  G4,  the  in- 
formation that  our  State  Department  received  in  February  1944  re- 
porting his  transfer  to  Oflag  64  could  have  had  no  possible  bearing 
on  the  delivery  of  Colonel  Van  Vliet's  reply,  as  he  had  actually  re- 
ceived the  letter  at  Oflag  No.  64  and  answered  it  4  months  earlier. 

Also  significant  is  the  State  Department's  conclusion  that  the  reason 
no  reply  was  received  from  Colonel  Van  Vliet  was  that  it  was  con 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1869 

sidered  likely  Colonel  Van  Vliet's  reply  may  have  been  intercepted 
by  the  Germans. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  am  going  to  have  to  interrupt  you  again,  because 
I  am  interested  in  this  whole  situation,  and  I  think  the  members  of 
the  committee  are.  I  am  trying  to  tell  you  I  am  very  much  confused. 
What  was  the  significance  of  that  letter  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  read  this  part  of  it  here. 

Mr.  ]\Iachrowicz.  What  was  the  significance  ? 

General  Bissell.  State  was  proceeding  on  the  theory  he  had  never 
received  their  letter. 

Mr.  IMachrowicz.  Wliose  letter  ? 

General  Bissell.  Tliis  letter  sponsored  by  the  Bern  Legation.  State 
had  sent  word  to  Bern  to  have  the  Swiss  Protecting  Power  get  a  letter 
to  Van  Vliet  asking  questions. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  What  has  that  got  to  do  with  the  matter  we  are 
investigating  ? 

General  Bissell.  If  Colonel  Van  Vliet  had  answered  that  at  the 
time,  and  I  could  get  my  hands  on  the  answers  then,  I  could  compare 
all  or  part  of  them  with  the  statement  he  made  to  me  2  years  later 
to  measure  his  memory,  his  veracity,  or  anything  else.  I  did  not  ques- 
tion them,  but  I  had  that  job  as  a  responsibility  to  do. 

Mr.  ISIachrgwicz.  Wliat  is  the  significance  ? 

General  Bissell.  The  significance  is  that  the  answer  State  gave 
me  that  he  had  changed  prison  camps  had  nothing  to  do  with  it  be- 
cause the  letter  had  reached  him  and  he  had  replied,  according  to  his 
statement,  so  the  change  of  prison  camps  had  nothing  to  do  with  it. 

]Mr.  ]\Iachrowicz.  I  frankly  say  I  am  as  much  confused  as  I  was  in 
the  beginning. 

Mr.  Dondero.  Perhaps  I  can  answer  my  colleague  from  Michigan 
by  saying  I  think  the  significance  is  that  the  State  Department  and  the 
Government  here  knew  about  this  thing  long  before  Colonel  Van  Vliet's 
report. 

Mr.  Machrow^icz.  Certainly.  So  did  the  Department  of  Defense 
in  1943. 

General  Bissell.  But  we  didn't  know  Van  Vliet's  part  in  it. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Neither  did  the  DeiDartment  of  State,  as  you  say. 

General  Bissell.  They  did. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  They  didn't  know  what  he  had  to  say. 

General  Bissell.  No  ;  but  they  knew  he  had  been  there. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  That  is  right.  It  is  up  to  the  Department  of 
Defense  to  get  a  statement. 

General  Bissell.  We  didn't  know  about  it.  We  were  not  asked  to  get 
such  a  statement.    This  is  the  State  Department's  job  in  time  of  war? 

IVIr.  DoNDERO.  They  were  contacting  these  two  prisoners  through 
the  delegation  in  Switzerland. 

General  Bissell.  Yes.  They  acted  as  American  Government  repre- 
sentatives as  a  neutral  close  to  Germany. 

Also  significant  is  the  conclusion  that  the  reason  no  reply  was  re- 
ceived from  Colonel  Van  Vliet  was  that  it  was  considered  likely  Colo- 
nel Van  Vliet's  reply  may  have  been  intercepted  by  the  Germans. 
Assuming  that  the  Germans  had  intercepted  the  Van  Vliet  reply  that 
Russia  was  guilty  of  the  Katyn  massacre,  as  Germany  had  stated  to 
the  world,  and  assume  that  Germany  was  innocent,  is  it  reasonable 

93744— 52— pt.  7 4 


1870  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

that,  if  innocent,  Germany,  who  had  gone  to  such  trouble  to  take 
Colonel  Van  Vliet  and  a  sizable  party  to  Katyn  for  the  very  purpose 
of  having  them  report  German  innocence  to  the  world,  would  not 
allow  a  letter  from  Colonel  Van  Vliet  accomplishing  such  purpose  to 
reach  the  United  States  ? 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Do  you  claim  the  letter  was  received  by  the  Swiss ; 
that  it  was  not  intercepted  ? 

General  Bissell,  I  don't  know.    It  is  a  funny  reason  to  give. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  don't  claim  it  was  received ;  do  you  ? 

General  Bissell.  No  ;  I  don't  claim  State  got  any  answer  back. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  don't  claim  that  Department  of  State  re- 
ceived this  information  ? 

General  Bissell.  No. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  What  is  it  you  claim  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  don't  believe  that  the  reason  they  gave  for  not 
receiving  it — that  Germany  intercepted  it — was  sound. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  What  has  that  got  to  do  with  this  ? 

General  Bissell.  Because  I  am  still  trying  to  get  Van  Vliet 's  report 
to  check  it. 

When  the  June  9,  1945,  reply  to  my  May  25,  1945,  letter  to  State 
Department  was  received,  the  question  naturally  occurred :  Why  had 
State  not  made  further  ert'ort  to  secure  reply  from  Van  Vliet?  State 
knew  about  the  Katyn  massacre.  The  State  Department  did  not  say 
specifically  that  the  September  and  December  1943  attempts  were 
the  only  attempts  they  made.  They  might  have  made  other  attempts 
without  tangible  results.  I  considered  it  purposeless  to  follow  this 
aspect  of  the  matter  further  because  I  believe  that  State  had  been 
furnished  Colonel  Van  Vliet's  report  on  May  25, 1945. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Because  what  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  believe  that  State  had  been  furnished  the  Colonel 
Van  Vliet  report  on  May  25, 1945. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Which  report  are  you  referring  to  ? 

General  Bissell.  The  one  made  in  my  office. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  not  tell  me  this  morning  you  cannot  state 
they  received  it  ? 

General  Bissell.  But  I  believe  they  did. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  believe  they  did  ? 

General  Bissell.  Let  us  get  straight.  What  I  believe  is  one  thing, 
and  my  positive  knowledge  is  another,  I  believe  that  they  had  re- 
ceived it  because  it  was  my  intention  to  get  it  there  or  to  another  place. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Where  was  the  other  place  ? 

General  Bissell.  The  other  place  was  the  War  Crimes  people. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  stated  this  morning  that  you  had  discussed  this 
matter  with  Mr.  Frederick  Lyon.     Is  that  correct  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  said  I  either  mentioned  it  to  Mr.  Lyon  or  Mr. 
ITolmos. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Over  the  telephone  or  in  person  ? 

General  Bissell,  I  s]>oke  to  Mv.  Lyon  only  on  the  phone.  On  the 
other  hand,  I  saw  or  talked  to  Mr.  Holmes  twice  at  approximately  the 
same  day.  We  had  a  very  hot  matter  in  the  Argentine,  and  I  was 
dealing  witli  both  of  them  at  the  same  time  on  it. 

This  is  off  the  Katyn  thing  a  little  bit,  but  I  think  it  is  all  right, 
because  it  is  not  classified  any  more. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1871 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  would  like  to  know  what  were  the  names  of  the 
people  designated  by  State  to  be  liaison  with  the  G-2  when  you  were 
the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2.  What  were  the  names  of  those 
individuals  from  the  Department  of  State  ? 

General  Bissell.  The  two  that  worked  with  me  most  closely  were 
Mr.  Holmes  and  Mr.  Lyon. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Anybody  else  at  this  time  that  you  care  to  mention  ? 
Are  there  any  other  names  'i 

General  Bissell.  Not  that  have  a  bearing  of  any  nature  in  connec- 
tion with  Katyn. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  In  other  words,  you  are  now  saying  for  the  record 
at  this  time  that  there  were  no  other  individuals  in  the  Department 
of  State  to  your  knowledge  that  had  any  bearing  on  the  Van  Vliet 
Katyn  report  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  believe  that  is  correct. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  are  sure? 

Mr,  Machrowicz.  I  want  to  pursue  that  line  because  it  is  important. 
I  think  it  is  important  to  you  and  it  is  important  to  us  all  as  Ameri- 
cans, because  if  the  Department  of  State  received  a  report  which  it 
denies  receiving  we  want  to  know.    Is  that  not  right  ? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  told  me  this  morning  that  you  cannot  say 
that  you  forwarded  that  report. 

General  Bissell.  No. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Now,  as  I  understand  you,  you  want  to  qualify 
it  by  saying,  although  you  cannot  say  you  sent  it  to  the  Department 
of  State,  you  believe  you  sent  it. 

General  Bissell.  I  thought  I  had. 

Mr.  Machrowicz,  You  still  think  you  did? 

General  Bissell.  I  don't  know  where  it  is,  and  it  is  pretty  difficult 
to  pin  it  down. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  are  not  much  help  to  this  committee. 

General  Bissell.  I  am  telling  everything  I  know  about  people  run- 
ning down  details  that  in  my  opinion  don't  hit  it  too  closely  that  bear 
on  it.    If  I  give  you  too  much,  stop  me. 

Mr.  MiTCjiELL.  General,  there  is  one  other  question.  I  asked  you 
a  minute  ago  who  were  the  people  designated  by  the  State  Depart- 
ment with  which  you  did  official  business  in  connection  with  G-2 
matters  that  State  should  know  about  in  the  line  of  conunand  or 
anywhere  else  ? 

You  told  the  committee  here  this  morning  and  again  now  that  the 
two  are  General  Holmes  and  Mr.  Lyon.     Is  that  correct  ? 

General  Bissell.  That  could  know  anything  about  the  Katyn 
matter  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  could  know  anything  about  the  Katyn 
massacre. 

General  Bissell.  I  don't  think  so. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Who  were  the  individuals  in  your  own  organization 
who  had  liaison  with  the  Department  of  State  who  might  know  any- 
thing about  the  Katyn  matter  ? 

General  Bissell.  Many,  many. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  mean  officially  designated  by  you  as  head  of  G-2, 

General  Bissell.  A  man  named  Dillingham,  a  colonel  at  that  time 


1872  THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE 

or  lieutenant  colonel,"  was  my  liaison  man  to  handle  hot  wires  that 
came  into  State.  If  something  came  in  among  their  stuff  that  re- 
quired military  consideration  or  action,  he  was  there  watching.  I 
don't  think  he  knows  a  thing  about  Katyn. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  specifically  nailed  my  question  down.  General,  to 
who  in  your  Department  was  designated  to  liaison  with  the  State  De- 
partment who  might  know  or  have  any  knowledge  of  the  Van  Vliet 
report  on  Katyn. 

General  Bissell.  No  one. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  No  one  but  yourself  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  think  that  is  right. 

]Mr.  Mitchell.  You  are  sure? 

General  Bissell.  I  think,  as  far  as  Katyn  is  concerned  on  this  par- 
ticular deal,  yes,  sir;  I  think  that  is  right.  But  I  had  many  contacts 
in  the  State  at  every  level. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  At  this  time  will  you  tell  us  now  who  in  your  De- 
partment had  knowledge  of  the  Katyn  matter  ? 

General  Bissell.  Mrs.  Meeres  and  an  officer  who  today  was  con- 
firmed to  be  Lieutenant  Colonel  Lantaff.  I  knew  someone  in  my  office 
handled  it,  but  I  could  not  tell  you  which  one.  His  handling  of  it  was 
not  to  be  present  when  anything  was  being  made  but  in  connection 
with  the  papers. 

]Mr.  IVIachrgwicz.  You  do  not  mean  those  are  the  only  two  people 
in  your  department  that  had  knowledge  of  Katyn  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  believe  they  are.  Colonel  Van  Vliet's  arrival 
and  his  procedure  was  not  the  routine. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  can  assure  you  you  are  wrong.  I  am  not  guess- 
ing at  it.     I  am  stating  you  are  wrong. 

General  Bissell.  I  will  try  to  think  hard  and  see. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  You  said  the  Katyn  matter.  Do  you  mean  the  Van 
Vliet  report  ? 

Mr.  IMiTCHELL.  I  said  the  Van  Vliet  report  on  the  Katyn  affair. 

General  Bissell.  I  thought  you  were  exploiting  his  question  or  ex- 
panding it.  That  is  not  so.  Lots  of  people  had  heard  of  Katyn. 
Loads  of  them.  The  whole  Polish  Liaison  Section.  We  had  Poles 
accredited  to  us  who  came  to  G-2. 

Chairman  Madden.  Everybody  knew  about  Katyn  after  it  was 
broadcast  and  the  bodies  were  found.     So,  that  is  not  so  ini])ortant. 

]\rr.  Mitchell.  General,  I  think  you  missed  the  point  of  my  (jues- 
tion.  The  question  I  want  to  get  across  is:  "Who  in  3'our  staff,  as  the 
head  of  G-2,  did  you  specifically  designate  to  take  this  matter  up  with 
the  Department  of  State  or  any  other  agency  of  the  (lovernment  ? 

(jeneral  Bissell.  I  did  not  designate  anybody  in  my  office  to  take 
it  \]\)  with  the  Department  of  State. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Then  you  personally  handled  the  matter  yourself? 

General  Bissell.  As  far  as  I  can  recollect.  AVhen  I  say  "handled 
it,"  I  mean  1  liHudled  the  direction  to  be  given  and  what  was  to  be 
done. 

^fr.  ^NfrrcMiKLT,.  Thou,  if  you  say  you  "handled  it,"  you  must  have 
directed  somebody  to  do  something  about  it. 

General  Bissell.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  MrrcHEi,L.  Those  are  the  names  I  want. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1873 

General  Bissell.  I  directed  someone,  who  from  this  morning^s 
testimony  I  believe  to  be  Colonel  Lantaff,  to  secure  a  proper  room 
where  this  dictation  could  be  handled. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  We  know  that. 

General  Bissell.  To  brief  Mrs.  Meeres,  who  was  doing  her  first  job 
in  my  office.    I  think  that  is  about  the  end  of  the  story. 

Chairman  jNIadden.  General,  is  it  something  unusual  while  you  were 
connected  with  this  assignment  over  there  for  a  report  of  this  kind 
coming  in  dealing  with  the  massacre  or  murder  of  over  4,000  soldiers? 
That  was  unusual  ? 

General  Bissell.  It  was  unusual  from  beginning  to  end. 

Chairman  Madden.  And  you  were  in  complete  charge  of  that  office? 

General  Bissell.  I  am  responsible  for  everything  that  my  people  do. 

Chairman  Madden.  You  just  testified  that  to  your  knowledge  there 
could  not  be  over  two  people  in  your  office  under  your  supervision 
connected  with  the  Van  Vliet  Katyn  report. 

General  Bissell.  That  is  right. 

Chairman  Madden.  That  report  that  was  made  by  Colonel  Van 
Vliet  was  quite  important  in  your  mind  ? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  correct. 

Chairman  Madden.  With  this  responsibility  that  you  had,  and  as 
your  testimony  showed,  it  was  completely  unusual,  a  case  of  this  kind. 
You  testified  this  morning  that  you  could  not  say  whether  or  not  the 
Van  Vliet  report  was  ever  delivered  to  the  State  Department. 

General  Bissell.  That  is  correct,  sir.    I  cannot  say  that. 

Chairman  Madden.  Do  you  not  think,  considering  the  background 
as  you  already  have  testified,  that  that  would  be  very  much  on  your 
mind  to  see  that  a  report  like  that  would  be  transferred  over  there  if 
that  was  the  place  it  should  go  ? 

General  Bissell.  Yes,  sir. 

Chairman  Madden.  Why  did  you  not  know  that  it  was  transferred 
over  there,  if  it  was? 

General  Bissell.  Because  I  would  have  given  instructions  to  have 
had  something  done,  and  I  w^ould  not  have  personally  been  doing  it. 

Chairman  Madden.  Did  you  give  instructions  to  have  that  done  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  am  positive  I  gave  instructions. 

Chairman  Madden.  To  whom  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  believe  now  I  don't  know.  I  think  I  could  give 
3'ou  my  story. 

Chairman  Madden.  Just  answer  that.  Whom  did  you  give  instruc- 
tions to? 

General  Bissell.  I  do  not  recall  whether  it  was  Congressman  Lan- 
taff, but  if  it  was  not 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  He  said  it  was  not. 

General  Bissell.  I  know.  If  it  was  not,  I  don't  know  what  other 
person. 

Mr.  Machroavicz.  There  was  only  one  other  person. 

General  Bissell.  She  could  not  have  done  it.  I  don't  know  who 
actually  got  the  instruction. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Then  there  were  no  instructions  given. 

General  Bissell.  That  is  not  something  I  can  swear  to  as  a  fact. 


1874  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  That  is  the  only  possible  logical  conclusion  that 
anyone  can  come  to. 

General  Bissell.  That  may  be  so,  but  I  don't  believe  you  are  giving 
me  quit-e  the  opportunity  you  desire.  Katyn,  although  unusual,  was 
unusual  because  Van  Vliet,  instead  of  coming  in  initially  and  report- 
ing to  the  executive  officer  and  being  sent  by  him  to  the  proper  section, 
being  handled  as  in  every  other  case  coming  in,  insisted  on  seeing  me. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  he  do  that  under  anybody's  direction  ?  He  said 
he  had  seen  General  Collins.  He  had  seen  other  people  over  there. 
When  he  initially  came  to  you,  did  he  tell  you  he  was  sent  there  by 
anybody  else? 

General  Bissell.  He  did  not,  but  he  told  me  he  had  seen  (xeneral 
Collins.  He  told  me  the  others  he  had  seen.  He  gave  me  a  straight 
story,  just  about  the  way  he  told  you  here.  I  think  he  was  right,  but 
he  did  get  an  unusual  handling  of  his  case  from  that  minute  on. 

Chairman  Madden.  Let  me  ask  you  this.  General,  considering  your 
testimony  that  just  Colonel  Lantaff  and  Mrs.  Meeres  were  the  only  two 
in  your  office  connected  with  the  Van  Vliet  report  and  that  you  might 
have  told  Colonel  Lantaff  to  deliver  the  report  to  the  State  Depart- 
ment or  you  might  have  told  Mrs.  Meeres 

(xeneral  Bissell.  No,  I  didn't  tell  her  to  do  any  such  thing. 

Chairman  Madden.  You  might  have  told  Colonel  Lantaff,  there 
would  not  be  anybody  outside  of  Lantaff  you  to\d( 

General  Bissell.  I  don't  think  so. 

Chairman  Madden.  Let  us  concede  that  you  told  Colonel  Lantaff. 

General  Bissell.  All  right,  sir. 

Chairman  Madden.  Considering  the  importance  of  this  report  deal- 
ing with  the  massacre  of  over  4,000  soldiers  of  our  allies,  had  you  told 
Colonel  Lantaff,  don't  you  think  the  most  natural  thing  would  be, 
as  the  head  of  this  department,  maybe  the  next  day  or  the  day  after, 
to  inquire  from  the  colonel  if  that  important  report  was  delivered  to 
the  State  Department  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  don't  think  I  would  have  done  that. 

Chairman  Madden.  Don't  you  think  the  colonel  would  have  come 
back  and  stated  to  you,  as  his  superior  officer,  that  he  had  carried  out 
your  instruction  ? 

General  Bissell.  He  would  not  do  that,  because  I  would  take  it  for 
granted.  I  knew  he  would  carry  out  instructions.  The  only  thing 
I  would  have  done  under  the  situation  you  paint  there,  if  I  had  ques- 
tioned the  delivery  of  that,  I  would  have  asked  Holmes  if  he  got  it. 
That  is  the  point. 

Chairman  Madden.  Colonel  Lantaff  testified  this,  morning  that 
there  was  never  any  order  given  to  him  at  all  to  deliver  the  report. 

General  Bissell.  The  only  instruction  ap|)arently  I  gave  Colonel 
Lantalf  was  to  secure,  after  securing  the  report,  a  place  for  the  report 
to  be  dictated  and  the  briefing  of  Mrs.  Meeres. 

Mr.  ]Maciii{owicz.  Are  you  not  contradicting  your  own  testimony? 

General  Bissei>l.  Colonel  Lantalf,  I  think — I  have  never  talked 
with  him,  T  never  saw  him  since  he  left  (x-2  until  he  came  in  this  room 
this  morning,  so  that  there  is  no  suggestion  coming  from  him,  and  I 
would  accept  anything  he  said  that  he  would  swear  to  as  being  true. 
He  would  not  need  to  swear  to  it,  if  he  said  it.  I  think  he  is  con- 
fused on  what  ha])pened  to  the  report,  as  I  am  confused  on  what  hap- 
pened to  it.     He  cannot  tell  us  how  it  went  out  of  the  room,  and  he 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1875 

does  not  know  whetlier  he  jxot  it  back  or  not.  He  did  reply  that  lie 
read  it  in  the  preparation  stai^e.  That  could  have  been  done.  There  is 
a  strono;  feeling  in  my  mind  that  Van  Vliet  started  one  day  and  fin- 
ished another  and  that  the  notes  had  to  be  put  np  overnifrht,  and  the 
colonel  indicated  that  was  the  case  because  he  put  them  u]). 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  That  is  not  what  the  colonel  says.  Colonel  Van 
A-^liet  said  he  finished  the  statement  in  1  day. 

General  Bissell.  The  Conoressman,  not  Colonel  Lantaff.  Colonel 
Van  Vliet  says  in  another  ])lace  he  does  not  know  whether  he  stayed 
over  another  day  or  not.  If  he  had  completed  it  the  first  day,  there 
would  have  been  no  reason  to  i>nt  away  stenofrrapher's  notes  that  nio-ht 
or  anything  else  or  to  come  back  and  <ret  the  papers  the  next  day  if  he 
had  brou^rht  them  to  me  that  day.  I  mifjht  have  been  busy.  He  might 
have  tried  to. 

Chairman  Maddex.  Did  anybody  ever  telephone  you  or  call  up  or 
come  into  your  office  after  the  report  was  signed  by  Van  Vliet  re- 
garding the  report,  did  a  telephone  call  come  in  to. request  to  read  it 
or  anything  { 

General  Bissell.  No. 

Chairman  Madden.  Xot  a  person  communicated  with  your  office 
regarding  it  after  it  was  signed  ^ 

General  Bissell.  No,  sir,  I  don't  think  so. 

Chairman  Madden.  When  did  you  decide  to  send  it  to  the  State 
De])artment  then  ? 

General  Bissell.  My  intention  had  been  to  have  it  go  to  the  State 
De]:)artment  at  once  and  whether  it  went,  I  don't  know,  as  I  have 
said. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Let  us  stick  to  that  now,  because  you  have  made 
some  very  serious  and  unwarranted  inferences  which  are  not  at  all 
in  accord  with  what  you  are  saying  right  now. 

General  Bissell.  If  I  had  not  pointed  out  these  things,  I  think  I 
would  not  have  given  you  all  I  know  on  the  matter. 

Chairman  Madden.  Was  it  the  next  day  you  sent  it  to  the  State 
Dejiartment  or  the  week  after  or  a  month  ? 

General  Bissell.  It  would  have  been  done  either  on  the  24:th  or 
25th,  that  it  would  have  gone  from  the  office,  had  it  gone  to  the  State 
Department. 

Chairman  Madden.  Why  do  you  say  it  would  have  gone  then  ? 

General  Bisseijl.  Because  on  the  twenty-second,  the  date  that 
Colonel  Van  Vliet  saw  me,  there  could  not  have  been  time  in  my  opinion 
to  have  processed  it,  and  I  saw  Colonel  Van  Vliet  on  two  different 
occasions. 

Chairman  ]Madden.  You  thought  it  was  so  important  that  you  im- 
mediately sent  it  over  to  the  State  Department  the  next  day? 

General  Bissell.  And  I  think  it  was  not  ready  to  go  the  next  day, 
but  it  would  have  been  ready  the  following  day. 

Chairman  Madden.  And  the  following  day  you  sent  it  over? 

General  Bissell.  The  twenty-fifth,  I  think;  if  it  ever  went  from 
G-2  to  State,  it  prol^ably  left  G-2  on  the  twenty-fifth. 

Chairman  Madden.  You  don't  know  whether  it  went  at  all  or  not? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  In  your  letter  to  Mr.  Lyon  you  state  as  follows : 

'  Dear  Mr.  Lyon  :  Transmitted  for  the  information  and  the  file  of  the  State 
Department  is  report  on  Katyn  by  Stanley  S.  V.  Gilder,  Captain.  British  Medical 


1876  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Officer.    This  report  supplements  the  statement  of  Lt.  Col.  John  Van  Vliet,  Jr., 
forwarded  to  (Jeueral  Holmes  on  May  25,  1945. 

General  Bissell.  Written  by  JSIrs.  Meeres, 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Signed  by  Clayton  Bissell. 

General  Bissell.  I  did  not  put  in  that  date. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  What  date  ? 

General  Bissell.  That  it  was  forwarded  on  a  certain  date.  That 
was  from  something  that  was  found  in  the  office  or  something  of  the 
kind.     I  did  not  put  that  in. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  signed  the  letter. 

General  Bissell.  I  signed  the  letter,  and  when  I  dictated  it,  I  dic- 
tated the  first  paragraph  and  then  I  said,  'Tt  is  the  Colonel  Van  Vliet 
report,  and  get  the  dope  on  the  thing  and  send  it  in." 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  For  your  information,  that  only  contained  one 
paragraph. 

General  Bissell.  That  is  the  second  thought.  The  first  thought, 
here  comes  a  letter,  and  the  second  thought,  compare  it  with  another 
thing. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  will  read  it  to  you  again : 

Dear  Mr.  Lyon  :  Transmitted  for  the  information  and  the  files  of  the  State 
Department  is  report  on  Katyn  by  Stanley  S.  V.  Gilder,  Captain,  British  Medical 
Officer.  This  report  supplements  statement  of  Lt.  Col.  John  Van  Vliet,  Ji'., 
forwarded  to  General  Holmes. 

General  Bissell.  That  is  the  way  I  remember  it.  There  were  two 
sentences.  The  first  one  I  dictated  straight  out  and  I  left  the  follow- 
ing thing  blank. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Are  you  inferring  that  you  as  commanding  offi- 
cer, G-2,  signed  a  letter  in  blank  with  your  secretary  filling  it  in? 

General  Bisseij^.  It  was  filled  in. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Was  the  date  in  there.  May  25  ? 

General  Bissell.  The  date  was  filled  in. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  What  was  not  in  then?  You  signed  the  letter, 
and  May  25  you  forwarded  it. 

General  Bissell.  When  I  signed  the  letter  it  was  exactly  the  form 
in  which  you  read  it.  When  I  dictated  I  dictated  what  I  could,  out 
of  my  head,  I  think  in  August. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  August  25. 

General  Bissell.  I  could  not  have  pulled  that  date  out  of  my  head 
after  all  that  had  been  happening,  with  accuracy. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  How  do  you  account  for  the  fact  that  you  stated 
in  your  letter  you  did  forward  to  General  Holmes  the  Colonel  Van 
Vliet  report? 

General  Bissell.  That  was  my  belief  at  the  moment  of  what  had 
happened.  They  went  back  to  the  files  apparently  and  got  something 
to  set  that  date  up  for  them.  The  one  that  did  it  I  think  is  Mrs. 
Meeres. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Where  is  that  letter  or  a  copy  of  that  letter  today  ? 

General  Bissell.  Isn't  that  one  of  those  you  have  here  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  am  not  referring  to  this.  I  am  referring  to  the 
letter  where  you  got  the  date  May  25, 19-1:5'  from. 

General  Bissell.  I  did  not  personally  do  that. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Just  a  minute,  (ieneral.  You  stated  to  Mr.  Mach- 
rowicz 1  minute  ago  that  you  could  not  recall  this  date,  so  you  dic- 
tated all  the  other  data  that  is  in  this  to  the  best  of  your  knowledge. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1877 

General  Bissell.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Then  you  probably  said,  as  many  men  do  to  their 
secretaries,  "Find  out  when  I  transmitted  that  over  to  General 
Holmes."  She  inserted  this  date  25th  of  May  1945.  If  she  could 
find  that  on  August  21,  1945,  why  can't  we  find  the  same  copy  of  the 
transmittal  today  ? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  what  I  would  like  to  know.  Also,  I  think 
it  is  very  significant  because  that  is  what  I  believed  at  that  particular 
time  and  put  in  writing  and  I  didn't  do  it  myself. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  That  is  what  you  would  like  to  find  out  and 
that  is  what  we  would  like  to  find  out.  You  are  inferring  the  fault 
lies  with  the  Department  of  State.  If  those  letters  were  lost,  they 
were  lost  in  the  Department  of  Defense,  is  that  right? 

General  Bissell.  I  don't  know  where  they  were  lost. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  They  never  got  out  of  the  Department  of  De- 
fense. 

General  Bissell.  I  don't  know  whether  they  did  or  not.  Wliy 
would  we  have  that  kind  of  letter  written  in  my  office  if  it  had  not 
gone  out. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  mean  the  original  report  of  Colonel  Van 
Vliet. 

General  Bissell.  That  is  what  I  am  talking  about,  too.  Why 
would  I  have  referred  to  it  by  date  if  I  didn't  believe  it  had  gone  out? 
And  why  if  it  had  not  gone  out  didn't  State,  when  they  got  the  letter, 
call  me  up  on  the  phone :     "How  about  this  thing,  we  haven't  got  that." 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  are  inferring  you  would  have  let  an  impor- 
tant document  go  out  without  some  receipt  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  never  got  a  receipt  from  anybody  on  anything  in 
G-2.  I  had  people  who  did  the  receipting  for  me,  and  a  section  in  my 
office  to  process  in  and  out  those  documents.  So  far  as  my  particular 
section  of  the  G-2  office  is  concerned,  we  had  Colonel  Lantaff's  group 
who  did  it  for  me.  I  never  signed  one  in,  I  never  signed  one  out. 
When  I  got  through  with  a  communication,  it  went  in  my  out  basket. 
Those  people  who  were  cleared  for  top  secret  information  brought  me 
in  masses  of  stuff  every  day.  I  acted  on  it  and  put  it  in  the  out  bas- 
ket. 

Chairman  Madden.  Did  they  ever  bring  you  in  masses  of  material 
that  pertained  to  the  killing  of  4,300  soldiers? 

General  Bissell.  At  that  time  I  dichi't  know  and  do  not  know  today 
exactly  how  many  were  killed. 

Chairman  Madden.  You  should  not  classify  a  report  of  this  im- 
portance with  the  thousands  of  little  details  that  come  in  and  out  of 
your  office.  This  was  an  extraordinary,  an  important  event,  as  you 
testified. 

General  Bissell.  I  was  very  concerned  all  of  this  particular  time 
with  events  that  were  even  more  critical  to  America's  war  with  Japan, 
and  this  was  not  going  to  help  win  the  Japan  war  one  bit  except  in  a 
different  way.  And  that  was  the  reason  I  was  so  careful  about  this 
thing. 

I  have  a  lot  of  stuff  here,  and  I  will  spoil  it  by  breaking  it  up  piece- 
rtieal.  The  UNO  conference  was  one.  I  had  been  on  there  the  pre- 
vious week.  Our  No.  1  objective,  other  than  defeating  Japan  at  that 
time,  was  to  get  a  UNO  going.  We  didn't  know  whether  we  could 
get  the  Russians  to  come  in. 


1878  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

Chairman  Madden.  You  wanted  to  maintain  friendship  with  the 
Hussians. 

General  Bissell.  That  Avas  tlie  policy  of  our  Government. 

Chairman  Madden.  Was  that  why  the  report  disappeared? 

General  Bissell.  No,  sir,  it  was  not  why.  I  don't  know  what  re- 
port you  are  talking  about  on  that.  That  is  a  fast  one.  I  cannot 
tell  you  a  thing  about  that. 

Mr.  DoxDERO.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  think  I  ought  to  enter  this.  T 
notice  that  my  colleague  from  Michigan,  who  is  critical  of  your  testi- 
mony, even  referred  to  a  letter  with  one  sentence  in  it  when  there  were 
two  in  it,  and  the  letter  was  right  before  hiui.  So  it  shows  the  falli- 
bility of  human  nature. 

I  want  to  ask  this  one  question:  General,  at  the  time  you  had  this 
Katyn  massacre  subject  before  you,  were  you  handling  other  matters 
for  the  Government  in  your  department? 

Geueral  Bissell.  Vast  numbei's. 

Mr.  DoNDERo.  You  had  other  items  around  the  world  in  relation  to 
the  war  which  we  were  then  in,  is  that  correct? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  right.  I  told  you  I  cauie  up  to  this  body, 
busy  as  I  was,  to  testify  to  them  about  subversive  activities  in  the 
service. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  The  Katyn  matter  was  only  one  of  the  items  that 
^ame  across  your  dessk  ? 

Chairman  Madde'n.  It  was  the  only  massacre  you  had. 

General  Bissell.  That  is  not  so.  It  was  the  ouly  one  of  that  magni- 
tude. No;  it  is  not  so.  I  was  receiving  at  the  same  time  that  the 
Colonel  Van  Vliet  report  came  in,  the  very  time,  the  Dachau  and  other 
German  concentration-camp  things  where  they  had  wdiolesale  mas- 
sacres that  make  this  thing  look  insignificant.  It  numbers  nearly  a 
quarter  of  a  million  that  went  through  Dachau.  And  there  were 
Poles  in  that,  lots  of  them.  My  driver  yesterday  taking  me  from  the 
station  was  a  Pole  whose  father  was  killed  in  that  thing,  and  who 
spent  as  a  child,  until  he  got  old  enough  to  come  to  the  United  States, 
his  time  in  Dachau  from  1943  on. 

The  Japanese  balloon  thing  was  cracking  on  us.  We  were  having 
a  devil  of  a  time  to  get  the  press  to  hold  it.  We  had  had  the  fatali- 
ties in  Oregon.  We  didn't  want  the  American  people  to  know  what 
was  hap])ening  in  that  thing,  and,  more  than  that,  we  didn't  want  the 
Japanese  to  know  how  successful  they  were.  I  was  busy  trying  to 
keep  that  one  from  bursting  in  the  press.  I  had  that  on  my  mind. 
The  same  day,  when  I  was  out  on  the  tri]>,  I  had  the  Minnea]X)lis 
newspapers  on  me  and  came  back  here  and  got  Price  together  with 
others  of  the  group  that  was  concerned  with  it  on  how  we  would 
handle  that  particular  thing.  I  was  preparing  somethino-  for  General 
Marshall  to  Field  Marshal  ]\faintland-Wilson  at  that  particular  time. 
If  I  racJv  my  memory,  I  can  show  you  that  the  Van  Vliet  visit  took 
30  minutes  one  day  and  less  the  next,  on  days  like  I  had  been  working! 
for  many  months  from  7  a.  m.  until  late  every  night  and  Sundavs,  on  I 
everything  in  the  world.  I  had  flown  14  or  15  hours  on  one  day  in 
connection  with  this  trip,  getting  in  here  to  meet  Colonel  Van  Vliet. 
I  didn't  know  he  was  hero. 

I  would  like  to  add  just  one  more  thing.  Coloiu^l  Lantaff  is  jii-^( 
as  honest  as  can  be,  but  he  said  that  Mrs.  Jepson  was  in  the  oflice 
and  I  had  loaned  Mrs.  Jepson  to  UNO  and  she  was  working  out  theie 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1879 

on  that  thing.  And  another  lady,  whose  name  slipped  his  memory, 
I  am  sure  Mrs.  Bryant,  was  the  secretary  on  duty.  He  didn't  tell  you 
anj- thing  wrong.  He  told  you  what  he  believed  and  remembered. 
He  just  overlooked  the  fact  we  did  loan  her  out  there  and  she  was 
not  yet  back  on  duty  in  my  office  at  the  time. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mrs.  who? 

General  Bissell.  Miss  Bryant.  She  is  now  married  and  living 
down  here  near  Hollis  some  place. 

Mr.  JNIiTCHELL.  Was  she  married  at  that  time  ? 

General  Bissell.  No. 

Mr.  SnEEiiAX.  General,  I  have  a  series  of  questions;  so  if  you  wnll 
be  patient  with  me,  because  some  of  them  might  be  a  little  rehashing 
of  something  that  has  been  said,  and  I  do  that  for  the  purpose  of  get- 
ting away  from  the  general  discussion,  so  that  it  will  come  out  and 
be  either  clarified  or  amplified. 

Number  one:  Mrs.  Meeres  in  her  testimony  stated  that  top-secret 
reports  usually  are  corrected  and  i-etyped,  and,  as  you  yourself  said, 
Colonel  Lantaff  read  this  report  in  the  preparation  stage.  Why  wasn't 
that -report  handled  this  way? 

General  Bissell.  My  intention  was  to  have  it  produced  in  what  we 
call  draft ;  bring  it  out  in  draft.  That  usually  means  that  a  thing 
is  typed  on  long  sheets,  double  or  triple  space,  just  the  original  im- 
pression. Then  it  is  corrected  and  modified  and  you  do  not  send  a 
dirty  copy  out,  so  a  retyping  is  essential.  That  is  what  I  thought 
would  happen  in  this  case,  because  I  thought  when  Colonel  Van  Vliet 
got  his  dictation  down  and  Mrs.  Meeres  knocked  it  out  the  first  time, 
she  would  have  misunderstood  or  misspelled  or  done  a  number  of  other 
things.  They  would  then  bring  it  in  to  me  and  we  would  talk  about 
it  and  I  would  see  if  there  were  any  other  errors  or  omissions  I  could 
ask  him  about  that  might  help  him  and  then  it  would  be  retyped. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Right  at  that  particular  stage,  was  this  rough  draft 
ever  converted  into  an  original  final  draft? 

General  Bissell.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Was  there  ever  a  top  secret  number  given  to  the  Van 
Vliet  report  ? 

General  Bissell.  That  I  would  not  know,  because  I  didn't  handle 
that  myself.     That  was  done  in  Colonel  Lantaff's  office. 

Chairman  Maddex.  I  suggest  that  Mr.  Sheehan  continue  his  ques- 
tions. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  I  had  yielded  to  the  gentleman  for  that  purpose. 

In  other  words,  once  you  determined  a  document  was  top  secret, 
you  turned  it  over  to  Colonel  Lantaff  or  someone  else  in  the  office  for 
the  classification? 

General  Bissell.  For  the  handling  in  accordance  with  instructions 
that  were  standard  throughout  the  General  Staff. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  In  other  words,  the  mere  fact  that  this  top-secret 
document  was  not  handled  that  way  is  no  fault  of  yours  because  you 
turned  it  over  to  your  subordinates? 

General  Bissell.  No;  it  is  partly  correct  and  partly  not.  That  is 
the  way  I  wanted  it  typed  up  the  first  time  and  that  is  the  way  I  ex- 
pected Van  Vliet  to  bring  it  to  me,  and  that  is  the  way  it  was  brought  to 
me.  The  only  thing  corrected  in  it  was  maybe  a  word  or  two  and  it 
was  not  necessary  to  have  a  rewrite  and  it  was  not  rewritten.  It  was 
a  very  good  job,  "that  report. 


1880  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

Mr.  Sheehan,  Colonel  Van  Vliet  stated  that  on  May  5,  1945,  he 
showed  photographs  of  the  Katyn  massacre  to  a  G-2  officer  of  the 
One  Hundred  Fouith  Infantry  stationed  overseas.  Do  you  recall  any 
report  at  all  on  this  instance  coming  into  your  office? 

General  Bissell.  I  never  heard  of  that  except  when  Colonel  Van. 
Vliet  told  about  it. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  I  understand  that  a  Col.  Thomas  Drake,  who  was  a 
senior  American  officer  at  Oflag  64  and  was  repatriated  because  of 
stomach  ulcers  in  1944,  that  he  made  out  reports  on  the  Van  Vliet 
and  Captain  Stewart  testimony  and  sent  a  copy  of  this  report  to 
G-1,  G-2,  State  Department,  Secretary  of  War  Stimson,  and  to  Mr. 
Lauchlin  Currie,  care  of  Mr.  Roosevelt.  Did  that  G-2  report  ever 
come  across  your  desk  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  never  heard  of  that  phase  of  it.  The  only  thing 
I  know  is  what  Colonel  Van  Vliet  told  me  and  what  is  in  his  testimony 
to  you. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  As  far  as  you  know,  it  never  came  to  your  attention? 

General  Bissell.  I  don't  know  anything  about  it.  That  would  have 
been  before  my  time,  you  understand. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  No;  you  said  you  came  in  there  in  1944. 

General  Bissell.  I  came  in  1944,  and  that  was  done  when? 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Colonel  Drake  was  repatriated  late  in  1944,  which 
means  he  arrived  in  this  country  in  late  1944  or  1945  to  make  out 
these  reports. 

General  Bissell.  My  impression  was  that  Colonel  Van  Vliet  had 
said  shortly  after  he  got  back  he  talked  to  Colonel  Drake  on  it. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  That  is  right;  but  he  was  not  repatriated  until  a 
year  later. 

General  Bissell.  I  don't  know  about  that.  All  I  have  is  what  is 
in  the  Colonel  Van  Vliet  report  and  what  he  may  have  mentioned 
to  me. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  In  classifying  a  document  top  secret,  after  your 
underlings  had  done  so 

General  Bissell.  I  don't  call  them  that — my  helpers. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Let  us  call  them  subordinates — or  any  other  phase 
of  secrecy;  do  the  Army  Regulations  prescribe  for  any  logging  or 
entering  of  this  in  the  log  book  in  your  office  ? 

General  Bissell.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Was  that  done  in  this  case  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  don't  know,  because,  as  I  said,  I  never  wenti 
back  to  those.  I  asked  if  it  was  in  the  log  when  I  was  working 
for — I  don't  believe  I  asked.  I  think  you  did  the  asking  on  that; 
I  suggested  to  you,  Mr.  Shackelford,  that  you  have  the  log  checked. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Who  in  your  specific  office  had  charge  of  your  log? 

General  Bissell.  I  thinfe  Congressman  Lantaff  was  the  senior,  and 
that  Earman  was  the  next,  and  they  both  had  to  do  it  because  my  hours 
were  longer  than  theirs. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Counsel,  I  think  the  chairman  should  instruct  you 
to  check  with  the  Army  to  see  if  that  thing  was  logged  any  place. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  believe  you  have  it  right  there. 

Mr.  Sackelford.  We  have  checked  tlie  logs  in  regard  to  that,  asi 
well  as  the  receipt  books.  That  was  the  part  of  the  careful  search  that| 
was  made  by  the  inspector,  and  with  negative  results.  I 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1881 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Congressman  Lantaff  this  morning  said  that  anyone 
in  the  G-2  immediate  staff  offices  might  have  access  to  your  personal 
safe.     Is  that  correct  or  is  that  incorrect  ? 

General  Bissell.  It  depends  on  what  he  says 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  I  would  like  to  have  you  answer  is  how  many 
people  of  your  immediate  staff  had  access  to  your  safe. 

Genera]  Bissell.  The  safe  that  he  described  as  my  personal  safe 
was  described  in  that  category  because  in  it  was  a  single  drawer  which 
had  my  personal  things  like  invitations,  and  so  on.  It  was  a  classified 
routine  safe  in  the  G-2  office.  Now,  the  safe  he  did  not  mention  was 
in  my  office.  And  in  my  office,  let  ns  get  straight,  too,  because  that  is 
causing  a  lot  of  trouble,  I  had  an  office  in  which  I  worked,  a  big  room. 
On  one  side  was  my  deputy,  on  the  other  side  was  Colonel  Lantaff, 
Colonel  Earman,  normally  Mrs.  Jepson,  and  Mrs.  Bryant,  and  a 
man  named  Carulli.  They  were  in  my  immediate  office.  They  were 
all  cleared  for  top  secret,  and  they  all  know  between  them  if  it  was 
added  up,  everything  I  do.  So  if  I  were  to  be  hit  by  a  car  crossing 
the  street,  there  is  enough  there  to  carry  on.  But  I  tried  hard  to 
keep  more  people  from  knowing  about  important  things  than  needed 
to  be.  So  I  didn't  try  to  let  all  of  them  know  everything  and  they 
worked  better.  They  w^ere  better  on  the  things  that  each  one 
remembered. 

Now,  the  G-2  office  is  directly  spoken  of  to  include  the  chief,  the 
deputy,  the  deputy's  stenographers,  and  this  little  group  that  I  told 
you.  However,  my  office,  that  is  just  one  room,  and  I  am  in  there  by 
myself.  When  I  want  a  secretary,  I  call  for  her.  They  worked  out- 
side because  all  the  stuff  that  I  talked  about  was  highly  classified,  or 
maybe  General  Marshall  came  in  or  General  Handy,  during  which 
we  would  discuss  some  action,  and  it  would  be  settled.  Anybody 
might  come  over.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  has  visited  me 
there,  any  number  of  people  on  all  kinds  of  matters.  So  I  had  to 
have  a  place  where  there  was  no  one  in  their  hair,  they  could  talk 
freely. 

Now,  in  my  little  office  I  might  be  called  to  General  Marshall's 
office  and  he  would  say,  "Come  on  up  here."  We  had  a  squawk  box. 
He  was  a  cracker]  ack  man  to  work  for.  When  I  ran,  if  I  had  things 
on  my  desk  that  were  classified,  and  there  usually  was  nothing  else, 
practically  nothing  unclassified  came  in,  I  just  picked  up  my  basket. 
I  had  a  three-combination,  two-drawer  safe,  and  I  dropped  the  basket 
complete  in  there,  flung  the  combination,  checked  it,  took  down  the 
red  sign  that  the  safe  was  open  that  we  had  on  every  safe  there  and 
put  it  on  top  and  was  on  my  way,  usually  hollering  when  I  went 
through  I  was  on  my  way  to  General  Marshall's  office.  That  safe  is 
my  personal  safe.  No  one  in  my  office  knew  the  combination  of  that 
safe  except  my  deputy.  General  Wackerling. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Was  the  Van  Vliet  report  we  speak  of  put  in  that 
safe  the  night  that  Van  Vliet  completed  it  ? 

General  Bissell.  No  ;  it  was  never  put  there,  so  far  as  I  know,  be- 
cause I  didn't  put  my  hands  on  the  thing  except  to  read  it.  They 
brought  it  in  to  me ;  I  sat  down ;  I  gave  Van  Vliet  a  chance  to  cor- 
rect it.  He  didn't  want  to  make  any  corrections.  It  was  not  what 
you  call  authenticated  in  that  there  were  a  number  of  pages  that 
were  not  initialed.     I  had  him  do  that.     I  had  him  sit  back  in  the 


1882  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

chair  comfortably  and  I  went  tlu-ough  it.  My  reason  for  g'oing 
tlirough  it  primarily  was  to  answer  the  question  whether  there  was 
any  discrepancy  between  this  and  what  he  had  told  me  before,  and  it 
w^as  a  crackerjack  report;  there  were  no  discrepancies.  I  then  said, 
"This  is  to  be  classified  top  secret.'"  I  can't  tell  you  whether  Mrs. 
Meeres,  Colonel  Van  Vliet,  or  myself  actually  did  the  top-secret  stamp 
on  the  top  and  bottom  of  ever}'  page. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Isn't  it  conventional  wdien  the  secretary  is  doing 
rough  draft  to  use  the  stamp  "top  secret"  before  handing  it  back  to 
the  individual  from  whom  she  took  the  dictation  ? 

General  Bisskll.  Not  if  she  kept  it  in  her  possession.  She  was  not 
through  with  the  report  yet.  However,  she  did  say  this  morning  that 
the  envelope  which  had  the  notes  taken  out  of  her  notebook — any  spare 
piece  of  paper  tliat  was  put  in,  that  might  carry  tlie  top-secret  infor- 
mation, goes  in  the  same  envelope.  Outside  it  is  marked  "Burn.'' 
And  the  officer  oversaw  the  burning.  1  don't  think  you  will  find 
there  are  many  leaks  out  of  G-2.  Maybe  we  have  been  too  tight,  but 
we  never  lose  them.     Nothing  got  to  the  ])ublic  from  G-'2.  ■ 

Mr.  SiiEEHAN.  General,  in  these  couple  of  days  here  in  May  when 
Van  Vliet  w^as  in  and  you  said  you  had  thought 

General  Bissell.  May  22. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  May  21  to  25  when  you  had  talked  to  General  Van 
Vliet,  if  I  remember  correctly,  you  stated  you  did  i)hone  or  you 
thought  you  phoned  Holmes  and  Lyons  in  the  State  Department. 

General  Bissell.  Yes. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  When  you  talked  to  any  of  these  gentlemen  or  with 
Colonel  Lantaff  about  the  Van  Vliet  report  did  the  question  come  up 
as  to  the  political  implication  of  this  report  at  any  time? 

General  Bissell.  The  only  reason  I  would  have  mentioned  it  to 
them  at  all  Avould  have  been  its  political  aspect. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Did  they  agree  with  you  it  was  vital  ? 

General  Bissell.  No  discussion  occurred  of  the  contents  of  the 
re]:)ort  at  that  stage. 

Mr,  Sheehan.  You  are  talking  about  the  political  implications  ? 

General  Bissell  (reading)  : 

There  was  a  man  here  named  Van  Vliet  who  arrived  yesterday  and  who  has 
information  on  the  political  matter,  the  Katyn  massacre,  that  we  will  send  ta 
you  as  soon  as  we  get  through  with  it. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  You  did  not  discuss  the  conclusions? 

General  Bissell.  No.  It  was  only  incidental  to  the  talk  on  the 
other  matter.  I  remember  the  other  matter  quite  well,  I  will  be 
glad  to  give  it  to  you  in  executive  session,  but  it  has  no  bearing  on 
Katyn  whatever, 

Mr.  Sheehan.  This  might  steal  a  little  thunder  from  my  colleague 
over  there.  This  morning  Congressman  O'Konski  asked  you  a  ques- 
tion al)out  whether  or  not  any  other  documents  had  disappeared  or 
were  lost  or  strayed  from  G-2.  I  did  not  use  the  word  "stolen''  ad- 
visedly because  tlie  Army  uses  the  word  "compromise."  As  I  under- 
stand it,  from  the  MacArthur  testimony,  tlie  eight  colonels  Avho  sent 
a  top-secret  repor-t  from  Japan  or  the  Near  East  in  which  they  tried 
to  advise  the  administration  of  the  danger  of  alining  themselves  with 
Russia  in  finisliing  off  the  Japanese  war,  I  understand  that  report 
disappeared  out  of  G-2.     Is  that  right  or  wrong? 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1883; 

General  Bissell.  Here  is  what  I  don't  believe  is  fully  understood 
and  probably  it  is  just  as  well  that  all  the  American  people  don't 
know  about 'all  of  G-2,  but  if  you  didn't  have  some  procedure  for 
destroying  set  up  with  the  mass  of  stuif  coming  in  there,  you  could  not 
get  the  people  that  would  be  required  to  keep  track  of  it  in  the  Penta- 
gon. There  goes  on  constantly  in  any  large  intelligence  organization 
a  sorting  out  and  a  reclassification  and  a  destruction.  At  the  end 
of  the  German  war  there  was  a  period  when  that  had  to  be  done  ex- 
tensively. The  German  war  had  ended  just  a  few  days,  a  short  time 
before  General  Van  Vliet's  arrival.  He  got  liberated  on  the  5th  of 
May.  The  war  was  over  on  the  Tth,  as  1  recall,  the  8th,  and  this  is; 
the  22d.  Now,  also,  at  the  end  of  the  German  war,  by  the  plans  ar- 
ranged in  advance,  we  were  to  start  cutting  down  personnel  drastically. 
The  biggest  fighting  part  of  the  war  was  over,  maybe  not  the  most 
difficult  part,  but  the  biggest  fighting  part.  With  that  cutting  dowm, 
your  procedure  of  destruction  is  weakened  because  you  try  to  let  those 
people  go  who  have  come  in  from  civil  life  and  given  you  fine  service 
in  the  order  in  which  they  want  to  go,  in  which  they  can  get  a  job.  If 
a  fellow  got  a  chance  to  leave  and  he  was  a  good  man,  his  boss  wants 
him  right  now  when  the  pressure  is  off.  Those  people  we  would  let 
go.  Others  were  cases  where  they  didn't  want  to  go  so  quickly,  and 
Ave  tried  to  be  loyal  to  them,  too.  During  the  time  I  was  there,  this 
procedure  and  declassification,  two  things,  must  go  on.  You  must 
destroy  the  things  that  are  no  longer  necessary  and  current,  and  you 
must  declassify  down  and  down,  as  time  passes. 

Mr.  Sheetiax.  The  Japanese  war  was  still  on  at  the  time? 

General  Bissell.  I  don't  know  the  instance  you  are  talking  about. 
I  was  asked  some  questions  about  a  report  of  a  number  of  colonels. 
They  were  not  of  ]\IacArthur's  staff.  They  were  right  here  in  Wash- 
ington, that  group,  and  I  didn't  know  MacArthur's  connection  with  it. 

Mr.  Sheeiian.  It  came  out  during  the  ^NlacArthur  hearings  that  the 
Army  G-2  was  advised  by  the  group  of  eight  colonels. 

General  Bissell.  Yes. 

Mr.  SiiEEiiAX.  Of  the  dangers  of  alining  themselves  with  Russia., 
Apparently  during  the  MacArthur  hearings  they  thought  this  was 
a  very  vital  document.  When  they  went  to  look  for  it,  they  a]5par- 
ently  could  not  find  it  because  it  was  referred  to  G-2  and  never  found 
afterward.  ^ 

General  Bissell.  The  way  the  story  came  to  me  was,  "Can  you  tell 
us  whether  such  a  report  was  ever  made  to  you  ?"  Well,  it  might  have 
been  prepai-ed :  those  people  were  in  my  office,  but  if  they  prepared 
such  a  repoi't.  it  never  came  to  me. 

Mr.  Machkowicz.  That  is  the  question  I  would  like  to  know  about, 
since  you  inferred  that  the  Katyn  matter  was  not  so  important  because 
of  the  tremendous  importance  of  the  Japanese  affair.  Here  is  a  report 
bearing  exactly  on  the  issue  which  you  considered  paramount  now. 
Now  you  don't  remember  those  eight  colonels  filing  a  report  with  you. 

General  Bissell.  I  have  talked  to  some  of  the  eight  colonels  and 
they  told  me  they  never  made  such  a  report.  I  think  you  will  have 
one  here  whom  you  may  ask  the  questions. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Was  he  one  of  the  eight  colonels  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  think  he  is. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Do  you  know  Col.  Truman  Smith  ? 


1884  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

General  Bissell.  Yes. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  say  Col.  Truman  Smitli  did  not  sign  a 
report  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  never  got  such  a  report  as  you  described  from 
him. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  At  any  rate  the  report  is  missing  in  G-2  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  don't  know  if  it  ever  left  the  office  where  it 
originated.  I  don't  know  anything  about  it,  because  I  never  saw  it. 
Don't  get  the  idea  that  we  didn't  appreciate  that  there  was  danger  in 
the  international  political  situation  or  danger  in  our  alinement  with 
Russia.  We  had  had  troubles  with  the  Russians  all  through  the  war 
trying  to  help  them  and  keep  them  out  of  our  hair. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  would  like  to  know  whether  the  loss  of  the  Van 
Vliet  report  was  not  one  of  those  attempts  to  help  them. 

General  Bissell.  Do  you  want  me  to  answer  that  question  ? 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Yes. 

General  Bissell.  So  far  as  I  am  concerned,  I  would  be  on  the  other 
side  of  that  fight  for  every  inch  that  was  of  me.  It  did  not,  with  my 
knowledge  or  my  help,  and  I  would  like  to  say  further  that  no  person, 
not  General  Marshall,  not  the  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Stimson,  not  any 
member  of  the  General  Staff  or  any  member  of  the  military  profession 
or  any  member  of  our  diplomatic  or  legislative  or  judicial  or  any 
other  human,  foreign  or  American,  ever  suggested  to  me  what  to  do 
or  what  not  to  do  with  the  Van  Vliet  report  or  anything  comiected 
with  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  are  implying  you  did  discuss  it  with  these 
gentlemen  ? 

General  Bissell.  No;  I  did  not.  I  said  none  of  them  ever  mem- 
tioned  it  to  me. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  How  could  they  mention  it  if  they  did  not  know 
about  it  ? 

General  Bissell.  Everybody  knew  about  the  Katyn  affair. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes;  but  you  were  talking  about  the  Van  Vliet 
report. 

General  Bissell.  I  thought  you  might  want  to  know  that  no  one 
ever  influenced  my  action  in  any  way  or  tried  to. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  How  could  they  influence  your  action  in  any  way 
if  they  didn't  know  about  the  Van  Vliet  report?  You  must  have 
discussed  it  with  these  individuals. 

General  Bi-sell.  I  di,^  -nt,  nor  did  they  uisc  ai  me. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  We  have  a  lot  of  ring-ar^--  ...^  on  i\\\s  question 

as  to  whether  or  not  t^^  '^ta'^p  Depa  'imtut  gjt  this  document.  I 
am  not  going  to  go  into  i.  t^d  both  'Congressman  Machrowicz  and 

myself  have  had  different  variations  of  your  answer  this  morning. 
I  want  to  put  a  very  short  bald  question  to  you,  and  you  weigh  it 
before  you  decide  to  answer  it.  The  question  I  would  like  to  ask  is: 
Would  you  state  it  to  be  a  fact  that  the  State  Department  did  receive 
the  original  Van  Vliet  report? 

General  Bissell.  Did? 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Yes. 

General  Bisseij^.  No  ;  I  would  not  state  it  as  a  fact. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  O.  K. 

On  the  other  hand,  he  did  state  when  he  read  the  previous  testimony 
from  all  the  mail  he  got,  the  letters,  that  they  referred  to  the  Van 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    IVIASSACRE  1885 

Vliet  report  &  .  eral  times,  and  he  said  someone  should  have  asked  him 
for  it  if  thev  didn't  have  it. 

Mr.  MAciiRowK  z.  The  answer  is,  he  thinks  they  must  have  known 
about  it,  but  he  will  not  say  they  knew  about  it. 

Mv.  ^iiEEiiAN.  General,  in  your  testimony  you  stated  m  drawing 
some  conclusions  that  the  facts  show  that  the  State  Department  had 
gone  into  the  Katvn  matter  carefully. 

General  Bissell>.  I  told  you  how  long  they  were  at  my  letters,  and 
how  many  places  it  had  been.    Somebody  must  have  looked  at  it. 

Mr.  SiiEEHAN.  Would  you  state  they  were  still  going  into  it  in 
1945.  because  previously  your  testimony  was  they  were  trying  to  get 
it  through  the  Swiss  when  he  was  a  prisoner  of  war.  Was  the  State 
Department  still  interested  in  that  in  1945^ 

General  Bissell.  I  would  have  thought  they  should  have  been. 
Let  me  see  now,  1945,  certainly  they  would  have  been  interested  in 
it.    They  would  have  wanted  anything  we  had  gotten  on  that  subject. 
Chairman  ]Madden.  Did  they  ask  for  it? 

General  Bissell.  No.  That  was  not  going  to  influence  the  outcome 
of  that  war  that  we  were  fighting  with  Germany  and  Japan. 

Xow,  I  would  like  to  make  a  point,  and  this  is  only— it  is  nothing 
that  happened,  but  it  is  a  consideration.  Had  there  been  evidence 
positive  in  the  Van  Vliet  report  that  any  particular  nation  had  been 
ouilty,  rather  than  an  opinion,  and  a  conclusion  formed  in  a  state- 
ment by  a  man  who  says  there  is  no  single  thing  that  proves  it,  just 
a  combination  of  circunistances  of  the  thing  makes  him  believe  it,  it 
probal)ly  would  have  been  of  very  much  greater  importance  to  me. 
But  when  I  got  through  with  Van  Vliet's  report  I  did  not  feel  positive 
by  any  means  that  he  was  right.  He  had  reached  a  conclusion.  I 
did  not  feel  at  all  sure  he  was  right.  I  felt  his  statements  were  as  he 
remembei'ed  them. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  ever  see  the  Kathleen  Harriman  report 
dated  January  1944?^ 
General  Bissell.  No. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  never  saw  it  during  the  period  January  1944 
and  Mav  1945? 

General  Bissell.  I  never  saw  it  at  all.    When  you  say  the  '  Kath- 
leen" you  mean  the  one  that  Mr.  Harriman  would  have  sent  in  due 
to  his  daughter's  visit? 
Mr.  MiT'TiELL.  Correct. 

General  '    Wh(  ^her  that  would  have  been  his  report  or  hers, 

I  don't  know.  '!  n6ver  seen  the  doer/       t  anyhow  •' 

Mr.  SHEEHAN.'i'f''  i  \now  it  to  be  a  fact  that  the  State  Depart- 
ment did  receive  the^'Br'nTsl.  i-epor^^*  <?  -A,  Stanley  Gilder  on  the 
Katyn  matter?  '  >''Jir>odj' 

General  Bissell.  I  think  tliey  have  it. 

Mr.  Siieehax.  I  think  you 'did  testify  this  morning  it  was  referred 
to  von  in  G-2  and  you  sent  it  on  to  State. 

General  Bissell.  That  is  right.  I  would  have  to  check  my  notes. 
I  think  there  was  an  ansAver  to  that. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  You  said  the  State  Department  stamp  showed  receipt  ? 
General  Bissell.  This  is  not  the  Gilder  one. 

^Ir.  Shackelford.  Mr.  Sheehan,  the  State  Department  did  receive 
the  Gilder  report. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  They  did  receive  it  ? 

93744— 52— pt.  7 5 


1886  THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE 

Mr.  Shackelford.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Sheeiian.  Do  or  do  you  not  know  whether  or  not  Gilder  men- 
tioned about  Van  Vliet  in  his  report? 

General  Bissell.  Not  ])Ositively.  I  know  he  said  there  were  British 
and  Americans  in  the  party. 

Mr.  DoNDEKO.  I  think  the  record  will  show  there  were  four  people 
in  the  party,  one  from  England  and  one  from  South  Africa  and  the 
two  American  officers. 

General  Bissell.  But  that  did  not  say  they  were  Van  Vliet,  as  I 
remember. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  The  only  reason  I  thought,  if  you  did  know  that, 
that  the  State  Department  was  informed  in  the  Gilder  report  of  Van 
Vliet,  it  would  seem  to  me  they  would  take  the  precautions  to  go  to  the 
Army  to  find  out  what  the  Van  Vliet  report  was. 

General  Bissell.  Mr.  Shackelford  has  been  kind  enough  to  show"  me 
the  copy  that  w\as  released  by  the  War  Department  of  the  Gilder  re- 
])ort,  and  it  shows  the  name  of  Captain  Stewart  and  Lieutenant  Col- 
onel Van  Vliet  in  Gilder's  report,  a  copy  of  which  was  contained  in  the 
War  Department  release  on  Katyn  sometime  ago  under  date  of  Sep- 
tember 18,  1950.  They  published  the  Gilder  report  and  the  Gilder 
report  says  that  Lieutenant  Colonel  Van  Vliet  and  Captain  Stewart 
of  the  American  Army  were  in  the  party.  So  they  did  know  from 
that. 

Mr.  Sheeiian.  In  other  w^ords,  the  State  Department  knew  in  194.5 
this  was  the  proposition  and  yet  apparently  took  no  steps  to  run  it 
down  with  the  Army  to  find  this  report;  otherwise  you  would  have 
had  correspondence  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  would  have  had  correspondence.  I  made  that 
point. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  I  am  trying  to  emphasize  that  here.  I  am  going  to 
ask  that  at  this  point  in  the  record — you  will  have  to  check  with  Mr. 
Shackelford  there  whether  it  is  a  confidential  report  from  the  Inspec- 
tor General  on  the  search  for  the  missing  document — that  ]\Ir.  Shackel- 
fora  see  to  it  that  whatever  security  information  is  necessaiy  to  be 
deleted  is  deleted  and  I  would  like  to  have  a  couple  of  questions  on  it. 

General  Bissell.  I  had  intended  to  mention  that  and  have  done  so 
under  my  authority  in  my  notes  here. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  These  are  extracts  now  from  this  report  in  which  1 
see  no  names,  so  I  cannot  say  whether  they  are  of  confidential  nature. 
Do  you  want  to  look  at  them  before  I  recite  them  ? 

Mr.  Shackelford.  Go  ahead,  jNIr.  Sheehan. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  It  seems  to  me  in  all  candidness  and  all  fairness  to 
you  that  the  Inspector  General's  report — I  do  not  lilvc  to  use  the  word 
"onus" — but  seems  to  put  the  blame  on  you  for  the  loss  of  this  right  in 
3'^our  office.  I  am  going  to  read  for  you  the  three  conclusions  that  the 
Inspector  General  lias  reached,  and  I  think  at  this  point  in  the  matter 
you  want  to  get  yourself  clear  so  that  for  the  record  it  does  not  stay 
as  a  blot  against  you.    Let  me  read  the  three  conclusions: 

No.  1,  tliiU  (lip  ori.siinal  Van  Vliot  rei)<>rt  made  to  General  Bissell  on  INIay  22, 
IMH,  and  coming  into  the  latter's  personal  possession  on  May  27),  104.1.  has  be- 
come permanently  lost  without  trace  or  reasonable  presumption  as  to  its  present 
existence  or  location. 

No.  2,  tliat  there  is  no  proof  that  this  document  ever  left  the  office  wherein  it 
originated. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE  1887 

No.  3,  that  under  the  circumstances  it  must  be  assumed  that  this  document 
has  liee'n  subjected  to  compromise  in  the  event  that  it  was  originally  given  a 
security  classification. 

In  other  words,  tlie  Inspector  General  says  everything  happened 
right  smack  in  your  office. 

General  Bissell.  Right.  He  says  it  came  into  my  personal  posses- 
sion on  May  25,  and  you  had  sworn  testimony  from  Colonel  Van  Vliet, 
from  Colonel  Lantaff  this  morning  and  Mrs.  ^Meeres  this  morning, 
that  Van  Vliet  had  long  since  been  gone  on  the  25th,  and  that  it  came 
into  my  possession  on  a  different  date.  I  only  mention  that  one  small 
point  because  if  one  is  in  error,  all  of  it  can  be  in  error.  It  is  not  all 
in  error,  but  I  mention  that  one  point.  The  testimony  of  Colonel 
Lantaff  and  Mrs.  Meeres  this  morning  did  not  state  that  it  came  into 
my  personal  possession.  They  were  very  careful  not  to  commit  them- 
selves. Since  no  one  else  knew  of  it,  I  do  not  know  from  what  source 
such  information  could  have  been  obtained,  as  no  one  else  could  know. 
The  man  wlio  wrote  this  is  honest  and  he  would  not  have  made  that 
statement  unless  he  had  a  reason  for  doing  it.  I  think  the  committee 
miglit  be  interested  in  finding  out  just  ^yhy  he  picked  the  25th,  be- 
cause it  would  fit  into  the  rest  of  this  picture. 

Mr.  Sheeiian.  I  think  when  the  committee  reads  the  entire  testi- 
mony they  will  see  his  reasons  for  his  conclusions. 

General  Bissell.  Riglit.  I  tliink  he  is  correct  that  there  is  no  proof 
that  the  document  left  the  office  wherein  it  originated.  I  think  that 
is  correct. 

Cliairman  Madden.  What  office  is  that  ? 

General  Bissell.  My  office,  tlie  office  of  G-2,  War  Department,  and 
the  Secretariat  Section;  not  the  rest  of  the  office  being  responsible 
at  all. 

Chairman  Madden.  If  I  get  that  right,  he  says  it  is  quite  true 

General  Bissell.  "That  there  is  no  proof  that  this  document  ever 
left  the  office  wherein  it  originated."  He  found  no  proof.  I  think 
that  is  correct. 

Mr.  Sheeiian.  For  our  information,  before  you  read  further 
you  might  define  what  the  Army  means  by  that  word  "compromise" 
there. 

General  Bissell.  A  document  is  compromised  when  its  contents 
have  become  known  to  an  unauthorized  person.  That  is  one  defini- 
tion. There  are  others.  If  a  document  is  completely  missing  and 
you  can't  account  for  it,  you  immediately  say  it  is  compromised  until 
you  find  out  what  happened  to  it,  if  anything.  If  you  do  not  re- 
ceive a  document  or  you  do  not  know  what  has  happened  to  a  document, 
or  any  break  in  the  chain  occurs,  you  immediately  say  it  is  com- 
promised, to  freeze  everything  on  it  and  get  right  back  on  checking 
it.  But  it  does  not  necessarily  mean  stolen.  It  does  not  necessarily 
mean  an  enemy  has  seen  it.  I  will  give  you  an  illustration.  We  had 
one  very  close  to  the  top  of  the  Government  during  the  war  where  a 
brief  case  of  information  disappeared.  We  immediately  put  that 
in  a  compromise  status.  It  subsequently  all  showed  up.  It  had  not 
been  seen  by  any  unauthorized  persons.  W^e  had  another  case  where 
part  of  a  plan  for  the  supply  of  the  operations  on  D-day  showed  up 
broken  open  in  the  post  office  in  Chicago  and  we  certainly  compro- 
mised that  in  a  hurry.    It  apparently  had  not  reached  any  unauthor- 


1888  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

ized  persons.  "When  the  matter  M^as  clarified,  we  didn't  need  to  chan<j:e 
the  date  of  tlie  landing.     We  went  ahead  with  things. 

Mr.  Sheeiian.  In  other  words,  it  is  like  the  Hiss-Chambei"s  case 
which  proves  that  papers  and  top-secret  documents  could  have 
been  copied,  could  have  been  photographed,  could  have  been  stolen, 
could  have  been  lost,  and  any  one  of  those  things  could  have  hap- 
pened to  it  in  the  State  Department.  I  assume  the  same  thing  could  be 
true  in  G-2  or  any  other  department  of  the  Army. 

General  Bissell.  It  is  possible.  We  tried  to  be  tighter  there  for 
several  reasons  :  First,  my  office  wrote  the  regulations.  Now,  that  puts 
me  in  an  odd  position.  The  authority  to  write  them  implies  the  au- 
thority to  change  them  or  modify  them.  That  gave  me  a  little  latitude. 
1  tried  not  to  take  advantage  of  it.  The  top  secret  thing  was  born 
while  I  was  in  G-2  and  I  had  to  put  out  the  instructions  that  governed 
at  that  time.  They  governed  for  2  years,  and  then  they  were  changed 
in  194G,  sometime  along  there. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  say  that  the  classification  or  designation  of  top 
secret  in  lO-ii  was  changed  or  originally  put  into  being  during  that 
period  of  time  ? 

General  Bissell.  Prior  to  the  issuance  of  the  regulation — but  the 
date  I  read  you  this  morning  is  the  right  one,  I  would  have  to  check 
my  memory  on  it,  because  we  have  been  throwing  dates  around  here — 
March  15,  I  believe,  approved  by  the  Joint  Cheifs  of  Staff  approxi- 
mately a  month  earlier  and  then  passed  over  to  the  regular  shops  that 
j)ut  out  the  information.  Here  is  the  document  that  came  out,  Army 
Kegulations  380-5,  came  out  on  March  15, 1944. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  In  other  words,  you  were  then  establishing  for  the 
entire  Army  operations  and  Air  Force 

General  Bissell.  World-wide. 

Mr.  SiiEEHAX.  World-wide,  including  the  Navy 

General  Bissell.    No.     Not  the  Navy. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  The  designation  "top  secret'-  for  the  first  time? 

General  Bisseli..  We  were  not  doing  it.  The  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff, 
by  agreement  with  the  Combined  Chiefs  of  Staff,  had  done  it  for  the 
J^ritish  and  ourselves,  not  only  for  the  military  services  but  for  cor- 
responding services  working  with  them. 

Mr.  SiiEEifAN.  Now^,  will  you  read  for  the  record,  please,  the  des- 
ignation of  top  secret  as  of  the  15th  of  March  1944,  if  you  have  it 
in  that  pamphlet  ? 

General  Bissell  Yes,  I  know  it  is  in  here. 

(a)  Wlien  classified  "tox)  secret,"  certain  secret  documents,  information  and 
material,  the  security  aspect  of  which  is  paramount  and  whose  unautliorized 
disclos\iiv  would  cause  exceptionally  grave  danger  to  the  Nation,  shall  l)e  classi- 
fied "top  secret."  The  following  are  examples  of  matter  which  normally  will  he 
graded  top  secret : 

(1)  Plans  or  particulars  of  future  ma.1or  or  special  operations. 

(2)  Particulars  of  imi)i»rtant  disi)ositions  or  impending  moves  of  o\u'  forces  or 
convoys  in  connection  with  (1)  ahove. 

(8)  Very  inuiortant  i>oliti<'al  documents  dealing  with  such  matters  as  ally 
alliances  and  the  like. 

(4)  Inforni.ition  of  the  method  used  or  success  ohtained  hy  intelligence  services 
and  counterintelligence  service  or  which  imperil  secret  agents. 

(T))  Critical  information  of  ntnv  or  improved  munitions  of  war.  including  proof, 
scientilic,  and  technical  development. 

(6)   Important  particulars  of  cryptography  and  cryptoanalysis. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  This  would  fall  in  classification  (3)  ? 


THE    KATYX    FOREST    MASSACRE  1889 

General  Bissell.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  JNIiTCHELL,.  I  would  like  to  ask  a  specific  question  on  that  point. 
Will  3'ou  explain  to  the  chairman  and  the  members  of  this  committee 
Avhy  and  to  what  extent  the  Van  Vliet  report  fell  into  the  category  of 
top  secret  in  May  1945,  which  was  after  Germany  had  surrendered, 
I  believe  ? 

Mr.  DoxDERO.  Germany  surrendered  on  May  8. 

General  Bissell.  We  had  had  the  Yalta  Conference.  You  have  me 
on  a  barrel  now.  I  don't  know  how  much  of  Yalta  has  been  declassi- 
fied. At  the  time  I  left  the  services,  part  of  it  was  not.  I  don't  know 
whether  what  I  had  intended  to  answer  is  declassified.  Does  anybody 
know  ? 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  had  better  check  before  you  make  the 
answers. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Is  Mr.  Shackelford  the  one  to  check  with  in  regard 
to  the  Yalta  ? 

Chairman  Maddex.  I  might  state  that  Russia  has  already  declassi- 
fied Yaka. 

General  Bissell.  That  does  not  quite  hit  what  I  am  talking  about. 
I  would  like  to  answer,  but  I  am  afraid  I  am  caught  on  it  at  the 
inoment. 

]\lr.  Shackleford.  Or  he  will  answer  in  executive  session  in  the 
event  it  is  still  classified  by  State. 

General  Bissell.  There  is  nothing  I  want  to  hold  from  j'ou.  It  is 
just  that  I  am  a  little  hamstrung  by  the  letter  I  got. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  want  to  know  why  the  Van  Vliet  report  on  the  22d 
of  May  1945,  after  Germany  had  surrendered  on  May  8,  1945,  was 
classified  "top  secret"  and  what  its  importance  or  significance  was  that 
it  had  to  be  so  classified  as  "top  secret." 

Mr.  INIachrowicz.  I  think  probably  the  statement  made  by  the  wit- 
ness is  a  justifiable  statement  that  the  answer  to  that  question  should 
be  withheld  until  he  has  an  opportunity  to  find  out  whether  it  is  declas- 
sified or  not. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Let  the  record  show  that  question  will  be  taken  up 
later,  please. 

Mr.  Sheeiiax.  In  your  capacity  as  head  of  G-2 — and  I  think  this 
is  a  little  before  your  time,  so  you  might  have  to  get  the  time  element — 
did  you  ever  hear  of  or  see  Colonel  Szymanski's  report  on  Katyn? 
He  was  a  military  attache  in  1942  and  1943, 1  believe,  and  was  sending 
reports,  G-2  reports  in. 

General  Bissell.  I  stated  this  morning  I  could  not  state  for  sure  if 
I  saw  him  when  I  came  through  Cairo.  I  never  saw  the  reports  while 
G-2.  The  first  I  knew  of  them  was  the  report  in  the  press  they  were 
before  your  committee. 

JNIr.  Sheehan.  Did  you  have  any  correspondence  or  remember  any 
correspondence  or  talk  with  the  State  Department  about  the  Holmes' 
report  ? 

General  Bissell.  Not  until  I  saw  in  the  press.  I  went  back  and  got 
permission  to  read  both  of  them. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  You  did  see  them  after  this  was  all  over? 

General  Bissell.  Yes. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  saw  them  in  the  Department  of  Defense? 

General  Bissell.  Yes;  and  asked  authority  and  they  told  me  I 
could  see  them  if  I  would  come  to  Washington.     I  did. 


1890  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

Mr.  Mitchell.  When  was  that,  sir? 

General  Bissell.  It  is  all  in  the  story  I  am  trying  to  read  to  you. 
It  was  the  1st  to  12th  of  April  I  was  in  Washington  and  came  up  to 
get  this  information  and  other  matters.     I  had  other  business  up  here. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  You  are  positive  of  the  fact  that  you  did  classify 
the  document  "top  secret"  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  am  positive. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Is  there  any  possibility  you  could  have  changed 
your  mind  afterward  ? 

General  Bissell.  That  one  would  have  been  a  little  impossible  in 
a  way.  I  had  authority  to  down  grade  any  document  by  anybody 
else  in  the  military  service  except  General  Marshall,  but  there  was 
a  string  to  it.  We  were  in  business  with  the  British  in  this  war, 
and  the  war  was  being  directed  by  the  Combined  Chiefs  of  Staff. 
They  had  set  up  an  arrangement  whereby  neither  nation  would  down 
grade  below  the  classification,  lower  classification,  of  the  two  nations. 
Since  the  Gilder  report — there  was  no  reason  for  bringing  it  here, 
because  it  was  secret  and  dealt  with  the  same  incident  as  the  Van  Vliet 
report,  so  it  was  not  within  my  independent  authority  to  down  grade 
below  the  grade  of  "secret."  To  have  done  that,  that  wouldn't  have 
let  any  human,  outside  of  those  who  needed  to  know  about  it,  see  it. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  I  think  that  my  final  question  that  I  am  coming  to 
might  have  to  do  with  the  possibility  of  leaks  in  G-2  while  you  were 
there.  If  you  will  look  at  the  Inspector  General's  report,  you  will 
find  there  is  a  paragraph  which  states  as  follows : 

With  further  reference  to  General  Bissell's  letter  to  General  Holmes  of  May 
25,  1945,  and  General  Holmes'  answer  thereto  to  General  Bissell  dated  June  9, 
1945,  a  search  of  the  files  of  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2,  failed  to  disclose 
copies  of  either,  although  both  were  recorded  in  the  logbook  kept  in  the  office 
at  that  time. 

Here  we  have  a  situation  where  you  have  made  references  in  a  log- 
book to  correspondence  which  you  wrote.  Yet,  they  are  nowheres  to 
be  found  in  the  Department.  However,  it  turns  out,  according  to 
the  Inspector  General's  report,  that  the  copies  of  these  letters  were 
obtained  from  the  files  of  the  State  Department.  The  Inspector  Gen- 
eral goes  on  to  say — is  it  not  plausible  that  some  sort  of  master  file — 
and  I  am  trying  to  state  that  myself — is  it  not  plausible  that  some  sort 
of  master  file  or  classification  number  should  identify  all  of  these 
matters  pertaining  to  Katyn  in  the  Van  Vliet  report? 

General  Bissell.  That  was  explained  in  o;reat  detail  by  a  man  named 
Carulli.  I  don't  know  whether  he  testified  to  them.  He  was  the 
man  I  mentioned  in  my  office.  I  suggested  to  Mr.  Shackelford  he 
was  the  expert  and  he  would  be  glad  to  inform  the  Inspector  Gen- 
eral whatever  went  on.     He  explained  our  system. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  He  did  because  he  is  referred  to  as  one  of  the 
informants. 

General  Bissell.  That  is  right.  We  didn't  package  things.  Mr. 
Carulli  explained  why.  When  I  was  vacating  my  personal  office, 
there  were  no  files  in  that  one.  That  was  not  a  place  for  papers  to  be 
filed.  In  the  one  next  to  it  there  were  quite  large  files,  probably  five 
or  six  big  file  cabinets  full. 

Then  the  next  door  to  that  had  a  small  card  index,  10,000,  20,000, 
or  30,000  cards,  perhaps,  which  covered  G-2,  things  that  had  been 
handled  in  a  recent  period.     We  had  to  keep  some  material  right 


THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE  1891 

there,  and  we  kept  that  as  a  quick  thing.  It  worked  beautifully.  We 
could  get  things  very  quickly.  General  Marshall  could  call  down, 
and  I  could  have  the  piece  of  paper  up  to  him  in  5  minutes.  I  could 
never  have  done  that  if  it  were  sent  to  the  general  files.    It  is  too  big. 

The  security  of  those  general  files  required  that  everything  went 
through  a  certain  way  in  and  out.  It  is  clumsy.  It  is  not  a  quick 
thing.  It  is  a  safe  thing.  You  have  to  compromise  between  speed  and 
absolute  security. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  There  is  another  thought.  You  mentioned  before 
when  we  were  talking  about  the  word  "compromise"  and  your  defini- 
tion, something  about  the  "day  plans"  that  were  forwarded  or  opened 
at  the  Chicago  post  office.  Will  you  just,  for  our  general  benefit, 
elaborate  on  that  ? 

General  Bissell.  It  has  been  published  briefly  in  the  press.  It  ap- 
pears that  the  headquarters  in  London  was  moving  its  G-4  depart- 
ment. The  individual  who  had  the  papers  intended  to  address  them 
to  himself  at  the  next  office  he  was  going  to.  He  was  writing  a  letter 
home,  intending  to  send  something  home  at  the  same  time,  and  he 
confused  them  and  put  them  in  the  wrong  envelopes.  The  plans  for 
the  supply  went  to  Chicago,  and  the  little  favors  for  his  family  went 
to  the  office  he  intended  to  move  to.  He  was  so  frightened  that  he 
did  not  report  it.  By  accident  the  package  was  broken  open  in  the 
Chicago  office,  and,  as  I  recall  it,  the  inspectors  immediately  called  the 
military,  and  we  had  someone  there  very  quickly.  The  papers  were 
flown  up  here,  and  we  asked  for  a  man  to  come  from  General  Eisen- 
hower's headquarters  quickly  to  check  the  papers  and  see  whether  they 
might  need  to  change  the  landing  date.  He  had  General  Crawford 
flown  over  here.  I  think  you  will  find  it  mentioned  in  Top  Secrets 
very  briefly,  in  that  book,  Top  Secret.  It  has  been  in  the  press  from 
time  to  time,  but  very  little  on  it.  No  harm  came  of  it,  although  it 
looked  very  suspicious  at  first  because  the  boy  came  from  a  German 
family.  It  was  addressed  to  a  German  family.  There  were  several 
unusual  things  about  that  end  of  it.  They  were  all  right.  The  whole 
thing  was  all  right.    No  harm  was  done. 

Mr.  SiiEEHAN.  When  you  use  the  phrase  "broken  up" 

General  Bissell.  By  accident  in  handling  when  they  dumped  the 
contents  of  the  pouches  onto  the  sorting  table.  That  is  the  way  I 
recollect  it.  There  may  have  been  some  details  I  have  not  described 
100  percent  accurate  in  that  brief  comment. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  The  only  thing  that  bothers  me  is  the  getting  around 
this  idea  of  whether  the  State  Department  got  it  or  not,  because  from 
some  of  your  correspondence — and  I  am  quoting  from  that  letter  you 
wrote  to  Mr.  Lyon  in  which  you  are  talking  about  the  Gilder  report 
again — your  last  sentence  said : 

This  report  supplements  the  statement  of  Lt.  Col.  John  H.  Van  Vliet,  Jr.,  for- 
warded to  General  Holmes,  May  25,  1945,  and  generally  substantiating  all 
material  facts  in  Col.  Van  Vliet's  report. 

It  seems  to  me,  from  writing  a  letter  like  that  to  the  State  Depart- 
ment so  shortly  after  you  were  processing  or  handling  the  documents, 
that  you  must  have  sent  it  to  the  State  Department.  They  are  not 
questioning  it,  saying  "We  never  got  such  a  report." 

General  Bissell.  I  wouldn't  question  them.  The  fact  that  I  make 
that  statement  is  what  I  believe  was  the  situation  when  I  dictated  that 


1892  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

letter.  I  didn't  do  it  all.  I  couldirt  fill  in  the  date  out  of  my  head 
when  that  thing  had  been  sent  the  21st  of  Angust  which  was  qnite  a 
while  from  the  22d  of  May,  or  the  23d  or  24th,  when  this  other  thing 
was  going  on.  It  leads  me  to  believe  that  there  must  have  been  some , 
record  from  Mrs.  Meeres  processing  that  letter  where  she  got  that 
information.  She  couldn't  have  gotten  it  without  going  to  some 
place  and  finding  that  it  had  been  sent.     She  didn't  know. 

Mr.  Machroavicz.  Is  Mrs.  Meeres  still  here  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  don't  know. 

Mr.  SiiEEHAN.  I  think  the  question  is  for  Mr.  Lijon  to  answer.  He 
got  a  letter.     Did  he  get  it  or  not  ? 

General  Bissell.  He  got  that  particular  letter.  I  told  you  how 
many  people  handled  it.  They  handled  it  for  2  months  in  State. 
Many  people  had  a  chance  to  check  up  on  that.  I  was  sitting  at  my 
desk  any  time  they  wanted  to  call  me.  That  doesn't  mean  that  I  am 
trying  to  throw  stones  at  State.  We  were  a  government  fighting  this 
war.  I  was  getting  plenty  of  help  from  them  and  giving  them  all 
I  could. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Except  we  found  there  were  several  governments  in 
the  State  Department,  you  know — Mr.  Hiss  et  al. 

General  Bissell.  I  don't  want  to  leave  the  impression  that  I  am 
trying  to  smear  somebody  that  has  been  convicted  or  trying  to  blame 
it  on  somebody.  I  can't  help  but  think  that  it  is  the  kind  of  document 
the  Communists  would  have  liked  to  have  a  look  at.  That  is  as  far 
as  I  will  go.  I  won't  make  any  inferences  or  implications.  I  will 
make  the  thing  the  other  way :  that  those  two  people  I  worked  with — 
Holmes  and  Lyon— you  would  never  get  them  mixed  up  with  any 
Communists.     I  will  tell  you  that. 

Mr.  Maciirowicz.  You  had  been  making  inferences  and  implica- 
tions that  Mr.  Holmes  and  Mr.  Lyon  must  have  known  about  this. 

General  Bissell.  I  am  giving  you  everything  I  know — everything 
that  touches  Katyn  as  far  as  you  had  me  proceed. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  I  would  like  to  ask  you  a  couple  of  questions  you  may 
have  answered.  If  you  would  refer  to  your  testimony,  when  the  State 
Department  was  working  through,  I  think  you  said,  the  Swiss,  trying 
to  get  Van  Vliet's  story,  when  did  you  find  that  out? 

General  Bissell.  Colonel  Van  Vliet  told  it  to  me  at  the  time  he  made 
his  report. 

Mr.  FuRcoLo.  That  was  the  first  time  you  knew^  of  that  ? 

General  Bissell.  The  first  time  I  knew  of  it.  It  afforded  me  the 
only  opportunity  I  knew  for  verification  of  his  re])ort.  I  don't  know 
why  Colonel  Van  Vliet  didn't  mention  that.  I  don't  recall  him  having 
mentioned  it  in  his  statement — oversight.  There  was  no  question  he 
was  giving  you  everything  he  could  think  of. 

Mr.  FuRcoLO.  We  are  interested  in  finding  out  what  happened  to 
the  report  in  your  office.  As  I  understand  your  testimony,  you  have 
stated  that  if  that  report  were  to  be  mailed  to  the  State  Department  it 
would  have  been  mailed  by  one  of  three  people — Mrs.  IMeeres.  and  you 
have  testified  as  I  recall  that  you  were  positive  you  did  not  tell  her  to 
mail  it.    Am  I  correct  in  that? 

(Jeneral  Bissell.  She  Avouldn't  have  had  anything  to  do  with  out- 
going mail. 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  1893 

Mr.  FuRcoLO.  So,  she  is  out  of  the  picture.  Secondly,  you  testified 
that  you  might  have  told  Colonel  and  now  Congressman  Lantaff,  but 
you  were  very  willing  to  accept  his  word  that  you  did  not  tell  him. 
So,  as  you  sit  there  today,  you  also  exclude  Congressman  Lantaff. 
I  don't  want  to  be  unfair  about  this.  I  know  you  are  trying  to  trace 
it  just  as  much  as  we  are ;  but,  with  those  two  people  out  of  the  picture 
on  your  own  story,  it  comes  down  to  the  fact  that  that  was  mailed 
to  the  State  Department,  then  comes  back  to  you ;  is  that  right  ? 

General  Bissell.  If  it  was  what  ?    Mailed  in  the  State  Department? 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  Yes. 

(xeneral  Bissell.  It  is  left  with  me. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  Up  to  now  we  have  got  it  back  to  you. 

General  Bissell.  Yes. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  As  I  understand  it,  and  I  want  to  be  sure  about  this, 
I  understand  that  you  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  mailed 
to  the  State  Department,  and  you  base  it  on 

General  Bissell.  Because  of  that  reference. 

Mr.  Fltrcol;).  Because  of  your  letter  of  May  25,  1945.  Do  I  get 
your  position  correctly  that  you  claim  if  it  was  mailed  to  the  State 
Department  it  was  mailed  in  the  letter  of  May  25,  1945  ? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  Am  I  fair  in  stating  that  u\)  to  this  point,  whether 
or  not  the  document  left  your  hands 

General  Bissell.  It  was  never  in  my  hands. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  Whether  or  not  the  document  ever  left  the  office  of 
General  Bissell 

General  Bissell.  Of  General  Bissell's  secretary,  because  it  didn't 
stay  in  my  office  except  while  Colonel  Van  Vliet  was  in  there. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  Whether  or  not  the  Van  Vliet  document  ever  left  the 
office  of  General  Bissell  is  determined  upon  what  conclusion  this  com- 
mittee can  come  to  with  reference  to  the  letter  of  May  25, 1945.  Is  that 
your  position  ? 

General  Bissell.  That  and  the  fact  that  their  having  that  document 
and  never  calling  back  for  any  comment  or  verification  or  anything 
on  the  letter  would  indicate  they  must  have  had  it,  plus  the  fact  that 
they  knew  all  about  it  in  advance  from  other  communications. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  Well,  what  you  come  down  to,  then,  is  showing  that 
the  State  Department  received  the  Van  Vliet  document  from  your 
office  is  No.  1,  the  copy  of  the  letter  of  May  25,  1945,  and  second,  the 
fact  that  the  State  Department  never  called  you  back  and  said,  "We 
did  not  get  this  document."  Is  that  right  ? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  right,  plus  the  fact  that  they  knew  about 
this  Swiss  business.    That  is  another  one. 

Mr.  FuRCOLo.  In  other  words,  three  things. 

General  Bissell.  Then  there  was  another  one  because  they  didn't 
know  about  the  Van  Vliet  report  but  they  knew  about  the  Katyn 
thing.  You  are  sticking  to  Van  Vliet.  Then  Lyon.  I  have  a  recol- 
lection or  a  feeling  that  I  told  either  Lyon  or  Holmes  on  the  telephone. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  I  am  not  directing  my  remarks  or  attention  at  the 
moment  to  anyone,  but  you  must  have  told  someone.  We  are  trying 
to  look  specifically  at  the  transmittal.  As  far  as  the  transmittal  is 
concerned,  coming  down  to  the  three  things  mentioned,  first,  what- 


1894  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

ever  that  letter  of  May  25,  1945,  may  be  interpreted  as ;  and,  second, 
the  fact  that  the  State  Department  did  not  call  you  back ;  and,  third^ 
this  Swiss  business  you  mentioned.    Is  that  right  ? 

General  Bissell.  There  was  a  specific  reference  to  Lt,  Col.  John  H. 
Van  Vliet's  report  forwarded  to  General  Holmes  on  a  certain  date, 
then  to  Mr.  Lyon. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  That  is  in  the  letter  that  transmitted  the  Gilder 
report  ? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  right.    So,  that  ties  it  in,  too. 

Mr.  FuRCoLo.  You  interpret  that  as  tying  it  in,  too? 

General  Bissell.  Certainly. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  Can  you  think  of  anything  else?  I  don't  want  to  tie 
you  down. 

General  Bissell.  I  don't  believe  so  at  the  moment.  I  have  tried  to 
get  everything  I  could  when  I  w\as  working  with  Mr.  Shackelford. 
I  wasn't  involved  at  all  in  this  thing,  except  as  someone  out  of  the 
picture  trying  to  help. 

Mr.  Furcolo.  I  want  to  get  it  first  with  reference  to  that  letter  of 
May  25,  1945. 

In  view^  of  the  wording  of  that  letter,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  that 
letter  contains  no  reference  to  transmitting  Van  Vliet's  memorandum 
and  also  there  is  no  reference  in  there  to  any  enclosure,  is  it  not  your 
position  right  now  that  as  far  as  that  letter  of  May  25,  1945  is  con- 
cerned, as  far  as  any  proof  there  may  be  in  that  letter  alone  that  you 
transmitted  the  Van  Vliet  document  in  there,  that  is  out  of  the  picture ; 
that  that  is  no  proof? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Furcolo,  we  have  been  talking  about  this  letter 
of  the  25th  of  May  1945  all  day  long.  Can  we  kindly  get  this  memo- 
randum into  the  record  since  it  is  not  in  the  record  as  yet  ?  This  is  a 
copy  that  I  have,  right  here.  The  committee  can  read  it.  From  there 
I  think  the  questions  can  be  asked. 

I  would  like  to  put  it  in  as  exhibit  No.  5,  with  the  original  to  come 
at  a  later  date  from  the  State  Department,  since  they  obviously  have 
it. 

Mr.  DoNDERo.  Wliat  date  is  that? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  The  25th  of  May  1945. 

Chairman  Madden.  Mark  it. 

(Exhibit  No.  5,  dated  May  25,  1945,  was  marked  and  received  as 
follows :) 

Exhibit  No.  5 

IMay  25,  1945. 
Brig.  Gen.  Julius  C.  Holmes, 

A.f.sistant  Sccrctarif,  JJcparfment  of  State,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Dear  General  Holmes  :  A  Lt.  Col.  John  H.  Van  Vliet,  Ji'.,  Infantry,  and  a 
Captain  Stewart,  while  prisoners  of  war  at  Oflat  No.  64,  are  reported  to  have 
been  given  a  letter  by  the  Swiss  Protectinji  Power  dated  about  October  1943,  which, 
asked  tliem  to  reply  to  certain  questions.    The  questions  were : 

1.  Had  Captain  Stewart  and  Lieutenant  Colonel  ^'an  Vliet  gone  to  Katyn? 

2.  How  had  they  been  treated? 

3.  Were  any  photographs  taken? 

4.  Had  they  made  a  statement? 

Colonel  Van  Vliet  believes  that  a  copy  of  this  letter,  together  with  his  reply^ 
is  in  the  State  Department's  files.     It  is  requested  that  this  be  verified  and,  if 
the  records  referred  to  ai"e  in  the  files  of  State  Department,  that  copies  be  made 
available  for  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2. 
Sincerely, 

Clayton  Bissell, 
JiSsistant  Chief  of  Staff,  0-2. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE  1895 

Mr.  FuRCOLo.  What  is  your  answer  to  the  question? 

General  Bissell.  I  can't  phice  your  question. 

Mr.  Ftjrcolo.  My  question  is — that  you  have  based  your  belief 
that  this  was  transmitted  to  the  State  Department  on  four  different 
things,  I  am  now  asking  you,  on  the  first  one  of  those  four,  which  is 
the  letter  of  May  25, 1945,  and  I  have  said  to  you — in  view  of  the  word- 
ing of  that  letter,  particularly  the  absence  of  any  reference  to  a  trans- 
mittal, in  the  absence  of  the  word  "enclosure"  at  the  bottom  of  the 
letter,  is  it  not  your  belief  that  that  letter  of  May  25,  1945,  does  not 
help  this  committee  in  any  way  as  far  as  that  alone  being  proof  of  the 
transmittal? 

General  Bissell.  This  one  did  not  carry  the  Van  Vliet  report  or  it 
would  have  to  be  listed. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  So  far  as  that  letter  transmitting  the  Van  Vliet 
report,  you  yourself  say  that  that  is  out  of  the  picture? 

General  Bissell.  That  did  not  transmit  it. 

Mr.  ]\Iitciiell.  Mr.  Chairman,  at  this  stage  of  the  proceedings  I 
would  like  to  have  the  record  show  that  we  already  have,  as  exhibit 
No.  4,  the  letter  from  the  State  Department,  signed  by  Julius  C. 
Holmes,  dated  June  9,  1945,  addressed  to  "My  Dear  General  Bissell." 
That  reply  is  on  the  record  prior  to  this  exhibit  No.  5.  There  is  no 
mention  of  the  previous  Van  Vliet  report  in  either  exhibit,  either  trans- 
ferring it  as  an  enclosure  in  any  shape,  form,  or  manner.  Therefore 
we  must  deduct  that  based  on  these  two  particular  letters,  namely, 
exhibit  No.  4  and  exhibit  No.  5,  there  was  no  enclosure  to  the  letter 
or  any  reference  in  either  letter  to  the  missing  Van  Vliet  report. 

Chairman  Madden.  How  long  after  that  was  it  that  Van  Vliet 
made  his  report  out? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Van  Vliet  had  made  his  report  reputedly  for  the 
record  the  22d  of  May  1945,  or  about  that  time,  3  days  previous. 

General  Bissell.  I  think  he  dictated  it  on  the  22d.  I  think  it  was 
typed  on  the  23d  or  24th.  I  think  I  saw  him  on  the  23d  or  24th,  the 
last  time  when  we  put  his  initials  on  it,  and  that  is  all  I  can  tell 
you  on  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  would  like  to  have  the  record  show  in  the  presence 
of  Mr.  Brown,  for  the  Department  of  State,  that  we  woulcl  like  to 
have  the  original  of  the  letter  of  May  25,  1945,  to  General  Holmes, 
and  I  would  like  to  have  Mr.  Shackelford  produce  the  original  of 
General  Holmes'  reply  to  General  Bissell  dated  June  9,  1945. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  Before  you  answer  I  want  to  ask  counsel  whether 
the  State  Department  has  transmitted  any  papers  of  any  kind  to  this 
committee  ? 

]\Ir.  Mitchell.  No,  sir.  Chairman  Madden  has  designated  a  sub- 
committee of  Mr.  OT^onski,  Mr.  Sheehan,  and  Mr.  Machrowicz,  to 
look  at  the  documents  that  the  State  Department  has  on  that.  My 
understanding  is  that  they  will  do  it  within  the  next  48  to  72  hours. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  In  connection  with  that,  we  had  agreed  that 
because  there  are  a  lot  of  documents  and  the  Department  of  State 
does  not  know  which  documents  we  want,  a  subcommittee  would  go 
there  and  pick  the  documents  out  which  we  feel  we  need.  They  offered 
to  turn  them  over  to  us. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  Pertinent  to  this  issue. 

Chairman  Maddex.  I  might  say  further,  last  Thursday  and  on 
Monday  I  asked  the  counsel  to  have  that  situation  in  readiness,  but 


1896  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

the  committee  members  were  not  available  to  go  over  and  see  the 
documents. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  correct.  I  did  talk  to  Mr.  Machrowicz  and 
Mr.  Sheehan  and  they  asked  me  to  set  up  that  meeting  for  some 
time  as  soon  as  we  complete  this  set  of  hearings  now.  I  will  do  that 
within  the  next  24  hours. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  To  continue,  I  will  have  to  ask  you  the  question  once 
more.  I  want  to  have  it  in  one  place.  There  has  been  this  other 
conversation  in  the  meantime. 

I  have  understood  your  testimony  to  be  that  your  position  is,  as 
far  as  that  letter  of  May  25,  1945,  is  concerned,  that  because  of  the 
language  of  that  letter  your  final  conclusion  is  that  that  letter  cer- 
tainly didn't  transmit  the  Van  Vliet  report  on  the  Katyn  Forest? 

General  Bissell.   No,  sir. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  I  also  understood  your  testimony  before  to  be  that 
after  Van  Vliet  had  dictated  his  report  to  Mrs.  Meeres,  which  was 
probably  the  21st  or  tlie  22d  of  May,  you  sent  it  to  the  State  Depart- 
ment, and  I  wrote  down  your  words.  You  said  you  intended  to  send 
it  at  once  and  you  believed  it  was  either  the  24th  or  the  25th  that  you 
sent  it.    Is  that  right  ? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  By  using  the  words  "you  sent  it"  you  were  referring 
to  the  Van  Vliet  report  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  am  not  referring  to  this  exhibit  No.  5,  the 
May  25  letter. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  Let  me  get  to  that.  By  "sent  it"  you  were  referring 
to  the  Van  Vliet  report  on  the  Katyn  Forest  massacred 

General  Bissell.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  I  understood  vou  to  say  that  you  sent  that  report  on 
either  the  24th  or  the  25th  of  May  1945. 

General  Bissell.  This  one? 

Mr.  FuRCOLo.  I  don't  know  what  you  mean  by  "this  one."  You 
sent  the  A^an  Vliet  report  on  the  Katyn  Forest  massacre,  outlining 
what  he  had  seen  there,  including  the  bodies  and  the  graves  ? 

General  Bissell..  It  was  my  intent  that  report  would  have  moved 
on  that  date  and  I  didn't  see  it  done  myself.  I  therefore  don't  know 
it  did.    So  you  have  me  there  swearing  to  it. 

Mr.  FuRcoLo.  If  you  would  follow  me  for  a  minute  I  will  do  my 
best  if  you  will  answer  the  questions.  Did  you  say  that  you  sent  the 
Van  Vliet  report  on  the  Katyn  Forest  massacre  out  in  a  letter  either 
Ma^  24  or  May  25  ? 

(leneral  Bissell.  I  did  not. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  I  understood  you  to  say  that. 

General  IJissell.  I  said  I  had  reason  to  believe  I  did  because  I 
mentioned  that  date  in  the  letter  transmitting  the  Gilder  report. 
I  described  not  this  paper  but  the  Van  Vliet  report. 

Mr.  FuRCOLo.  Did  you  say  that  immediately  after  Van  Vliet  had 
concluded  his  report  about  the  massacre  of  the  Polish  oflicers  at 
Katyn  Forest,  that  it  was  your  intention  to  send  that  report  at  once 
out  of  your  oflice? 

Genei-al  Bissell.  I'hat  is  correct. 

Mr.  Fuitcoi/).  Did  you  also  say  that  to  your  best  recollection  he 
had  completed  tliat  rei)ort  about  May  22  or  May  23,  approximately? 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1897 

General  Bis.sp:ll.  ]My  recollection  was  that  he  had  done  the  dictat- 
ing on  the  '22d,  that  it  was  conii)leted  either  on  the  2;3d  or  the  24th, 
and  bronoht  to  me  on  one  of  those  two  dates. 

]Mr.  FuRCOLO.  In  other  words,  yon  apparently  had  the  Van  Vliet 
report  of  the  Katvn  Forest  massacre  on,  say,  the  23d  or  the  24th  of 
May  1945^ 

(ieneral  Bissell.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  And  at  that  time,  on  May  23  or  May  24,  wdien  you 
had  that  completed  report,  the  purpose  in  your  mind  was  to  send 
that  out  immediately;  is  that  right? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  And  at  that  time,  on  May  23  or  May  24,  when  you 
had  that  completed  report,  the  i)urpose  in  your  mind  was  to  send 
that  out  immediately ;  is  that  right  ? 

General  Blssell.  That  is  right. 

]\Ir.  FuRCOLO.  The  very  next  letter  in  connection  with  it  that  you 
can  recall  having  sent  out  was  the  letter  of  May  25,  1945,  to  General 
Holmes? 

General  Bissell.  Yes.  Well.  I  don't  know  that  is  so  because  there 
were  lots  of  other  State  De})artnient — I  can't  tell  you.    I  don't  know. 

On  this  subject,  certainly. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  On  this  subject,  your  best  recollection  is  that  the 
very  next  letter  you  sent  out  was  to  General  Holmes  on  May  25,  1945  ? 

(ieneral  Bissell.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  And  is  it  for  that  reason  that  you  believed  the  Van 
Vliet  report  of  the  Katyii  Forest  massacre  was  sent  in  the  letter  of 
May  25,  1945  ?  ' 

General  Bissell.  No;  my  reason  for  believing  it  is  because  it  was 
so  stated  in  the  letter  carrying  the  Gilder  report  on  the  21st  of  August, 
I  think. 

Mr.  FuRCOLo.  Well,  the  letter  carrying  the  Gilder  report  does  not 
indicate  wdien  they  might  have  received  the  Van  Vliet  report  from 
you,  but  merely  in  effect  says :  "Compare  the  Gilder  report  W' itli  the 
Van  Vliet  report." 

General  Bissell.  Forwarded  to  General  Holmes  May  25,  1945,  and 
it  generall}'  substantiates  all  material  facts  in  Van  Vliet's  report. 

Mr.  FuRCOLo.  Forwarded  to  General  Holmes  May  25,  1945.  Now, 
does  that  not  completely  fix  in  your  mind  the  fact  that  if  you  ever  did 
send  the  Van  Vliet  report  on  the  Katyn  Forest  massacre  to  General 
Holmes,  it  was  sent  in  the  letter  of  May  25,  1945,  to  which  this  Gilder 
report  refers? 

General  Bissell.  In  a  letter  of  May  25. 

Mr.  FuRaiLo.  In  a  letter  of  May  25,  1945. 

General  Bissell.  A  transmittal  letter. 

Mr.  FuRCOLo.  Have  we  finally  got  tied  down  the  fact  that  you  say 
that  the  Van  Vliet  report  on  the  Katyn  Forest  massacre  was  sent  in 
a  definite  letter  to  General  Holmes  on  a  definite  date  of  May  25,  1945? 

General  Bissell.  I  said  that  in  this  letter. 

Mr.  FuRcoLo.  Is  that  what  you  say  as  you  sit  here  today  ? 

General  Bissell.  Today  I  am  not  sure  it  did  go  because  there  is  no 
in.dication  it  was  received.  Something  could  have  happened  and  I 
don't  know  Avhat,  if  anything,  ever  did. 

Mr.  FuRCOix).  That  is  right,  but  the  point  is  if  you  did  send  it,  you 
are  saying  that  you  sent  it  on  May  25,  1945,  in  a  letter  to  General 


1898  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

Holmes.  Would  you  be  willing  to  say,  in  view  of  that,  if  it  was  not  in 
that  letter  of  May  25,  1945,  to  General  Holmes,  then  your  position 
would  be  it  apparently  did  not  go  ? 

General  Bisseix.  Almost  that.  What  I  actually  say  is  this :  there 
were  two  places  it  was  logical  for  me  to  send  that,  and  quick.  One 
was  to  War  Crimes,  which  was  not  so  urgent  at  that  time  because  they 
were  just  getting  going.  The  second  one  was  to  State.  Van  Vliet  and 
I  had  both  mentioned  the  State  Department  aspect  of  it.  I  don't 
know  w^here  the  paper  was  sent.  Therefore,  I  tried  to  figure  back 
where  there  is  any  evidence  of  it  being  sent.  The  only  evidence  is 
that.    That  is  that. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  In  other  words,  the  only  evidence  that  the  Van  Vliet 
report  was  sent  to  the  State  Department  would  be  the  fact  that  the 
Glider  letter  says  that  it  was  sent  in  the  letter  of  May  25,  1945,  to 
General  Holmes? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  right,  plus  the  fact  that  the  Glider  letter 
was  then  processed  for  nearly  months  in  State  and  no  one  ever  made 
a  query  as  to  "Where  is  this  thing  you  are  referring  to  ?" 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  That  is  a  separate  thing.  That  is  an  absence  of  evi- 
dence rather  than  a  positive  indication. 

In  other  w^ords,  your  position  as  you  say  now  is  that  tlie  only  docu- 
mentary evidence  that  the  Van  Vliet  report  on  the  Katyn  Forest 
massacre  was  sent  to  the  State  Department  was  the  fact  that  in  the 
Gilder  letter  it  stated  it  had  been  sent  in  the  letter  of  May  25,  1945, 
to  General  Holmes? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  FuRcoLo.  So  that  is  the  only  documentary  evidence.  Now,  re- 
ferring back  to  your  testimony  about  10  minutes  ago  at  the  beginning 
of  my  questioning  of  you,  you  agreed  with  me  that  as  far  as  just  that 
letter  of  May  25,  1945,  is  concerned,  your  interpretation  of  that  letter 
would  be  that  there  was  no  enclosure  in  that.    Is  that  not  right  ? 

General  Bissell.  In  this  one? 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  In  the  letter  of  May  25, 1945,  to  General  Holmes.  You 
stated  that  about  10  minutes  ago  and  you  gave  your  reasons;  is  that 
not  true  ? 

General  Bissell.  Yes,  but  I  am  not  talking  about  the  same  May  25 
letter.    I  think  there  were  two  of  that  date. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  You  think  there  might  be  some  other  letter  of  ISIay 
'25,1945? 

General  Bissell.  Van  Vliet  was  as  much  a  part  of  getting  this 
letter  over  to  State  as  getting  over  tlie  other  one.  This  all  came  out 
of  him.    It  would  have  gone  out  together. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  The  only  letter  that  you  have  in  the  files  or  the  only 
letter  of  which  you  have  seen  a  copy  in  the  files  of  G-2,  your  own  office, 
on  May  25,  1945,  addressed  to  General  Plolmes,  having  anything 
to  do  with  Van  Vliet's  report  on  the  Katyn  Forest  massacre,  is  this 
letter  that  you  hold  in  your  hand  and  which  we  have  read  into  the 
record;  is  that  correct? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  You  agree  that  letter  is  not  any  evidence  at  all  of 
the  fact  tliat  the  Van  Vliet  report  document  was  sent,  because  of  the 
wording  of  the  letter? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  correct. 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  1899 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  So  it  is  fair  to  summarize  your  position  as  being 
this:  your  position  is,  first  of  all,  that  you  believe  the  Van  Vliet 
report  on  the  Katyn  Forest  massacre  was  sent  to  the  State  Depart- 
ment. You  believe  that  it  was  sent  in  the  letter  of  May  25,  1945. 
That  was  your  original  position  ? 

General  Bissell.  In  a  letter. 

Mr.  FuRcoLO.  You  believe  it  assent  in  a  letter? 

General  Bissell.  Not  this  one. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  Of  May  25,  1915.  The  only  letter  that  you  can 
find  at  G-2,  or  in  your  office  on  May  25,  1945,  addressed  to  General 
Holmes,  is  that  letter  which  is  now  exhibit  No.  5,  I  believe? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  correct.    That  is  not  it. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  You  state  it  is  certainly  no  proof  it  was  sent  but  in 
fact  from  the  wording  of  the  letter  it  indicates  very  clearly  that  it 
was  not  sent  in  that  one  ? 

General  Bissell.  It  was  not  sent  in  that  letter  of  May  25. 

Mr.  FuRCOLO.  So  what  it  comes  down  to,  in  other  words,  is  that 
when  you  state  this  Van  Vliet  report  we  have  been  talking  about  had 
been  sent  to  the  State  Department  in  a  letter  of  May  25,  1945,  you 
are  basing  that  upon  a  letter  that  is  nonexistent  as  far  as  you,  or  this 
committee,  or  anyone  in  the  Government  has  been  able  to  determine? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  correct,  at  the  moment. 

Mr.  Siieehan.  Or  it  could  have  been  sent  by  a  courier  directly  over 
there,  without  a  letter  of  transmittal  ? 

General  Bissell.  It  could  but  I  don't  think  I  did.  I  could  have 
done  that.  I  had  a  courier,  a  special  one  that  I  started  to  mention, 
this  Mr.  Dillingham.  He  did  not  follow  hardly  any  of  these  pro- 
cedures in  handling  State  Department  material  to  us  or  our  material 
to  State.  His  specialty  was  bringing  to  me  State  Department  wires 
of  certain  categories  and  picking  them  out  over  there  that  I  would  be 
interested  in,  getting  them  to  me  quickly,  things  that  would  come  to 
me  again  later  in  the  regular  channels  after  reproduction. 

On  rare  occasions,  none  of  which  I  can  remember,  I  have  sent 
things  back  by  him  because  there  could  not  have  been  any  more  a 
secure  way  to  get  them  over  there  quickly.  I  don't  think  it  was  clone 
in  this  case  because  usually  when  I  sent  anything  like  that,  since  it 
was  short-cutting  all  the  rules,  I  would  call  Mr.  Holmes  and  ask  him 
if  he  got  it  right  away.  Or  I  would  do  the  opposite  thing,  I  would 
have  Dillingham  phone  me  back,  gas  line  or  otherwise  and  tell  me  it 
was  there,  either  one  of  which  satisfied  him. 

Mr.  FuRCOLo.  I  wanted  to  say  I  know  your  position  is  the  same  as 
ours.  We  are  interested  in  tracing  that  report.  We  are  not  par- 
ticularly concerned  about  whether  we  trace  it  to  the  State  Department 
or  trace  it  to  the  Department  of  the  Army,  or  G-2,  or  anyplace.  Your 
position  is  the  same,  I  know. 

With  that  in  mind  I  wanted  to  ask  you  this :  In  view  of  your  testi- 
mony, which  I  know  to  be  true,  and  I  know  that  you  had  so  many 
of  these  matters  and  some  at  the  time  were  more  important  than 
others.  Later  on  history  will  show  that  some  which  looked  unimpor- 
tant have  turned  out  to  be  extremely  important. 

Might  it  not  appear  to  you  at  the  present  time  that  actually,  with 
all  the  different  things  you  had  to  do  and  the  hours  you  had  at  the 
time,  and  short-handed  as  you  were,  and  with  the  testimony  that  has 


1900  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

been  developed  upon  wliich  you  based  your  opinion  had  it  been  sent, 
that  actually  the  Van  Vliet  report  was  just  lost  in  the  shuflie  some- 
place alon<>;  the  line  ? 

General  Bissj:li..  When  I  started  in — Mr.  Shackelford  is  a  person 
not  involved — I  said,  "Where  is  this  paper?"  It  is  in  State,  it  is  in 
(t-2,  it  is  in  War  Crimes,  or  it  is  in  my  own  personal  office  file.  I  was 
no  lonfrer  in  (t-2.  We  searched  every  one  of  those.  We  p;ot  in  touch 
Avith  all  of  the  people  that  could  have  seen  it.  We  went  further  down 
the  line  of  files  than  you  did.  We  went  to  Miss  McKenna  and  then  on 
down.  When  I  started  down  the  line,  I  knew  there  were  some  outs 
that  were  perfectly  all  ri^ht,  that  mio;ht  block  us  on  findino;  it  in  G-2 
if  it  had  been  left  there,  and  never  gone  out.     These  are  those  outs. 

While  I  was  in  G-2  we  were  still  cuttino;  down  files  and  people  to 
get  smaller.  I  was  only  there  some  7  months  after  the  Van  Vliet 
arrival,  then  I  was  gone.  At  that  time  I  turned  the  whole  thing  over 
to  General  Vandenberg.  I  made  every  assumption  that  I  coidd 
against  myself.  The  first  one  was,  "Maybe  yon  forgot  and  put  it  in 
your  personal  safe  in  your  own  office,  the  little  one."  I  never  took  it 
out  of  there,  so  if  it  were  taken  out  of  there  it  had  to  be  taken  out 
by  someone  who  had  the  combination. 

I  asked  General  Weckerling  if  he  had  the  combination.  He  said, 
"I  might  have."  I  said  he  did  because  I  had  left  Washington  for  as 
much  as  2  months  at  a  time.  He  didn't  remember  a  thing  about  this 
matter. 

I  did  not  contact  General  Vandenberg,  but  it  was  not  appropriate 
as  he  was  my  boss.  It  was  not  appropriate  to  ask  him  this  question. 
So  I  had  it  asked  through  Mr.  Shackelford's  office.  The  reply  from 
General  Vandenberg  was  "Absolutely  no."  When  he  opened  that  safe 
and  took  over  from  me,  it  w^asn't  there.  He  doesn't  remember,  either, 
any  of  the  papers,  if  any,  that  were  there,  which  did  not  help  me.  I 
know  that  the  day  I  left  G-2  I  had  the  combination  of  the  safe 
changed. 

So,  after  that  what  was  in  it  w^as  not  mine.  General  Vandenberg 
did  not  steal  those  papers  and  turn  them  over  to  the  Commies,  or  he 
did  not  hold  them  up  for  anybody  else.  I  am  sure  of  that.  He  was 
busy  taking  over  G-2,  and  I  know  what  it  means. 

Then  where  could  it  be?  Well,  outside  the  door  were  these  files 
they  spoke  of  as  my  personal  safe.  That  really  wasn't  a  personal  safe, 
except  that  it  had  some  personal  files  in  one  drawer.  The  rest  of  them 
were  routine  safe  in  the  alphabetical  number  system.  It  might  have 
been  in  some  of  those.  So  we  found  out  where  the  contents  of  those 
had  been  sent  first.  The  safe  outside  the  door — a  man  named  Gen. 
Carter  Clark  had  gone  over  those  with  Miss  Bryant,  who  is  still 
within  reach.  She  is  married  and  down  just  south  of  Alexandria. 
She  said  she  sorted  out  every  ])a])er  in  there,  saying  "I  will  lake  this 
one.  These  are  top  secret."  This  is  one  of  the  instauces  they  did  not 
go  through  with  the  red  tape.  "I  will  take  this  one.  You  send  that 
one  to  so-and-so."  When  they  were  through  there  were  two  piles. 
The  young  lady  did  not  know  wdiat  was  in  either  pile.  She  knew  she 
transmitted  these  in  the  pile  she  was  directed  to  forward. 

General  Clark  was  contacted  and  said  he  didn't  see  anything  about 
Katyn  or  the  Colonel  Van  Vliet  report.  We  went  to  the  next  safe 
where  the  big  files  were.    We  went  to  the  files  we  had  in  the  office, 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1901 

Avliere  we  kept  them  by  subject.  We  ^Yent  throuoli  those  cards.  I  had 
trouble  getting-  tha:  done  because  those  cards  were  still  extant  at 
that  time.  The  papers  to  which  they  referred,  for  the  most  part, 
were  jjone.  The  reason  they  were  jrone  was  because  they  had  been 
shipped  out  to  various  places  to  clear  the  office.  The  Korean  business 
was  on.  They  needed  space.  Papers  in  these  files  were  pushed  out 
and  considerable  numbers  had  been  destroyed  in  the  ])eriod  between 
my  departure  from  (1-2  in  1045  and  this  period  in  1950,  4  years. 

G-2  had  been  com])ressed,  in  the  Penta<2:on  into  much  less  space.  It 
was  a  smaller  machine.  It  could  have  been  destroyed  amonn;  those 
])apers.  The  people  that  did  that  destroying,  a  lot  of  them  were  not 
too  well  qualified.  They  did  the  best  they  could.  But  how  could  it 
have  gotten  into  that  file?  Mr.  Lantafi'  said  it  came  out  to  him.  He 
told  you  what  file  he  kept  it  in.  He  doesn't  know  what  happened  to  it. 
Neither  do  I.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  neither  do  I,  to  absolutely  say  I  saw 
ii  go  there.  My  ]:)rocedure  of  having  other  people  do  everything  ])os- 
sible  and  that  is  the  only  way  you  get  any  bigger  job  done,  where  I  did 
not  actually  handle  the  paper — I  did  not  bring  it  in.  Either  Van  Vliet 
or  Mrs.  Meeres  brought  it  in.  I  did  handle  it  a  while.  One  of  those 
two,  or  Lantaff,  took  it  out.    After  that  I  never  saw  the  paper  again. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  am  not  going  to  repeat  some  of  the  matters  that 
wei-e  gone  into  by  my  colleagues,  but  there  is  one  thing  that  I  would 
like  to  find  out  Avhich  concerns  all  of  us,  even  more  than  the  Katyn 
matter.  That  is  the  possibility  of  the  loss  of  these  documents  at  such 
frequent  intervals. 

I  would  like  to  find  out  fi'om  you,  in  view  of  what  you  just  said,  just 
Itow  you  keep  those  documents.  Let  me  ask  you  this :  suppose  someone 
comes  in  and  talks  to  you  or  brings  you  information  about  the  Katyn 
massacre  or  Dachau,  or  some  other  incident.  Do  you  file  that  just  in 
\  our  safe,  or  do  you  put  it  under  a  certain  heading  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  keep  nothing  in  my  safe. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Do  you  have  it  filed  under  a  certain  heading. 

General  Bissell.  A  file  system  is  established  for  the  entire  office. 
It  was  established  before  I  came  there.  The  same  one  was  in  effect 
when  I  left. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  am  not  insisting  you  were  to  blame  for  it.  I 
want  to  find  out  whether  there  is  a  system. 

General  Bissell.  Very  definitely. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  It  is  pretty  hard  for  a  INIember  of  Congress  to 
break  into  this  wall.  It  is  hard  to  get  information  from  the  Pentagon. 
When  you  receive  information  on  a  particular  subject,  is  that  infor- 
mation ])laced  in  a  master  file  with  that  name  as  a  heading? 

General  Bissell.  In  G-2,  while  I  was  there  we  had  a  group  called 
the  Specialist  Group,  who  specialized  on  Germany  and  on  Japan. 
They  saw  everything  on  their  subject.  Unless  it  required  action  or 
was  ready  for  action,  it  went  to  them  first  and  not  to  me.  They  had 
everything. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  That  does  not  answer  my  question.* 

General  Bissell.  They  kept  a  certain  amount  of  this  material  in 
their  offices  while  it  was  live.  As  it  passed  the  live  stage  and  became 
dead,  it  was  sent  down  to  general  files. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  That  does  not  answer  my  question.  Supposing 
you  are  interested  in  obtaining  information  which  G-2  possesses  on 

93744— 52— pt.  7 (! 


1902  THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE 

a  particular  subject,  Katyn  for  example,  can  you  go  to  the  file  and 
find  under  "Katyn"  all  the  information  which  the  Department  has  on 
that  subject  ? 

General  Bissell.  Not  now.  It  has  been  spread  from  one  end  of  the 
place  to  the  other. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Was  it  at  the  time  you  were  there? 

General  Bissell.  It  would  all  have  been  in  the  Russian  section. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  If  you  were  interested  as  the  head  of  G-2  to  get 
all  available  information  on  a  specific  question,  was  there  not  a  file  to 
which  you  could  look  to  find  out  where  all  the  information  available 
to  G-2  is  on  that  particular  subject? 

General  Bissell.  All  the  live  information,  yes.  There  would  be  lots 
more  information  in  other  places  than  G-2,  but  it  would  not  be  live. 
Some  may  be  far  away. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  So  I  presume  there  was  a  file  labeled  "Katyn"? 

General  Bissell.  Probably.    I  can't  say  for  sure.    I  didn't  check  it. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  know  now,  although  you  probably  didn't  at 
that  time,  there  had  been  information,  and  valuable  information,  re- 
quested and  received  by  G-2  on  Katyn  prior  to  the  Van  Vliet  report? 

General  Bissell.  I  found  out  subsequently  about  the  Szymanski 
report  and  read  the  letter  of  transmittal  to  General  Strong. 

Mr.  Machrowicz,  You  know  G-2  specifically  requested  Colonel 
Szymanski  to  furnish  information  relative  to  the  Katyn  matter  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  know  that  the  report  came  in  two  ways,  one  to 
General  Strong  personally,  and  exactly  the  same  paper  sent  another 
way. 

Mr.  Macifrowicz.  You  as  the  head  of  G-2  wanted  to  get  all  the 
available  information  on  Katyn  there  was,  any  place  where  you  could 
look  under  a  filing  system  and  find  Katyn  and  find  Szymanski  ? 

General  Bissell.  It  would  have  gone  to  the  Russian  specialists,  be- 
cause that  is  Russian  territory  and  a  Russian  problem. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  do  not  care  where  it  would  have  gone,  but  there 
was  a  place  where  you  could  have  gone  and  gotten  all  the  available 
information  ? 

General  Bissell.  All  I  would  have  had  to  do  was  to  tell  LantalT. 
He  would  have  gotten  the  Russian  specialists.  The  Russian  specialists 
would  have  gotten  the  stuff  from  their  office.  They  would  have  gotten 
the  stuff  I  needed. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  There  was  a  way  of  finding  out  available  infor- 
mation on  any  important  subject? 

General  Bissell.  Hot  stuff. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  When  you  were  told  that  Colonel  Van  Vliet  was 
coming  to  see  you  and  make  a  report  on  the  Katyn  massacre,  did  you 
request  from  anyone  under  you  to  get  a  complete  file  on  that  subject? 

General  Bissell.  I  didn't  get  any  such  warning.  Ha  was  in  the 
office  when  I  got  back  from  a  trip  out  of  town.  I  wanted  to  get  to 
him  in  a  hurry  because  I  understood  ho  had  bi^en  waiting. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  When  you  did  talk  to  him,  did  you  then  request 
to  ijet  that  information  ? 

General  Bissell.  No;  I  did  not  at  that  time  because  I  had  a  copy 
of  this  letter  of  May  25. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  did  not  have  it  then? 

General  Bisskll.  No;  it  was  written.  While  I  was  talking  to  Van 
Vliet  I  didn't  want  to  be  influenced  by  anylhino;  but  Van  Vliet. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1903 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  He  came  to  see  you  on  May  22.  The  letter  was 
May  25? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  right.     I  put  this  letter  out. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Which  letter? 

General  Bissell.  The  letter  of  May  25,  addressed  to  Julius  C. 
Holmes. 

Mr.  Mitchell,  May  ? 

General  Bissell.  May  25, 1945,  to  Julius  C.  Holmes. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  at  either  time  when  you  talked  to  Colonel 
Van  Vliet,  or  afterward,  refer  to  the  available  live  information  which 
was  in  the  G-2,  to  either  check  his  information  with  other  information 
which  you  received  as  to  his  veracity  in  regard  to  his  observations  or 
anything  at  all  ? 

Did  you  do  anything  to  find  out  what  other  available  information 
you  had  in  G-2  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  did  not  go  to  the  general  files.  I  didn't  mention 
it  to  the  Russian  specialist. 

Mr.  Machro\vicz.  Did  you  have  anyone  else  do  it? 

General  Bissell.  No,  sir.  The  reason  for  that  was,  had  anything 
come  in  during  the  period  I  was  G-2  on  a  matter  of  that  nature,  it 
would  have  been  told  to  me. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  say  the  Katyn  report  would  have  been  prop- 
erly filed  under  Russian  affairs? 

General  Bissell.  The  Russian  specialist  would  have  had  it  and  he 
would  have  determined  where  it  was  going  to  go. 

Mr.  MACHRo^vIcz.  If  I  am  wrong,  I  hope  Mr.  Shackelford  corrects 
me.     It  actually  was  found  under  Poland  ? 

General  Bissell.  It  could  well  have  been.  Wliere  you  have  three 
countries,  it  would  go  first  geographically  to  the  man  who  handled 
the  area.  Then  he  would  see  that  those  interested  in  it  would  receive 
either  copies  made  for  them  or  have  a  chance  through  rotation  to  see  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Was  it,  at  the  time  you  were  G-2,  a  fact  that  Poland 
and  Russia  were  in  the  same  area  known  as  eastern  Europe  ? 

General  Bissell.  There  was  Eastern  Europe  Chief.  He  had  sub- 
chiefs  for  different  subareas. 

Mr.  MrrcHELL,  The  reports  would  have  gone  to  the  Eastern  Europe 
Section  ? 

General  Bissell,  That  is  right, 

Mr,  Machrowicz.  At  any  rate  no  attempt  was  made  by  you  to 
evaluate  the  Van  Vliet  report  by  even  trying  to  compare  it  with  avail- 
able information  you  already  had  in  G-2  ? 

General  Bissell,  I  was  going  to  use  the  reply  to  this  letter  as  the 
starting  point  for  that. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  use  it  as  a  starting  point  ? 

General  Bissell,  No. 

Mr,  Machrowicz.  Wliynot? 

General  Bissell.  Because,  when  it  came  back,  I  was  just  telling  you 
my  reaction,  and  why  I  didn't  go  along  with  the  State  Department's 
comments  or  their  conclusions.  I  have  just  mentioned  two  of  them. 
Wlien  questions  put  an  end  to  it, 

Mr,  Machrowicz.  Their  conclusions  had  nothing  to  do  with  the 
evaluation  of  the  Van  Vliet  report  ? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  what  you  say. 


1904  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Am  I  right  ?  What  conchisions  are  vou  referring- 
to? 

General  Bissell.  If  State,  instead  of  being  able  to  tell  me  they  didn't 
actually  get  this  reply,  had  told  me,  "Yes,  we  got  it :  here  is  what  it 
says,"  and  gave  me  another  Van  Vliet  report,  I  would  have  had  every- 
tliing  I  needed  to  evaluate  his  report,  one  sent  in  2  years  earlier,  and 
then  this  one.  That  would  have  established  his  memory,  accuracy^ 
detail  of  a  good  many  kinds. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Why  didn't  you  look  in  your  own  department  to 
see  what  information  you  had  ? 

General  Bissell.  Because,  had  anything  of  significance  come  in 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  How  do  you  know  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  had  a  meeting  each  morning  about  7  something, 
at  which  the  specialists  of  each  branch  told  me  everything  of  impor- 
tance that  came  in  within  the  last  24  hours. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  consider  the  Colonel  Szymanski  report 
filed  with  your  department  at  the  request  of  your  predecessor,  and  a 
report  w^hich  w^as  very  lengthy  and  very  important,  or  did  you  think 
it  not  important  enough  to  consider  ? 

General  Bisseu^.  Had  that  report  been  brought  to  me  without  evalu- 
ation, as  it  came  in,  the  colonel  did  not  say,  "This  is  true,  this  is 
untrue,  this  is  probably  true." 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  are  talking  about  Colonel  Van  Vliet's  re- 
port or  Colonel  Szymanski's? 

General  Bissell.  Szymanski's.  He  didn't  say  "This  is  based  on 
people  whose  veracity  and  dependability  I  know  well." 

Mv.  Machrowicz.  He  did  not  say  that  ? 

General  Bissell.  He  didn't  evaluate  it  at  all.  He  said,  "Trans- 
mitted herewith  is  so-and-so,"  a  very  short  letter,  to  General  Strong. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Are  you  quite  positive  of  that? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  .Are  you  referring  to  the  exhibits  which  are  already 
on  record  with  this  committee? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  the  only  thing  I  know  about  it,  what  has 
been  printed  in  the  press.  I  read  his  report  in  G-2  during  that  period, 
April  1  to  12. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  year  ? 

General  Bissell.  This  year.  I  saw  nine  exhibits  with  about  this 
mncli  of  letter  transmitted  [indicating  about  3  inches].  That  is  all 
Szymanski  contributed.  It  was  someone  else's  material  being  for- 
warded. I  examined  each  of  those.  Three  of  them  said  they  were 
hearsay.  Some  of  them  said  they  were  hearsay  several  times  re- 
moved.    Three  others  did  not  mention  Katyn. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  What  you  are  referring  to  is  he  never  got  anyone 
actually  at  Katyn  when  the  shooting  took  place? 

General  Bissell.  It  was  all  hearsay. 

Mr.  Machroavicz.  He  never  had  an  eyewitness? 

General  Blssell.  No.  He  had  neitlier  eyewitnesses  nor  other  evi- 
dence. By  evidence  I  mean  something  that  a  lawyer  can  use.  For- 
tunately we  had  lots  of  lawyers  in  G-2.  They  weighed  things.  They 
had  to  be  right. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  think  you  said  a  few  minutes  ago  that  you 
never  had  the  Colonel  Van  Vliet  report  in  your  hands. 

General  Bissell.  I  didn't  say  I  never  had  it  in  my  hands.  I  held  it 
a  while  while  I  read  it  over  with  Van  Vliet  in  mv  office,  and  asked 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1905 

him  if  he  wanted  to  make  any  chancres.  He  didn't  want  to  make  any. 
I  had  liim  initial  the  thing.  He  did  that.  I  don't  think  I  even  picked 
it  np  off  my  desk. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  ever  order  that  to  be  put  in  the  Katyn 
file? 

General  Bissell.  No. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Why  not  ? 

General  Bissell.  Becaiise  I  didn't  want  it  to  get  that  much  circula- 
tion at  that  point. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  If  you  ever  transmitted  to  anyone 

General  Bissell.  I  would  not  have  needed  to  say  that.  If  a  paper 
came  into  my  office  and  I  did  not  need  to  take  action  on  it,  just  infor- 
mation, my  initial  was  usually  put  in  on  it,  but  not  always.  It  was 
put  in  the  out  basket.  It  went  out  and  was  filed  properly.  I  didn't 
personally  have  anything  to  do  with  the  filing. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Was  it  properly  filed  ? 

General  Bissell.  Maybe  only  99.999  percent  thereabouts. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  If  some  one  subsequent  to  you,  a  successor  to  you, 
the  next  day,  wanted  to  check  the  Katyn  file  and  asked  the  head  of 
the  Russian  or  Polish  departments  about  it,  would  he  have  been  able 
to  find  the  Van  Vliet  report? 

General  Bissell.  No. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Then  you  would  say  it  was  not  properly  filed, 
was  it  ? 

General  Bissell.  If  he  did  not  find  it,  he  would  have  come  to  my 
secretary  and  reported  the  fact.  My  secretary  would  say,  "Well,  this 
is  the  dope  on  that." 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  How  could  he  report  a  fact  which  he  would  not 
have  known  about  ?     How  could  he  have  known  about  the  report  ? 

General  Bissell.  If  he  didn't  know  about  it,  he  couldn't  do  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  just  said  in  reply  to  Mr.  Machrowicz  that  you 
had  a  daily  briefing  session  with  the  members  of  your  staff.  Did  you 
meet  these  area  chiefs  at  any  time  and  discuss  either  the  Katyn  affair, 
or  Van  Vliet's  report  at  that  briefing  session? 

General  Bissell.  I  did  not. 

Mr.  ]\Iitchell.  You  never  have  discussed  that  ? 

General  Bissell.  Never. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  have  never  discussed  it  with  any  other  member 
of  G-2  except  Colonel  Lantaff  and  Mrs.  Meeres  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  didn't  discuss  it  with  Lantaff. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  They  are  the  only  two  people  you  knew  who  knew 
about  it  ? 

General  Bissell.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  have  any  members  designated  as  liaison 
officer  with  the  OWI? 

General  Bissell.  Yes. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Who  were  they? 

General  Bissell.  Many  people  at  many  times.  I  can  recall  no 
names. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  At  that  time,  in  May  1945. 

General  Bissell.  I  couldn't  tell  you. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Wlioever  they  were,  did  you  instruct  them  to 
give  this  information  to  the  OWI? 

General  Bissell.  No. 


1906  THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  did  not  think  the  OWI  should  know  this 
information  ? 

General  Bissell.  I  think  we  are  getting  in  trouble  on  sources  of 
information,  but  I  will  be  glad  to  tell  you  in  executive  session. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Shackelford,  does  the  record  of  the  G-2  office 
in  the  period  while  General  Bissell  was  in  charge  of  G-2,  show  who 
were  the  liaison  officers  to  OWI  and  who  were  the  OWI  representatives 
to  G-2? 

Mr.  Shackelford.  I  would  be  glad  to  check  the  records  for  that 
information,  and  if  it  is  in  the  records,  to  supply  it  to  the  committee. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  It  would  not  do  any  good  in  view  of  the  testimony 
it  was  not  generally  discussed,  anyway. 

General  Bissell.  I  did  not. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  They  had  no  knowledge  of  the  Van  Vliet  report? 

General  Bissell.  I  can't  say. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  If  they  did,  they  got  it  improperly? 

General  Bissell.  No.  There  were  other  people  in  the  world  who 
knew  that  these  people  had  been  there.  They  had  many  contacts  in 
many  places. 

Mr.  DoNDORO.  Was  that  a  part  of  your  function? 

General  Bissell.  I  was  on  a  committee  called  the  Joint  Intelligence 
Committee.  There  were  meetings  once  a  week  where  I  saw  representa- 
tives of  OSS,  State,  War,  Navy,  Air,  and  sometimes  others.  This  is 
not  the  nature  of  a  question  that  would  have  been  taken  up  there. 
They  were  not  policy  recommendations  to  the  combined  Chiefs  of 
Staff  or  Joint  Chiefs  for  the  conduct  of  their  intelligence  arrange- 
ments, prior  to  major  operations,  or  something  that  we  could  think 
of  that  would  help  the  prosecution  of  the  war. 

I  also  had  conferences  with  the  head  of  Naval  Intelligence  and 
the  FBI,  a  little  different  group.  We  met  periodically  and  took  up 
everything  on  the  counterintelligence  side  both  in  the  United  States 
and  world-wide,  dividing  the  duties  between  us,  according  to  the  regu- 
lations in  effect  at  that  time,  which  was  an  Executive  order. 

Beyond  that,  I  don't  think  I  should  go  into  that  one. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  presume  you  read  Arthur  Bliss  Lane's  article 
in  the  American  Legion  magazine? 

General  Bissell.  I  don't  know  who  wrote  it.  It  doesn't  say.  I  would 
like  to  have  found  out. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  am  not  saying  this,  because  I  believe  statements 
contained  in  here,  but  I  believe  you  should  be  given  an  opportunity 
to  comment.    There  is  a  statement  there  which  states : 

We  heard  that  Van  Vliet  was  behind  the  closed  doors  of  General  Bissell's 
private  office  a  long  time,  alone  with  the  G-2  general.  When  he  reappeared  in 
the  reception  office  we  learned  Van  Vliet  was  flushed,  seemed  intensely  but 
silently  angry.  He  went  as  directed  by  Bissell,  with  the  general's  personal 
security  stenographer  across  the  corridor  to  a  smaller  office. 

Colonel  Van  Vliet  made  no  such  statement  to  us,  that  he  was  flushed 
or  angry  or  anything  that  occurred  between  you  two  which  Avould  give 
rise  to  that  statement.  I  am  going  to  ask  you,  have  you  any  comment 
on  that? 

GoiuM'nl  Bissell.  I  would  welcome  you  taking  Van  Vliet's  word  on 
it,  but  there  was  not  the  sliglitest  unpleasantness.  My  only  feeling 
was,  shall  we  push  this  fellow  for  this  now?  He  was  off  the  normal 
track.     Normally,  when  some  returned  person  came  in,  we  tried  to 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1907 

be  sure  they  were  fit  to  make  a  report.  Colonel  Van  Vliet  was,  but 
he  was  awfully  tired.  He  was  ready  to  oo,  it  seemed.  I  don't  know 
anything  that  happened,  to  my  knowledge,  that  didn't  suit  him  to 
a  "t." 

Mr.  Maciirowicz.  I  want  this  on  the  record. 

Do  you  claim  that  this  statement  is  not  justified  by  the  facts? 

General  Bissell.  As  far  as  I  know,  there  is  no  basis  of  fact  in  it  at 
all.    I  don't  know  where  it  could  have  come  from. 

Mr.  MrrcnELL.  Have  you  tried  to  find  out? 

General  Bissell.  No.  The  only  thing  I  was  interested  in  was  having 
a  check  made  to  see  if  any  of  those  were  libelous.  Wlien  you  analyze 
them  carefully,  there  is  not  a  firm  statement  about  me  in  them ;  every 
one  is  a  quiz,  qualification,  or  implication,  or  inference. 

JMr.  Mitchell.  Have  you  discussed  the  article  with  Arthur  Bliss 
Lane  ? 

General  Bissell.  No.  I  do  not  go  to  former  State  Department 
people  except  through  War  Department  channels.    I  am  a  civilian. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  So  is  he. 

General  Bissell.  His  status  is  different  from  mine.  I  am  on  the 
Government  payroll  as  a  retired  officer. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  So  is  he. 

General  Bissell.  I  didn't  know  that.  Mr.  Lane  is  a  nice  person. 
I  don't  think  he  would  be  vindictive  about  me.  He  might  have  lent 
himself  to  something  for  a  purpose,  but  I  don't  think  he  meant  any- 
thing vindictive. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  I  have  two  or  three  short  questions. 

I  try  to  get  in  through  a  crack  once  in  a  while  between  my  colleague 
from  Michigan  and  counsel  for  the  committee. 

Here  is  something  that  challenges  my  attention  and  may  yours: 
In  the  letter  that  you  wrote  on  August  21, 1945,  appears  this  statement : 

Transmitted — 

and  this  goes  to  Mr.  Lyon — 

for  the  information  and  file  of  the  State  Department  is  the  report  ou  Katyn  by 
Stanley  S.  Gilder,  captain,  EAMC,  British  medical  officer.  This  report  supple- 
ments statement  of  Lt.  Col.  John  H.  Van  Vliet,  Jr.,  forwarded  to  General  Holmes, 
May  25,  194.1,  and  generally  substantiates  all  material  facts  in  Lientpuant 
Colonel  Van  Vliet's  report. 

The  word  "forwarded"  is  w^hat  challenges  my  attention.  Would 
it  be  forwarded  by  mail  or  would  it  be  forwarded  by  a  messenger? 

General  Bissell.  I  think  undoubtedly  by  top-secret  courier. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  Now,  after  that  letter  was  written,  was  it  delivered 
to  the  State  Department  ? 

General  Bissell.  This  particular  one  ? 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  This  letter  of  August  21, 1945. 

General  Bissell.  They  got  this  letter  all  right. 

Mr.  Dondero.  Did  the  State  Department  at  any  time,  from  the  time 
they  received  it,  up  to  this  hour,  ever  say  to  you  or  to  your  office  that 
they  had  not  received  the  Van  Vliet  report? 

General  Bissell.  No.  I  pointed  out  they  processed  this  letter  for 
just  5  days  less  than  2  months.  So  many  people  handled  it.  It  seemed 
to  me  that  would  have  been  almost  inevitable. 

Mr.  Dondero.  It  goes  without  saying,  if  they  did  not  receive  it, 
some  statement  should  have  come  from  the  Department  they  did  not 
receive  it. 


1908  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I^et's  get  this  correct.  Do  you  say  the  State 
Department  never  denied  receiving  the  letter  of  May  25? 

General  Bissell.  I  thought  the  State  Department  had  not.  I  am 
talking  about  the  letter  to  Lyon  carrying  the  Gilder  report,  and  not 
the  May  25  letter.    This  letter  is  a  letter  of  August  21. 

Mr.  iilACHROwicz.  Head  page  2  of  the  Department  of  Defense  re- 
lease in  this  matter. 

General  Bissell.  "General  Holmes,  in  reference  to  the  matter" — 
Which  matter  ? 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  This  is  the  Department  of  Defense  speaking  here. 
They  say,  "The  Department  of  State  has  no  record  of  having  received 
the  memorandum  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Van  Vliet  on  May  25,  1945, 
and  the  Department  of  Army  has  found  no  receipt  for  it  and  no  cover- 
ing letter  of  transmittal." 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  What  is  the  date  of  that  ? 

Mr.  Machrov^icz.  September  18, 1950. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  That  would  have  been  5  years 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Just  a  minute. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  That  is  the  date  the  Department  of  Defense  gave 
the  information,  not  the  date  from  the  Department  of  State. 

Mr.  Dondero.  That  is  the  only  statement  I  have  heard  as  to  what 
the  attitude  of  the  Department  of  State  was,  whether  they  received 
that  or  not. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  want  to  say  that  is  not  in  any  letter  form  what- 
soever. That  is  a  comment  by  the  Department  of  the  Army  at  the 
time  they  passed  this  memorandum  for  the  press,  dated  September 
18,  1950. 

The  State  Department,  to  my  personal  knowledge,  is  not  on  record 
with  this  committee  or  anywhere  else. 

Mr.  Dondero.  That  they  ever  received  the  report  or  denied  or  even 
answered  that  letter  of  August  21,  1945,  when  they  had  a  chance  to  do 
it,  after  General  Bissell  had  written  this  letter  to  them  and  said,  "This 
supplements  the  material  contained  in  the  Van  Vliet  report." 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  can't  understand  your  statement. 

Mr.  Shackelford.  The  State  Department  will  speak  for  itself,  but 
insofar  as  tliis  Defense  Department  statement  was  concerned,  it  was 
based  on  a  thoroughgoing  cooperation  on  their  part.  They  were  as 
anxious. to  find  it  as  we  were.  They  gave  it  the  full  diligence,  when 
they  were  unable  to  find  it.  It  is  on  the  basis  of  that  information 
that  this  statement  is  based. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Information  from  the  Department  of  State? 

Mr.  Shackelford.  Yes,  sir.  When  they  are  before  your  committee, 
they  will  speak  for  themselves. 

Mr.  Dondero.  When  tlie  State  Department  receives  a  letter  from 
General  Bissell,  or  received  a  letter  back  in  August  1945  that  he  had 
forwarded  this  report  and  they  did  not  have  it,  wouldn't  you  naturally 
suspect  they  would  come  out  and  say  then,  not  5  years  later,  "We 
never  received  that  report"? 

Mr.  Shackelford.  I  l)elieve  it  would  be  more  satisfactory  from 
your  standpoint  and  the  conunittee's  standpoint  if  State  were  to  speak 
to  that,  since  it  is  outside  of  my  province. 

Mr.  Dondero.  I  just  wanted  to  call  attention  to  that.  There  is  one 
other  matter,  and  then  I  am  through. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1909 

I  liave  before  me  here  a  letter  written  by  Mr.  Shackelford  to  me  on 
October  6,  1950,  in  answer  to  corresi)ondence  which  I  had  directed  to 
either  the  Department  of  the  Army  or  the  Department  of  State,  inquir- 
ing- Avhat  had  become  of  the  Van  Vliet  report.     You  answered  me. 

In  the  answer  is  this  statement : 

There  was  a  mistake  made — 
I  want  to  read  three  or  four  lines — you  say : 

Gen.  S.  LeRoy  Irwin  in  his  reply  on  October  19,  1949,  to  your  letter — 

meaning  to  me — 

of  October  6.  1949,  referred  to  a  Katyn  massacre  report  which  was  partially 
liased  on  Lieutenant  Colonel  Van  Vliet's  observations. 
In  making  this  statement  he  erroneously  thought — 

and  he,  I  think,  refers  to  General  Irwin — 

he  erroneously  thought  that  the  study  entitled  "Supplementary  Report  on  Facts 
and  Documents  Concerning  the  Katyn  Massacre'"— 

which  was  the  report  which  the  Polish  government  in  exile  made,  if 
I  recall  correctly — 

was  based  in  part  on  information  supplied  by  Lieutenant  Colonel  Van  Vliet. 
This  was  not  so,  and  the  supplementary  report  was  an  independent  and  detailed 
study  made  by  a  Polish  committee,  which  at  no  time  has  conferred  or  consulted 
with  Lieutenant  Colonel  Van  Vliet. 

How  was  it  possible  in  that  office  for  General  Irwin  to  make  a  mis- 
take of  that  magnitude  ? 

Mr.  Shackelford.  It  was  a  very  unfortunate  job  of  mislabeling, 
as  is  brought  out  in  the  Inspector  General's  report,  and  through  really 
just  a  plain  error. 

This  supplemental  report,  which  I  believe  is  approximately  some 
45  to  50  pages  in  length  and  prepared  by  the  Polish  government  in 
exile,  was  incorrectly  labeled  as  partially  based  on  the  Van  Vliet 
report.  It  was  from  that  clue,  as  it  ultimately  came  through  to 
General  Irwin,  his  letter  was  based. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  Could  it  be  possible  there  is  some  error  made  regard- 
ing the  Van  Vliet  report,  so  far  as  it  affects  this  committee? 

Mr.  Shackelford.  We  have  done  everything  in  our  power — and 
very  aggressively,  to  try  to  follow  every  possible  clue  that  we  had,  and 
to  examine  every  possible  file  to  turn  the  report  up  and  to  find  out 
any  error, 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  I  know  you  have  made  every  effort  possible,  because 
you  have  been  in  my  office  more  than  once  regarding  it. 

Mr.  Shackelford.  Thank  you. 

General  Bissell.  Mr.  Dondero,  may  I  say,  when  I  appeared  before 
the  Inspector  General,  I  pointed  out  that  several  letters  had  been  sent 
out  of  the  Department  of  Defense  that  conflicted  with  each  other,  to 
Members  of  Congress  and  to  others,  and  that  I  asked  the  Inspector 
General  to  especially  clear  that  thing  up,  I  think  he  did.  It  was 
because  people  didn't  know  what  they  were  handling,  and  called  it 
different  names,  and  because  it  was  handled  by  different  people  at 
different  times,  and  they  didn't  coordinate.     I  did  stress  that. 

If  you  read  the  testimony  there,  given  to  the  Inspector  General,  you 
will  find  that  I  especially  asked  them  to  go  into  that  and  clear  it  up, 
so  that  the  Secretary  of  Defense  would  not  be  in  an  untenable  position 
as  he  was  in  then. 


:1910  THE    KA.TYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

]Mr.  Mitchell.  I  have  one  question  to  ask. 

When  were  you  relieved  as  assistant  G-2? 

General  Bissell.  In  January  1946. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  was  your  next  assignment  ? 

General  Bissell.  Military  and  air  attache,  Court  of  St.  James's, 
London,  American  Embassy. 

Mr.  Mitchell,  When  did  you  report  for  active  duty  there? 

General  Bissell.  In  May,  the  8th  day  of  May  1946. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  When  were  you  handed  the  Polish  reports,  known 
as  the  facts  and  documents  concerning  Polish  prisoners  of  war  cap- 
tured by  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  during  the  1939  campaign  ^ 

General  Bissell.  I  have  got  that  in  my  story  here,     I  will  find  it. 

Mr,  Mitchell,  And  the  supplemental  report  on  facts  and  documents 
concerning  the  Katyn  massacre,  which  is  the  one  that  was  just  re- 
ferred to  ? 

General  Bissell,  That  is  1946,  and  the  Polish-London  report  is 
page  43. 

On  November  20,  1947,  after  a  dinner  with  a  small  group  of  Poles, 
and  during  the  course  of  a  social  evening 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Wait  a  minute.  What  is  that  date?  Was  that 
November  27?     What  year? 

General  Bissell.  On  November  20,  1947 — and  I  went  to  London  in 
1946. 

You  asked  me  when  I  got  those  papers.  I  am  trying  to  paint  the 
picture  precisely  for  you. 

On  November  20,  1947,  after  a  dinner  with  a  small  group  of  Poles 
and  during  the  course  of  a  social  evening  in  the  home  of  one  of  these 
Polish  couples  in  London,  arrangements  were  made  for  me  to  meet 
with  a  Polish  gentleman  who  was  stated  to  have  assembled  all  the 
available  Polish  information  on  Katyn.  The  meeting  occurred  on 
November  25, 1947. 

Again  I  was  told  the  story  of  the  massacre  of  thousands  of  Poles 
by  the  speaker,  who  stated  he  believed  that  it  had  been  committed  by 
the  Russians.  He  wished  the  information  brought  to  the  attention 
of  the  Americans  at  Nuremberg.  I  made  a  request  for  all  the  data 
they  wished  to  furnish  me. 

I  agi'eed  thereafter  that  the  action  would  be  taken  that  was  con- 
sidered appropriate,  after  a  check  of  the  nature  of  the  data  furnished 
me.  I  did  not  know  what  they  were  going  to  furnish  me,  and  I  did 
not  want  to  be  committed  to  get  something  into  Nuremberg  if  it 
wasn't  right. 

Arrangements  were  made  for  anotlier  meeting  at  which  all  the 
available  material  would  be  delivered  to  me  in  writing. 

Within  a  week,  the  material  was  furnished  to  me.  On  December 
2,  1947,  I  telephoned  Gen.  Telford  Taylor  at  Nuremberg,  telephone 
Justice  6117,  and  told  him  guardedly  what  I  had  secured,  and  that  it 
was  for  the  United  States  group  at  the  International  ISIilitary  Tribu- 
nal, that  I  thought  he  sliould  see  it  promptly. 

He  said  he  would  soiul  a  ])lane  for  it  within  3  daj^s.  This  arrange- 
ment did  not  eventuate,  so  other  arrangements  for  delivery  were 
made. 

On  December  15,  1947,  I  talked  with  General  Taylor  on  the  tele- 
phone.    He  then  informed  me  the  material  had  been  received,  ex- 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  1911 

pressed  appreciation,  but  made  no  other  comment  to  me  then  or  ever 
subsequently. 

Following  what  was  routine  procedure,  G-2  Washington  was  ad- 
vised of  the  procurement  of  this  London  Katyn  report,  and  of  its 
handling,  having  been  forwarded  to  General  Taylor.  I  believe  no 
duplicate  copy  was  available  to  send  to  G-2  in  Washington,  and  1  re- 
quested General  Taylor  to  send  to  G-2  the  copy  furnished  him  when 
it  had  served  his  purposes.  I  believe  this  copy  was  duly  received,  be- 
cause Mr.  Shackelford  told  me  he  had  seen  a  copy  and  his  comments 
concerning  it  convinced  me  that  he  had. 

The  Katyn  report  forwarded  from  London  to  General  Taylor  and 
subsequently  to  G-2,  consisted  of  two  voluminous  reports  totaling  529 
images.  They  were  in  English.  I  believe  they  were  anonymous, 
though — as  I  recall,  there  was  a  statement  in  them  that  the  Polish 
sources  had  been  used;  in  part  the  matter  w^as  repetitious,  but  it  did 
contain  a  most  comprehensive  account  that  obviously  had  involved 
a  great  effort.  These  papers  reached  no  stated  conclusion  of  guilt, 
but  tended  to  build  up  a  case  against  the  Communists.  I  have  rea- 
son to  believe  that  one  copy  of  this  report  had  been  before  the  Nurem- 
berg Tribunal  in  June  1946  and  was  rejected. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  the  point  exactly,  right  there. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Is  he  right  on  his  dates? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  want  to  point  out  the  Inspector  General's  report 
is  totally  inadequate,  because  it  mentions  no  data  as  to  what  the  gen- 
eral is  giving  here.  Obviously  he  must  have  talked  to  the  general,  be- 
cause he  is  talking  about  November  1947  and  they  leave  out  wdien  he 
sent  these  documents  to  General  Taylor. 

The  Nuremberg  trials  were  July  1  and  July  2, 1946,  when  the  Katyn 
affair  was  involved,  and  it  was  on  the  Goering  indictment  at  that  time. 

Therefore,  the  date  that  was  sent  to  General  Taylor  in  December 
1947,  was  wholly  unnecessary.  There  was  nothing  that  could  have 
been  done  with  it  at  that  particular  time.  However,  the  general  has 
just  made  the  statement  that  he  had  reason  to  believe  that  these  same 
documents  were  present  at  the  Nuremberg  trials. 

Could  you  explain  that  further? 

General  Bissell.  I  never  had  an  opportunity  to  read  the  Nuremberg 
report  until  I  came  up  here  last  month,  when  I  read  them  and  found 
what  I  thought  was  the  same  thing. 

Mr.  Maciirowicz.  That  is  the  reason  you  had  to  believe  they 
were 

General  Bissell.  The  Russian  counsel  is  quoted  in  the  Nuremberg 
reports  as  describing  the  paper  as  anonymous,  as  in  English,  as  having 
been  published  in  London  and  as  not  being  admissible,  because  it  was 
from  Polish  sources  and  they  were  not  admitting  it  at  Nuremberg,  as 
I  understood  it,  in  reading  it.  I  did  not  look  at  it  too  carefully. 
There  is  a  lot  of  stuff  on  Nuremberg.  They  were  not  admitting  as 
evidence  anything  on  this  particular  case,  except  official  Government 
papers. 

The  Russian  paper  was  an  official  Government  paper,  but  the  Rus- 
sians had  not  recognized  that  Polish  Government  that  was  in  London 
at  this  time.  They  had  severed  relations  with  the  Poles  when  the  Poles 
asked  the  International  Red  Cross  to  intercede. 

So,  that  made  the  document  inadmissible. 


1912  THE    KATYN    FOEEST    MASSACRE 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  'Who  was  offering  that  document  in  evidence  in 
Nuremberg?  I  frankly  have  not  seen  any  mention  of  it.  I  don't 
know  if  our  counsel  has  or  not. 

General  Bissell.  One  of  the  counsel  for  either 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Goering? 

General  Bissell.  Or  another  defendant.  Two  were  being  tried 
jointly  at  that  particular  moment.  Now,  please  don't  misunderstand 
me  at  all.  I  knew  about  Nuremberg.  I  visited  Nuremberg  when  the 
principal  criminals  were  being  tried. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  was  at  this  time  ? 

General  Bissell.  No. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes.     Goering  was  the  principal  witness. 

General  Bissell.  But  this  was  1947,  and  the  time  I  visited  them  was 
earlier  than  that. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Frankly,  I  am  confused  again.  I  have  not  read 
all  of  the  Nuremberg  trial  proceedings,  although  I  have  some  of  them, 
and  frankly  I  saw  no  mention  of  anyone  offering  in  evidence  any 
documents  obtained  from  the  London  government. 

General  Bissell.     Yes;  I  think  they  tried  to  get  this  one  in. 

Mr.  Machrowt:cz.  I  would  like  to  ask  our  counsel,  who  I  presume 
has  checked  the  Nuremberg  trials,  Is  there  any  record  of  anyone  offer- 
ing them  in  evidence  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  If  you  will  recall,  when  we  had  Mr.  Kempner  on 
the  stand  in  Frankfurt,  several  volumes  of  the  Nuremberg  trials  were 
mentioned  in  the  course  of  that,  I  believe  when  they  were  submitting 
documentary  evidence,  although  I  have  not  checked  the  official  docu- 
ments because  they  are  not  contained  in  the  trial  hearings,  as  yet. 
But  I  intended  to  do  that  in  the  near  future,  and  I  will  check  tliat  vei  y 
point.  However,  if  the  general  can  tell  me  which  volume  and  where 
it  is,  I  will  be  very  appreciative. 

General  Bissell.  Mr.  Shackleford  can.  but  I  can't.  His  office  made 
some  references  to  where  things  appeared.  I  didn't  have  time  to 
read  many  of  them.  I  ran  into  that  one  and  that  is  the  reason  tliat  I 
have  it  in  here,  because  it  seems  to  be  bearing  on  the  Nuremberg 
presentation  on  this  particular  material.  I  knew  from  personally 
being  at  the  Nuremberg  trial  when  the  principal  criminals  were  under 
trial,  and  talking  with  Telford  Taylor  there.  They  couldn't  do  that 
trial  without  the  electrical  set-up  for  the  tiling  coming  out  in  many 
languages.  That  broke  down  so  I  had  a  chance  for  an  liour  and  a  half 
to  talk  with  Taylor.  There  was  no  mention  of  Katyn  at  that  time. 
He  was  on  another  case.  I  was  interested  in  these  criminals  in  the 
box,  because  they  left  them  there  and  the  judges  went  out.  I  knew 
only  tlie  details  on  the  Nuremberg  thing  since  last  April,  and  then  not 
very  thoroughly.  There  is  supposed  to  be  a  book  of  document  5.  I 
didn't  look  at  it  at  all  at  that  time. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Our  committee  was  given  the  infoi-mation  in 
Europe  that  certain  documents  had  been  furnished  by  tlie  Polish 
Government  in  London  to  the  j)roper  authorities  in  Nuremberg,  and 
were  never  ])resented.  Now,  the  information  that  you  give  me  seems 
to  beai-  out  that  that  charge  is  not  correct. 

General  Bissell.  Tliey  didn't  let  them  present  it. 

Mr.  MAcniRowicz.  That  is  different. 

General  Bissell.  They  got  tliem  ready. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  They  were  offered? 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1913 

General  Bissell.  And  the  Russian  who  was  presiding  that  day 
made  the  decision,  "AVe  would  aaree  only  to  take  official  documents 
and  this  one  is  not  an  official  document  because  it  is  not  of  a  <rovern- 
ment  recognized  by  all  of  the  members  of  the  court."' 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  believe  that  will  be  confirmed  in  our  hearings,  I 
believe,  by  both  Dr.  Stahmer  and  Mr.  Kempner.  Dr  Stahmer  was 
the  German  defense  counsel  on  the  Katyn  indictment  on  the  Goering 
trial,  and  I  think  you  will  find  that  that  is  correct,  except  that  I  do 
think  there  was  some  mention  in  the  record,  which  I  have  not  had  an 
opportunity  to  check  but  which  we  will  take  np  later  when  we  go  in 
that  aspect  of  the  case. 

Mr.  Shackelford.  I  will  be  glad  to  check  our  own  records  with 
i-egard  to  the  Nuremberg  trials  and  volumes  and  supply  any  pertinent 
citations  which  we  may  have  to  the  committee. 

Mr.  Sheehax.  Might  I  ask  you  to  refresh  my  recollection  on  the 
Xuremberg  trials?  Weren't  they  started  in  November  of  1945  and 
finished  in  July  or  August  of  1946? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  happened  was  this :  They  started  discussing 
the  Katyn  affair  or  indictment.  They  didn't  know  where  to  put  it. 
So  they  finally  selected  Goering  as  a  major  war  criminal.  They  put 
it  in  his  indictment.  They  came  up  with  the  discussion  in  February 
1946  as  to  how  many  witnesses  each  side  would  be  permitted  to  call, 
and  they  haggled  over  it  for  2  or  3  or  4  months.  On  June  29,  if  my 
memory  serves  me  correctly,  the  presiding  judge  at  that  time,  wdio 
was 

Ml'.  DoNDERO,  Lawrence,  Judge  Lawrence. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Judge  Lawrence,  of  the  British,  finally  ruled  and 
told  both  of  them,  "You  will  have  three  witnesses  and  only  three 
witnesses,"  and  they  had  those  people  up,  cross-examination  of  both 
sides,  July  1  and  July  2, 1946.  There  was  a  summary  by  Dr.  Stahmer, 
the  German  defense  counsel,  I  believe,  on  July  6.  There  was  no  sum- 
mary by  the  Russians  or  tlie  Soviets,  and  the  matter  was  dropped. 

Mr.  Sheehan,  That  is  what  I  am  trying  to  tie  up.  The  general  is 
quoting  November  1947  and  the  trials  were  all  over. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  It  was  not  stated  by  any  witness  in  Frankfurt 
that  any  offer  was  made  to  "present  any  evidence  in  Nuremberg  in  the 
form  of  a  document  from  the  Polish  Government  in  London. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  There  was  a  slight  reference  in  which  he  gave  us  a 
reference  to  a  volume,  in  which  I  have  a  reference,  and  which  I  intend 
to  check. 

General  Bissell.  I  knew^  all  of  the  time  when  this  fellow  came  to 
me  and  wanted  me  to  present  this  particular  thing  at  Nuremberg  that 
the  main  criminal  trials  were  finished  and  the  criminals  executed  long 
since,  or  disposed  of.  Then  the  court  kept  on  for  a  long,  long  time  w^ith 
the  minor  things  before  they  broke  it  into  small  particles  and  it  went 
on  for  a  long  time.  When  I  first  went  there — I  could  get  it  out  of 
these  papers  but  it  is  not  important — it  was  approximately  a  year 
earlier,  and  the  main  criminals  were  then  on  trial.  But  I  knew  it  was 
not  going  to  change  the  main  trial  but  was  going  to  get  to  Nuremberg 
everything  I  could  get  as  fast  as  I  could  get  it  there. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  No  further  questions,  sir. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  I  have  one  question,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Counsel,  you  asked  Colonel  Van  Vliet  in  his  testimony,  when  he 
came  back  and  was  in  General  Bissell's  office,  if  Colonel  Van  Vliet  knew 


1914  THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE 

or  heard  of  a  Lieutenant  Colonel  Holloman.  Did  yon  have  any  par- 
ticular purpose  in  that? 

Mr.  ]\IiTCHELL,  Yes,  sir ;  that  was  cleared  up  yesterday  by  Mrs.  Mil- 
dred Meeres  when  I  talked  to  her.  Holloman's  identity  was  mistaken 
for  Lantaff.  In  other  words,  Lantaff  in  the  record  there  is  Holloman, 
really.  Holloman  has  taken  quite  a  beating  from  the  Inspector  Gen- 
eral's office  and  everything  as  regards  the  mistaken  identity  on  the 
part  of  Mrs.  Mildred  Meeres,  and  she  went  back  to  the  War  Depart- 
ment yesterday  after  meeting  Congressman  Lantaff  and  corrected  the 
file  as  far  as  who  the  individual  was,  and  it  was  Congressman  Lantaff, 
not  Holloman.     At  that  time  I  was  merely  exploring. 

General  Bissell.  I  think  I  can  help  you  on  that.  Holloman  was 
the  head  of  the  section  for  which  ]\Irs.  Meeres  worked,  and  she  only 
was  in  our  office  for  this  one  thing.  That  is  why  Congressman  Lan- 
taff was  the  man  instead  of  the  colonel  in  his  own  section. 

Chairman  Madden.  General  Bissell,  the  committee  wishes  to  thank 
you  for  testifying  here  today.  Considering  the  extended  versions  of 
the  testimony  presented  in  regard  to  the  particular  report  which  the 
committee  is  interested  in,  there  is  no  doubt  but  what  the  committee 
will  have  to  explore  further  as  to  whether  there  is  any  possible  avenue 
to  determine  the  whereabouts  or  what  happened  to  that  particular 
report.  We  will  make  every  effort  by  further  witnesses  which  we 
will  call.  There  is  a  possibility  that  we  miglit  want  further  testimony 
from  you.  Of  course,  our  committee  is  merely  interested  in  concrete 
testimony  if  we  can  secure  it,  or  proof  as  to  where  the  original  Van 
Vliet  report  went.  Inferences  or  suppositions  will  not  satisfy  the 
public  as  to  what  happened  to  the  report.  Of  course,  the  testimony 
here  today,  possibly  the  highlight  of  the  testimony,  was  the  Inspector 
General's  report,  and  I  wrote  it  down  as  the  testimony  came  out  that 
in  the  Inspector  General's  report  it  said,  in  conclusions  of  it,  there  is 
no  proof  that  the  Van  Vliet  report  ever  left  the  office  where  it  orig- 
inated.    I  asked  you  about  that,  and  you  said  that  is  correct. 

General  Bissell.  I  confirmed  it. 

Cliairman  Madden.  Now,  of  course,  I  know  that  the  members  of  the 
committee  are  not  satisfied  as  to  its  proposed  exploration  to  determine 
the  wliereabouts  or  what  hap]3ened  to  the  Van  Vliet  report.  So  we 
will  explore  further  and  possibly  we  might  have  you  testify  again,  I 
don't  know.  But  nevertheless  we  are  thankful  for  your  presence  here 
today. 

General  Bissell.  Be  assured  I  not  only  welcome  that,  but  hope  you 
will. 

Chairman  Madden.  The  committee  will  meet  tomorrow  morning  at 
10  o'clock,  in  this  room. 

(Whereupon,  at  5  p.  m.  the  committee  was  recessed,  to  reconvene  at 
10  a.  m.,  Wednesday,  June  4, 1952.) 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 


WEDNESDAY,   JUNE  4,    1952 

House  of  Representatives, 
The  Select  Committee  on  the 

IvATYN  Forest  Massacre, 

Washington^  D.  C. 

The  select  committee  met  at  10  a.  m.,  pursuant  to  recess,  in  room  362,, 
House  Office  Building,  Hon.  Eay  J.  Madden  (chairman),  presiding. 

Present :  Messrs.  Madden,  Flood,  Machrowicz,  Dondero,  O'Konski, 
and  Sheehan. 

Also  present :  John  J.  Mitchell,  chief  counsel  to  the  select  committee. 

Chairman  Madden.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

]\Ir.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  a  few  brief  remarks  I  would 
like  to  direct  to  the  attention  of  the  entire  committee. 

You  will  recall  that  when  we  were  in  Chicago  taking  the  testimony 
of  Col.  Henry  Szymanski,  Colonel  Szymanski  took  out  of  his  personal 
file  some  documents  which  we  put  into  the  record  as  exhibits.  At  that 
time  the  staff  of  this  committee  had  never  seen  those ;  neither  had  any 
member  of  this  committee.  Yesterday  the  same  incident  occurred 
here  on  the  stand  when  General  Bissell  was  testifying.  The  War  De- 
partment counselor,  Mr.  Shackelford,  brought  out  some  additional 
letters. 

You  will  also  recall  that  this  committee  visited  with  the  President 
of  the  United  States  in  January,  at  which  time  this  committee  was  as- 
sured that  all  official  documents  pertaining  to  the  missing  Polish 
officers  and  the  Katyn  massacre  would  be  made  available  to  this 
committee. 

This  committee  has  repeatedly  requested  verbally  of  the  War  De- 
partment counsellor's  office  all  documents  connected  with  it.  I  am 
sorry  to  say  this  morning  that  I  have  been  placed  in  a  rather  em- 
barrassing position  several  times  in  the  course  of  these  hearings. 

I  would  like  to  state  openly  that  all  documents  in  the  War  Depart- 
ment pertaining  to  the  missing  Polish  officers  and  the  Katjai  affair 
should  be  presented  to  this  committee. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Mr.  Chairman,  would  it  not  be  better  to  wait 
until  Mr.  Shackelford  is  here  before  making  that  statement  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  His  representative  is  here  and  has  heard  the  remark. 
I  am  referring  to  Mr.  Faclier. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Is  Mr.  Shackelford  going  to  be  here  this 
morning  ? 

Mr.  Facher  (Jerome  P.  Facher,  assistant  to  F.  Shackelford,  coun- 
selor. Department  of  the  Army).  He  will  be  unable  to  be  here  today. 

1915 


1916  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Mr.  Maciirowicz.  Do  you  want  to  make  any  statein  l  in  connec- 
tion with  that  ? 

Mr.  Facher.  No,  sir.  We  are  trying  to  uncover  i>  le  documents 
for  the  committee  and  there  are  several  that  are  going-  to  be  forwarded 
hiter  in  the  week. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Thank  you,  sir. 

The  first  witness  this  morning  is  Colonel  Yeatoix 

Chairman  Madden,  Colonel  Ivan  Yeaton.  Will  you  step  forward, 
please,  and  raise  your  right  hand  and  be  sworn  ? 

Do  you  solemnly  swear  that  in  this  hearing  you  will  tell  the  trutli, 
the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  your  God  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  do,  sir. 

TESTIMONY  OF  IVAN  DOWNS  YEATON,  UNITED  STATES  ARMY, 
ACCOMPANIED  BY  JEROME  FACHER,  ASSISTANT  TO  F.  SHACKEL- 
FORD, COUNSELOR,  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  ARMY 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Colonel  Yeaton,  will  you  tell  the  committee  your 
full  name  for  the  record,  please? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Ivan  Downs  Yeaton. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  And  your  home  address,  please? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  My  home  address  at  present  is  Fort  Wayne,  De- 
troit, Mich. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Colonel  Yeaton,  will  you  state  the  date  of  your 
birth? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  was  born  January  2,  1895,  at  Haverhill,  Mass. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Will  you  state  briefly  your  educational  background 
for  the  committee? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Grammar  school  in  Boston  or  Allston,  Mass.; 
high  scliool,  Pasadena,  Calif. 

I  have  a  degree  in  osteopathy  from  the  College  of  Osteopathic  Phy- 
sicians and  Surgeons  in  Los  Angeles,  and  I  took  a  year's  postgraduate 
work  in  the  College  of  Physicians  and  Surgeons  in  San  Francisco, 
and  interned  in  the  City  County  Hospital  in  San  Francisco. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  attend  the  United  States  Military  Academv 
at  West  Point? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  did  not,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  When  did  you  first  enter  the  Army  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Seventeenth  of  September  1917. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  How^  long  have  you  been  in  the  United  States  Army  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Ever  since,  with  the  exception  of  1  year's  retire- 
ment, wdiich  was  last  year. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  was  your  official  duty  station  on  September  [ 
1,  19)59,  and  in  wdiat  capacity  w^ere  you  serving?  j 

Colonel  Yeaton.  September  1,  1939,  I  was  designated  as  military  [ 
attache  to  the  Soviet  Union.     I  am  not  quite  sure  wdiere  I  was.     I 
don't  tliink  I  had  joined  my  station,  but  I  was  en  route.  j 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Was  your  official  position  at  that  time  in  any  way  i 
coiuiected  with  interpretive  duties?  I 

Colonel  Yeaton.  At  that  time  I  was  to  be  military  attache  to  the  { 
Soviet  Union.  It  was  my  duty  to  collect  information  and  to  evaluate  ■ 
it.     Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  speak  the  Russian  language,  or  write  it,  or 
read  it? 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1919 

Mr.  MiTCHr- ')!(■.  Do  you  remember  or  recall  having  seen  those  docu- 
ments coming    I'o  G-2  from  Col.  Henry  I.  Szymanski? 

Colonel  YE.-pfff.  I  did,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Could  you  tell  the  committee  what  happened  to 
those  documents  as  they  were  received,  what  the  procedure  was  in 
connection  with  such  documents? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  At  that  time,  the  organization  of  G-2  had  what 
is  known  as  a  reading  panel.  There  were  three  officers  detailed  down 
to  the  records  section.  Military  attache  reports  came  in  in  10  copies,  I 
believe.  The  original,  from  which  additional  copies  could  be  made, 
was  sent  to  the  records  section.  Of  the  10  remaining  copies,  the  read- 
ing panel  decided  on  the  distribution. 

And  as  long  as  I  was  the  responsible  section  chief,  all  extra  copies 
w-ould  of  necessity  come  to  me.  In  my  office  these  reports  were  filed 
under  my  Polish  intelligence  group. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Polish  intelligence  group — how  many  individuals 
were  working  at  that  time,  and  what  was  their  primary  duty  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  My  memory  doesn't  serve  me.  I  am  not  sure  how 
large  the  section  was  at  that  time. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  All  right;  proceed,  please. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  That  is  one  section  of  the  question.  But  the  other 
section  of  the  question  Avas,  What  was  their  primary  duty?  Could 
you  answer  that  part  of  the  question  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  The  primary  duty  of  what,  sir? 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Of  tliis  particular  section,  the  Polish  intelligence 
section. 

Colonel  Yeaton.  The  Polish  intelligence  subsection's  primary 
duties,  were  to  file,  evaluate,  make  such  memoranda  as  they  thought 
necessary. 

And  our  main  interest  at  tliat  time  was  the  size  and  training  and 
possible  use  of  tlie  Polisli  Army  in  the  Far  East. 

Therefore,  the  subject  of  missing  officers  was  one  of  vital  impor- 
tance to  us,  if  they  were  still  alive  and  where  they  were  and  what  action 
it  would  take,  or  what  help  we  could  give  the  Poles  in  getting  them 
out  of  prison  camps  or  wherever  they  were.  They  were  simply  listed 
as  missing  officers,  and,  as  such,  in  the  Polish  file;  there  was  a  section 
where  reports  that  dealt  with  these  missing  officers  were  filed  sepa- 
rately. 

You  must  understand  at  this  time  we  were  getting  Polish  intelli- 
gence from  tlie  Polish  Government  in  exile  and  London  and  through 
the  Polisli  diplomatic  group  here  in  Washington.  So  I  had  Polish 
intelligence  coming  in  from  at  least  two  sources. 

Hut  all  reports  wound  up  in  the  same  file. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  sav  all  the  reports  wound  up  in  the  same 
file?  ■ 

Colonel  Yeaton.  At  that  time ;  yes,  sir. 

]\Ir.  Mitchell.  At  that  time  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman  and  members  of  the  committee,  I 
have  never  seen  any  reports,  from  any  other  source  other  than  from 
Col.  Henry  Szymanski. 

Colonel,  you  have  read  the  exhibits  which  are  in  part  3  of  Col.  Henry 
Szynianski's  testimony.  Are  those  all  of  Col.  Henry  Szymanski's 
reports,  to  your  knowledge,  or  were  there  additional  reports? 


1920  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  think  there  were  more  than  that,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  think  tliere  were  more  than  that? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Yes. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Mr.  Chairman  at  this  point  of  the  proceedings, 
I  would  like  to  ask  the  representative  of  the  Department  of  Defense 
where  the  additional  reports  are.  Mr.  Facher  is  here  speaking  on 
behalf  of  the  Department  of  Defense.    Is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Facher.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Will  you  identify  yourself  for  the  record,  please? 

Mr.  Facher.  I  am  Jerome  P.  Facher,  assistant  to  F.  Shackelford, 
Department  of  the  Army  counselor. 

To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  we  have  located  all  the  reports  that 
Col.  Henry  I.  Szymanski  has  sent  in. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Have  you  turned  them  all  over  to  the  committee  ? 

Mr.  Facher.  We  have  turned  all  the  reports  of  Colonel  Szymanski 
that  we  have  located  over  to  the  committee. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  There  is  evidently  a  difference  of  opinion  be- 
tween you  and  the  colonel. 

Am  I  correct,  Colonel,  that  you  made  the  statement  that  not  all  the 
reports  are  included  in  the  list  of  those  which  you  have  seen  in  the 
transcript  of  testimony  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  You  must  understand,  sir,  that  all  the  reports 
that  Szymanski  sent  in  didn't  have  to  do  with  Katyn. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Are  all  the  reports  of  Colonel  Szymanski  m  re- 
lation to  tlie  Polish  officers  and  Katyn  included  in  that  list? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  1  can't  say  positively. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Are  there  any  other  reports  relating  to  the  miss- 
ing Polish  officers,  or  to  Katyn,  other  than  those  which  have  been 
listed  in  your  testimony  before  the  committee,  that  you  know  of? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  That  I  know  of,  sir ;  no.    Not  that  I  know  of. 

Chairman  Madden.  Just  a  moment.  Then  your  statement  that  you 
made  a  moment  ago  dealt  with  Colonel  Szymanski's  reports  not  only 
concerning  Katyn,  but  as  to  other  matters  also ;  is  that  correct? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  believe  the  record  will  show  that  he  was  also  re- 
sponsible for  liaison  with  the  Czechoslovakians ;  is  that  correct? 

General  Yeaton.  That  is  true. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  think  he  told  us  that  in  Chicago. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Mr.  Chairman,  is  it  your  pleasure  to  question  the' 
witness  as  he  goes  along,  or  to  wait  until  he  makes  his  statement  ? 

Chairman  I^Iadden.  Did  you  have  a  statement  you  wanted  to  makiv 
Colonel? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  No,  sir. 

Chairman  Madden.  You  can  pursue  your  questions,  Mr.  Sheehan. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Colonel,  there  is  a  distinction  that  the  gentleman  tr 
your  right  drew.  He  said  that  all  the  papers  of  Colonel  Szymanski 
were  turned  in.  The  committee  is  concerned  with  all  the  papers  and  all 
the  reports  containing  the  Katyn  Forest  massacre,  from  whatevoi 
source.  Has  the  Army  turned  over  to  the  committee  all  the  papers 
referring  to  the  Katyn  massacre  situation,  from  whatever  source^ 

Coloney  Yeaton.  I  have  no  way  of  knowing,  sir. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Will  Mr.  Facher  answer  that? 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  1921 

Mr.  Facher.  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  Mr.  Slieelian,  that  has 
been  clone.  The  search  for  missing  papers  is  still  continuing,  and  we 
have  several  other  documents  which  we  are  going  to  forward  this  week. 

I  might  say  that  we  have  forwarded  to  your  committee  military 
attache  reports  from  Iran  and  from  other  countries. 

I  believe  Mr.  Mitchell  will  find  from  some  of  our  forwarding  letters 
that  we  did  send  some  of  those  reports  over. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  The  Army  turned  it  over,  of  course,  and  it  had  spe- 
cifically to  do  with  the  Van  Vliet  report. 

We  know  that  Colonel  Hulls — which  is  one  of  those  debatable 
things — made  a  report,  which  the  Army  has  refused  to  declassify, 
although  they  did  turn  it  over  to  us. 

We  do  know  that  the  military  attache  in  Lisbon  in  1942  and  1943 
made  quite  a  few  reports  regarding  the  Polish  missing  officers,  which 
I  do  not  think  the  Army  has  officially  turned  over. 

Now,  it  would  seem  to  me  that,  on  the  basis  of  these  reports  that  we 
know  about,  there  must  be  a  lot  of  other  reports. 

You  mentioned  a  while  ago  that  you  had  a  separate  section  or  a 
separate  file  folder  for  the  various  reports  on  the  missing  Polish 
officers.  Now,  could  you  tell  the  committee,  was  this  given  any  par- 
ticular number  or  file  name  or  something? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  That  question,  sir,  can  only  be  answered  if  you 
will  put  a  date  to  it. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Let  me  put  the  date  from  1941  to  1946,  inclusive, 
all  reports  concerning  the  missing  Polish  officers,  from  whatever 
source. 

Colonel  Yeaton.  On  July  1,  1943,  the  Eastern  European  Section 
became  a  branch.  Any  reports  coming  from  Spain  would  not  come 
into  the  Eastern  European  Section. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Even  if  they  specifically  referred  only  to  Russians 
and  Polish  relations? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  We  would  be  given  a  copy. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Certainly. 

Colonel  Yeaton.  But  the  basic  reports  would  not  be  in  our  office, 
but  we  would  be  kept  advised. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  We  are  interested  in  anything.  Copies.  We  do  not 
necessarily  want  the  official  reports. 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Yes,  sir. 

Then  on  September  1  I  became  chief  of  the  unit  and  no  longer 
responsible  for  the  files  of  any  of  the  branches.  I  was  the  over-all 
chief  of  Europe,  Middle  East,  and  Africa,  and,  as  such,  we  didn't  keep 
any  files  in  our  office. 

Mr.  MrrcHELL.  What  year  was  that? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  That  was  on  September  1,  1943. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  But  Colonel,  even  if  you  became  chief  of  the  Eu- 
ropean Section,  someone  succeeded  you  in  that  Polish-Eussian  section, 
did  he  not? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  That  is  true,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  He  would  inherit  all  the  papers  that  were  there, 
would  he  not? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  That  is  right. 


1922  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

Mr.  Sheehan.  The  files  would  be  continued,  would  they  not  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  All  the  files. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Mr.  Chairman,  it  seems  to  me  we  should  get  after 
the  Army.    There  are  still  reports  we  do  not  know  about. 

May  I  proceed  a  little  while  before  we  go  on  that  ? 

In  handling  your  eastern  European  end  in  1941  and  1943,  when 
you  were  in  charge  of  that,  did  you  work  closely  with  the  State  De- 
partment in  this  respect:  Assume  the  State  Department  got  infor- 
mation from  the  Ambassador  or  someone  directly  to  the  State  Depart- 
ment concerning,  say,  missing  Polish  officers  or  military  problems, 
would  they  refer  that  to  you,  a  copy  of  it,  or  something  like  that? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  would  say  so,  normally. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  In  other  words,  G-2  was  sort  of  a  clearing  house 
on  all  phases  of  the  military  situation  as  it  affected  the  political  situa- 
tion also? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  would  rather  say  liaison  than  a  clearing  house. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Then  you  reported  your  talk  with  Anders  to  Am- 
bassador Steinhardt — and  there  must  be  other  Ambassadors  to  Russia 
by  this  time — who  had  reports  on  the  missing  Polish  officers?  The 
State  Department  must  have  referred  some  of  these  reports  to  the 
Army,  did  they  not? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  can  only  answer  that  by  saying  that  they  at- 
tempted to  keep  us  in  the  picture.  Now,  I  couldn't  pin  down  any 
one  report. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  No  specific  one.  But  by  keeping  you  in  the  picture 
sometimes  between  1941  to  1945,  State  must  have  referred  items  of 
strictly  military  interest  to  G-2  concerning  Polish  officers  and  the 
Polish-Russian  situation. 

The  Army,  so  far  as.  I  know,  Mr.  Mitchell,  has  not  come  up  with 
any  of  that.    Has  it  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  State  Department  or  G-2? 

Mr.  Sheehan.  G-2  has  not  come  up  with  any  State  Department 
reports. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  No.  The  only  thing  I  got  from  G-2  is  already  on 
the  record,  or  whatever  they  may  have  given  in  my  absence  during 
the  European  trip  of  the  committee.  I  will  search  the  files  and  correct 
any  misstatements  that  may  have  been  made  this  morning. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  And  that  was  only  after  we  informed  them  of  the 
Existence  of  the  documents,  particularly  of  the  Szymanski  report. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  They  did  not  submit  them  to  us  until  we  found 
out  about  them  from  outside  sources. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  wnll  correct  the  record  on  that  point. 

If  you  will  recall,  Mr.  Machrowicz,  you  were  in  town  last  Decem- 
ber. 'We  got  four  of  the  nine  attachments  to  Col.  Henry  Szymanski's 
report,  and  then  in  January  we  finally  got  the  rest  of  them  after  we 
were  informed  from  outside  sources  as  to  their  whereabouts.    Correct? 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Colonel,  just  to  pursue  that  a  minute  longer,  so  I 
can  finish  at  this  point  here :  When  you  were  talking  about  a  lile  where 
all  these  materials  were  channeled  or  sent  to,  do  you  recall  any  par- 
ticular designation  or  file  number  or  file  classification  given  to  that, 
from  memory,  or  from  any  facts  you  might  have  there? 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  1923 

Colonel  Yeatox.  That  file  number  would  be  put  on  down  in  the 
receiving  room  by  this  panel  that  I  spoke  about.  They  determined 
where  it  would  be  filed  and  what  the  distribution  would  be.  That  was 
not  a  part  of  the  branch  chief's  duty. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Do  you  remember  the  names  of  this  panel,  for  the 
record  ? 

Colonel  Yeatox.  No.  It  was  constantly  changing.  I  know  that 
Dave  Crist,  out  of  my  office,  was  on  it  some  time,  but  it  wasn't 

Mr.  :Mitchell.  Mr.  Sheehan,  I  would  like  to  interrupt  for  one 
moment. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  now  like  to  ask  the  War  Department  coun- 
selor for  a  complete  personnel  breakdown  of  all  individuals  in  the 
EE  section  and  the  Balkan  section  from  the  j'ear  1942,  when  we 
became  involved  in  World  War  II,  through  ]\Iay  1945. 

Mr.  Maciirowicz.  What  is  the  EE  section?  Is  that  the  Eastern 
European  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  includes  Poland  and  Russia. 

I  would  also  like  to  see  the  names  of  the  individuals  connected  with 
the  Balkan  section  in  G-2. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  I  might  say  for  the  record  here — and  INIr.  Mitchell 
and  Mr.  Madden  will  agree  with  this — that  when  we  visited  the  Presi- 
dent, he  did  not  directly  say  he  would  have  all  the  executive  depart- 
ments deliver  to  us  or  send  to  us  whatever  material  they  had  on  Katyn. 

Is  that  right,  Mr.  ]\Iitchell  ?     Do  you  remember  that  ? 

Mr.  INIiTCHELL.  I  do  not  recall  whether  he  said  that  they  would  take 
the  initiative,  or  whether  we  would  take  the  initiative,  but  I  do  recall 
that  when  we  walked  out  of  that  office,  I  had  the  very  definite  under- 
standing that  anything  that  was  available  this  committee  could  have. 

My  protest  this  morning  was  on  the  fact  that  twice  in  official  testi- 
mony before  this  committee  I  have  been  caught  by  surprise  when  wit- 
nesses produced  documents  either  from  War  Department  files  or  their 
own  personal  files. 

The  latest  illustration  was  General  Bissell  yesterday,  on  the  letter 
of  May  25, 1945,  about  the  Swiss  protecting  power. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Sheehan. 

Now,  Colonel  Yeaton,  I  would  like  to  show  you  exhibit  No.  12.  I 
don't  think  that  the  exhibit,  in  part  3,  has  on  it  the  routing  of  the 
various  reports  as  they  came  in.  This  is  the  top  cover  sheet  of  exhibit 
No.  12.  It  comes  from  the  "Military  Intelligence  Division,  WGS, 
military  attache  report,  Poland.  Subject :  Polish  Army  in  England 
and  the  Middle  East.  From :  M.  A.,  liaison  officer.  November  6, 
1942,  source  and  degree  of  reliability :  Gen.  Wladyslaw  Sikorski,  Lt. 
Gen.  Wladyslaw  Anders." 

Down  in  the  lower  left-hand  corner  is : 

"Auth. :  Colonel  Yeaton.  Date:  11-30-1942.  Number  of  copies: 
13." 

I  would  like  you  to  read  it.  Will  you  read,  for  the  committee,  what 
other  departments  received  or  were  notified  of  that  report? 


1924  THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE 

Colonel  Yeaton.  The  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence  received  a  copy. 

The  recording  section  received  the  original. 

The  British  Empire  section  received  a  copy. 

Air  Intelligence  received  a  copy. 

The  Middle  East  section  received  a  copy  and  the  eastern  European 
section  received  six  copies. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  just  one  question  in  con- 
nection with  that. 

What  does  that  report  deal  with  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  It  is  on  the  record.  The  balance  of  the  report  is  in 
the  record. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  But  just  generally,  Colonel,  can  you  tell  us  what 
that  report  deals  with  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Minutes  of  the  meeting  on  organization  of  the 
Polish  forces  in  the  Middle  East,  a  chart  of  defensive  disposition  of 
the  Polish  Corps  in  Scotland,  a  chart  of  the  organization  of  the  First 
Army  of  the  Motorized  Corps,  and  a  chart  of  the  organization  of  the 
territorial  units. 

Mr.  INIachrowicz.  Who  had  charge  of  routing  copies  of  this  re- 
port to  the  various  other  departments  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  The  reading  panel,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  have  charge  of  it? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  the  Department  of  State  receive  a  copy? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  No,  sir;  it  is  not  so  recorded  on  here. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Just  so  there  will  be  no  misunderstanding,  I  would 
now  like  to  have  the  War  Department  counselor's  representative,  Mr. 
Facher,  make  a  note  that  I  would  like  to  have  the  names  of  the 
various  reading  panel  members  in  G-2  from  April  1942  until  Decem- 
ber 1943. 

I  believe  it  was  December  18  that  Colonel  Szymanski  was  relieved 
of  his  duty  as  assistant  military  attache.  Is  that  correct,  Mr.  Machro- 
wicz? 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  do  not  know.    I  do  not  remember  the  date. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Are  there  any  further  questions  from  the  com- 
mittee ? 

Mr.  OT^ONSKi.  "VAHiy  was  he  relieved  of  his  duty  ? 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  will  tell  my  colleague  from  Wisconsin  I  am 
vei'y  much  interested  in  bringing  that  point  out,  and  I  will  bring 
it  out  later  in  the  cross-examination,  if  I  am  permitted  to  do  so. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  I  shall  look  forward  to  it  very  much. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Would  you  like  to  ask  the  colonel  about  page  418, 
part  3,  at  this  time,  Mr.  O'Konski  ? 

Mr.  OT^ONSKi.  No. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Colonel,  I  would  like  to  proceed  a  little  further 
by  asking  what  was  the  procedure  within  the  office  of  G-2  when  such 
reports  Avere  received,  and  how  did  the  information  channel  up  to 
the  head  of  G-2  and  thence  to  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  or  wherever 
else  it  may  have  been  sent?  How  was  it  done?  Who  did  it?  Was 
it  oral  briefing,  or  was  it  in  memorandum  form?    What  was  it? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  The  information  that  came  in  on  these  attache 
reports  was  broken  down  according  to  subject  and  could  have  been 
handled  in  one  of  several  manners.  Any  intelligence  or  any  informa- 
tion on  the  Polish  troops  in  the  Near  East  was  a  matter  of  great 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1925 

concern  to  the  G-3  section  of  the  War  Department,  the  plans  and 
training,  because  they  were  responsible  for  the  strategy  and  the  orders 
pertaining  to  the  Allied  troops  that  we  had  anything  to  do  with. 

Information  on  the  missing  Polish  officers  was  of  spot  intelligence 
value  to  ns  as  long  as  we  thought  they  were  alive,  because  they  were 
the  cream  of  the  Polish  Army,  and  their  presence  with  the  new  Polish 
Army  would  have  been  of  vital  importance.  Once  we  were  sure  they 
were*  dead,  the  question  of  who  killed  them,  or  how,  was  not  of  spot 
intelligence  value ;  it  was  a  matter  for  further  investigation. 

Now  to  come  back  to  these  reports  of  Szymanski,  certain  parts 
of  the  information  were  broken  down  into  separate  reports  and  sent 
upstairs  to  the  Plans  and  Intelligence  Division  where  they  kept  daily 
account  of  the  strength  of  that  organization,  its  training,  and  its 
location. 

Information  on  the  whereabouts  or  the  death  of  the  missing  officers 
was  handled  occasionally  by  verbal  report  and  other  informal  mem- 
oranda to  G-2,  so  that  they  could  be  used  as  briefing  material  for  the 
Chief  of  Staff  on  the  following  morning. 

"VMien  the  Germans  released  their  propaganda  blast,  that  was  spot 
news  for  the  minute,  because  we  were,  as  branch  chiefs,  responsible 
that  any  information  coming  in  over  the  air  would  be  immediately 
evaluated  by  the  chief  in  question  and  presented  to  G-2  or  the  Director 
of  Intelligence,  so  that,  if  the  Secretary  of  War  or  the  Chief  of  Staff 
called  down  and  said,  "Wiat  does  this  latest  propaganda  mean?" 
G-2  would  be  in  a  position  to  give  him  at  least  the  evaluation  of  his 
chief  of  section. 

I  think  that  answers  your  question. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Let  me  ask  you  a  question  in  connection  with 
that.  Colonel. 

Are  you  now  telling  us  that  Colonel  Szymanski's  report  dealt  only 
with  the  death  of  the  Polish  ofiicers? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Were  there  sections  of  that  report  which  dealt 
with  matters  in  which  your  department  was  concerned  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Were  there  sections  of  that  report  which  dealt 
with  the  question  of  maintaining  peace  in  Eastern  Europe? 

Let  me  refer  to  you  one  of  the  statements  in  his  report : 

1.  Polish-Soviet  relations  are  marked  by  differences  which  are  in  my  humble 
opinion  irreconcilable. 

2.  These  differences  are  irreconcilable  at  present  because  (a)  the  Soviets  did 
not  carry  out  their  end  of  the  Polish-Soviet  nonaggression  pact;  (b)  the  Soviets 
are  not  carrying  out  the  provisions  of  the  Polish-Soviet  agreement  of  July  30, 
1941;  (c)  Stalin's  promises  to  Sikorski  and  Roosevelt  are  not  being  kept;  (d) 
there  are  still  some  900,000  Polish  citizens,  deportees,  in  Russia,  slowly  being 
exterminated  through  overwork  and  undernourishment;  (e)  there  are  still  some 
50,000  Polish  children  slowly  dying  of  starvation. 

3.  If  the  Soviets  forsake  their  communistic  and  imperialistic  aspirations  there 
is  a  good  chance  that  peace  may  reign  in  the  eastern  part  of  Poland. 

4.  The  Polish  Government  and  Army  officials  are  making  a  determined  effort 
to  reconcile  the  differences.     The  attitude  of  the  Government  is  realistic. 

Would  you  say  that  that  section  of  the  report  and  the  reports  which 
preceded  it,  upon  which  these  conclusions  were  based,  were  an  im- 
portant thing,  so  far  as  your  department  was  concerned  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  don't  want  to  answer  that  "yes"  or  "no,"  sir. 
That  report  was  made  by  an  assistant  military  attache.     His  first 


1926  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

duty  is  to  bring  that  matter  that  you  bring  up  to  the  attention  of 
the  military  attache,  wlio,  in  turn,  should  have  brought  it  immediately 
to  the  attention  of  the  Ambassador. 

That  is  a  matter  that  the  military  are  not  supposed  to  get  into. 

Mr.  Maciirowicz.  Would  you  say  it  is  a  matter  in  which  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  should  get  into  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Decidedly,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  or  anyone  in  your  department  bring  this 
report  to  the  attention  of  the  Department  of  State  ^ 

Colonel  Yeaton.  It  should  have  been  done  in  Cairo,  sir,  not  from 
my  office. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  do  not  care  where  it  should  have  been  done,  and 
I  do  not  care  about  technicalities.     I  care  about  realities. 

Was  that  report  which  your  department  received  ever  brought  to 
the  attention  of  the  Department  of  State? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Not  to  my  knowledge. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  think  it  should  have  been  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  This  particular  report,  sir? 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  mean  this  report  we  have  here,  or  the  one 
you  read,  sir  ? 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  This  particular  report  that  I  read  from. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Which  exhibit  is  it,  please? 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Exhibit  11. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  page  is  that  on,  sir  ? 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Page  458  of  part  3. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  "Future  Polish-Soviet  relations?" 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  That  is  right. 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Iwould  have  to  see  the  covering  sheet.  I  am  not 
sure  that  wasn't  sent  to  the  State  Department,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  might  tell  you,  for  your  information,  that  Mr. 
Shackelford  testified  before  our  committee  and  said  that  it  had  not 
been  sent  to  the  Department  of  State. 

Now,  I  am  going  to  ask  Mr.  Facher,  is  that  correct  ? 

Mr.  Facher.  I  am  sorry,  sir ;  I  can't  say. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  think  the  record  will  speak  for  itself  that  Mr. 
Shackelford  said  before  the  committee  that  that  report  had  never  been 
forM'arded  to  the  Department  of  State  for  its  information. 

If  you  have  something  to  counter  it,  I  would  like  to  know. 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  have  nothing  to  counter  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  have  the  original  right  here,  sir. 

Mr.  Chairman  and  the  committee,  I  show  you  herewith  the  original 
letter  transmitting  the  Szymanski  reports,  with  the  exhibits  to  which 
Congressman  Machrowicz  has  referred,  one  of  them  he  has  read  into 
the  record  just  now.     Here  is  the  original  letter.     It  says: 

"Legation  of  the  United  States  of  America,  Office  of  the  Military 
Attache,  Cairo,  Egypt." 

"W.  M.  S."  is  up  in  the  right-hand  corner,  with  the  "/LS"  as  the 
identifying  number,  IG  No.  3600.  The  subject  is:  Polish-Russian 
Relations. 

It  is  addressed  to  the  Chief,  Military  Intelligence  Service,  War 
Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  1927 

The  letter  states : 

1.  A  deferred  copy  of  letter  submitted  by  Lt.  Col.  Henry  I.  Szymanski,  covering 
nine  appendixes  pertaining  to  the  Katyn  affair  is  forwarded  herewith. 

It  is  signed  by  William  S.  Ward,  colonel,  military  attache. 

Down  in  the  lower  left-hand  corner  it  states  "Enclosure:  Letter 
with  appendixes." 

Mr.  Maciiroavicz.  Is  there  anything  to  show  that  it  was  forwarded 
to  the  Department  of  State  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  what  I  was  going  to  ask  the  witness  now. 
I  cannot  see  it.    There  is  nothing  to  show  it  on  here,  to  my  knowledge. 

Mr.  Flood.  Ask  the  witness  if  there  is  any  evidence  of  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  By  Department  of  State  does  he  mean  the  Ambas- 
sador in  Egypt  or  here  in  Washington  ? 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  mean  the  Department  of  State.  I  do  not  care 
who  it  was  in  the  Department  of  State. 

Colonel  Yeaton.  There  is  still  missing  from  this  document  that 
cover  sheet,  and  without  that,  this  can't  stick. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  am  still  going  to  repeat  my  statement  to  you, 
Colonel.  I  realize  you  probably  cannot  answer  that  at  this  time,  but 
Mr.  Shackelford,  on  behalf  of  the  Department  of  Defense,  has  already 
verified  to  this  committee  that  tliat  report  has  never  been  sent  to  the 
Department  of  State. 

Now,  I  am  going  to  ask  you  another  question,  to  refer  to  page  472 
of  part  3  of  the  hearings.  That  is  an  excerpt  of  an  enclosure.  No.  5,, 
in  Colonel  Szymanski's  report.  It  is  entitled  as  follows:  "Will  the- 
Russians  Fight  Next  Spring?"  Was  that  subject  matter  of  impor- 
tance to  your  department  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Decidedly,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Was  it  of  importance  to  the  Department  of  State  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  would  say  more  to  us  than  them. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Let  me  read  to  you  what  was  contained  in  that 
report,  which  has  now  been  declassified : 

Will  the  Russians  Fight  Next  Spring? 

Yes;  if  they  find  the  Germans  very  weak.  This  winter  they  will  conduct 
limited  offensives  in  order  to  straighten  their  lines.  Behind  these  lines,  they 
will  rest,  reorganize,  train  and  equip  more  divisions.  They  will  wait  until  the 
Allies  and  Germans  annihilate  each  other.  They  will  wait  until  the  German 
Army  confronting  them  is  so  weak  that  their  own  effort  will  bring  easy  and  huge 
results.  They  will  not  stop  their  westward  march  until  the  American  Army  stops 
them. 

Europe  is  confronted  with  what  seems  to  many  of  the  powers  an  "either/or" 
choice ;  i.  e.,  either  German  domination  or  Soviet  domination. 

There  is  little  faith  that  the  United  States  could  control  a  victorious  Russia 
at  any  ijeace-table  conference. 

One  of  Mr.  Willkie's  secretaries  stated  to  me  in  Tehran  that  Russia  and  the 
United  States  will  dictate  the  peace  of  Europe.  When  I  repeated  this  (without 
mentioning  the  source)  to  a  very  prominent  Pole  in  Tehran,  he  at  first  begged  me 
not  to  jest,  and  then  very  suddenly  said  to  me  that  "In  that  case  Poland  has  lost 
the  war  and  the  Allies  have  lost  the  war." 

The  choice  in  Europe  is  not  merely  democracy  versus  Hitler,  as  so  many  Amer- 
icans seem  to  think  it  is. 

That  is  signed  "Henry  I.  Szymanski,  Lieutenant  Colonel,  Infantry, 
United  States  Army,  Liaison  Officer  to  Polish  Army." 
Was  that  information  important  to  your  department? 


1928  THE    KATYN    FOREST    IMASSACRE 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Decidedly,  sir, 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  And  to  the  Department  of  State  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  assume  so. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  And  yet  not  one  bit  of  evidence  has  been  produced 
here  that  that  report  has  ever  been  brought  to  the  attention  of  the 
Department  of  State. 

If  that  is  true,  would  you  say  there  was  an  error  made  on  somebody's 
part  in  the  Department  of  Defense  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  can  only  report,  sir,  that  the  channel  for  this 
to  get  into  the  State  Department  was  in  Cairo.  This  military  attache 
is  working  for  his  ambassador,  and  it  is  up  to  him  to  report  to  his 
ambassador  anything  that  even  faintly  touches  a  matter  concerning 
the  state. 

Mr.  Machroavicz.  Colonel  Szymanski  was  directly  under  your  con- 
trol; was  he  not? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Directly  under  my  control. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  When  he  reported  it  to  you,  and  if  you  were  not 
the  proper  source  to  receive  that,  was  it  not  your  duty  to  report  it  to 
the  Department  of  State? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Instead  of  that,  you  put  it  in  the  warehouse  in 
Alexandria? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  did  not,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  That  is  where  the  committee  found  it. 

I  am  going  to  ask  you  another  question. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Might  I  interrupt  a  minute,  sir  ?  I  think  that  is  an 
unfair  statement  to  the  colonel.  He  has  come  here  voluntarily.  I  am 
sure  that  these  reports  were  not  in  the  warehouse  when  the  colonel  was 
in  charge  of  this.    We  found  them  there  later ;  yes. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Let  me  ask  you  whether  subsequent  to  the  receipt 
of  this  report  you  sent  a  telegram  to  Colonel  Szymanski. 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  sent  him  many  telegrams,  sir. 

Mr.  JVIachrowicz.  Did  you  send  him  one  as  a  direct  result  of  that 
report  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  do  not  remember,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Mr.  Facher,  do  you  have  that  telegram  with  j'Ou? 

Mr.  Facher.  No,  sir ;  I  do  not. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Where  is  it? 

Mr.  Facher.  Which  telegram  are  you  talking  about,  sir? 

]\Ir.  Machrowicz.  I  am  talking  about  the  telegram  which  was  dis- 
cussed in  executive  session  of  our  committee,  in  which  Colonel  Szy- 
manski was  very  thoroughly  blamed  for  showing  anti-Soviet  leanings. 

Let  me  ask  the  colonel :  Do  you  remember  the  telegram  ?  Now 
that  I  have  refreshed  you  as  to  the  text  of  the  telegram,  do  you  re- 
member at  any  time  sending  a  telegram  or  a  cable  to  Cairo  after  re- 
ceipt of  these  reports  ? 

Mr.  Facher.  Mr.  Machrowicz,  may  I  interrupt  just  a  second? 

I  believe  the  contents  of  that  telegram  are  still  classified  as  to  the 
personal  information. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  do  not  agi'ee  with  you.  Of  course,  the  only  rea- 
son it  is  classified  is  that  it  is  embarrassing  to  someone  in  the  Depart- 
ment.    And  I  think  it  is  about  time  we  found  out. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  To  bring  us  up  to  date  on  that  particular  phase  of  it, 
when  we  returned  to  Chicago,  we  had  that  executive  session  with  Mr. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1929 

Korth.  I  believe  Mr.  Shackelford  was  there,  too,  at  that  time.  Then 
we  departed  for  Europe.  I  am  still  waiting  to  see  what  they  are  going 
to  do  about  that. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  do  not  think  we  want  to  wait  any  longer. 

Did  you  at  that  time  think  that  Colonel  Szymanski,  because  of  this 
report,  showed  too  much  anti-Soviet  tendencies  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  ever  tell  him  so  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Not  to  my  knowledge. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  am  going  to  ask  the  chairman  now  that  that 
wire  should  be  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  committee.  I  think  we 
have  waited  long  enough, 

Mr.  Flood.  May  I  interrupt  ?  I  have  no  objection  to  that,  but  may 
I  say  this :  If  you  will  yield  for  a  question  on  the  same  thing 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  will  be  glad  to  yield. 

Mr.  Flood.  Do  you  remember.  Colonel,  drafting  a  cable  or  a  wire 
or  an  order  to  Colonel  Szymanski  at  Cairo,  for  General  Strong  or 
anybody  else  to  Colonel  Szymanski?  Do  you  remember  drafting 
sucli  a  statement  advising  Colonel  Szymanski  that  his  attitude  was 
too  anti-Soviet? 

If  you  do  not  remember  doing  it  yourself,  on  your  own  order,  do 
you  remember  doing  it  on  the  order  of  General  Strong,  for  General 
Strong,  to  Colonel  Szymanski,  advising  him  that,  in  the  opinion  of 
General  Strong,  Szymanski's  conduct  was  too  anti-Soviet  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  don't  ever  remember  that  phrase ;  no,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Let  us  fix  the  date  of  that  now. 

Where  were  you  in  December  19-lo,  and  what  were  you  in  charge  of, 
and  would  you  be  responsible  for  drafting  such  a  telegram  or  cable? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  December  1943  I  was  chief  of  the  European  unit. 
That  is  all  of  Europe,  Middle  East,  and  Africa. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Europe,  Middle  East,  and  Africa.  The  Middle 
East  would  be  Cairo. 

Colonel  Yeaton.  If  such  a  telegram  originated  in  the  Eastern  Eu- 
ropean section — and  a  draft  would  have — it  would  have  passed  across 
my  desk  as  a  matter  of  information. 

Mr.  Flood.  Do  you  remember? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  remember  there  was  a  telegram  sent  out  at  that 
time,  but  the  anti-Soviet  part  of  it,  I  don't  remember  any  such  remark 
as  that. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Mr.  Chairman,  as  I  remember,  the  only  reason 
Mr.  Shackelford  did  not  want  to  declassify  that  cablegram  was  be- 
cause he  thought  it  might  be  injurious  to  Colonel  Szymanski. 
_  Colonel  Szymanski  has  advised  this  committee  that  he  has  no  objec- 
tion to  that  cablegram  being  declassified.  I  think  it  is  important  that 
we  ought  to  have  it. 

Chairman  Madden.  It  is  my  understanding  that  the  Department  of 
Defense  has  already  gone  on  record  that  any  matter  connected  with 
the  Katyn  problem  is  declassified.    Is  not  that  correct  ? 

Mr.  Facher.  I  believe  there  are  still  some  aspects  of  it,  sir,  which 
we  furnish  you  on  a  classified  basis,  but  we  do  furnish  them. 

Chairman  Madden.  Why  would  this  particular  telegram  be 
classified  ? 

Mr.  Facher.  To  the  best  of  my  recollection,  sir,  I  think,  as  Con- 
gressman Machrowicz  stated,  it  was  because  of  some  derogatory  in- 


1930  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

formation.     I  Avas  not  present  at  the  executive  session;  so  I  can't 
speak  first-hand. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Colonel  Szymanski  feels  just  as  I  do,  and  as 
overy  member  of  this  committee  thinks ;  that  anything  derogatory  in 
there  is  not  derogatory  to  him ;  it  is  rather  complimentary,  even  though 
the  Department  thought  he  was  too  anti-Soviet.  And  Colonel  Szy- 
manski is  perfectly  willing  to  have  it  declassified. 

Now,  if  it  is  embarrassing  to  the  Department,  that  does  not  bother 
me  at  all.  It  should  not  be  classified  if  it  is  embarrassing  to  the 
Department. 

Mr.  Flood.  I  think  it  should  be  declassified,  no  matter  who  it  em- 
barrasses, Szymanski  or  the  Department. 

Chairman  Madden.  What  reason  does  the  Department  give  for  not 
presenting  it  to  us  ? 

Mr.  Sheeiian.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  remember  that.  I  can  remember 
the  circumstances.  Part  of  the  cablegram  had  to  do  with  recommen- 
dations that  Szymanski  had  made  with  reference  to  intelligence,  and 
the  Department  did  not  want  to  declassify  it  because  they  have  now 
followed  his  recommendations.  They  did  not  want  to  reveal  what 
the  intelligence  was. 

Chairman  Madden.  Could  the  telegram  be  presented  now? 

Mr.  Facher.  I  believe  the  telegram  is  still  classified,  sir;  but  we 
will  check  it  over,  and  if  it  can  be  declassified  we  will  provide  it  to 
the  committee.  I  am  not  sure  the  operational  aspects  were  included 
in  the  same  telegram. 

Mr.  Sheeiian.  They  were  not  included  but  referred  to. 

iNIr.  Facher.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  May  I  ask  if  there  is  any  reason  that  you  know 
why  that  section  relating  to  the  Dei)artment  of  Defense,  relative  to 
Colonel  Szymanski,  cannot  be  declassified  if  he  consents  to  it? 

Mr.  Facher.  Not  to  my  personal  knowledge,  sir.  "However,  I  am 
not  an  Intelligence  officer. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  May  I  make  an  observation,  Mr.  Chairman  ? 

Chairman  Madden.  Proceed. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Part  of  the  telegram  that  the  "War  Department 
wanted  declassified  was  the  part  of  the  telegram  that  was  derogatory 
toward  Colonel  Szymanski.  Without  revealing  the  othei-  part  of  it, 
it  would  put  the  colonel  in  a  bad  light,  and  the  committee  members  in 
executive  session  felt  it  should  not  l)e  revealed  unless  the  entire  cal)lo- 
gram  was  revealed. 

Mr.  Dondero.  Mr.  Chairman,  who  has  the  authority  to  classify  or 
declassify? 

May  I  ask  the  colonel  that  question:  Who  has  the  authority,  who 
does  the  classifying  and  declassifying? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  The  originating  officer  does  the  classifying.  Any 
declassifying  must  be  done  by  a  special  branch  in  the  Intelligence 
Department. 

Mr.  DoNDEKO.  Does  that  come  from  the  Chiefs  of  Staff,  or  is  that 
down  in  a  lower  echelon  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  There  is  another  section  down  in  the  Joint  Staff, 
that  is  also  involved  in  all  War  Department  document  declassification  ;j 
yes,  sir. 

But  matters  that  pertain  only  to  G-2,  they  have  their  own  sectionl 
that  has  that  jiower. 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  1931 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Mr,  Chairman,  if  I  may  make  an  observation  there, 
Avliich  is  not  my  own,  but,  as  someone  else  stated,  the  doctors  are  able 
to  bnry  their  mistakes  and  the  military  classify  them  "Top  secret." 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  think,  ]Mr.  Chairman,  it  is  abont  time  now  we 
make  some  decision  on  that  cablegram.  I  think  it  is  important.  We 
have  waited  a  long  time  for  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  will  take  up  the  matter  with  the 
War  Department  Counselor's  office  and  I  will  straighten  it  out  before 
our  next  set  of  hearings.     We  will  get  it  into  the  record. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Now,  Counsel,  that  was  on  March  14.  This  is  now 
June  4.  March  14  to  June  4  seems  to  me  like  a  sufficient  lengfh  of  time 
for  them  to  make  up  their  minds  as  to  what  they  are  going  to  do  with 
this. 

The  problem  is  very  simple.  I  see  no  reason  why  they  should  be 
the  sole  judges  as  to  whether  a  cablegram  of  this  type  should  be 
declassified. 

]Mr.  Mitchell.  Sir,  if  I  recall  correctly — and  I  think  Congressman 
Sheehan  can  check  me  on  that — I  think  that  in  that  particular  cable 
that  was  referenced,  the  first  part  of  it  had  the  derogatory  remark 
about  Colonel  Szymanski,  and  then  the  other  part  referred  to  some 
memorandum  on  a  military-intelligence  subject  that  he  had  written. 
I  think  the  Department  is  primarily  concerned  with  the  reference  to 
the  military-intelligence  scheme  or  plan  that  he  had  recommended 
previously  in  another  memorandum,  which  you  recall. 

I  think  that  that  probably  is  the  reason  why  they  are  having  dif- 
ficulty there  on  this. 

But  I  agree  with  you. 

yiv.  Machrowicz.  Thiee  months  seems  to  be  sufficient  time  to  resolve 
the  difficulty. 

Mr.  jNIitchell.  I  agree,  and  I  will  get  on  it  right  away,  sir. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  think  the  record  should  show  here 
that  whenever  the  word  "derogatory''  with  reference  to  Colonel 
Szymanski  is  used  they  mean  derogatory  from  the  viewpoint  of  a 
pro-Communist  and  not  derogatorj-  from  the  standpoint  of  personal 
beliefs  in  freedom  and  justice. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  stand  corrected. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Mr.  Counsel,  may  I  ask  the  colonel  one  or  two 
questions  ? 

Just  before  you  were  being  cross-examined  here.  Colonel,  you  said 
something  to  the  effect  that  all  the  information  on  the  Polish  officers 
was  of  spot-intelligence  value  to  you  as  long  as  they  were  alive.  Then 
you  went  on  and  said  that  when  the  officers  were  dead  the  informa- 
tion was  not  of  spot-intelligence  value. 

Wlien  did  you  or  your  section  determine  officially  that  the  Polish 
officers  were  dead  and  were  not  worth  looking  for  any  more^ 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  did  not  say  they  "were  not  worth  looking  for," 
sir.     I  said  they  were  not  spot  intelligence  any  more. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  No.  You  stated  that  when  they  were  dead  they 
were  not  of  spot  intelligence. 

Colonel  Yeaton.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  When  did  you  determine  they  were  dead? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  After  the  investigation  that  follov\'ed  the  German 
broadcast. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  What  investigation? 


1932  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Red  Cross. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  The  Polish  Red  Cross. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  The  Polish  Red  Cross? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  In  other  words,  you  took  their  word  for  it ;  did  you  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  We  took  their  word  for  it  that  the  officers  were 
dead.  I  didn't  mean  by  that  that  we  didn't  continue  to  believe  G-2 
and  the  staff  on  all  phases  of  the  massacre  end  of  it,  but  we  didn't 
consider  that  spot  intelligence. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  I  see. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  did  G-2  do  at  the  time  of  the  revelation  of 
the  Katyn  Forest  Massacre  ? 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  I  have  some  questions  on  that. 

Was  that  the  time  when  a  communication  went  out  under  the  name 
or  signature  of  George  Marshall  to  Colonel  Szymanski  asking  him 
to  make  a  report  on  the  Katyn  Massacre  ?  Do  you  remember  any  such 
telegram  going  out? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  drafted  it,  sir. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  You  drafted  the  telegram  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  And  you  remember  it? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  May  I  pursue  another  question  along  this  line  there? 

Yesterday  it  was  brought  out  that  apparently  our  State  Department 
had  asked  the  Swiss  Government,  as  a  neutral,  to  find  out  from  Van 
Vliet,  while  he  was  a  prisoner  of  war,  certain  information. 

Did  G-2  take  any  hand  in  that  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  don't  know,  sir.  At  that  time  I  was  coordinator 
of  specialists.  I  wasn't  chief  of  any  branch  and  it  was  just  before 
going  overseas. 

Chairman  Madden.  Are  there  any  further  questions  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  At  this  time.  Colonel,  I  would  like  to  have  you  run 
down  the  complete  assignments  that  you  had  in  the  Office  of  G-2  from 
the  time  of  your  return  from  your  duties  as  assistant  military  attache 
in  Moscow ;  your  respective  duty  assignments  and  title  of  each  position. 

Colonel  Yeaton.  From  about  the  middle  of  May  1942  to  the  30th 
of  June  1943, 1  was  Chief  of  the  E;ist  European  Section. 

By  June  1943  the  sections  had  grown  so  large  that  they  were  re- 
named branches.  So  on  July  1,  1943,  until  August  31,  1943,  I  was 
Chief  of  the  Eastern  European  Branch. 

On  September  1,  1943,  I  was  promoted  to  Chief  of  the  European 
Unit,  which  was  known  before  that  as  a  theater  group  and  then  known 
as  a  unit. 

On  the  IGth  of  June,  when  the  whole  of  G-2  was  reorganized,  the 
branches,  which  had  been  up  to  that  time  geographical  units,  were  all 
of  a  sudden,  right  in  the  middle  of  the  war,  reorganized  into  func- 
tional units. 

Mr.  MiTc^HELL,  Wlien  was  that  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  That  was  the  middle  of  June  1944.  And  at  that 
time  the  records  in  every  one  of  the  branches,  where  they  had  been 
immediately  under  the  supervision  of  a  branch  chief  and  file  clerk, 
were  all  picked  np  and  moved  down  in  the  basement  in  a  large  room 
and  put  in  one  large  room. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Under  whose  order  was  that  reorganization? 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1933 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Under  General  Bissell's. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  know  why  that  reorganization  took  place? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  do  not,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  it  strike  yon  as  being  rather  odd  that  such  a 
reorganization  should  take  place  at  that  particular  time,  June  1944? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Yes,  sir. 

I  didn't  agree  with  it  in  principle,  because  I  think  the  geographic 
set-up  was  the  more  workable  one. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  the  other  officers  who  were  in  G-2  at  that  time 
feel  that  this  reorganization  was  necessary,  or  did  they  agree  one  way 
or  the  other,  or  disagree?    Wliat  was  the  majority  opinion ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  The  majority  opinion  among  the  branch  chiefs 
was  that  the  reorganization  was  not  well  timed. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Was  there  a  drastic  shift  in  the  officers  in  charge 
of  these  various  units  at  that  time? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  There  was.  The  branqh  chiefs  became  known  as 
specialists. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Specialists  in  what  line  ?    Evaluation  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  In  the  line  that  they  had  been  chiefs  in  prior. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  ever  hear  of  an  Alfred  McCormack? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  have,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  lAHiat  was  has  official  position  in  G-2  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  When  I  joined  G-2  early  in  1942  Col.  Alfred  Mc- 
Cormack was  in  charge  of  what  was  known  as  the  Special  Branch. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Wliat  was  the  Special  Branch,  if  you  are  at  liberty 
to  say  here? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  It  had  to  do  with  evaluation  of  crytographic 
material. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  he  receive  intelligence  and  evaluate  intelligence 
reports  in  his  official  capacity  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  wish  you  would  clarify  "intelligence  reports." 

If  you  mean  military  attache  reports,  the  answer  is  "No." 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  he  receive,  or  was  he  responsible  for  the  trans- 
mission of,  any  reports  that  may  have  been  sent  in  by  Szymanski 
cablewise,  or  through  any  other  means,  to  G-2  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Responsible  for  the  evaluation  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes. 

Colonel  Yeaton.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Thank  you. 

Did  yon  ever  hear  of  a  T.  Achilles  Polyzoides  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  have,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  was  his  position  at  that  time  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  am  not  sure.  I  would  rather  let  the  record  show 
it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Thank  you. 

How  was  liaison  with  the  State  Department  conducted  during  1942 
and  1943,  as  far  as  your  particular  EE  section  was  concerned  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  G-2  had  a  liaison  branch  that  contacted  the  State 
Department  officially. 

But  the  same  thing  was  true  with  us  as  in  all  other  departments, 
there  was,  as  the  British  say,  an  old  boy  liaison  between  departments 
and  like  geographic  branches.    At  that  time.  Ambassador  Loy  Hen- 

93744— 52— pt.  7 8 


1934  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

dei'son,  I  think,  was  in  charge  of  the  State  Department  Eastern  Euro- 
pean Section. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  know  any  of  the  State  Department  people  ? 
Did  they  ever  come  to  G-2  or  did  you  liave  anybody  specifically 
assigned  from  your  section  or  unit  to  have  liaison  with  the  State 
Department  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  With  the  Eastern  European  branch  of  State,  I  did 
the  liaisoning  myself. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  the  question  of  the  missing  Polish  officers  come 
up  ^ 

Colonel  Yeaton.  It  did. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  With  whom  in  the  State  Department? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  think  with  Ambassador  Henderson,  who  was  in 
charge  at  that  time. 

Mr.  Dondero.  Do  you  mean  Loy  Henderson  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  have  liaison  with  the  office  of  OWI? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  No,  sir. 

]Mr.  Mitchell.  Was  anybody  from  your  staff  assigned  to  OWI? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  MiTCHELi..  Was  there  a  section  in  G-2  that  had  liaison  with 
OWI,  another  section,  or  some  other  means? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Not  that  I  know  of,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Thank  you. 

I  have  no  further  questions. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  May  I  have  a  question  ? 

Colonel,  you  just  said  a  while  ago  that  you  knew  and  drafted  the 
cable  asking  Szymanski,  and  probably  others,  to  make  a  report  on 
the  Katyn  massacre.  As  these  reports  came  in,  did  you  and  your 
fellow- workers  evaluate  these  reports  and  come  on  to  any  off-the- 
record  conclusions  as  to  who  was  responsible  for  that  crime? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  O'Konski.  Could  j^ou  tell  us  what  your  conclusions  were,  to 
the  best  of  your  knowledge,  at  that  time,  as  these  reports  started  to 
come  in? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  My  conclusions  Avere  the  same  as  Szymanski's. 

Mr.  O'Konski.  That  the  Russians  committed  the  murders? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  That  is  right,  sir. 

Mr.  O'Konski.  Was  that  the  generally  prevalent  opinion  around 
your  department,  that  it  was  the  Russians  that  were  responsible,  as 
these  reports  started  to  come  in? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  can  only  si)eak  for  myself,  sir. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKK  Did  the  Slate  Dei)artment  show  a  partieidar  inter- 
est in  the  nuirder  of  these  Polish  officers?  That  is,  was  their  interest 
jn  this  phase  of  international  relations  more  keen  than  the  average 
observations  in  their  visits  with  you? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  think  the  peak  of  interest  came  the  24  liours 
following  the  German  broadcast.  Thereafter,  the  information  on 
those  things  came  in,  as  you  know,  in  small  pieces,  and  we  felt  that 
each  little  bit  added  another  brick  to  the  wall. 

lint  witliin  itself  it  was  only  a  matter  of  vital  importance  for  the 
record. 

The  reason  I  sent  that  telegram  to  Szymanski  was  I  felt  ])erfectly 
certain  that  at  some  future  date  there  would  be  an  investigation,  and 


THE    5ATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE  1935 

I  was  doing  everything'  I  could  at  the  time  to  see  that  my  files  were 
>()  complete  that  when  that  day  came,  my  office  certainly  would  not 
})e  subject  to  criticism. 

Mr.  O'KoxsKi.  That  is  all. 

Thank  you,  Colonel. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Colonel,  you  stated  that  you  carried  on  the  liaison 
with  the  State  Department  yourself.  Do  you  remember  in  1942  or 
1943,  when  the  question  of  the  missing  Polish  officers  came  up,  whether 
you  gave  any  opinion  to  the  State  Department  as  to  your  opinion,  as 
you  expressed  it,  that  the  Russians  were  guilty? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  did  not  give  any  official  opinion ;  no,  sir. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Unofficial  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  undoubtedly  expressed  myself  unofficially. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  I  would  like  to  go  back  a  little  bit. 

In  your  testimony  here  in  the  early  part,  when  you  stated  that 
wdien  you  were  called  into  G-2  you  were  asked  to  prepare  a  documen- 
tary project  paper  that  you  prepared  on  Russia,  you  said  that  at  the 
time  Russia  was  the  only  country  in  which  G-2  did  not  have  the  par- 
ticular documentary  knowledge;  is  that  right? 

Colonel  Yeatox.  So  far  as  I  know ;  yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Did  we  have  documentary  knowdedge  on  England? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Oh,  yes,  sir.    We  have  volumes  on  it. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  And  France? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  In  other  words,  the  xlrmy  intelligence  was  in  the 
peculiar  position  of  having  documentary  evidence  and  information 
about  every  country  in  the  world,  including  our  close  allies,  except 
Russia? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  That  is  almost  a  true  statement,  sir. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  It  is  a  sort  of  reflection,  I  think,  on  Army  intelli- 
gence, with  Russia  being  what  it  is,  as  big  a  country  as  it  is,  that 
nobody  ever  bothered  to  find  a  lot  of  evidence  about  it  and  a  lot  of 
security  information. 

Colonel  Yeaton.  We  were  trying,  sir. 

Mr.  Dondero.  I  think  Colonel,  the  reason  why  you  did  not  get  it  is 
that  the  Russians  saw  to  it  that  you  did  not  get  it. 

Colonel  Yeaton.  That  is  right,  sir. 

Mr.  DoxDERO.  I  have  just  one  question. 

In  what  manner  was  the  liaison  relationship  conducted  between  G-2 
and  State  Department  ?    Was  it  by  messenger,  or  by  mail  ? 

Colonel  Yea'jox'.  By  officer  liaison. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  In  other  words,  if  you  had  documents  to  send  over, 
it  was  done  by  a  person;  is  that  right? 

Colonel  Yeaton^.  That  is  right,  sir;  so  that  the  document  w^ould 
be  recorded  out  and  in  at  the  State  Department,  so  that  there  would 
be  no  question.  If  they  raised  the  question,  "We  did  not  see  the 
document,'"  we  could  point  to  the  record  and  show  where  they  had 
received  it. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  The  State  Department,  I  assume,  had  the  same  pro- 
cedure ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Dondero.  That  is  all. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  have  one  question  along  those  lines,  Colonel. 


1936  THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE 

In  other  words,  if  any  document  was  turned  over  to  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  by  your  department,  you  had  something  in  writing, 
a  receipt,  to  show  that  that  actually  was  done  ? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  Out  of  my  branch ;  yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Do  you  have  anything  to  show  that  these  reports 
of  Colonel  Szymanski  were  turned  over  to  the  Department  of  State? 

Colonel  Yeaton.  I  do  not,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  It  has  been  admitted  yesterday  already  that  there 
was  nothing  showing  in  the  department  wliich  was  of  a  nature  to 
indicate  that  the  Van  Vliet  report  was  received  in  the  Department  of 
State  also. 

Mr.  Flood.  I  have  listened  to  this  thing  for  a  couple  of  days,  or  a 
day  and  a  half.  I  would  like  to  say  that  if  there  is  any  evidence,  any 
place,  anywhere,  anyhow,  of  any  kind,  that  information  was  trans- 
mitted to  the  Department  of  State,  I  would  be  as  anxious  to  find  out 
as  anybody  else. 

And  I  have  tried  hard  to  find  it  out.  I  cannot  find  a  scintilla  of 
evidence  that  the  State  Department  was  apprised  of  this  documentary 
reporting  from  anybody. 

I  think  it  is  about  time  we  stopped  this  torturing  every  phrase  to 
try  and  establish  that  the  State  Department  had  this  information. 

Now,  if  they  got  it,  I  want  to  know.  If  they  did  not  get  it,  let  us 
stop  this  business. 

The  Defense  Department  made  a  mistake  or  an  error,  deliberately 
or  inadvertently,  in  my  judgment.  These  reports  did  not  get  to  the 
State  Department. 

Now,  if  they  did,  I  want  to  see  how  they  got  there,  who  took  them 
there,  and  where  are  the  receipts.  The  evidence,  in  my  opinion,  and 
only  in  my  opinion — I  am  only  saying  in  my  opinion — shows  very 
clearly  that  this  information  did  not  get  to  the  Department  of  State ; 
why,  I  do  not  know. 

Now,  let  us  find  that  out.  We  are  wasting  time,  if  there  was 
deliberate  conspiracy,  inadvertence,  stupidity,  negligence,  or  anj^- 
thing  else,  in  any  of  the  various  areas  of  the  Defense  Department, 
if  the  reports  should  have  gotten  to  the  State  Department,  why  did 
they  not? 

Let  us  do  away  with  this  business  of  spending  all  week  trying  to 
find  out  did  the  State  Department  hide  this  or  conspire  with  the 
Defense  people  to  prevent  these  reports  from  getting  there,  or  con- 
spire with  somebody  to  steal  them  or  destroy  them  to  protect  Russia. 

I  think  we  have  knocked  ourselves  out  trying  to  prove  that,  and  we 
have  not  done  so.  If  we  have  not,  let  us  start  on  it  right  now  and 
prove  it. 

But  if  we  are  satisfied  that  it  cannot  be  proved,  let  us  stop  this 
whipping-boy  business  of  the  State  Department  and  find  out  what 
was  wrong  in  the  Department  of  Defense,  if  we  can.  If  we  cannot 
find  that  out,  let  us  stop  this. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  concur  100  percent  with  the  Congressman. 
I  wanted  to  say  that  I  would  bo  the  first  to  criticize  the  De]iart- 
ment  of  State  for  neiilectinc:  to  do  soniethinii  it  should  have  done. 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  1937 

But  I  have  been  looking  in  vain  for  one  iota  of  testimony  to  show 
that  any  of  this  information  whicli  the  Department  of  Defense  ob- 
tained was  turned  over  to  the  Department  of  State.  If  I  am  wrong, 
tlie  Department  of  Defense  should  liave  an  opportunity  to  present 
such  proof.  If  they  cannot  do  so,  let  us  forget  it  now.  Let  us  not 
Jvcep  on  sniping  at  somebody  who  quite  obviously  is  not  at  fault. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Congressman  Flood,  I  would  like  to  bring  you  up 
to  date  now,  that  Mr.  Madden  has  appointed  a  subcommittee,  consist- 
ing of  Congressman  O'Konski,  Congressman  Machrowicz,  and  Con- 
gressman Sheehan,  to  meet  with  the  State  Department  officials  tomor- 
row to  go  over  the  files  and  any  records  they  may  have  concerning  the 
missing  Polish  officers  or  the  Katyn  affair.  They  are  going  to  do  that 
tomorrow  morning. 

I  agree  with  your  statement. 

Mr.  Flood.  That  is  all  right  with  me.  If  you  want  to  go  to  the 
Bureau  of  Mines  or  the  Department  of  Aginculture,  go  ahead,  but 
let  us  get  this  thing  cleaned  up  one  way  or  the  other.  It  is  going  on 
like  Tennyson's  Brook,  going  no  place. 

Chairman  INIadden.  Let  me  suggest  that  although  Congressman 
Sheehan  and  Congressman  Machrowicz,  and  Congressman  O'Konski 
are  to  investigate  the  records  of  the  State  Department,  in  which  the 
State  Department  stated  they  would  be  glad  to  cooperate  in  any  way, 
let  me  suggest  that  any  other  member  of  the  committee  that  wants 
to  accompany  them  on  this  investigation  is  at  liberty  to  do  so. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Mr.  Chairman,  can  I  ask  Mr.  Facher  whether 
he  can  have  that  cable  that  we  are  talking  about  here  this  afternoon. 

Mr.  Facher.  I  will  try,  sir. 

Mr.  Machroavicz.  You  have  been  trying  since  March  14.  That  is 
such  a  simple  thing.    It  should  take  exactly  5  minutes,  not  3  months. 

I  am  a  little  bit  tired  of  this  "trying"  and  this  informing  witnesses 
not  to  cooperate  with  the  committee.  I  will  bring  that  out  if  it  is 
necessary,  too. 

Chairman  Madden".  Will  you  have  Mr.  Shackelford  come  over  here 
this  afternoon  ? 

Mr.  Facher.  Yes,  sir. 

(The  following  letter  and  cablegram  are  herewith  placed  in  the 
record  by  the  counsel,  John  J.  Mitchell :) 

Department  of  the  Army, 
Office  of  the  Department  Counselor, 

Washington,  June  4,  1952. 
Hon.  Ray  J.  Madden, 

Chairman,  House  Select  Committee  To 

Investigate  the  Katyn  Forest  Massacre, 
House  of  Representatives. 
Dear  Mr.  Madden  :  I  am  inclosing  herewith  a  copy  of  the  telegram  of  Decem- 
ber 19,  194.3,  which  your  committee  requested  at  the  hearing  held  in  Washington 
this  morning,  .Tune  4.  This  telegram  has  remained  classified  because  it  contains 
personal  information  concerning  an  individual  member  of  the  Army.  As  such 
it  was  treated  in  confidence,  in  accordance  with  Department  of  the  Army  policy 
to  treat  efficiency  reports  and  similar  personal  information  as  confidentiai. 
Upon  assurance  of  your  committee  that  the  individual  named  in  this  telegram 
has  no  objection  to  the  information  being  made  public,  I  have  had  the  telegram 
declassified. 

Sincerely  yours, 

F.  Shackelford,  Department  Counselor. 


1938  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Headquarters 
U.  S.  Army  Forces  in  the  Middle  East 

MESSAGE   FORM 
IN    COMING 
[Paraphrase] 

No.  8623  for  AMSME  from  WAR 

DATE:    Dec.  19,  1943. 
RECD:    Dec.  19,  1943. 
DECD:    Dec.  20,  l&i3. 
Cite  WDGBI  from  Strong  for  Osmun  Jicame.    AMSME  9965. 

Proposed  by  Szmanski  in  his  draft  dated  October  30tli  project  of  setting  iip' 
Joint  Polish  Intelligence  Agency  is  disapproved.  Reference  the  above  radio 
his  visit  to  London  is  disapproved.  Szynianski  is  being  appointed  Milo  with  the 
Poles  and  is  being  relieved  as  AMA.  Answering  Jicame  58  Szyraanski  is  under 
your  control  as  far  as  Collection  Intelligence  is  concerned.  Regarding  his  im- 
mediate future  in  that  connection  all  decisions  are  up  to  you.  As  now  operating 
there  is  confidence  here  in  the  Jicame  set-up.  Szymanski  should  accompany 
them,  if  and  when  Poles  move  into  other  Theatre  and  report  to  MID  through 
its  representative  in  the  New  area.  His  work  has  been  only  satisfactory  because 
of  small  volume  and  much  duplication  of  information  previously  received  from 
the  Poles  in  the  opinion  of  the  Military  Intelligence  Department.  Further- 
more frequently  expressed  opinions  show  bias  opinion  in  favor  of  Polish  group 
which  is  Anti-Soviet.  Instruct  him  to  avoid  political  involvement  and  recom- 
mend you  require  him  to  concentrate  on  Liaison  with  Poles. 

ULIO  TAG 

Classification  Changed  To  Unclassified,  Security  Information. 

Bv  authority  of  The  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2. 
Bv  Date  4  June  19.52. 

JICAME for  ACTION.      ( JA) 

Distribution  1-AG,  l-G-2. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  think  it  is  about  time  tlie  Department  of  De- 
fense slionld  be  instructed  they  have  no  rio-ht  to  interfere  with  wit- 
nesses and  tell  them  not  to  divulo^e  information  to  the  committee.  If 
there  is  any  question  about  that,  let  us  make  that  clear  right  now. 
If  anybody  wants  information  on  that,  I  will  give  it  to  them. 

Chairman  Madden.  Are  there  any  further  questions? 

We  want  to  thank  you  for  your  testimony  here  this  morningv 
Colonel  Yeaton. 

Is  there  anything  further? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  have  nothing  further  of  the  colonel. 

Chairman  Madden.  We  thank  you  for  your  testimony,  Colonel. 

Boris  Olshansky. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman,  this  is  Mrs.  J.  P.  Feeley,  an  official 
interpreter  for  the  committee. 

Will  you  kindly  swear  her  in,  please? 

Cliairman  Madden.  Do  you  solemnly  swear  that  you  will  interpret 
the  testimony  to  be  given  by  the  witness  truthfully,  so  help  you  God? 

Mrs.  Feeley.  I  do. 

(The  witness  was  duly  sworn  by  the  chairman  through  the  inter- 
preter, as  follows :) 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Olshansky,  will  you  raise  your  right  hand, 
please? 

Do  you  solemnly  SAvear  that  in  the  hearing  now  being  held,  you 
will  tell  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  ' 
you  God?  I 

Mr.  Olshansky.  I  do. 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  AIASSACRE  1939 

TESTIMONY  OF  BORIS  OLSHANSKY  (THKOUGH  MRS.  J.  P.  FEELEY, 

INTERPRETER) 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Will  yoii  state  your  full  name  for  the  record,  please  ? 

Mr.  Olsiiansky.  Boris  Olshansky. 

Chairman  Maddex.  Will  you  kindl}'^  spell  it  out? 

Mr.  MncHELL.  B-o-r-i-s   0-1-s-li-a-n-s-k-y. 

Where  were  you  born,  Mr.  Olshansky  ? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  I  was  born  in  Voronezh,  U.  S.  S.  R. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  When  were  you  born? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  I  was  born  on  the  5th  of  August  1910. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Where  were  you  educated? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  I  was  educated  in  Voronezh. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  schools  did  you  attend  ? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  I  attended  high  school  in  Voronezh  and  the  State 
University  of  Voronezh. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  In  what  did  you  specialize  at  the  state  university? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  In  mathematics. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Where  were  you,  Mr.  Olshansky,  on  September  1, 
1939? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  In  Voronezh. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  were  you  doing  in  Voronezh  on  September 
1,1939? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  I  was  associate  professor  at  the  Voronezh  State 
University,  in  the  department  of  mathematics. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  How  long  did  you  remain  in  this  position? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  I  held  this  position  for  2  years. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  When  did  you  enter  the  Russian  Army? 

Mr,  Olshansky.  In  September  1941. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  was  your  rank  and  position  in  the  Russian 
Army  ? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  I  was  a  staff  officer  of  the  armj'  then,  and  I  was  a 
major  in  the  Engineering  Corps. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman  and  the  committee,  the  witness  has 
informed  me  that  he  would  like  to  make  a  brief  statement  as  to  his 
position  and  service  in  the  Russian  Army  covering  the  period  1941 
through  1946. 

Will  you  make  a  brief  statement  covering  your  time  and  service  in 
the  Russian  Army  for  the  ])eriod  1941-46? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  From  1941  and  until  1942  I  was  a  staff  officer  in 
the  Southwestern  Army, 

From  the  summer  of  1942  until  1943,  I  took  part  in  the  Stalingi'ad 
operations,  and  from  1943  until  1944,  I  took  part  in  Bielo-Russian 
operations  under  Marshal  Rokosovsky. 

Then  from  1944  until  the  end  of  the  war,  I  was  in  the  same  opera- 
tions under  Marshal  Zhukov,  and  he  was  with  the  Fifth  Army  then. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  When  did  you  leave  the  Russian  Army,  and  where  ? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  I  left  the  army  after  the  war  ended,  and  I  stayed 
in  Berlin,  Germany. 

From  1946  until  the  end. of  1947  I  was  inspector  of  a  section  of 
German  people's  education  under  Soviet  military  administration,  and 
besides,  I  was  a  teacher  of  the  Russian  schools  in  Berlin  at  the  same 
time. 


;1940  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Mr.  Mitchell.  When  you  say  Russian  schools,  do  you  mean  the  one 
that  was  established  after  the  war  ? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  Yes.  Those  schools  were  established  after  the 
war  under  Soviet  military  administration. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Where  did  you  know  Professor  Burdenko,  or  Dr. 
Burdenko,  who  was  the  head  of  the  Soviet  extraordinary  state  special 
committee  to  investif^ate  the  Katyn  Forest  massacre  ? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  My  father  was  a  doctor,  and  he  was  a  good  friend 
of  Professor  Burdenko  from  1919.  From  1919  until  1923,  Professor 
Burdenko  and  my  father  were  together  in  Voronezh. 

After  that  Professor  Burdenko  left  for  Moscow,  but  he  kept  his 
friendship  with  my  father  and  my  family. 

My  father  died  in  1929,  but  every  time  I  visited  Moscow  I  visited 
Professor  Burdenko.  And  Professor  Burdenko  helped  me  to  finish  my 
education  and  he  helped  me  financially. 

I  saw  Burdenko  before  the  war  for  the  last  time  in  1936.  From 
1936,  Professor  Burdenko  was  personal  physician  in  the  Kremlin  and 
he  was  the  physician  of  Stalin,  too. 

In  1939  Professor  Burdenko  had  to  join  the  party.  Professor  Bur- 
denko Avas  an  outstanding  scientist,  and  he  was  a  member  of  the  old 
Union  Academy  of  Sciences. 

During  the  war,  I  met  Professor  Burdenko  in  1944  in  Gomel.  I 
was  wounded  then  in  the  hospital,  and  Professor  Burdenko  was  sent 
there  for  inspection.  At  that  time.  Professor  Burdenko  was  the  chief 
surgeon  of  the  Red  Army,  and  he  had  the  rank  of  lieutenant  general 
of  the  Medical  Corps,  which  was  the  highest  rank  assigned  in  the 
Medical  Corps. 

As  far  as  the  Katyn  massacre  was  concerned,  I  could  not  discuss 
that  problem  in  the  hospital.  I  could  not  discuss  the  matter  as  there 
w^ere  too  many  strangers.  So  we  just  interchanged  several  sentences, 
as  far  as  my  house  was  concerned. 

I  heard  about  the  Katyn  massacre  from  the  Soviet  press  at  the 
beginning  of  1944.  I  didn't  have  any  doubts  right  from  the  beginning 
that  it  was  one  of  the  Soviet  tricks.  My  opinion  was  shared  by  many 
officers  of  the  army  with  whom  I  was  very  friendly.  AVhen  I  got  into 
Poland  with  the  army  of  Marshall  Rokosovsky,  I  heard  from  the 
Polish  people  the  same  opinion,  and  I  developed  a  great  desire  to  find 
out  the  truth  of  that  matter. 

I  left  Berlin  at  the  end  of  April  1946  for  Moscow.  I  was  traveling 
to  the  assignment  for  5  days,  and  I  made  it  my  point  to  visit  Professor 
Burdenko,  wlio  was  sick  at  that  time. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Where? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  In  Moscow. 

At  that  time,  Professor  Burdenko  was  the  president  of  the  Academy 
of  Medical  Science  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  This  was  in  1946? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  Yes ;  it  was  at  the  end  of  xVpril  1946. 

Mr.  ISIiTciiELL.  1946? 

Ml-.  Olshansky.  1946. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Proceed. 

Mr.  Olshansky.  And  Pi-ofessor  Burdenko  was  a  member  of  the 
Supreme  Council  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  At  the  time  when  I  went  to  visit 
Professor  Burdenko,  he  was  sick  and  he  didn't  take  mucli  part  in  any 
activities.     Professor  Burdenko  was  67  years  old  at  that  time.    He, 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  1941 

ipceived  me  at  his  apartment  on  Iverskoy-Imskoy  Street  in  Moscow. 

When  I  visited  Professor  Burdenko,  he  was  wearing  his  general's 
coat  then  and,  to  all  appearances,  it  seemed  that  he  was  a  well  man. 
Knowing  that  he  was  not  feeling  well,  I  did  not  want  to  prolong  onr 
conversation,  which  lasted,  in  all,  40  minutes.  After ^everal  sentences 
of  usual  conversation,  I  asked  him  on  the  matter  of  Katyn. 

Professor  Burdenko  answered  that  there  was  nothing  to  think  about 
it ;  that  Katyns  existed  and  are  existing  and  will  be  existing.  Anyone 
who  will  go  and  dig  up  things  in  our  country,  Eussia,  would  find  a  lot 
of  things,  that  we  had  to  straighten  out  the  protocol  given  by  the 
Germans  on  the  Katyn  massacre, 

]Mr.  Flood.  By  the  German  protocol,  do  you  mean  the  German 
report  and  conchisions  on  their  investigation  of  the  Katyn  massacre  ,*^^ 
is  that  what  you  mean  ? 

Mr.  Olshanskt.  Yes.    It  is  the  German  report. 

Mr.  Flood.  And  the  German  protocol,  the  German  report,  concluded 
that  the  Russians  committed  the  crime  ? 

Mr.  Glshansky.  Yes. 

Mr.  Flood.  Professor  Burdenko  meant  by  clearing  up  the  German 
protocol  was  that  the  Russians  had  to  file  some  kind  of  a  report 
showing  that  the  Germans  did  it ;  is  not  that  what  you  mean  ? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  There  was  a  special  commission  established  by 
Burdenko. 

Mr.  Flood.  To  prove  that  the  Germans  did  it  ? 

Mr.  Olshansky,  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Will  you  go  on  about  your  conversation  with 
Professor  Burdenko  ? 

Mr.  Olskaxsky.  I  repeat  the  statement  I  made  previously.  He 
said  that  Katyns  are  existing,  and  would  be  existing,  if  you  would  be 
digging  out  in  the  country  of  Russia. 

Now  I  repeat  the  words  of  Professor  Burdenko,  who  later  said,. 
"I  was  appointed  by  Stalin  personally  to  go  to  the  Katyn  place.  All 
the  corpses  were  4  years  old." 

And  Professor  Burdenko  said.  "For  me,  as  a  medical  man,  this 
problem  was  quite  clear.  Our  NKVD  friends  made  a  mistake."  Such 
were  the  words  of  Professor  Burdenko,  which  proved  what  I  sup- 
posed before. 

I  did  not  ask  him  why  he  signed  the  protocol  because  for  every 
Soviet  citizen  it  was  obvious — he  had  to  lose  his  head  if  he  would 
not  have  signed  it.  I  left  Professor  Burdenko,  and  he  wished  me 
all  the  luck  in  the  West,  as  he  mentioned  it,  and  then  I  heard  that 
he  died  in  November  1946. 

Mr.  Flood.  This  Professor  Burdenko  was  the  chief  of  the  Russian 
medical  mission  which  investigated  the  Katyn  massacre,  was  he? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  Yes. 

Mr.  Flood.  And  this  commission  made  an  investigation  at  Katyn 
and  filed  a  report  that  the  Germans  committed  the  crime  ? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  Yes. 

Mr.  Flood.  Professor  Burdenko,  as  the  chief  of  the  Russian  medical 
mission,  signed  the  report,  did  he  not? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  Yes. 

Mr.  Flood.  Do  you  want  us  to  believe  now  that  in  your  conversation 
with  Professor  Burdenko,  as  you  have  described  it,  do  you  construe- 


1942  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

Professor  Biirdenko's  conversation  as  a  complete  repudiation  by 
Professor  Burdenko  of  the  Russian  report? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  When  Professor  Burdenko  signed  the  report  he 
knew  that  the  crime  was  committed  by  the  NKVD. 

Mr.  Flood.  Did  Professor  Burdenko  say  that  the  Polish  officers,  in 
his  judgment,  had  been  killed  by  the  Russian  NKVD? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  He  stated  it  himself,  that  in  being  a  doctor 
himself  he  didn't  have  any  doubt  at  all. 

Mr.  Flood.  Doubt  about  what  ? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  That  the  Russian  NKVD  conniiitted  the  crime. 

Mr.  Flood.  That  is  all. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Where  did  you  go  fi'om  Moscow? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  From  Moscow  1  returned  to  my  work  in  Berlin. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  How  long  did  you  stay  in  the  Berlin  zone? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  I  was  in  Kai'lshorst  from  1948,  and  after  that  I 
escaped  with  my  family  and  I  became  a  political  refugee. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Where  did  you  enter  the  western  zone  ? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  I  arrived  in  Regensburg  to  the  American  military 
government,  and  I  got  protection  from  the  American  authorities  and 
the  right  for  immigration. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  When  did  you  arrive  in  the  United  States? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  I  arrived  in  the  States  on  January  2,  1952. 

Mr.  Flood.  Did  anybody  promise  you  anything  to  come  here  to 
testify? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  Nobody  promised  anything,  but  I  consider  it  my 
moral  duty. 

Mr.  Flood.  Are  you  a  voluntary  witness,  or  were  you  subpenaed? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  will  answer  that.    He  is  a  voluntary  witness,  sir. 

Mr.  Flood.  I  have  just  one  more  question. 

Is  it  not  true  that  Professor  Burdenko,  or  Colonel  General  Bur- 
denko, the  chief  of  the  Medical  Corps  of  the  Russian  Army,  was  also, 
from  time  to  time,  the  personal  physician  of  Stalin? 

Mr.  Olshansky.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Flood.  That  is  all. 

Mr.  INIiTCHELL.  Do  you  have  any  further  questions,  Mr.  Sheehan  ? 

Mr.  Sheehan.  No. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  have  no  further  questions. 

Mr.  Flood.  We  appreciate  your  interest  in  these  proceedings,  Mr. 
Olshansky,  and  we  are  grateful  to  you  for  taking  the  time  to  come 
here  and  give  us  the  advantage  of  this  very  important  testimony. 

Mr.  Olshansky.  I  repeat  again  that  it  is  my  moral  duty. 

Mr.  Flood.  The  committee  will  now  recess,  to  reconvene  subject  to 
call  of  the  Chair. 

(Thereupon,  at  12: 10  p.  m.,  the  committee  adjourned  to  reconvene 
subject  to  call  of  the  Chair.) 


THE  KATYN  FOKEST  MASSACKE 


TUESDAY,   NOVEMBER   11,   1952 

House  of  Representati\t:s, 
The  Select  Committee  on  the  Katyn  Forest  Massacre, 

Washington^  D.  C. 

The  committee  met  at  10  a.  m.,  pursuant  to  call,  in  room  1301, 
House  Office  Building,  Hon.  Ray  J.  Madden  (chairman),  presiding. 

Present:  Messrs.  Madden,  Machrowicz,  Dondero,  OTvonski,  and 
Sheehan, 

Also  present:  John  J.  Mitchell,  chief  counsel  to  the  select  com- 
mittee, and  Roman  Pucinski,  chief  investigator. 

Chairman  Maddex.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

I  might  say  that  the  hearings  this  week  will  terminate  the  investiga- 
tions of  the  Katyn  committee. 

A  year  ago  in  September,  Congress  authorized  the  creation  of  this 
special  committee  for  the  purpose  of  determining  officially  the  guilt 
of  the  nation  responsible  for  the  massacring  of  approximately  14,000 
Polish  soldiers  and  intelligentsia  at  the  beginning  of  World  War  II. 

This  connnittee  started  hearings  in  October  a  year  ago,  and  when 
Congress  reconvened  in  January  we  held  hearings  in  Washington 
•and  Chicago  in  February  and  March,  and  in  March  the  Congress 
authorized  our  committee  to  go  abroad  and  complete  our  hearings. 

The  members  of  tlie  committee  decided  last  June  that  it  was  essential 
that  we  file  an  interim  rej^ort  as  to  the  No.  1  purpose  of  the  committee, 
which  was  to  determine  the  guilt  of  the  nation  committing  these  mas- 
sacres. 

The  Katyn  Massacre  is  the  only  international  crime  in  world  history 
where  two  nations  disputed  the  guilt.  There  have  been  a  great  num- 
ber of  international  crimes  in  history,  but  the  world  always  knew 
the  nation  that  was  responsible,  except  in  the  case  of  the  massacre  of 
the  Polish  soldiers  and  intellectual  leaders  at  Katyn. 

In  order  to  file  our  report  with  the  Congress  before  adjournment 
last  July,  the  committee  decided  to  file  an  interim  report  dealing  with 
the  guilt  of  the  nation  responsible  for  the  massacre.  In  our  report 
which  I  have  just  mentioned,  we  unanimously  decided  that  the  testi- 
mony revealed  tliat  the  Soviet  Government,  beyond  any  doubt  or 
question  wliatsoever,  was  responsible  or  guilty  for  the  massacring  of 
these  Polish  soldiers  and  intelligentsia. 

At  the  time  this  committee  was  created.  Members  of  Congress  were 
very  much  interested  in  what  happened  to  certain  reports  that  were 
filed  immediately  after  the  finding  of  these  bodies  at  Kaytn.  These 
reports  disappeared. 

Also,  there  were  a  number  of  questions  by  the  Members  of  Congress 
at  the  time  this  resolution  was  on  the  floor  of  the  House,  regarding 

1943 


1944  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

the  operation  of  the  Nuremberg  trials.  That  is  tlie  reason  why  we  are 
ho](lin<jj  hearings  here  this  weeK. 

We  have  ah^eady  had  several  witnesses  in  our  former  hearings 
testify  regarding  these  reports,  but  the  witnesses  that  will  be  heard 
this  week  will  further  elaborate  for  the  information  of  the  com- 
mittee as  to  what  happened  to  these  reports. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson  was  very  cooperative  to  volunteer  testimony  this 
morning  as  to  information  regarding  the  Nuremberg  trials. 

I  also  wish  to  commend  the  members  of  the  committee  for  the  out- 
standing work  they  have  done  on  the  hearings  both  here  and  abroad. 
The  work  of  the  committee  has  been  difficult  and  its  success  can  be 
attributed  to  the  nonpartisan  and  diligent  work  of  the  committee 
members. 

After  the  hearings  this  week,  the  committee  will  complete  its  report 
on  the  second  phase  of  the  hearings,  to  wit,  the  disappearance  of  the 
files  and  testimony  regarding  Nuremberg.  We  will  make  our  final 
report  to  Congress  before  the  end  of  the  year  on  this  phase  of  the 
hearings. 

I  might  further  state  that  in  the  filing  of  our  interim  report,  the 
committee  made  four  recommendations  to  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States,  which  were  unanimous: 

No.  1,  requesting  that  the  President  of  the  United  States  forward 
the  testimony,  evidence,  and  findings  of  this  committee  to  the  United 
States  delegates  at  the  United  Nations. 

No.  2,  requesting,  further,  that  the  President  of  the  United  States 
issue  instructions  to  the  United  States  delegates  to  present  the  Katyn 
case  to  the  General  Assembly  of  the  United  Nations. 

No.  3,  requesting  that  the  appropriate  steps  be  taken  by  the  General 
Assembly  to  seek  action  before  the  International  World  Court  against 
the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  for  committing  a  crime  a^ 
Katyn  which  was  in  violation  of  the  general  principles  of  law  recog- 
nized by  civilized  nations,  and. 

No.  4,  requesting  the  President  of  the  United  States  to  instruct  the 
United  States  delegation  to  seek  the  establishment  of  an  international 
commission  which  would  investigate  other  mass  murders  and  crimes 
against  humanity. 

Judging  from  the  revelations  and  the  testimony  that  this  committee 
has  revealed  regarding  the  Katyn  massacre,  I  believe  all  members  of 
the  committee  and  possibly  all  Members  of  Congress  will  cooperate 
with  the  members  of  this  committee  to  investigate  other  massacres  and 
violations  of  international  law  which  have  been  committed  in  Korea. 

I  believe  that  every  member  of  this  connnittee  would  pursue  the 
work  that  ^ye  have  started  to  see  if  something  camiot  be  done  to  arouse 
world  public  opinion  against  international  bi-igandry,  barbarism,  and 
lawlessness  of  this  kind. 

If  any  othei-  members  have  anything  to  say,  we  w^ill  be  glad  to  iiear 
them.    Otherwise,  we  can  proceed  with  the  testimony. 

In  order  to  finish  the  hearings  this  week,  we  decided  to  have  hear- 
ings today,  wliich  is  Armistice  Day.  The  commitfec  and  the  peo])le 
in  the  room  will  stand  for  a  minute  to  pay  tribute  to  the  war  dead. 

(An  interval  of  silence.) 

Chairman  Madden.  Let  me  say  that  under  the  rule  in  the  House  of 
Representatives,  we  do  not  wish  to  have  photographs  taken  while  the 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1945 

witness  is  testifying.  If  any  photographer  here  woukl  like  to  take 
pictures  at  this  time,  it  is  agreeable  with  the  witness  and  also  with  the 
committee. 

Mr.  Justice,  is  it  agreeable  with  you  to  take  some  pictures  now? 

ISIr.  Justice  Jackson.  Yes. 

STATEMENT  OF  HON.  ROBERT  H.  JACKSON,  ASSOCIATE  JUSTICE, 
UNITED  STATES  SUPREME  COURT 

Chairman  Madden.  For  the  purposes  of  the  record,  Mr.  Justice, 
would  you  state  your  name  and  your  title? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  Robert  H.  Jackson.  At  the  present  time  I  am 
associate  Justice  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court.  I  was  repre- 
sentative and  chief  of  counsel  for  the  United  States  at  the  Nuremberg 
prosecutions,  at  the  international  trial  only. 

Chairman  Madden.  Do  you  have  a  statement  you  wish  to  read  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  Yes.  I  told  your  counsel  that  I  would  pre- 
pare a  statement,  with  dates  as  exact  as  I  could  get  them,  so  that  it 
would  be  as  accurate  as  possible.  I  have  such  a  statement,  which  is 
being  handed  to  your  counsel  and,  if  there  is  no  objection  on  the  part 
of  the  committee,  it  will  be  given  to  the  press.  It  has  not  been  dis- 
tributed so  far. 

Chairman  Madden.  That  is  satisfactory. 

Will  you  now  proceed  with  your  statement,  please? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  The  guilt  for  the  Katyn  Forest  massacre  has 
not  been  adjudged  by  the  Nuremberg  Tribunal,  and  inquiry  into  it  is 
not  inconsistent  with  the  position  taken  by  the  United-  States  prosecu- 
tion at  the  Nuremberg  international  trial  of  Goering  and  others. 

It  was  my  responsibility  to  conduct  the  prosecution  on  behalf  of  the 
United  States.  I  am  glad  to  inform  you  in  detail  concerning  all 
decisions  and  actions  in  reference  to  the  Katyn  atrocity  and  the  reasons 
which  conduced  to  them. 

The  first  step  that  seems  pertinent  was  an  agreement  to  divide  pri- 
mary responsibility  for  preparation  and  presentation  of  the  case 
among  the  prosecutors  representing  the  four  Allied  Powers.  This  was 
intended  to  fix  on  someone  responsibility  for  covering  each  part  of  the 
case,  to  avoid  duplication,  and  to  expedite  a  trial  of  unprecedented 
complexity. 

To  the  United  States  was  allocated  the  over-all  conspiracy  to  incite 
and  wage  a  war  of  aggression.  The  British  were  assigned  the  viola- 
tion of  specific  treaties  and  crimes  on  the  high  seas.  Violations  of 
the  laws  of  war  and  crimes  against  humanity  were  divided  on  a 
geographical  basis.  The  French  undertook  crimes  in  western  Europe, 
and  the  Soviet  prosecution  was  assigned  the  duty  of  preparing  and 
presenting  evidence  of  crimes  in  eastern  Europe — an  area  largely 
in  Soviet  occupation,  and  to  much  of  which  the  others  of  us  had  no 
access.  The  geographical  area  thus  assigned  to  the  Soviet  repre- 
sentatives included  Katyn  Wood  and  Poland  as  Avell,  but  at  that  time 
it  was  not  known  that  the  Katyn  massacre  would  be  involved. 

The  first  proposal  that  the  Nuremberg  trial  should  take  up  examina- 
tion of  the  Katyn  massacre  came  from  the  Soviet  prosecutor  during 
the  drawing  of  the  indictment.  Preliminary  drafts  w^ere  negotiated 
in  London  at  a  series  of  conferences  where  I  was  represented,  but  not 


1946  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

personally  present.    At  the  last  London  meeting,  tlie  Soviet  prosecutor 
included  among  crimes  charged  in  the  east  the  following : 

In  September  1941,  925  I*olish  officers  who  were  prisoners  of  war  were  killed  in 
the  Katyn  Forest  near  Smolensli. 

Both  British  and  American  representatives  protested,  but  they 
finally  concluded  that,  despite  their  personal  disapproval,  if  the 
Soviet  thought  they  could  prove  the  charge  they  were  entitled  to  do  so 
under  the  division  of  the  case. 

Tlie  indictment  was  brought  to  Berlin  for  final  settlement  and 
filing,  where  I  objected  to  inclusion  of  the  charge  and  even  more 
strongly  when,  at  the  last  moment,  the  Soviet  delayed  its  filing  by 
amending  the  Katyn  charge  to  include  11,000  instead  of  925  victims. 
However,  it  was  in  the  Soviet  part  of  the  case  and  they  had  inves- 
tigated Katyn;  we  had  no  opportunity  to  do  so.  In  view  of  what 
we  knew  of  the  over-all  Nazi  plan  to  exterminate  inhabitants  of 
Poland,  it  did  not  seem  unlikely  that  this  was  part  of  their  program, 
and  the  Soviet  claimed  to  have  adequate  evidence  of  Nazi  guilt. 

While  we  did  not  feel  justified  in  preventing  the  issue,  we  warned 
the  Soviet  delegation  that  we  did  not  have  evidence  to  support  the 
charge  nor  time  nor  opportunity  to  investigate  it  and  that,  if  it  met 
with  denial  or  countercharges,  we  would  keep  hands  off  and  leave 
the  entire  contest  to  the  Soviet  and  German  lawyers. 

The  reasons  for  opposing  inclusion  of  this  charge  and  refusal  to 
participate  in  its  trial  were  that  to  litigate  that  issue  would  conflict 
in  several  respects  with  what  I  considered  to  be  sound  trial  policy 
for  the  first  such  case  in  history.  It  was  not  based  upon  any  convic- 
tion in  my  own  mind  about  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the  charge.  I 
knew  that  the  Nazis  and  the  Soviets  accused  each  other,  that  both 
were  capable  of  the  offense,  that  perhaps  both  had  opportunity  to 
commit  it,  and  that  it  was  perfectly  consistent  with  the  policy  of  each 
toward  Poland.  Whatever  the  facts  were,  they  had  become  overlaid 
with  deep  layers  of  Nazi  and  Soviet  propaganda  and  counterpropa- 
ganda,  and  it  seemed  we  could  not  at  the  international  trial  wisely 
undertake  or  satisfactorily  achieve  the  long  task  of  separating  truth 
from  falsehood.  The  chief  reasons  in  support  of  that  conclusion  are 
four: 

First,  responsibility  for  the  massacre  did  not  appear  to  be  capable 
of  documentary  proof  or  substantial  corroboration.  One  of  the  basic 
decisions  on  policy  concerning  the  Nuremburg  international  trial  was 
that  we  should  accuse  only  defendants  whose  guilt  could  be  established 
and  should  charge  only  offenses  whose  occurrence  could  be  fully  proved 
or  substantially  corroborated  by  documentary  evidence  captured  from 
the  Germans  themselves. 

Because  this  Avas  the  first  internatioiuil  criminal  trial  in  history 
and  was  held  in  the  wake  of  war  when  passions  were  high,  we  did 
not  want  any  judgment  that  Mould  rest  solely  on  oral  testimony  of 
witnesses  whose  interest,  bias,  memory,  and  truthfulness  would  always 
be  open  to  question.  This  required  us  to  pass  over  many  tempting 
matters  because  evidence  measuring  uj)  to  tliis  standard  was  not  then 
obtainable,  llowevei',  that  policy  was  so  far  observed  thai  the  tribu- 
nal, in  its  judgment,  said  : 

Tilt'  rase,  thcrefoi-e.  a.yainsi  the  (IcfciHl.-ints  rcsis  in  a  l.-iriic  nicasiin'  in  di>c- 
iinicnts  (if  their  own  nuikin;:,  the  antlicnl  icit\  of  wliicli  Ims  not  been  (  lialienyed 
except  in  one  or  two  cases. 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  1949 

We  had  tile  diary  of  Hans  Frank,  the  Nazi  Governor-General  of 
Poland,  acknowledged  by  him  to  be  authentic,  saying : 

We  must  annihilate  the  Jews  wherever  we  find  them  and  wlierever  it  is 
possible. 

In  August  1942  he  wrote  of  Nazi  manipulation  of  hunger  rations 
in  Poland : 

That  we  sentence  1,200,000  Jews  to  die  of  hunger  should  be  noted  only  mar- 
ginally. It  is  a  matter,  of  course,  that  should  the  Jews  not  starve  to  death  it 
would,  we  hope,  result  in  the  speeding  up  of  the  anti-Jewish  measures. 

We  had  written  evidence  of  specific  extermination  measures,  such 
as  the  75-page  leather-bound  official  report  by  Major  General  Stroop 
which  recited  the  killing  of  men,  women,  and  children  of  the  Warsaw 
ghetto  to  the  exact  number  of  56,065,  and  set  out  the  day-to-day 
measures,  including  shooting,  fire,  explosion,  and  chemical  extermina- 
tion in  the  sewers,  where  the  victims  had  taken  refuge,  accompanied 
by  photographs  to  prove  the  operation's  efficiency. 

We  had  the  report  by  SS  Brigade  Fuehrer  Stahlecker  to  Himmler, 
dated  October  1941,  of  the  execution  of  135,567  persons  in  Lithuanian 
area. 

We  had  a  top-secret  report,  dated  May  16,  1942,  of  the  ghastly 
details  of  the  operations  in  the  east  of  gas  wagons  for  killing 
undesirables. 

We  also  had  German  protests,  official,  but  not  very  high  minded, 
against  such  exterminations,  in  one  instance  of  150,000  to  200,000  Jews, 
and  in  another  instance  of  5,000  Jews,  because  it  was  complained  they 
should  have  been  spared  for  use  as  forced  labor. 

Some  of  the  documents,  intended  to  conceal  crime,  unconsciously 
dramatized  it.  For  example,  a  death  book  of  the  Mauthausen  con- 
centration camp  recorded  35,317  deaths.  During  a  sample  period  203 
persons  died  of  the  same  ailment,  heart  trouble,  died  at  brief  and  regu- 
lar intervals,  and,  more  astonishingly,  died  in  alphabetical  order. 
Death  came  first  to  Ackermann,  at  1 :  15  a.  m.,  and  reached  Zynger  at 
2  p.  m. 

Oral  testimony  and  affidavits  were  available  from  captured  Ger- 
man officials.  One  told  of  the  official  Gestapo  estimate  that  the  Nazi 
extermination  program  had  done  away  with  4  million  persons  in 
concentration  camps  and  that  2  million  additional  were  killed  by  the 
secret  police  in  the  east. 

Another  Nazi,  General  Ohlendorf,  testified  willingly,  even  boast- 
fully, that  he  supervised  execution  of  over  90,000  men,  women,  and 
children  in  the  eastern  area. 

The  witness  Hoess,  in  charge  of  Auschwitz  extermination  center, 
swore  that  under  his  regime  it  exterminated  3  million  human  beings. 
This  was  by  far  the  largest  and  most  atrocious  of  the  atrocities  com- 
mitted against  the  Polish  people. 

Nor  did  we  rest  upon  the  documents  which  the  fortunes  of  war 
had  placed  in  our  hands  when  documents  were  procurable  from  other 
sources.  An  example  was  the  Nazi  persecution  of  the  church  and 
clergy,  particularly  vicious  in  Poland,  which  the  Nazis  documented 
with  the  candor  and  thoroughness  that  they  did  persecution  of  the 
Jews.  It  is  doubtful  whether,  even  if  time  were  available  to  us,  we 
could  have  gathered  evidence  of  the  church  persecution  in  Poland, 
since  any  probable  witnesses  were  in  the  area  under  Soviet  control 

93744— 52— pt.  7 9 


1950  THE    K.\TYN    FOREST    AIASSACRE 

where  Americans  even  then  were  rarely  admitted,  and  we  may  doubt 
the  zeal  of  the  Soviets  to  obtain  proof  on  that  subject.  However,  I 
sought  an  audience  with  Pope  Pius,  and  obtained  from  His  Holiness 
the  Vatican  documents  in  which  detailed  evidentiary  material  was 
already  collected,  and  which  supported  the  charge  of  religious 
persecution. 

As  to  the  Katyn  massacres,  we  knew  of  no  source  to  which  we  could 
turn  for  such  documentation.  Extermination  of  these  intelligent  and 
patriotic  Poles  who  might  become  the  leadership  of  the  restoration  of 
Poland  was  provable  by  document  to  be  consistent  with  the  Nazi  policy 
toward  Poland.  Yet,  while  they  had  boasted  on  paper  of  the  worst 
crimes  known  to  man,  we  found  but  one  Nazi  document  that  even 
hinted  at  Nazi  responsibility  for  the  Katyn  massacre,  that  being  a 
telegram  reporting  that  the  Polish  Red  Cross  had  found  that  German- 
made  ammunition  was  used  in  the  killings. 

A  fourth  difficulty  entered  into  our  reluctance  to  undertake  the 
Katyn  murder  charge  as  part  of  the  Nuremberg  trial.  We  were  under 
exceedingly  heavy  pressure  to  get  along  with  the  trial.  A  persistent 
criticism  in  the  American  press  during  the  trial  was  its  long  duration. 

Of  course,  that  is  forgotten  now. 

Oral  testimony  from  witnesses,  subject  to  cross-examination  by 
several  counsel,  of  course  takes  much  more  time  than  documentary 
proof.  Every  word  of  testimony  taken  in  the  Nuremberg  trial  had 
to  be  forthwith  interpreted  into  three  other  languages.  Every  exami- 
natio7i  or  cross-examination  had  to  include  any  proper  questions  de- 
sired by  more  than  20  lawyers  representing  defendants  and  4  for  the 
prosecution,  and  these  were  trained  in  5  different  legal  systems — 
English,  American,  French,  Russian,  and  German. 

Therefore,  in  the  interests  of  expedition  it  was  necessary  to  forego 
calling  of  witnesses  so  far  as  possible.  You  will  best  realize  the  extent 
to  which  we  aA'oided  relying  on  oral  proof  when  I  remind  you  that 
all  4  prosecutors  at  Nuremberg  called  only  83  witnesses  to  testify 
orally  on  the  whole  case  against  the  20  individual  defendants,  and 
these  defendants,  in  addition  to  themselves,  called  only  61  witnesses. 

You  have  already",  according  to  your  interim  report,  orally  ex- 
amined 81  witnesses  on  this  1  atrocity. 

Notwithstanding  these  considerations,  the  Soviet  prosecutor,  on 
February  14,  11)46,  opened  tlie  subject  by  presenting  to  the  tribunal  a 
report  by  a  Soviet  extraordinary  state  commission  of  its  investigation 
of  the  Katyn  crime.  It  recited  testimony,  including  a  good  deal  of 
hearsay  and  medical  data,  as  to  the  condition  of  the  exhumed  bodies. 
On  this,  experts  based  opinions  that  the  executions  took  place  during 
the  period  of  (lei'man  o('('u])ation  and,  theivfoi-e,  that  the  Germans 
were  resj)onsible. 

\h\  Stahmer,  counsel  for  (ioering,  made  a  ])r()nn)t  request  to  call 
Avilnesses  to  contradict  the  Soviet  report,  whicli  occasioned  some  disa- 
greement between  the  Soviet  prosecutors  and  those  rei)resenting  Great 
Britain  and  tlie  United  States.  The  Soviet  lawyers  took  the  view 
that,  since  the  court  took  "judicial  notice"  of  the  report  of  the  ex- 
traordinary commission  as  a  state  document,  it  could  not  be  contra- 
dicted. Under  Soviet  hiw  it  probably  could  not,  but  would  be  en- 
titled to  faith  and  credit — as  a  jndgnient,  statute,  or  public  act  would 
be  here.    Nevertheless,  we  thought  that  its  nature  was  such  that  it  was 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  1951 

clearly  open  to  contradiction.  Then  the  Soviet  lawyers  proposed,  if 
the  subject  were  opened,  to  call  10  witnesses.  The  tribunal,  however, 
ruled  that  it  would  "limit  the  whole  of  the  evidence  to  three  witnesses 
on  either  side,  because  the  matter  is  only  subsidiary  allegation  of  fact.'" 

Testimony  of  three  witnesses  for  each  was  heard  on  the  1st  and  2d 
days  of  July  1946.  What  it  was  is  a  matter  of  record — I  have  cited 
the  record  to  you — and  what  it  is  worth  is  a  matter  of  opinion. 

At  the  conclusion,  neither  side  was  satisfied  with  its  own  showing 
and  both  asked  to  call  additional  witnesses.  The  Soviet,  especially, 
complained  that  they  had  been  allowed  to  call  only  3  of  the  120  wit- 
nesses that  appeared  liefore  the  Soviet  commission.  The  tribunal, 
wisely,  I  think,  refused  to  hear  more  of  the  subject. 

The  Soviet  prosecutor  appears  to  have  abandoned  the  charge.  The 
tribunal  did  not  convict  the  German  defendants  of  the  Katyn  mas- 
sacre. Neither  did  it  expressly  exonerate  them,  as  the  judgment 
made  no  reference  to  the  Katyn  incident.  The  Soviet  judge  dis- 
sented in  some  matters  but  did  not  mention  Katyn. 

This  history  will  show  that,  if  it  is  now  deemed  possible  to  estab- 
lish responsibility  for  the  Katyn  murders,  nothing  that  was  decided 
by  the  Nuremberg  tribunal  or  contended  for  by  the  American  prose- 
cution will  stand  in  your  way. 

Chairman  JNIadden.  Does  that  complete  your  formal  statement,  Mr. 
Justice? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  That  is  right. 

And  I  may  say  that  my  files  supporting  this  are  open  to  your  coun- 
sel at  any  time,  as  I  think  he  understands. 

Chairman  Madden.  If  you  have  any  further  comments  to  make  be- 
fore the  members  propound  questions,  you  are  at  liberty  to  many  any 
comments  you  desire. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  Thank  ^ou,  Mr.  Chairman. 

I  think  that  tells  the  story  of  the  situation,  and  I  will  be  glad  to 
answer  any  questions  that  the  committee  wishes  to  ask  about  it. 

Chairman  Madden.  Do  any  members  of  the  committee  have  ques- 
tions ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  just  finish  up  one  part  of  this 
now  ? 

Chairman  ]\Iadden.  Proceed. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Jackson,  will  you  refer  to  part  5  of  the  Katyn 
Forest  JNIassacre  Committee  hearings  held  in  Frankfurt,  Germany, 
page  1537,  and  will  you  read,  please,  the  statement  of  Dr.  Kempner? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson  (reading)  : 

Count  I,  conspiracy,  and  count  II,  crimes  a,u;ainst  peace,  were  handled  by  the 
United  States  and  by  the  British.  Count  III,  war  crimes,  and  count  IV,  crimes 
against  humanity,  were  divided  up  accordinji'  to  seographical  regions  or  dis- 
tricts. The  French  handled  the  war  crimes  and  crimes  against  humanity  as  far 
as  Western  Europe  was  concerned.  They  were,  so  to  siieak,  sp<ikesnien,  the 
prosecuting  spokesmen,  for  the  French,  for  the  Dutch,  for  the  Belgians,  and 
other  German-occupied  western  territories.  The  Kussians  were  in  charge  of  war 
crimes  and  crimes  against  humanity  which  were  allegedly  committed  in  the 
eastei-n  areas,  and  if  I  say  eastern  areas,  I  mean  the  Soviet  Union,  Poland,  and 
at  the  time  they  handled  also  Yugoslavia  and  Bulgaria,  Czechoslovakia. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Your  prepared  statement  of  this  morning  has  satis- 
factorily cleared  up  any  doubt  that  might  be  in  the  mind  of  anybody 
concerning  that  statement ;  is  that  correct,  sir  ? 


1952  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  think  so. 

Of  course,  there  were  crimes  against  Greece  which  were  also  in- 
cluded in  the  eastern  territory.  We  included  some  against  the  Lith- 
uanians, Estonians,  and  the  Baltic  groups. 

And  while  this  division  prevailed,  it  was  not  an  absolute  division, 
for  the  reason  that  conspiracy  to  commit  these  crimes  was  the  re- 
sponsibility of  the  Americans,  and  in  establishing  the  conspiracy,  we 
put  in  a  great  deal  of  evidence  on  those  crimes  ourselves,  as  I  pointed 
out. 

We  put  in  a  great  deal  about  Poland,  although  it  was  not  in  our 
area  on  the  crimes  against  humanity.  It  was  in  our  area  in  the  over-all 
conspiracy  charge. 

So  that  it  is  a  little  difficult  to  say  that  a  very  exact  division  was 
observed,  because  of  the  overlapping. 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Counsel,  for  the  record,  I  think  you  should 
identify  who  Dr.  Kempner  is. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  Dr.  Kempner  was  a  man  who  had  been  a  Ger- 
man lawyer  and  was  in  the  employ,  I  believe,  of  the  OSS.  My  staff 
was  not  a  staff  that  I  hired.  I  borrowed  the  staff  from  other  depart- 
ments. I  had  no  budget  and  I  borrowed  help.  Dr.  Kempner  was  bor- 
rowed from  the  OSS  and  assisted  us  there  throughout  the  trial. 

He  tlien  took  a  part  in  the  subsequent  trials. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  While  participating,  he  was  an  American  citizen, 
was  he  not? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  Yes ;  I  think  that  is  the  case. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Will  you  now  refer  to  page  3  of  your  prepared 
statement,  Mr.  Justice? 

In  paragraph  2  the  statement  is  made  that : 

We  would  keep  hands  off  and  leave  the  entire  contest  to  the  Soviet  and  German 
lawyers. 

Now,  there  has  been  a  great  deal  of  talk  that  representatives  of  the 
United  States,  members  of  your  staff,  in  some  way  or  other,  by  imjili- 
cation  or  by  assistance,  tried  to  assist  the  Soviets  in  the  proving  of  this 
case.  Do  you,  to  your  personal  knowledge,  know  of  any  individual 
who,  in  any  way,  participated  in  assisting  the  Soviets  in  proving  this 
case  against  the  Nazis,  that  is,  an  American  ? 

Mr.Justice  Jackson.  That  is  a  very  difficult  question  to  answer  as 
broadly  as  you  have  asked  it. 

Our  captured  documents  were  set  up  in  a  document  room  and  our 
captured  documents  were  available  to  the  Soviets  and  to  the  Germans. 
For  example,  the  document  that  the  Soviets  did  use  showing  the  tele- 
gram about  the  German  ammunition,  that  was  an  American-captured 
document. 

Our  documents  were  available  to  both  sides. 

But  that  is  the  only  document  that  we  ever  found. 

Now,  we  did  not  permit  the  Soviets  to  go  into  our  document  room 
and  make  their  own  selections  of  documents.  If  there  was  something 
tliat  bore  on  particularly  their  phase  of  the  case,  I  suppose  that  some 
of  our  people  furnished  them  those  documents. 

Other  than  that,  I  know  of  no  assistance.  In  fact,  there  was  not  a 
^reat  deal  of  even  conferring  between  their  staff  and  ours  because  the 
Soviets  are  not  very  sociable,  I  might  say.  They  hesitate  somewhat 
to  be  too  much  with  us. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1953 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Could  you  clear  up  for  the  record,  please,  the  exact 
function  of  General  Mitchell,  who  was  the  executive  secretary?  I 
believe  it  was  he.  Was  he  the  American  who  was  in  control  of  mak- 
ing arrangements  for  the  lawyers  to  meet? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  cannot  give  you  much  information  about 
General  Mitchell.  He  was  not  under  my  control  and  he  was  not  on  my 
staff. 

The  tribunal,  when  it  arrived,  set  up  its  own  staff,  and  General 
Mitchell  was  selected  by  somebody  to  represent,  as  general  secretary — 
I  believe  it  was  called — the  tribunal.  He  did  not  in  any  way  represent 
me.  He  was  not  a  lawyer,  and  I  suppose  any  instructions  that  he  had 
came  from  the  tribunal. 

We  had  an  American  that  I  had  asked  to  remain  over  there,  Mr. 
Willey,  now  Clerk  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court,  who  had  gone 
over  to  help  set  up  courts  in  that  country.  I  asked  him  to  come  to- 
Nuremberg  to  assist  in  the  clerical  work  of  the  tribunal.  The  tribunal, 
however,  got  General  Mitchell  and  put  him  over  all  four  of  the  repre- 
sentatives. 

Mr.  JNIiTCHELL.  Do  you  know,  to  your  own  personal  knowledge, 
whether  any  member  of  your  staff'  participated  in  the  discussions 
between  the  German  counsel  and'the  Soviet  counsel? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  could  not  say.  I  think  they  may  have  been 
present  as  observers,  or  something  of  that  sort,  because  we  were  much 
concerned  about  not  having  a  situation  that  would  prolong  this  trial. 
B'ut  we  took  no  part  in  any  arrangements  between  the  Soviets  and  the 
Germans  about  it.     We  thought  that  was  their  fight. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Therefore,  any  memlier  of  your  staff  had  no  specific 
instructions  from  you  to  participate  in  preparing  the  case  one  way  or 
the  other  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  Oh,  no. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Xo  further  questions. 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Machrowicz. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Mr.  Justice,  referring  to  the  final  paragraphs  of 
your  statement,  you  state  that : 

The  Soviet  prosecutor  appears  to  have  abancioned  the  charge.  The  tribunal 
did  not  convict  the  German  defendants  of  the  Katyn  massacre     *     *     * 

That  is  based  upon  the  fact  that  there  were  no  findings  made  by  the 
tribunal;  is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Since  the  question  has  been  raised  at  various 
times,  I  would  like  to  have  you  give  us  your  statement  as  to  whether 
it  could  have  been  possible,  if  proper  testimony  had  been  adduced  at 
the  hearing,  to  convict  the  Soviets  of  the  crime  at  the  Nuremberg 
trial,  in  view  of  the  four  power  nature  of  that  tribunal? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  It  could  not. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Will  you  explain  why? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  They  had  not  been  indicted. 

And  if  you  will  inake  reference  to  the  very  first  page,  you  will  see 
that  my  authority  was  only  to  prepai'e  and  pi'osecute  charges  of  atroci- 
ties and  war  crimes  "against  such  of  the  leaders  of  the  European  Axis 
Powers  and  their  principal  agents  and  accessories  as  the  United  States 
may  agree  with  any  of  the  United  Nations  to  bring  to  trial  before  an 
international  military  tribunal.'' 


1954  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  So  it  could  not  have  been  presented  at  the  Nurem- 
berg trial. 

Mr.  Justice  Jacksox.  It  surely  could  not  have  been,  nor  was  I  at 
liberty  to  negotiate  on  any  such  subject. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  at  any  time  receive  any  instructions  from 
anyone  in  authority  to  treat  the  Katyn  case  in  any  other  manner 
than  the  other  portions  of  the  indictment  against  the  Germans? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  No.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  I  received  very  little 
instruction  from  anybody.  The  thing  was  a  lawyer's  job,  and  I  had 
no  instructions.  If  I  may  be  so  blunt  as  to  say  so,  I  thought  that 
having  once  gotten  me  into  it,  there  was  a  pronounced  disposition  to 
leave  everything  to  me.  I  will  not  say  exactly  that  it  was  to  "pass  the 
buck,"  but  I  was  in  charge  of  it. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Do  you  have  with  you  the  exchange  of  any  cables 
or  other  messages  that  Avere  sent  prior  to  the  presentation  of  the  Katyn 
case  between  you  and  any  other  representative  of  the  United  States 
Government  ? 

Mr,  Justice  Jackson.  There  was  no  cable  that  I  know  of,  except 
the  cable  that  I  referred  to,  from  General  Clay,  which  I  do  have  here. 
It  is  classified  "Secret,"  and  perhaps  should  not  become  a  part  of  the 
record.  But  I  should  be  perfectly  satisfied  to  have  the  committee 
see  it. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  May  I  ask  whether  you  have  any  recollection  of 
receiving  a  cable  from  Ambassador  Lane  in  Warsaw? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  This,  I  suppose,  originated  with  Ambassador 
Lane. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Could  the  committee  see  that,  please? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  Yes,  certainly. 

It  may  be  a  paraphrase,  and  may  not,  I  don't  know. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Is  that  dated  December  16,  1945? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  No;  January  21,  1946. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  would  like  to  have  you  examine  this  exhibit 
I  have  here,  which  purports  to  be  a  cablegi'am  from  Ambassador  Lane 
to  Secretary  of  State  Stettiiiius  at  Washington,  with  a  cojjy  to  Berlin, 
flustice  Jackson,  Nuremberg,  bearing  the  date  of  December  16,  1945, 
and  I  ask  you  whether  you  have  a  recollection  of  seeing  that  document  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  could  not  say  whether  I  ever  saw  that  or  not. 
1  certainly  would  not  say  that  I  did  not.  There  was  a  vast  amount 
of  material  pouring  in  on  us,  and  we  had  a  number  of  people  working 
on  different  branches  of  the  case.  I  surely  would  not  say  that  it 
might  not  have  come  to  the  attention  of  somebody  in  a  responsible 
position  with  me. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Do  you  remember  any  information  received  from 
Warsaw  or  Washington  which  would  give  you  advice,  let  us  say, 
similar  to  that  contained  in  that  cablegram? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  That  was  consistent  with  our  attitude,  and 
I  have  no  recollection  of  any  specific  inference. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  referred  in  your  statement  to  statements 
made  by  Colonel  Van  Vliet,  Colonel  Stewart,  and  Colouel  Szymanski. 
I  believe  you  referred  to  Colonel  Szymanski,  who  had  testilied  before 
this  committee.     Is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  That  is  Avhere  I  heard  about  it. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  read  those  statements? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  No;  I  have  not. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1955 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Have  you  read  the  statements  of  witnesses  that 
appeared  to  give  testimony  before  this  committee  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  No.     I  have  not  had  time  to  do  so. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  are  aware,  however,  that  these  three,  Colonel 
Van  Vliet,  Colonel  Stewart,  and  Colonel  Szymanski,  did,  prior  u> 
December  1945,  make  reports  to  the  Department  of  the  Defense  in- 
dicating Russian  guilt  for  the  Katyn  massacre  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  am  so  informed  now ;  yes. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Looking  in  retrospect,  would  you  not  think,  then, 
that  it  would  have  been  of  assistance  to  you  had  you  had  those  reports 
in  your  possession  at  the  time  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  Of  course,  any  information  would  have  been 
helpful.  If  we  had  had  information  of  that  kind,  I  cannot  pass  on 
whether  this  would  have  been  adequate,  but  if  we  had  had  adequate 
information  of  Russian  guilt,  we  would  not  have  consented  at  all 
to  have  it  in.  It  would  have  strengthened  our  hand  in  keeping  it 
out  immensely  and  probably  would  have  resulted  in  the  Soviets  not 
making  the  accusation. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  The  point  I  wish  to  make  is  that  you  know  now 
that  prior  to  December  1945  the  United  States  Government  did  have 
certain  officials  reports,  namely,  reports  of  Colonel  Van  Vliet,  Colonel 
Stewart,  and  Colonel  Szymanski,  which  very  strongly  indicated  Soviet 
guilt. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  understand  they  had  such  statements. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Can  you  give  us  any  reason  that  you  might  know 
of  why  those  reports  were  not  made  available  to  j'ou? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  do  not  know  where  they  were.  You  must 
remember  that  communication  at  that  time  was  very  difficult.  I  do 
not  know  where  the  reports  may  have  been.  I  do  not  know  what 
their  reasons  may  have  been  for  not  calling  them  to  our  attention. 

Since  we  did  not  propose  to  go  into  the  litigation  of  this  issue, 
they  may  have,  knowing  our  attitude,  thought  they  were  not  important. 
I  would  not  know  what  their  reasons  were. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Referring  to  a  remark  contained  on  page  5  of 
your  statement,  you  state  that  the  attitude  of  the  Polish  Government 
in  exile  was  that  the  case  should  not  be  presented  at  Nuremberg;  is 
that  correct  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  That  is  what  they  concluded. 

I  will  give  you  the  photostats  of  the  letter. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  "WHiich  letter  are  you  referring  to?  The  letter 
of  the  12  Members  of  the  Parliament  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  Yes.     I  will  give  you  photostats  of  that. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  General  Anders  did  offer  to  testify  if  he  was 
requested  to  do  so,  by  the  tribunal ;  is  that  correct  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  did  not  know  of  that  until  his  book,  as  I 
have  said,  I  did  not  know  that  Stahmer,  who  was  Goering's  counsel, 
had  asked  him  to  testify.  I  did  know  that  Stahmer  knew  that  these 
conversations  to  which  Anders  was  a  party  had  taken  place,  because 
the  Germans  filed  with  the  tribunal  a  request  for  documents  which 
would  show  that  they  knew  that. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Is  there  anything  in  these  documents,  Mr.  Justice, 
which  would  indicate  that  this  communication  from  the  members  of 
the  Polish  Parliament  was  sent  to  you  as  a  result  of  instigation  by  the 


1956  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

British  authorities,  or  as  a  result  of  conference  with  the  British 
authorities? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  No ;  I  do  not  think  so.  I  do  not  recall  any- 
thing in  it  that  would  give  that  indication. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  That  is  all,  Mr.  Chairman.     . 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Dondero. 

Mr.  DoNDERo.  Mr.  Justice  Jackson,  there  is  one  thing  in  your  state- 
ment that  caused  me  to  raise  my  eyebrows,  and  I  am  sure  you  may  be 
able  to  help  us  on  it. 

It  is  on  page  4,  at  the  bottom  of  the  page : 

Second,  if  we  were  ever  to  depart  from  the  policy  of  presenting  documentary 
evidence,  tliis  atrocity  was  not  a  suitable  instance  because  we  knew  of  no  wit- 
nesses who  could  supply  oral  proof  to  establish  the  identity  of  the  perpe- 
trators    *     *     *. 

Now,  the  Nuremberg  trial  took  place  in  1945  and  1946. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  DoNDERo.  There  was  presented  to  us — I  will  have  to  make  this 
statement  to  you — there  was  presented  to  this  committee  at  Frankfurt, 
Germany,  what  is  known  as  a  protocol  or  statement  signed  by  12 
medical  experts,  representing  at  least  6  different  governments  of  Eu- 
rope, some  of  them  neutral  governments,  to  the  effect  that  when  the 
graves  of  these  men  were  discovered  by  the  Germans  they  had  invited 
in  these  experts  to  make  an  examination  of  the  bodies  and  to  file  such 
statement  as  they  saw  fit. 

These  12  did  so  at  the  grave  site,  and  such  statement  is  now  known 
as  the  protocol  whicli  was  offered  in  evidence  before  our  committee 
and  is  now  a  part  of  the  record. 

Wlien  we  were  in  Euroj^e  we  called  before  us  as  witnesses  some  of 
those  12,  who  were  still  living,  and  I  recall  the  doctor  from  Denmark, 
Dr.  Tramsen,  and  Dr.  Naville,  from  Switzerland,  and  Dr.  Miloslavich, 
of  Yugoslavia. 

It  appeared  that  the  other  doctors  who  lived  in  the  countries  that 
have  since  been  taken  behind  the  iron  curtain  have  committed  suicide, 
or  have  died. 

I  do  not  have  that  statement  before  me,  but  it  is  dated  as  I  recall, 
in  May  of  1943,  which  would  be  more  than  2  years  before  the  Nurem- 
berg trials. 

They  stated  that  in  the  protocol  these  Polish  officers  or  intelligentsia 
were  killed,  in  their  opinion,  sometime  in  the  autumn  of  1989  or  the 
early  part  of  1940.  At  that  time,  the  ground  in  which  these  bodies 
were  found  was  in  possession  of  the  Russians,  and  it  is  on  Russian  soil. 

My  question  is :  Did  the  tribunal  of  whicli  you  were  a  i)ait,  have 
before  it  any  of  that  evidence  either  of  that  protocol  or  of  the  12 
doctors,  representing  some  of  the  neutral  nations,  who  made  their 
findings  at  the  graves  in  1948  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  First,  I  would  like  to  say  that  I  was  not  a 
part  of  the  tribunal.    I  was  a  prosecutor  before  the  tribunal. 

However,  we  knew  of  that  report.  What  the  tribunal  knew  about 
it  I  think  Avas  put  in  evidence  by  the  Germans.  That  report  was  the 
subject  of  the  controversy.  The  Germans  had  their  rej^tort  signed  by 
the  12  doctoi-s.  The  Russians  had  theii-  extraordinaiy  commission  re- 
port, in  which  their  doctors  had  looked  at  these  bodies,  not  the  same 
bodies  perhaps,  but  they  had  exhumed  bodies,  and  they  gave  their  ex- 
pert opinions. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1957 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  Was  that  last-named  commission  wholly  Russian  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  That  is  right. 

Now,  at  the  request  of  the  Germans,  we  located  Dr.  Naville,  whom 
I  think  you  swore,  and  you  will  find  in  my  statement  at  page  13,  in 
the  fine  print,  Congressman  Dondero,  that  the  tribunal  allowed  him 
to  Goering,  provided  he  could  be  located. 

We  found  him  in  Switzerland,  but  he  informed  the  tribunal  that  he 
saw  no  use  in  coming  as  a  witness  for  Goering.  In  other  words,  some 
of  these  witnesses  that  may  be  available  today  were  not  going  to  help 
Goering  and  his  crowd.    That  was  the  attitude  of  General  Anders. 

That  correspondence  w^as  conducted  between  Goering's  lawyer  and 
General  Anders,  and  he  was  not  willing  to  come  at  their  request. 

We  did  not  want  to  get  into  expert  testimony.  The  Russians  did 
have  an  enormous  number  of  alleged  witnesses,  and  we  would  be  there 
yet  if  it  called  their  120  witnesses  and  the  German  witnesses. 

The  tribunal  limited  it  to  three  on  a  side.  That  was  not  at  our 
request,  although  I  may  say  I  was  greatly  relieved  when  I  found 
that  they  had  done  it. 

And  I  do  not  criticize  them  for  it  because,  in  the  conditions  of  that 
time,  I  do  not  think  it  would  have  been  a  profitable  inquiry. 

Mr.  Dondero.  Tlie  court  had  been  in  session  a  considerable  length 
of  time,  I  think  9  months,  and  it  wanted  to  wind  up  its  hearings  and 
disband. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Dondero.  Now,  I  have  one  more  thing. 

You  spolve  of  the  German  ammunition.  Did  the  tribunal  call  be- 
fore it  any  of  the  manufacturers  of  German  ammunition  to  testify? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  No.  There  was  no  request  from  the  Germans 
to  do  so. 

You  will  fin.d  all  that  I  know  about  the  German  ammunition  in  the 
fine  print  on  note  20,  on  page  9.  There  was  a  letter  which  followed, 
and  we  never  found  the  letter.  It  may  be  in  existence.  ^"NHiat  the 
letter  would  have  shown,  we  do  not  know. 

Mr.  Dondero.  The  reason  for  asking  you  that  question  is  this: 
There  was  presented  to  this  committee  in  Frankfurt,  Germany,  the 
head,  or  the  president  of  the  company  that  made  the  ammunition, 
with  his  books,  showing  that  firm  had  sold  ammunition  to  the  three 
Baltic  States,  and  also  to  Russia  some  years  before  World  War  II 
had  broken  out.  That  rather  indicated  that  even  though  it  was 
German  ammunition  that  was  used  in  the  killing  of  these  men,  there 
was  an  explanation  as  to  how  it  got  into  the  hands  of  the  Russians. 
They  had  purchased  it. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  That  piece  of  evidence  we  did  not  regard  as 
of  any  significance  to  ourselves,  because  of  the  fact  that  so  much 
ammunition  changes  hands.  You  might  find  American-made  guns  in 
the  hands  of  some  of  these  other  people.  You  cannot  tell  by  the  gun 
that  is  used  who  shot  it. 

Mr.  Dondero.  The  reason  why  I  am  inquiring  of  you,  Mr.  Justice, 
regarding  that  protocol  of  the  12  doctors,  is  that<  this  committee  felt 
if  they  could  fix  the  time  that  these  men  were  killed,  they  could  also 
fix  the  guilt. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Dondero.  And  these  doctors,  some  of  them  from  neutral  coun- 
tries, signing  this  statement  showing  that  they  were  shot  either  in  the 


1958  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

fall  of  1939  or  the  cold  months  of  1940,  up  to  May  1,  indicated  that 
at  that  time  Russia  was  in  complete  control  of  that  part  of  her  terri- 
tory on  which  the  graves  were  found.  So  that  it  made  it  almost 
physically  impossible  for  the  Germans  to  have  committed  the  crime. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  If  you  fix  the  time  of  that  crime,  you  fix  the 
responsibility.    I  fully  agree. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  That  was  the  opinion  of  this  committee. 

Mr.  Justice  Jacksox.  But  the  difficulty,  from  our  point  of  view, 
about  that,  was  that  all  that  we  had  by  which  to  fix  the  time  was  the 
opinion  of  doctors,  based  on  the  condition  of  the  bodies. 

While  I  do  not  want  to  say  anything  disrespectful  of  a  brother 
profession,  God  save  the  man  who  has  to  prove  his  case  by  expert  testi- 
mony, because  it  is  a  terrible  proposition. 

The  Russians  had  their  doctors,  too,  and  they  called  one  of  the 
Gei'man  doctors  who  testified. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  Was  there  anything  submitted,  Mr.  Justice,  in  the 
Nuremberg  trial  as  to  mute  evidence  found  on  the  bodies  of  these  men  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  Except  as  is  found  in  these  reports. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  There  were  presented  to  this  connnittee  post  cards, 
letters,  and  other  documents  found  in  the  ]X)ckets  of  these  men.  But 
none  of  them  bore  a  date  later  than  May  1, 191:0. 

JNIr.  Justice  Jackson.  You  had  a  great  deal  of  evidence  that  we  did 
not  have. 

Mr.  DoNUERo.  That  you  did  not  have  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  That  is  right;  a  great  deal  of  it. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  There  is  just  one  thing  more,  and  that  is  at  the  bottom 
of  page  4 : 

The  Polish  Government  then  in  power  at  Warsaw  kept  a  delegation  at 
Nuremberg  which  cooperated  closely  with  the  Soviet  in  all  matters. 

At  that  time,  Mr.  Justice,  Warsaw  was  in  complete  control  of  the 
Russian  Government,  was  it  not? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  That  is  all  I  have,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  O'Konski. 

Mr.  O'Konski.  Mr.  Justice,  here  is  the  conclusion  of  the  conmiittee : 

The  evidence,  testimony,  records,  and  exhibits  recorded  by  this  committee 
through  its  investigations  and  hearings  during  the  last  D  months  overwhelmingly 
will  show  the  people  of  the  world  that  Russia  is  directly  reseponsible  for  the 
Katyn  massacre. 

And  here  is  the  significance : 

Throughout  our  entire  proceedings  there  has  not  been  a  scintilla  of  proof 
or  even  any  remote  circumstancial  evidence  that  could  indict  any  other  nation 
In  this  international  crime. 

How  many  staff  members  did  your  division,  or  your  office,  have  at 
the  Nuremberg  trials  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  We  had  a  very  large  number.  I  do  not  know 
just  what  you  wish  to  include  in  that.  We  had  translators  and  inter- 
preters. I  never  knew  just  what  our  staff  consisted  of  because  the 
Army  did  a  great  many  things  in  connection  with  it.  But  it  was  a 
very  large  number. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Would  that  run  into  the  thousands? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  No.  I  thiuk  that  at  its  maxinuim,  including 
translators,  people  assigned  by  the  Army  to  run  mimeograph  ma- 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  1959 

chines — we  had  to  make  copies  in  four  hmguages  of  everything  that 
was  used  in  the  tribunal — I  think  our  American  personnel  at  its 
maximum  was  about  750. 

Mr.  O'KoxsKi.  This  committee  was  made  up  of  seven  members, 
and  we  had  one  counsel  and  one  investigator.  We  came  to  this 
conclusion. 

Now,  since  the  conclusion  was  so  obvious,  is  it  not  logical  to  assume, 
then,  that  either  one  of  two  things  happened  at  Nuremberg : 

No.  1.  Your  staff  did  not  make  a  conscientious  effort  to  get  the 
evidence,  or 

No.  2.  The  evidence  which  was  available  at  that  time  was  deliber- 
ately withheld  from  your  people? 

Is  not  that  a  logical  conclusion  after  listening  to  the  conclusion 
of  this  committee? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  No;  that  is  not  a  logical  conclusion,  Mr. 
OTvonski.  You  have  used  a  great  deal  of  evidence,  if  I  rely  on  the 
newspapers,  that  we  could  not  have  introduced.  We  could  not  call 
a  witness,  for  instance,  who  was  masked  so  that  his  identity  could  not 
be  determined.     We  could  not  use  that  kind  of  testimony. 

You  may  be  entirely  satisfied  with  evidence  because  you,  no  doubt, 
know  the  man  and  know  his  history. 

But  I  use  that  merely  as  an  example  of  the  availability  of  evidence 
to  a  congressional  committee  that  we  could  not  have  used  in  court 
if  we  had  found  it.  My  staff  was  never  instructed— and  I  take  the 
full  responsibility  for  it — was  never  instructed  to  investigate  this 
atrocity,  because,  from  the  very  beginning  we  told  the  Soviets,  and 
the  Germans  well  understood  it,  that  it  was  to  be  settled  between 
them. 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Sheehan. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  ]\Ir.  Justice,  I  have  one  or  two  questions  with  refer- 
ence to  the  Nuremberg  trials  and  the  Korean  situation  as  we  know 
it  today. 

First  of  all,  on  page  6,  I  want  to  refer  to  two  sentences  in  your 
statement.     No.  1  is : 

We  did  not  learn  of  any  usable  evidence  in  American  possession. 

No.  2  is : 

I  knew  of  nothing,  at  any  time  during  the  trial,  of  Colonel  Van  Vliet,  Colonel 
•Stewart,  or  Colonel  Szymanski. 

In  talking  to  Congressman  Machrowicz  a  little  while  ago,  you  said 
that  if  you  had  some  of  that  evidence  brought  to  your  attention  at  the 
trial  you  would  not  have  permitted  the  Katyn  phase  of  it  to  be  put  on 
the  indictment ;  is  that  right  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  If  that  had  been  available  to  us  before  October 
20  or  the  18th — I  have  forgotten  whether  it  wa.s  the  18th  or  the  20th 
that  the  indictment  was  filed — we  might  very  well  have  kept  this  out 
of  the  case  entirely. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Is  that  1945,  or  1946? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  1945. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Did  anyone  from  our  State  Department  make  any 
attempt  to  give  you  a.nj  evidence  that  they  had  about  the  Katyn  situa- 
tion, any  material? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  No. 


1960  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Did  anybody  in  the  Army  Intelligence,  G-2,  make 
any  attempt  at  any  time  to  give  you  an}^  evidence  that  the}'  had  i 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  have  recited  to  you  exactly  what  they  gave 
us,  the  date  that  they  gave  it,  and  I  liave  it  in  my  files  available  to 
your  counsel. 

Mr.  Sheehax.  Permit  me  to  be  sj^ecific.  I  mean  things  like  the 
Van  Vliet  report,  things  which  have  disappeared  that  you  could  not 
have  had. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  never  heard  of  the  Van  Vliet  report  until  I 
heard  it  was  lost. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Then  there  was  Captain  Gilder,  who  gave  a  report  to 
G-2,  who  was  a  British  ofHcer  who  went  to  Katyn  and  testified  on  this 
report  that  the  Russians  were  guilty.     Did  you  ever  get  that  report? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  never  got  that  report. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Therefore,  should  not  an  attempt  have  been  made  by 
our  American  officials  in  the  State  Department,  the  executive,  or  the 
G-2,  to  bring  to  your  attention  all  the  evidence  they  had,  such  as 
reports  from  military  attaches,  ambassadors,  and  so  forth? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  am  not  prepared  to  criticize  them. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  It  is  not  criticism;  I  just  called  it  to  your  attention. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  It  would  be  criticism  if  I  said  they  should 
liave  brought  it  to  my  attention,  and  did  not. 

You  have  to  remember  the  conditions  at  that  time.  The  Army  was 
closing  up  a  war  over  there.  I  am  not  going  to  criticize  the  other 
services. 

If  I  had  known  of  and  asked  for  something  and  they  had  withheld  it 
from  me,  then  I  should  criticize  them.  But  the  fact  that  they  did  not 
bring  something  to  my  attention  that  now  would  appear  to  have  been 
useful  to  have  had — you  see,  we  had  so  much.  We  had  over  100.000 
documents  that  my  staff  screened  out.  We  translated  over  5,000  doc- 
uments and  put  in  evidence  over  4,000  documents,  making  our 
documentary  case. 

It  is  hard  to  say  that  they  were  under  any  criticism  because  they 
did  not  produce  it.  That  is  a  conclusion  for  the  committee  to  draw, 
and  not  for  me  to  say. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  I  might  only  remark  on  that,  Mr.  Justice,  that  if  we 
waited  for  some  of  these  documents  to  come  from  G-2  and  the  State 
Department  we  would  be  in  the  same  mess  you  fellows  were  in  in 
Nuremberg.  We  get  Avhat  we  are  looking  for  specifically,  and  we 
fight  for  them. 

Now,  I  will  ask  my  other  question. 

As  you  can  well  see,  the  Nuremberg  trials  have  had  an  effect  on  this 
Katyn  investigation,  and  our  committee  has  gone  on  record  rather 
informally  that  the  Congress  should  do  something  about  the  Korean 
pro})lem,  because  we  have  found  our  American  soldiers  murdered  in 
much  the  same  manner  as  tlie  Polish  soldiers  were,  with  their  hands 
tied  behind  their  backs  and  with  a  single  bullet  hole.  Some  of  us 
have  concerned  ourselves  about  the  international  military  tribunal,  the 
l)recedent  you  men  set  up  in  London  and  Nuremberg.  So  that  some  of 
the  questions  our  committee  is  interested  in  come  from  that  particular 
angle,  and  I  would  like  to  phrase  them  to  you  in  this  way : 

No.  1,  I  want  to  ask  about  the  precedent  that  you  set  up  at  Nurem- 
berg. When  I  say  "you,''  I  mean  the  Nuremberg  trials,  the  Int.«i'- 
uatioiial  Militarv  Tribunal. 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  1961 

We  have  heard  much  in  the  hist  couple  of  months  and  several  years 
of  guilt  by  association,  and  you  have  personal  feelings  on  that,  I 
assume. 

However,  in  State  Department  Document  3080,  you  point  out — and, 
if  you  want,  I  will  read  it  to  you — that  the  purpose  of  the  Nuremberg 
trials  was  only  to  find  certain  organizations  guilty  so,  by  the  same 
token,  you  can  then  find  a  lot  of  individuals  guilty. 

Is  that  a  good  legal  and  moral  premise  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  That  is  not  the  premise  that  I  stated, 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Just  so  that  we  may  know  the  interpretation,  may  I 
read  3^our  direct  quotation  there '. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  You  can  take  thinks  out  of  context. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  No;  I  will  read  the  whole  paragraph.  All  right, 
whatever  you  like. 

This  is  document  published  by  the  State  Department,  No,  3080, 
which  was  the  stenographic  record  of  the  report  of  the  London  Con- 
ference which  set  up  the  International  Military  Tribunal.  Yon  are 
the  author  of  this  particular  document,  and  the  quotation  I  have  here, 
according  to  the  document,  is : 

I  have  never  thoii.sht  of  this  as  a  permanent  tribunal.  The  whole  American 
plan  which  was  professed  here  was  designed  to  reach  a  very  large  number  of 
people  at  a  single  trial,  or.  at  most,  perhaps  a  very  few  trials.  That  is  the 
reason  we  have  tried  to  reach  people  through  organizations.  We  have  not 
thought  of  it  as  a  trial  of  Iri  or  .30  people,  but  we  have  thought  of  it  as  a  trial 
the  result  of  which  would  affect  thousands  of  people  at  least. 

And  in  your  direct  testimony  here  you  said  you  only  heard  from  13 
oral  witnesses. 

Do  you  think  this  procedure  of  indicting  a  couple  of  organizations 
and  indicting  all  the  people  per  se  is  a  proper  legal  and  moral  thought? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  Not  if  you  put  it  that  way.  That  is  not  what 
we  did ;  that  is  not  what  we  proposed  to  do. 

I  can  explain  it  to  you  if  you  care  to  have  the  explanation. 

Mr.  Sheehan,  Yes, 

Mr,  Justice  Jackson.  Certain  organizations,  such  as  the  SS,  the 
SA,  the  Grestapo,  were  founded  for  certain  purposes.  Men  joined  those 
well  knowing  their  purposes.  We  did  not  propose  to  start  out  to 
find  each  individual  and  have  each  individual  try  the  question  of  the 
character  of  his  party. 

That  is  one  of  the  difficulties  that  is  inherent  in  the  present  situation 
in  the  United  States  in  which  in  each  individual  case  involving  Com- 
munists you  are  going  over  the  same  old  material  about  the  central 
core  of  the  party  and  its  teachings  and  what  they  mean. 

We  proposed  to  put  the  organization  on  trial  and  ascertain  its  pur- 
poses, its  character,  and  have  that  declared.  Anyone  who  showed  any 
interest  in  it  should  have  the  right  to  come  in  and  make  a  defense 
of  the  organization;  but,  once  that  had  been  found,  the  individual 
could  not  thereafter  say,  "Well,  it  is  true  I  joined  it;  I  participated, 
but  it  was  an  innocent  organization." 

But  what  he  could  say  was,  "It  is  true  I  joined  it,  but  I  had  a  gun 
at  my  back,"  or  "I  was  defrauded  into  it;  I  did  not  understand  it." 

But  the  central  core  of  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  party,  the  group 
of  the  SA  and  the  Gestapo,  we  proposed  to  dispose  of  in  one  trial. 

And  I  think  yon  will  find  that  was  explained  clearly  throughout 
those  London  proceedings. 


1962  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

Now,  those  proceedinfrs  took  place  before  we  knew  that  the  Control 
Council  was  going  to  set  up  a  denazification  policy,  which  I  had 
nothing  to  do  with.  If  we  had  known  that,  we  would  not  have 
bothered  probably  with  the  organizations,  because  the  denazification 
program  went  considerable  farther,  on  paper,  at  least,  than  any  pro- 
posal that  we  made. 

But  the  proposal  was  to  try,  first,  the  general  purposes,  plan,  teach- 
ings, and  criminality  of  the  organization  as  such,  and  then  to  allow 
any  individual  to  be  heard  as  to  why  he  participated  in  it. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Thank  you. 

That  straightens  that  out,  because  it  concerned  me  that  you  were 
going  to  affect  thousands  of  people  by  trying  the  organization. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  It  is  very  confusing.  Discussions  among 
four  men  with  different  legal  systems  is  very  confusing. 

Mr.  SiiEEHAN.  I  am  only  reading  from  the  record,  and  we  like 
to  straighten  this  out  because  our  committee  is  concerned  about  the 
Nuremburg  phase. 

Another  thing  that  concerns  us  and  which  you  probably  will  be  able 
to  straighten  out  is  this :  You  stated  in  these  London  hearings,  in  Docu- 
ment 3080,  that  you  expressed  grave  doubts  about  the  trial  procedure, 
and  you  went  on  to  make  it  clear  that  the  proposals  were  to  be  con- 
tained, setting  up  the  trial,  in  an  executive  agreement  by  the  Presi- 
dent as  Commander  in  Chief. 

Otherwise,  you  stated,  the  delays  would  occur  because  the  agree- 
ment would  then  have  to  be  ratified  by  the  United  States  Senate. 

My  question  is :  This  idea  of  bypassing  the  Senate  to  get  a  commit- 
ment on  foreign  agreements,  was  that  set  up  to  you  as  a  matter  of 
policy  that  you  had  to  follow,  or  was  this  your  idea  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  How  do  you  mean  "set  up  to"  me  ? 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Set  up  by  executive  agreement,  the  Nuremberg  trial. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  Certainly.  That  was  the  policy  of  the  United 
States,  to  w^ork  this  out  by  executive  agreement. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  And  not  to  give  in  at  all  to  the  United  States  Senate  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  The  resolution  that  Congress  had  had — I  do 
not  recall  what  became  of  it — went  farther  than  anything  we  proposed. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  These  are  just  personal  questions. 

Let  me  put  it  this  way :  Do  you  think  that  this  idea  of  working  out 
all  these  things  by  executive  agreements  and  bypassing  the  Congress 
and  the  Senate  are  good  for  the  country  in  the  long  run  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  In  view  of  the  cases  that  come  before  our 
courts  sometimes,  I  think  I  would  rather  not  express  an  opinion  on 
the  general  policy  of  matters  of  that  kind.  It  depends  very  much  on 
what  it  is. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  All  right.     I  respect  your  opinion. 

The  reason  why  I  bring  that  up  is  because  of  this  fact:  We  have 
recently  been  apprised  that  a  certain  Chinese  lurist  who  served  on 
the  International  Militarv  Tribunal  in  tlie  Far  East  crimes  has 
brouglit  up  something.  His  name  is  Mei  Ju-so.  He  is  accusing  the 
United  States  now  of  military  crimes,  germ  warfare,  et  cetera,  against 
the  Koreans  and  the  Chinese.  He  has  ])roposed  publicly  someday 
to  bring  us  to  trial,  if  they  are  ever  victorious,  for  these  crimes. 

Now,  in  view  of  the  precedent  that  we  have  set  up  in  the  Nurem- 
berg trials,  after  every  war  may  not  there  be  these  wholesale  trials 
of  both  civilian  and  military  personnel? 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  1963 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  have  answered  that  several  times  in  this 
way,  Mr.  Sheehan:  What  is  new  about  the  Nuremberg  trials  is  not 
that  the  conquered  is  executed  by  the  victor.  What  is  new  about  the 
Nuremberg  trials  is  that  he  gets  a  trial  before  he  is  punished. 

And,  a  I  am  ever  captured  by  tlie  Soviets,  I  will  thank  God  if  I 
get  as  fair  a  trial  as  we  gave  the  Germans  at  Nuremberg.  I  do  not 
expect  it,  and  I  beg  for  it,  because  the  tribunal  acquitted  a  great  many 
of  the  people  that  we  thought,  on  the  face  of  what  information  we  had, 
were  guilty. 

But  many  of  them  were  acquitted  on  some  of  the  charges,  and  some 
of  them  were  acquitted  on  all  of  the  charges. 

I.  have  never  heard  even  the  Germans,  even  Lord  Malmesbury, 
criticize  us  for  having  trials.  He  said  these  trials  were  fair,  and  that  is 
what  I  would  not  expect  if  I  got  captured  by  the  other  side. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  I  am  quite  willing  to  agree  with  you. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  do  not  think  we  would  wait  for  that. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  There  is  one  other  thought  I  would  like  to  have  you 
dwell  on,  if  you  will,  and  I  think  that  perhaps  I  ought  to  read  your 
quotation  from  the  report.    This  is  your  statement : 

Now,  it  may  be  that  we  were  mistaken  in  our  attitude  and  philosophy  and 
that  what  Germany  has  done  is  right  and  legal,  but  I  am  not  here  to  confess 
the  error,  nor  to  confess  that  the  United  States  was  wrong  in  regarding  this  as 
an  illegal  war  from  the  beginning  and  in  believing  that  the  great  crime  of 
crimes  in  our  generation  was  the  launching  of  a  needless  war  in  Europe. 

In  other  words,  from  the  document,  apparently  there  was  some 
question  as  to  whether  or  not  you  were  right. 

In  view  of  the  situation  as  we  see  it  in  Korea,  and  in  view  of  the 
results  of  the  Nuremburg  trials,  would  you  care  to  make  any  com- 
ment as  to  whether  or  not  you  think  that,  as  of  now,  the  Nuremberg 
trials  served  a  useful  purpose  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  Of  course,  I  am  not  entirely  a  disinterested 
witness  on  that,  you  understand. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  I  realize  that. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  think  they  did.  I  think  that,  had  it  not 
been  for  the  trials,  you  never  could  have  had  the  collection  of  docu- 
ments which  exhibit  the  origin  of  that  war  as  they  do  now. 

These  men  in  the  dock  had  a  chance  to  deny  these  documents  and, 
as  the  tribunal  pointed  out,  there  Avere  almost  none  of  them  denied. 

Then,  too,  we  showed — and  I  think  it  is  important  to  the  future  of 
international  law — that  the  lawyers  representing  four  different  sys- 
tems of  law  can  find  common  ground  for  settling  a  controversy  by 
judicial  process  instead  of  resorting  to  war. 

I  think  that  maybe  in  the  long  run  the  best  thing  that  was  accom- 
plished is  that,  because  heretofore  it  has  always  been  thouglit  that 
you  could  not  do  that  kind  of  thing. 

Then,  too,  there  is  a  store  of  documents  that  if  they  were  properly 
used,  in  my  opinion — and  it  is  my  opinion  you  are  asking  for — if  they 
were  properly  used,  would  very  greatly  strengthen  the  position  of 
democracy  in  Germany.  I  think  they  have  never  been  properly  used, 
brought  to  the  attention  of  the  German  people. 

I  will  give  you  one  example  only,  because  I  do  not  suppose  you  want 
to  spend  all  day  on  this. 

Mr.  Speer,  who  was  the  Minister  of  Production,  testified  as  to  his 
conversations  with  Hitler  and  with  other  of  the  hiffh  Nazi  officials 


1964  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

after  it  was  apparent  that  we  w^ere  going  to  take  Germany.  He  tried 
to  get  them  not  to  destroy  bridges,  electric-light  plants,  and  other 
things,  pointing  out  that  the  German  people  would  be  the  ones  who 
would  suffer  if  those  things  were  destroyed. 

He  pointed  out  it  was  the  German  people  who  had  to  live  there; 
the  rest  of  us  did  not.  And  Hitler's  remarks  about  the  German  people, 
that  they  were  undeserving,  I  think  is  one  of  the  most  important  assets 
the  United  States  and  the  other  powers  have  for  a  free  Gernumy 
against  the  rising  nazism,  if  it  had  been  exploited. 

Those  things  are  at  least  available. 

Then  I  think  we  established  the  principle  that  aggressive  war  is  a 
crime,  and  I  am  for  that  principle.  I  do  not  care  whether  the  aggres- 
sion comes  from  our  side  or  the  other.  We  cannot  have  a  rule  of  inter- 
national law  that  applies  only  one  way. 

I  feel  that  a  great  deal  was  accomplished.  But,  as  I  say,  I  am  an 
interested  witness,  and  there  are  those  of  distinction  and  ability  who 
disagree  with  me. 

Mr.  SnEEHAisr.  Could  you  enlarge  on  the  term  "aggressive  warfare"  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  By  "aggressive  warfare"  as  defined  to  the 
tribunal,  we  could  not  get  the  Eussians  to  agree  on  a  definition  of  it. 
In  the  document  which  you  have  been  quoting,  you  will  find  we  spent 
a  good  deal  of  time.  We  endeavored  to  adopt  their  definition  as  con- 
tained in  the  Baltic  treaties.  But  they  did  not  want  to  adopt  their 
ow^n  definition. 

It  was  not  very  important  to  us  for  the  particular  purposes  of 
Nuremberg,  because,  in  view  of  the  documents  that  we  had,  Hitler's 
instructions  to  his  generals,  and  his  conversations  and  speeches  to 
them  in  what  he  thought  were  private  gatherings,  his  conduct  was 
aggressive  by  anybody's  definition. 

So,  it  did  not  become  very  important  to  us. 

But  we  have  never  been  able  to  agree  on  a  definition  of  what  con- 
stitutes aggression. 

Mr.  SiiEpniAN.  JNIy  reason  for  asking  that  question,  Mr.  Justice,  is 
that  it  seems  to  me  that  North  Korea,  in  view  of  the  present  situation 
in  Korea,  certainly  \jy  any  standards  would  be  judged  an  aggressor, 
and,  I  think,  China,  with  all  tlie  assistance  and  everything  she  has 
been  giving  to  North  Korea,  there  is  the  possibility  of  their  being 
judged  aggressors. 

Also  the  Ivussians,  with  their  help  in  ai-ms  and  anununition  and  now 
soldiers,  tliey  might  be  so  judged. 

Hut  no  nation  has  called  anybody  an  aggressor  except  the  North 
Koreans.  Yet  we,  by  the  terms  of  the  j)hilosophy  that  you  are  ex- 
])ounding,  certainly  would  classify  them  as  aggressors,  and  yet  we 
take  no  action  to  brand  them  to  the  world  as  aggressors. 

You  may  or  may  not  want  to  conuuont  on  that. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  T  think  I  would  ratlier  not  couunent  on  that. 

Mr.  SiiKKHAN.  That  is  all  I  liave,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chaijiuan  AfAnnKN.  ]\Ir.  O'Konski. 

Mr.  OlvoNSKi.  Would  you  consider  the  Russian  unprovoked  attack 
upon  Finland  in  1939  as  an  aggression,  Mr.  Justice  Jackson'^ 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  w^ould  ratlier  not  pass  judgment  on  that, 
because  I  have  never  examined  the  documents,  as  1  have  in  this  case. 
If  you  asked  mo  my  offliand  impression  from  what  I  read  in  the  news- 
pa])ers,  my  answer  would  be  the  same  as  yours.    If  you  ask  ni}'  opinion 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1965 

as  one  who  feels  some  responsibility  for  his  opinions  on  legal  subjects, 
I  would  say  that  I  have  not  adequate  information. 

Mr,  O'KoNSKi.  The  same  thine;  would  apply  in  the  case  where 
Kussia  took  over  Latvia,  Lithuania,  and  Estonia  before  1040,  and  the 
same  thing;  would  probably  apply  to  the  manner  in  which  Kussia  took 
over  half  of  Poland  in  league  witli  Hitler  in  September  of  Idod. 

That  may  be  neither  here  nor  there,  because  under  the  regulations 
and  under  the  manner  in  which  your  high  tribunal  was  established — 
by  "your,"  I  mean  the  combined  efforts  of  the  four  major  powers — 
you  do  not  bring  the  charge,  and  I  notice  the  United  States  was 
allocated  the  over-all  responsibility  on  conspiracy  to  incite  and  wage 
a  war  of  aggression.  Tliaf  was  the  American  responsibility  at  the 
Nuremberg  trials. 

Under  the  procedure,  there  was  no  way  in  which  the  LTnited  States 
of  America,  in  meeting  its  responsibilities  of  this  allocation  of  power, 
could  have  brought  the  charge  against  Russia,  of  aggression  against 
Finland,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Estonia,  and  Poland.  There  was  no  way 
in  which  it  could  be  done  at  Nuremberg,  was  there? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  That  is  true.  But  you  will  find,  with  reference 
to  Latvia,  Estonia,  and  the  Baltic  States,  that  we  refused  to  accede 
to  their  description  of  them  in  the  indictment.  We  had  a  consid- 
erable rumpus  about  it  because,  from  their  description,  the  inference 
was  possible  that  they  were  a  part  of  Soviet  territory,  as  I  guess  they 
are  now,  in  fact. 

And  we  refused  to  accept  that.  And  we  came  near  not  being  able 
to  file  an  indictment  because  of  our  disagreement  about  it. 

Finally,  in  order  to  get  on  with  the  business,  I  let  them  file  the 
indictment,  and  I  filed  with  it  a  statement  that  nothing  in  that  indict- 
ment could  be  construed  as  a  recognition  of  anj^  claims  of  tlie  Soviet 
Union  in  any  of  those  states. 

So  that  there  could  never  be  a  claim  made  that  we  had  in  any  way 
recogniz'^d  the  validity  of  Russian  action  in  those  states. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  In  the  same  manner,  Mr.  Justice,  even  if  the  various 
agencies  of  the  Government  had  given  you  all  this  evidence  which 
was  available,  that  the  Communists  were  responsible  for  the  Katyn 
murders,  still  you  could  not  do  anything  about  it  even  if  you  had 
that  evidence;  is  not  that  corrects  You  could  not  do  anything  about 
it,  under  the  procedure  of  the  trial  ? 

Mr.  Justice  J.\cksox.  We  could  not  have  proceeded  against  them. 

What  we  could  have  done  would  be  that  with  that  strengthening 
our  hand,  we  could  have  insisted  that  it  not  be  brought  in  at  all.  But 
you  would  be  in  the  same  place  you  are  today;  you  would  not  have  it 
settled. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Then  I  would  like  to  have  your  comment  on  this, 
Mr.  Justice :  If  a  nation  has  committed  vast  crimes  against  humanity 
or  has  committed  vast  acts  of  aggression,  be  sure  to  get  on  the  winning 
side  of  the  war,  get  a  seat  on  the  high  tribunal,  and  you  can  never  be 
prosecuted  for  the  crimes  that  you  have  committed. 

In  other  words,  suppose,  in  the  closing  days  of  the  Korean  war, 
Russia  should  reverse  itself  and  join  us  as  an  ally  and  then  sit  at  the 
table  of  the  high  tribunal.  As  long  as  they  are  on  the  winning  side, 
as  long  as  they  get  a  seat  on  the  high  tribunal,  there  is  no  way  in  which 
they  could  ever  be  prosecuted  for  their  acts,  crimes  against  humanity, 
or  acts  of  aggression ;  is  not  that  right  ? 

93744— 52— pt.  7 10 


1966  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  do  not  know  how  you  could  ever  prosecute 
a  prisoner  that  you  cannot  capture.  Even  in  our  own  domestic  society 
you  first  have  to  get  physical  power  over  him  before  you  can  do 
anything  to  him. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  The  thing  that  worries  me,  Mr.  Justice,  is  that,  the 
way  the  tribunal  was  set  up  a  nation  can  go  on.  From  our  investiga- 
tion there  is  no  difference  between  Hitler  and  Stalin.  I  think  that 
your  tribunal  did  a  very  good  job  in  hanging  the  Germans  who  were 
responsible  for  these  acts  against  humanity. 

But  in  our  investigation  all  the  way  through,  we  found  out  that  the 
acts  of  genocide  by  the  Communists  are  just  as  vicious  as  the  acts  of 
genocide  used  by  Hitler.  They  are  of  the  same  pattern,  cut  out  of 
the  same  cloth. 

It  seems  to  me  that,  according  to  the  way  the  tribunal  was  set  up, 
Russia  is  going  to  be  able  to  get  by  with  its  program  of  genocide  and 
never  get  to  trial,  because  they  have  maneuvered  themselves  into  the 
position  of  being  on  the  winning  side  and  get  a  seat  as  a  judge. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  will  make  a  bargain  with  you,  Mr.  Congress- 
man.   If  you  will  capture  Stalin,  I  will  try  him. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  I  will  ask  for  that  job  myself  to  be  sure  he  hangs.  I 
wouldn't  trust  another  Nuremberg  trial. 

Chairman  Madden,  Mr.  Machrowicz. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Mr.  Justice,  apparently  there  has  been  some  con- 
fusion as  to  the  position  of  the  London  government  at  the  time  of 
these  hearings.  So  there  may  be  no  misunderstanding,  I  would  like 
to  read  from  the  last  paragraph  of  the  letter  you  presented  us,  the  let- 
ter from  the  parliamentary  group  to  you  dated  February  15,  1946. 
That  letter  points  to  the  fact  that  there  is  strong  indication  of  Russian 
guilt,  and  they  state  as  follows : 

These  circumstances  show  that  the  fate  of  the  Polish  officers  in  the  Russian 
POW  camps  has  not  yet  been  fully  elucidated. 

The  crime  perpetrated  upon  them  at  Katyn,  contrary  to  every  feeling  oi 
humanity  and  violating  international  law  and  custom,  does  not  only  concern  tlic 
families  of  the  victims.  The  entire  Polish  Nation  is  entitled  to  demand  that 
this  tragedy  be  cleared  up. 

In  view  of  these  facts  and  circumstances,  the  undersigned  would  like  to  express 
the  opinion  that  it  would  be  ill-advised  to  include  the  Katyn  case  in  the  tasks  ol 
the  Nuremberg  Tribunal.  This  case  is  of  a  special  character  and  needs,  in  ordei 
to  be  fully  elucidated,  to  be  examined  apart  and  treated  indeiiendently  by  an 
international  judicial  body. 

Would  you  not  say  that  their  position  was  that  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  there  is  a  strong  indication  of  Russian  guilt  and  in  view  of  tlie 
fact  that  the  tribunal,  as  constituted  at  Nuremberg,  could  not  possibly 
find  Russian  guilt;  that  they  did  not  consider  that  the  proper  tribunal 
to  try  the  case  ?    Is  that  a  fair  statement  of  their  position  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  That  is  a  fair  statement  of  their  position,  and 
that  is  what  I  understood  their  position  to  be,  and  I  agreed  with  that. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  That  is  all,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Madden.  Do  any  other  members  of  the  committee  have 
any  questions  ? 

Mr.  Sheehan.  I  have  one  or  two  questions,  Mr.  Chairman. 

I  just  want  to  get  this  on  the  record  for  our  purposes,  Mr.  Justice. 

When  you  and  I  were  talking,  you  referred  to  that  Soviet  agreement 
in  193;i,  where  they  did  agree  with  certain  Baltic  States  about  the 
definition  of  crimes  of  aggression. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    ]VL\SSACRE  1967 

I  think,  for  the  purpose  of  our  members  here,  I  would  like  to  read 
the  four  things  they  did  agree  to  as  being  crimes  of  aggression  in  this 
]  933  agreement : 

1.  Declaration  of  war  upon  another  state. 

2.  Invasion  by  its  armed  forces  with  or  without  a  declaration  of  war  of  the 
territory  of  another  state. 

3.  Attack  by  its  land,  naval,  or  air  forces  with  or  without  a  declaration  of  war 
on  the  territory,  vessels,  or  aircraft  of  another  state. 

4.  Provision  of  support  to  armed  bands  formed  in  the  territory  of  another 
state,  or  refusal,  notwithstanding  the  request  of  the  invaded  state,  to  take  in 
its  own  territory  all  the  measures  in  its  power  to  deprive  those  bands  of  all 
assistance  or  protection. 

That  was  the  agreement  that  Russia  signed  in  1933  at  a  convention 
for  the  definition  of  aggression  signed  at  London  by  Rumania,  Estonia, 
Latvia,  Poland,  Turkey,  the  Soviet  Union,  Persia,  and  Afghanistan. 

I  merely  relate  that  to  the  committee  because,  judging  from  the 
conduct  of  Russia  during  the  last  10  years,  she  has  been  guilty  of  every 
single  one  of  the  acts  of  aggression,  by  her  own  definition. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  That  is  the  definition  I  tried  to  get  adopted, 
because,  logically,  if  you  were  prosecuting  persons  for  aggression,  it 
would  be  well  to  include  a  definition. 

But,  as  I  say,  for  our  purposes,  the  failure  to  have  a  definition  of 
aggression  was  not  serious  because,  under  any  definition  of  aggression, 
Hitler's  acts  would  come  within  it. 

But  they  refused  to  accept  as  general  the  definition  which  they  had 
applied  in  these  particular  treaties. 

Mr.  SHEEHAiSr.  As  a  matter  of  information,  for  our  committee,  Mr. 
Justice — and  in  this  I  understand  in  your  position  on  the  Supreme 
Court  you  may  not  want  to  talk  to  us  except  in  an  executive  session — 
but  we  were  thinking  actually  of  what  we  could  do  to  bring  this  to 
the  attention  of  the  world  in  the  sense  that,  from  the  definitions  as  we 
know  them  at  Nuremberg,  and  from  the  regular  practices  of  law,  if, 
on  the  basis  of  the  findings  of  Katyn,  if  we  could  not  still  indict 
Russia  for  aggression  on  the  basis  of  the  knowledge  we  have? 

Of  course,  as  you  say,  we  did  not  have  the  prisoner.  It  is  a  question 
of  world  opinion. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  gathered  from  joixr  interim  report  that  you 
had  done  that.    The  difficulty  is  that  you  do  not  have  the  prisoner. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  In  your  opinion,  Mr.  Justice,  do  you  think  it  was  a 
worth-while  gesture,  or  not  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  think  that  the  exploration  of  this  subject  is  a 
thoroughly  wholesome  thing.  That  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  1  co- 
operated with  your  counsel,  or  tried  to,  and  why  I  say  that  my  files  are 
open.    I  am  ready  to  give  any  help  that  I  can  in  it. 

Mr,  Sheehan.  Mr.  Justice,  I  have  one  more  question. 

This,  as  I  understand  it,  was  turned  in  to  the  War  Crimes  Com- 
mission at  Nuremberg,  and  I  was  just  wondering,  from  your  stand- 
point, do  you  have  any  idea  of  when  this  was  turned  over,  the  approxi- 
mate date  ? 

I  may  first  preface  it  with  this  remark :  As  I  remember  it,  the  origi- 
nal indictment  of  the  Katyn  massacre,  which  the  Russians  put  in  the 
indictment,  was  the  fact  that  the  men  were  killed  in  September  of 
1941,  and  it  would  seem  to  us  that  this  document  I  have  here  Avould 
more  or  less  prove  or  lend  a  reasonable  doubt  as  to  the  time. 


1968  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

So  if  tliis  document  had  been  aA-ailnlile  to  you  before  the  indictment, 
or  to  your  staif,  it  certainly  shouhi  have  stopped  the  Russians  from 
})uttin<>;  in  a  specific  date  in  the  indictment. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  do  not  know  what  the  indictment  is,  so  I 
cannot  say  when  it  was  received. 

And  I  do  not  know  I  can  do  that  by  looking  at  it,  because  we  had 
a  collection  of  over  100,000  documents  and  I  did  not  see  them  all. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  For  the  record,  I  believe  this  document  w^as  sent 
by  General  Bissell  when  he  was  military  attache  at  London,  which 
was  after  1946  and  after  the  indictment.  I  do  not  know  whether  it 
reached  the  Nuremberg  trials.     It  was  returned. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  It  has  the  date  on  it,  the  4th  of  August  194U. 
I  do  not  know  Avhat  that  means. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  I  think  I  can  help  you  on  that. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  This  is  a  receipt  by  General  Telford  Taylor, 
who  was  my  successor,  and  he  was  not  appointed  brigadier  general 
until  he  was  named  as  my  successor. 

This  was  not  only  after  the  indictment,  but  was  after  the  interna- 
tional trial  was  practically  completed. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  I  think,  in  answer  to  that,  Mr.  Justice,  you  also, 
wrote  a  letter  after  the  trials  to  General  Anders  saying  that  you  got 
that,  but  it  came  too  late.  And  even  if  that  was  not  the  case,  there 
was  not  anything  that  could  be  done  about  it  because  of  the  set-up 
of  the  tribunal.  It  was  not  your  responsibility  to  charge  crimes 
against  humanity.     That  was  a  Kussian  responsibility. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  remember  writing  to  General  Anders  when 
he  sent  me  his  book.     So  whatever  you  say  is  doubtless  correct. 

Cliairman  Madden.  Do  any  members  of  the  committee  have  further 
questions  ? 

Does  counsel  have  any  questions  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  No  further  questions. 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Justice,  speaking  on  behalf  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  committee,  we  wish  to  thaidi  you  for  coming  here  today 
and  giving  us  your  testimony. 

As  I  stated  before,  when  tlie  resohition  was  befoi'e  the  Congress, 
a  number  of  Members  of  Congress  incjuired  regarding  the  Nuremberg 
trials.  Your  testimony  has  been  very  enlightening  and  valuable  from 
the  standpoint  of  what  this  committee  will  submit  to  the  Congress  on 
this  i^hase  of  the  hearings. 

I  might  ask  your  opinion  regarding  the  matter.  If  you  care  to 
preS'ent  it,  we  will  be  glad  to  receive  it. 

Our  connnittee,  especially  when  we  were  in  Europe,  ])ublicized  the 
testimony  of  the  witnesses.  There  was  testimony  brought  out  by  o"2 
witnessses  at  Fi'nnkfurt  and  also  exliibits  were  introduced  nunibei"ing 
into  ()\('i'  a  Inindred. 

This  testimony  was  daily  chronicled,  ])rinted,  aiul  sent  out  over  all 
the  free  countries  of  Europe,  by  the  daily  newspapers  and  the  radio. 
It  was  conveyed  to  the  people  over  there  every  day.  Not  only  was  it 
presented  to  the  free  countries,  but  througli  Ridio  Free  Euroj^e  and 
jilso  the  Voice  of  America,  it  was  carried  behind  the  iron  curtain. 

Just  as  an  exani])le  of  wliat  I  am  ))r()|>osiiig  to  ask,  I  might  say  this: 
Two  members  of  tlie  counnittee  visited  Berlin.  'Jliere  was  a  conven- 
tion of  tlie  free  jouiMialists  of  both   Fastt'ni  and  Westei'U  Europe  in 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1969 

Berlin  at  the  time.  Some  of  these  journalists  had  escaped  from  behind 
the  iron  curtain. 

The  comment  of  some  of  these  journalists  was  that  the  facts  that 
were  revealed  by  our  committee  while  in  Frankfurt  brought  to  the 
minds  of  millions  of  people  in  Europe,  both  ontside  and  behind  the 
iron  curtain,  a  picture  of  the  false  propaganda  which  the  Russians 
had  been  circulating  regarding  the  guilt  for  the  Katyn  massacre. 
This  testimony  completely  refuted  all  this  propaganda  that  the  Com- 
munists had  been  circulating. 

One  journalist  there  in  Europe  had  a  reproduction  of  a  broadcast 
that  went  over  the  Warsaw  radio  a  few  nights  before.  This  broadcast 
tried  to  explain  to  the  hundreds  of  people  that  had  requested  the  reason 
why  the  Russian  Government  did  not  answer  our  invitation  to  appear 
before  our  conmiittee  to  give  testimony  on  the  Katyn  massacre. 

Testimony  came  to  the  committee  that  the  bodies  that  were  found  at 
Katyn  were  just  a  fraction  of  the  massacres,  barbarities,  and  genocide 
that  the  Soviets  had  been  inflicting  on  other  captured  countries. 

By  bringing  out  this  testimony  to  the  attention  of  the  people  in 
Europe  behind  the  iron  curtain  and  also  to  the  world  generally,  I  think 
our  committee  has  contributed  a  great  deal  to  world  public  opinion 
that  something  should  and  must  be  done  by  the  free  nations  about 
international  criminals. 

And,  of  course,  the  enslaved  people  behind  the  iron  curtain  are 
crying  for  some  kind  of  termination  to  the  atrocities  and  the  genocide 
that  is  going  on  today. 

The  members  of  our  committee  are  going  to  follow  through  in  the 
next  Congress  in  trying  to  persuade  the  United  Nations  to  take  steps 
to  terminate  these  atrocities,  massacres,  and  barbarities  that  the  Com- 
munist government  today  is  committing. 

Mr.  Justice,  from  your  experience  in  the  Nuremberg  trials  and  as  a 
public  official,  would  you  have  any  suggestions  or  any  comment  you 
would  like  to  make  to  this  committee  as  to  what  could  he  done  in  addi- 
tion to  what  is  already  being  done  to  try  and  create  a  world  public 
opinion  to  see  if  something  could  not  be  done  to  slow  down  the  genocide 
and  the  atrocities  that  are  being  committed  ? 

I  might  say  that  since  the  work  of  this  committee  started,  we  have 
not  heard  much  about  atrocities  in  Korea.  I  think  the  work  of  this 
committee  has  already  slowed  up  the  Communists  on  some  of  the 
wholesale  slaughters  that  had  been  going  on  in  Korea. 

Do  3^ou  have  anything  you  would  like  to  state  in  the  way  of  comment, 
Mr.  Justice,  for  the  information  of  the  committee,  in  that  regard? 

INIr.  Justice  jACKSOisr.  I  think  in  that  respect  that  your  effort  is 
very  similar  to  the  purpose  that  we  sought  to  accomplish  at  Nurem- 
berg: To  pin  responsibility  where  responsibility  belongs,  to  make 
known  to  the  public  these  atrocities,  to  bring  about  a  state  of  public 
opinion  in  which  war  will  not  be  the  way  to  settle  controversies. 

I  see  nothing  inconsistent  there.  I  think  you  are  working  along 
very  much  the  same  ultimate  lines  that  we  were.  But  you  have  a 
particular  incident  on  which  you  can  focus  the  light,  whereas  we 
were  dealing  with  a  more  confused  and  larger  situation  growing  out 
of  the  whole  war. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  have  a  statement,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Madden.  Very  well. 


1970  THE    KATYN    FOREST    JVIASSACRE 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Justice,  you  referred  to  the  masked  man  who 
appeared  before  tliis  committee.  I  think  I  will  now  have  to  reveal 
what  the  committee  instructed  me  to  do  on  that.  That  masked  man 
is  available  today  in  the  United  States.  That  masked  man,  if  this 
case  ever  goes  beifore  the  International  World  Court,  will,  I  am  sure, 
stand  before  that  World  Court  and  testify. 

We  are  not  an  official  court.  Consequently,  the  masked  man  testi- 
fied in  that  fashion.  He  has  a  family ;  he  is  disfigured  .  That  was  no 
publicity  stunt,  or  anything  of  that  kind. 

But  I  w^ant  the  record  to  clearly  show  that  that  individual,  who 
was  the  only  eyewitness  of  this  massacre,  is  available,  and  even  if  the 
Soviets  would  like  to  join  in  the  World  Court  at  that  time,  I  am 
sure  that  he  can  be  induced  to  talk  to  the  world. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  do  not  want  you  to  take  my  observations 
as  any  reflection  on  your  work,  because  I  was  answering  a  question 
as  to  why  we  could  not  do  these  things,  and  it  is  quite  plain  that  you 
can  take  a  gi"eat  deal  of  evidence  that  we  could  not. 

Mr.  INIiTCHELL.  This  committee  has  traveled  all  over  the  world  to 
get  that  evidence.  It  is  officially  documented.  This  committee  will 
stand  on  that  evidence  before  any  international  tribunal,  and  I  am 
sure  tlie  case  will  stand  up. 

That  is  a  personal  opinion. 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Sheehan,  do  you  have  any  further  ques- 
tions ? 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Along  the  lines  that  the  chairman  brought  out,  as 
to  your  opinion  on  the  fact  that  we  are  trying  to  form  or  develop 
world  opinion,  I  would  like  to  ask  you  this  question,  and  as  a  legal 
opinion,  not  a  political  opinion,  if  you  may  want  to  answer  it: 

Under  the  present  set-up  of  the  World  Court  of  the  United  Nations, 
does  the  world  have  any  legal  means  of  trying  Russia  for  the  atrocities 
which  we  assume  or  allege  she  is  guilty  of  today?  Is  there  any  way 
that  we  could  do  it  legally  ? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  think  that  is  a  question  on  which  I  had 
better  not  express  an  offhand  opinion. 

Mr.  SiiEEHAN.  The  thouglit  is,  Mr.  Justice,  that,  under  the  princi- 
ples laid  down  at  Nuremberg,  of  trying  to  prevent  aggression,  and  as 
the  precedent  is  set  up,  will  we  have  to  wait  until  after,  say,  peace 
is  declared  in  the  world  to  try  the  Communist  nations  in  Korea,  and 
can  the  Nuremberg  trials  be  used  as  a  precedent? 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  You  have  to  bear  in  mind  that  Nuremberg 
was  not  something  that  we  thought  out  as  a  matter  of  theory.  We 
were  confronted  with  certain  facts.  We  had  as  prisoners  German 
Goering,  Ribbenti-o]),  aud  all  of  these  men.  They  had  been  accused 
of  the  worst  tilings  iniagina})le. 

Tliere  Avere  tliree  tilings  we  could  do  with  them,  one,  we  could  just 
let  them  go.  And  if  you  will  remembei-  the  tenii)o  of  those  times,  you 
know  that  that  would  have  been  impossible. 

Another  thing  we  could  do  would  be  to  just  execute  them  or  other- 
wise punish  them,  without  trial.  That  always  would  go  against  the 
conscience  of  the  American  people,  in  my  opinion. 

The  only  thing  left  to  do  was  to  give  them  a  trial. 

So  that  the  Nuremberg  trial  grew  out  of  the  fact  that  you  had  the 
prisoners,  you  had  the  charges,  and,  fortunately,  we  captured  the 
evidence. 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  1971 

I  do  not  know,  to  be  perfectly  candid  with  you  how  we  ever  would 
liave  come  out  if  we  had  had  to  use  oral  testimony,  because  it  is  so  vul- 
lu'iable  to  attack.  The  great  thing  that  saved  the  Nuremberg  trial 
was  the  capture  of  innumerable  incriminating,  authentic  documents. 

If  you  do  not  have  those  things,  you  are  going  to  be  greatly  handi- 
capped in  any  international  trial,  in  my  experience. 

Chairman  Madden.  Are  there  any  further  questions  ? 

Mr.  Justice,  we  are  indeed  very  grateful  to  you  for  coming  here  and 
testifying.    Your  testimony  is  very  valuable. 

Mr.  Justice  Jackson.  I  shall  be  glad  to  be  of  any  help  that  I  can. 

Chairman  Madden.  Because  your  prepared  statement  has  many 
footnotes  for  references  which  you  did  not  mention  when  you  were 
reading  the  statement  for  the  committee,  we  will  accept  your  entire 
statement  at  this  point  as  exhibit  6.  The  photostatic  copies  of  corre- 
spondence from  the  Polish  Government  in  exile  in  London  which  you 
mentioned  earlier  as  having  received  will  be  marked  "Exhibit  7."  The 
ommittee  will  now  recess  until  1 :  30  p.  m. 

(Thereupon,  at  12:15  p.  m.,  a  recess  was  taken  until  1:30  p,  m. 
same  day.) 

Exhibits  6  and  7  were  received  in  evidence  and  follow : 

EXHIHIT   6 

The  Katyn  Forest  Massacre  and  the  Nuunberg  International  Trial 

statement  by  Robert  H.  Jackson  before  Select  Committee  of  House  of  Represent- 
atives To  Investigate  the  Katyn  Massacre 

The  guilt  for  the  Katyn  Forest  massacre  has  not  been  adjudged  by  the  Niirn- 
berg  Tribunal  and  inquiry  into  it  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  position  taken 
by  the  United  States  prosecution  at  the  Niirnberg  international  trial  of  Goering 
and  others. 

It  was  my  responsibility  to  conduct  the  prosecution  on  behalf  of  the  United 
States.  I  am  glad  to  inform  you  in  detail  concerning  all  decisions  and  actions 
in  reference  to  tlie  Katyn  atrocity  and  the  reasons  which  conduced  to  them. 

The  first  step  that  seems  pertinent  ^  was  an  agreement  to  divide  primary  re- 
sponsibility for  preparation  and  presentation  of  the  case  among  the  prosecutors 
representing  the  four  allied  powers.  This  was  intended  to  fix  on  someone  re- 
sponsibility for  covering  each  part  of  the  case,  to  avoid  duplication,  and  to 
expedite  a  trial  of  imprecedented  complexity. 

To  the  United  States  was  allocated  the  over-all  conspiracy  to  incite  and  wage 
a  war  of  aggression.  The  British  were  assigned  the  violation  of  specific  treaties 
and  crime  on  the  high  seas.  Violations  of  the  laws  of  war  and  crimes  against 
humanity  were  divided  on  a  geographical  basis.  The  French  undertook  crimes 
in  Western  Europe,  and  the  Soviet  prosecution  was  assigned  the  duty  of  pre- 
paring and  presenting  evidence  of  crimes  in  Eastern  Europe — an  area 
largely    in    Soviet    occupation,    and    to    much    of    which    the    others    of    us 


1  Earlipr  steps  incUided  my  appointment  by  President  Truman  on  May  2,   1945.     The 
order  defined  the  duty  as  follows  : 

'.  .  .  preparing  and  prosecuting  charges  of  atrocities  and  war  crimes  against  such  of 
the  leaders  of  tlie  European  Axis  powers  and  tlieir  principal  agents  and  accessories  as  the 
United  States  may  agree  with  any  of  the  United  Nations  to  bring  to  trial  before  an 
international  military  tribunal."  Exec.  Order  No.  9547,  10  Fed.  Reg.  4961. 
Also  included  was  a  conference  of  representatives  of  the  four  nations  to  reach  prelimi- 
nary undeistandings  as  to  how,  in  view  of  tlieir  different  languages,  systems  of  hiw  and 
methods  of  trial,  they  would  proceed.  The  conf(>rence  began  in  Eonf'on,  June  23,  and 
concluded  August  8,  1945,  when  an  agreement  was  signed  by  the  United  States,  the 
United  Kingdom,  the  Soviet  Union,  and  the  KeiJublic  of  France,  subsequently  adhered  to 
by  nineteen  other  powers.  Tlie  minutes,  proceedings,  and  agreements  are  published. 
Ilnternaticnitl  Conference  on  Military  Trials,  Dept.  State  Pub.  30S0. 

I  I  sh;ill  cite  two  i>fticial  publications.  One  is  the  Nazi  Conspiracy  and  Aggression  series 
of  11  volumes  of  the  Niirnberg  international  trial  documents  in  English  (GPO).  They 
are  cited  herein  as  N.  C.  v<c  A.  The  other  is  the  official  transcript  of  the  nroceedings  and 
testimony.  International  Military  Tribunal,  Trial  of  the  Major  War  Criminals,  42  volumes 
in  English  except  the  documents,  which  are  set  forth  in  their  original  language.  They 
are  cited  as  Proceedings. 

The  indictment  is  found  I  N.  C.  &  A.  13  and  1  Proceedings  29. 


1972  THE    KATYX    FOREST    IVIASSACRE 

had  access.  The  geographical  area  thus  assigned  to  the  Soviet  representatives 
included  Katyu  Wood  and  Poland  as  well,  but  at  that  time  it  was  not  known  that 
the  Katyn  massacre  would  lie  involved. 

The  first  proposal  that  the  Niirnberg  trial  should  take  up  examination  of  the 
Katyn  massacre  came  from  the  Soviet  prosecutor  during  the  drawing  of  the 
indictment.  Preliminary  drafts  were  negotiated  in  London  at  a  series  of  con- 
ferences where  I  was  represented  Imt  not  personally  present.  At  the  last  Lou- 
don meeting,  the  Soviet  prosecutor  included  among  crimes  charged  in  the  East 
the  following :  "In  Septeml)er  1941,  925  Polish  officers  who  were  prisoners  of 
war  were  killed  in  the  Katyn  Forest  near  Smolensk."  P>oth  P>ritish  and  Ameri- 
can representatives  protested,  but  they  finally  concluded  that,  despite  their 
personal  disapproval,  if  the  Soviet  thought  they  could  prove  the  charge  they  were 
entitled  to  do  so  under  the  division  of  the  case." 

The  indictment  was  brough  to  Bei'lin  for  final  settlement  and  filing,  where  I 
objected  to  inclusion  of  the  charge  and  even  more  strongly  when,  at  the  last 
monment,  the  Soviet  delayed  its  filing  by  amending  the  Katyn  charge  to  include 
11,000  instead  of  92.j  victims.  However  it  was  in  the  Soviet  part  of  the  ca.se  and 
they  had  investigated  Katyn  ;  we  had  no  opportunity  to  do  so.  In  view  of  what 
we  know  of  the  over-all  Nazi  plan  to  exterminate  inhabitants  of  Poland,  it  did 
not  seem  unlikely  that  this  was  part  of  their  program,  and  the  Soviet  claimed 
to  have  adequate  evidence  of  Nazi  kuilt.  While  we  did  not  feel  justified  in  pre- 
venting the  issue,  we  warned  the  Soviet  delegation  tliat  we  did  not  have  evidence 
to  support  the  charge  nor  time  or  opportunity  to  investigate  it  and  that,  if  it  met 
with  denial  or  countercharges,  we  would  keep  hands  off  and  leave  the  entire  con- 
test to  the  Soviet  and  German  lawyers. 

The  reasons  for  opposing  inclusion  of  this  charge  and  refusal  to  participate 
In  its  trial  were  that  to  litigate  that  issue  would  conflict  in  several  respects  with 
what  I  considered  to  be  sound  trial  policy  for  the  first  such  case  in  history.  It 
was  not  based  upon  any  conviction  in  my  own  mind  about  the  truth  or  falsity 
of  the  charge.  I  knew  that  the  Nazis  and  the  Soviets  accused  each  other,  that 
both  were  capable  of  the  offense,  that  perhaps  both  had  opportunity  to  commit 
it,  and  that  it  was  perfectly  consistent  with  the  policy  of  each  toward  Poland. 
Whatever  the  facts  were  they  had  liecome  overlaid  with  deep  layers  of  Nazi  and 
Soviet  propaganda  and  counterpropaganda,  and  it  seemed  we  could  not  at  the 
international  trial  wisely  undertake  or  satisfactorily  achieve  the  long  task  of 
separating  truth  from  falsehood.  The  chief  reasons  in  support  of  that  conclu- 
sion are  four : 

First,  responsibility  for  the  massacre  did  not  api>ear  to  be  capable  of  docu- 
mentary proof  or  substantial  corroboration.  One  of  the  basic  decisions  on  policy 
concerning  the  Niirnberg  international  trial  was  that  we  should  accuse  only 
defendants  whose  guilt  could  be  established  and  should  charge  only  offenses 
whose  occurrence  could  be  fully  proved  or  substantially  corroborated  by  docu- 
mentary evidence  captured  from  the  Germans  themselves.  Because  this  was 
the  first  international  criminal  trial  in  history  and  was  held  in  the  wake  of  war 
when  passions  were  high,  we  did  not  want  any  judgment  that  would  rest  solely 
on  oral  testimony  of  witnesses  wliose  interest,  bias,  memory  and  trutlifulness 
would  always  be  open  to  question.  This  required  us  to  pass  over  many  tempting 
matters  because  evidence  measui'ing  up  to  this  standard  was  not  then  obtain- 
able. However,  that  policy  was  so  far  observed  that  the  Tribunal,  in  its  Judg- 
ment, said  :  "The  case,  therefore,  against  the  defendants  rests  in  a  large  measure 
in  documents  of  their  own  making,  the  authenticity  of  which  has  not  been 
challenged  except  in  one  or  two  cases."  ^ 

Second,  if  we  w(>re  ever  to  depart  from  the  policy  of  presenting  documentary 
evidence,  this  atrocity  was  not  a  suitaltle  instance  because  we  knew  of  no  wit- 
nesses who  could  supply  oral  proof  to  establish  the  identity  of  the  perpetrators 
that  would  meet  the  high  standards  of  credibility  required  in  a  criminal  trial. 
Neither  the  American  nor,  as  far  as  I  have  reason  to  believe,  the  British  prosecu- 
tors knew  of  such  witnesses. 


2  Tlioso    nogotiations   ure    iinl)lisho(l    in    Alderman    (and    othors),    Negotiating  With    the 
Kussians  (World  Peace  Foundation,  I!),')]  ),  49-98. 
'■'  N.  C.  &  A.,  Opinion  and  .liidgnieiit  3. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1973 

It  was  plaiu  that  we  could  not  get  such  evidence  from  Polish  sources.  Atti- 
tudes of  Polish  authorities  at  that  time  were  conflicting,  which  confirmed  my 
opinion  that  we  should  not  participate  in  the  trial  of  the  Nazi-Soviet  dispute. 
The  Polish  Government  then  in  power  at  Warsaw  kept  a  delegation  at  Niiruberg 
which  cooperated  closely  with  the  Soviet  in  all  matters,  including,  as  I  under- 
stood it,  accusing  the  Nazis  of  the  Katyn  murders. 

The  Polish  Government  in  Exile  in  London,  on  the  contrary,  was  accusing 
the  Soviet.  On  February  15,  1946,  eleven  Senators  and  ten  Deputies  of  the  Polish 
Parliamentary  Group  in  London  filed  with  me  a  letter  and  statement  reciting 
evidence  on  which  they  pointed  to  Russian  guilt,  concluding  with  this  statement : 

"In  view  of  these  facts  and  circumstances  the  undersigned  would  like  to 
express  the  opinion  that  it  would  be  ill-advised  to  include  the  Katyn  case  in  the 
tasks  of  the  Nuremberg  tribunal.  This  case  is  of  a  special  character,  and  needs, 
in  order  to  be  fully  elucidated,  to  be  examined  apart  and  treated  independently 
by  an  international  judicial  body."  ■* 

It  also  characterizes  the  Polish  attitude  at  that  time  that  General  Anders, 
while  believing  in  Sm'iet  guilt,  refused  the  request  of  Goering's  lawyer  to  help 
him  prove  it — a  quite  understandable  attitude  in  view  of  what  Poland  had 
suffered  at  the  hands  of  those  who  would  benefit  from  his  testimony.  He  said, 
however,  that  he  would  be  willing  to  give  his  information  to  the  Tribunal  "at 
their  express  written  and  oflicial  request."  He  did  not  know,  nor  do  I,  whether  the 
Tribunal  was  ever  so  advised.  Certainly  I  was  not.  Only  three  years  after  the 
trial,  when  General  Anders  published  his  book  and  thoughtfully  sent  me  a  copy, 
did  I  learn  these  facts.' 

On  January  21,  1946,  General  Clay  transmitted  for  my  "strictly  confidential 
information  from  the  Embassy  at  Warsaw"  word  that  the  Germans  were  not, 
in  the  opinion  of  the  Polish  circles  with  which  the  American  Embassy  was  in 
contact,  responsible  for  the  Katyn  deaths.  There  was  no  suggestion  that  this 
opinion  was  supported  by  legal  evidence.  Apparently  it  was  not,  for  Mr.  Lane, 
then  American  Ambassador  at  Warsaw,  2  years  later  published  the  information 
then  known  to  him  pointing  to  Soviet  guilt,  but  even  then  said,  "The  identity 
of  the  perpetrators  of  the  outrageous  massacre  of  Katyn,  contrary  to  all  laws 
of  war  and  humanity,  has  never  been  definitely  established.  Perhaps  it  never 
will  be."" 

We  did  not  learn  of  any  usuable  evidence  in  American  ijossession.  Military 
intelligence,  on  February  26,  1946,  delivered  to  a  member  of  my  staff  then  in 
Washington  several  documents,  classified  "Secret,"  including  the  German  report 
accusing  the  Soviet,  two  Soviet  documents  accusing  the  Nazis  and  a  paper 
labeled  "Excerpts  of  conversations  between  Sikorski,  Anders,  Stalin,  and  Molo- 
tov."  The  conversations  referred  to  are  substantially  those  published  by  Jan 
Ciechanowski,  Polish  Ambassador  to  the  United  States,  in  1947."  None  of  these 
were  in  condition  to  be  useful  as  evidence.  I  knew  nothing  at  any  time  during 
the  trial,  of  Colonel  Van  Vliet,  Colonel  Stewart,  or  Colonel  Siemansky.  We  heard 
nothing  of  any  of  the  witnesses  since  claimed  to  have  personal  knowledge  of  the 
crimes. 

Third,  we  did  not  need  to  prove  Nazi  responsibility  for  tlie  Katyn  murder  in 
order  to  establish  that  the  Nazi  regime  and  individual  defendants  were  guilty 
of  a  conspiracy  and  a  program  to  exterminate  vast  numbers  of  Poles.  Poland 
had  been  the  scene  and  the  Polish  people  had  been  the  victims  of  many  un- 
believable barbarities  which  put  to  death  much  larger  numbers  of  persons  than 
the  Katyn  murders.  To  make  sure  that  the  grievances  of  the  Polish  people,  as 
well  as  other  Eastern  peoples,  were  proved  and  proved  beyond  doubt,  we  did  not 
leave  the  matter  wholly  to  the  Soviet  but,  as  a  part  of  the  American  case,  proved 
by  captured  documents  or  by  admissions  of  captive  German  officials  the  over-all 
Nazi  extermination  program  embracing  many  atrocities  in  Poland  and  affecting 
the  Polish  people,  as  well  as  others  in  East  Europe.  Examples  will  indicate  what 
I  mean  : 


*  I  am  filinc;  a  photostatic  copy  of  this  pommnnication  with  the  Committee. 
"Anders,  An  Armv  in  Exile  (1949),  82,  140.  295. 
8  Lane,  I  Saw  Poland  Betraved  (1948),  36-39. 
'  Ciechanowski,  Defeat  in  Victory  (1947),  66-69. 


1974  THE    KATYN    FOREST    IVIASSACRE 

We  had  the  diary  of  Hans  Frank,  the  Nazi  Governor-General  of  Poland, 
Acknowledged  by  him  to  he  authentic,  saying,  "We  must  annihilate  the  Jews 
wherever  we  find  them  and  wherever  it  is  possible.  *  *  *"  *  In  August  1942, 
he  wrote  of  Nazi  manipulation  of  hunger  rations  in  Poland :  "That  we  sentence 
1,200,000  Jews  to  die  of  hunger  should  be  noted  only  marginally.  It  is  a  matter, 
of  course,  that  should  tlie  Jews  not  starve  to  death  it  would,  we  hope,  result  in 
the  speeding  up  of  the  anti-Jewish  measures."  ° 

We  had  written  evidence  of  specific  extermination  measures,  such  as  the  75- 
page  leather-bound  official  report  by  Major-General  Stroop  which  recited  the 
killing  of  men,  women  and  children  of  the  Warsaw  ghetto  to  the  exact  number 
of  56,0G5  and  set  out  the  day-to-day  measures,  including  shooting,  fire,  explosion 
and  chemical  extermination  in  the  sewers,  where  the  victims  had  taken  refuge, 
accompanied  by  photographs  to  prove  the  operation's  efficiency." 

We  had  the  report  by  SS  Brigade-Fuehrer  Stahlecker  to  Ilimmler,  dated 
October  3941,  of  the  execution  of  lo.5,.567  persons  in  the  Lithuanian  area." 

We  had  a  top-secret  report,  dated  May  16,  1942,  of  the  ghastly  details  of  the 
operations  in  the  East  of  gasivngons  for  killing  undesirables." 

We  also  had  German  protests,  oflScial  but  not  very  high-minded,  against  such 
exterminations — in  one  instance  of  1.50,000  to  200,000  Jews "  and  in  another 
instance  of  5,000  Jews  " — because  it  was  complained  they  should  have  been 
spared  for  use  as  forced  labor. 

Some  of  the  documents,  intended  to  conceal  crime,  unconsciously  di'amatized 
it.  For  example,  a  deathbook  of  the  Mauthausen  concentration  camp  recorded 
35,317  deaths.  During  a  sample  period  203  persons  died  of  the  same  ailment — ■ 
"heart  trouble" — died  at  brief  and  regular  intervals,  and  more  astonishingly, 
died  in  alphabetical  order.  Death  first  came  to  Ackermann,  at  1 :15  a.  m.,  and 
reached  Zynger  at  2  p.  m.'° 

Oral  testimony  and  affidavits  were  available  from  captured  German  officials. 
One  told  of  the  official  Gestapo  estimate  that  the  Nazi  extermination  program 
had  done  away  with  four  million  persons  in  concentration  camps  and  that  two 
million  additicmal  were  killed  by  the  Secret  Police  in  the  East." 

Another  Nazi,  General  Ohlendorf ,  testified  willingly,  even  boastfully,  that'  he 
supervised  execution  of  over  90,000  men,  women  and  children  in  the  Eastern 
area."  The  witness  Hoess,  in  charge  of  Auschwitz  extermination  center,  swore 
that  under  his  regime  it  exterminated  three  million  human  beings.^^  This  was 
by  far  the  largest  and  most  atrocious  of  the  atrocities  committed  against  the 
Polish  people. 

Nor  did  we  rest  upon  the  documents  which  the  fortunes  of  war  had  placed 
in  our  hands  when  documents  were  procurable  from  other  sources.  An  example 
was  the  Nazi  persecution  of  the  Church  and  clergy,  particularly  vicious  in 
Poland,  which  the  Nazis  had  not  documented  with  the  candor  and  thoroughness 
that  they  did  persecution  of  the  Jews.  It  is  doubtful  whether,  even  if  time  were 
available  to  us,  we  couid  have  gathered  evidence  of  the  Church  pei-secution  in 
Poland,  since  any  probable  witnesses  were  in  the  area  under  Soviet  control 
where  Americans  even  then  were  rarely  admitted,  and  we  may  doubt  the  zeal 
of  the  Soviets  to  obtain  proof  on  that  subject.  However,  I  sought  an  audience 
with  Pope  Pius  and  obtained  from  His  Holiness  the  Vatican  documents  in  which 
detailed  evidentiary  material  was  already  collected  and  which  supported  the 
charge  of  religious  persecution." 

As  to  the  Katyn  massacres,  we  knew  of  no  source  to  which  we  could  turn  for 
such  documentation.  Extermination  of  these  intelligent  and  patriotic  Poles  who 
might  become  the  leadership  of  the  restoration  of  Poland  was  provable  by  docu- 


8  Doc.  No.  2233-D-PS  (USA  exhibit  2S1),  Entry  of  Dec.  16,  1941,  pp.  76-77.  4  N.  C. 
&  A.  S91. 

»Doc.  No.  22.'^3-E~PS  (USA  28.S).  Entrv  of  An?.  24,  1942.     4  N.  C.  &  A.  893. 

10  Doc.  No.  1061-PS  (USA  275),  3  N.  C.  &  A.  718. 

"  Doc.  No.  U-180  (USA  276),  7  N.  C.  &  A.  978. 

"  Doc.  No.  .501 -PS  (USA  288).    3  N.  C.  &  A.  418. 

"  Doc.  No.  3257-PS  (USA  290).     .5  N.  C.  &  A.  994. 

'»  Doc.  No.  U-1.S5  (USA  289).       8  N.  C.  &  A.  205. 

'•"'  1  N.  C.  &  A.  907. 

'»  Doc.  No.  273.S-PS  (USA  290).    5  N.  C.  &  A.  380. 

"4  Proceed iiisrs  811-:?.^>4. 

"  Doc.  No.  3SfiS-PS  (USA  819).     6  N.  C.  &  A.  787. 

"These  documents,  nnniliered  from  3261-PS  to  3269-PS,  inchisive,  are  published  in 
5  N.  C.  &  A.,  pp.  1009  to  1040,  Inclusive. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1975 

ment  to  be  consistent  with  the  Nazi  policy  toward  Toland.  Yet,  while  they  had 
boasted  on  paper  of  the  worst  crimes  known  to  tuan,  we  found  but  one  Nazi 
document  tliat  even  hinted  at  Nazi  responsibility  for  the  Katyn  massacre,  that 
being  a  telegram  reporting  that  the  Polish  Ked  Cross  had  found  that  German- 
made  ammunition  was  used  in  the  killings."" 

A  fourth  ditHcuIty  entered  into  our  reluctance  to  undertake  the  Katyn  murder 
charge  as  part  of  the  Niirnberg  trial.  We  were  under  exceedingly  heavy  pressure 
to  get  along  with  the  trial.  A  persistent  criticism  in  the  American  press  during 
the  trial  was  its  long  duration.  Oral  testimony  from  witnesses,  subject  to  cross- 
examination  by  several  counsel,  of  course  takes  nuich  more  time  than  docu- 
mentai-y  proof.  Every  word  of  testimony  taken  in  the  Niirnberg  trial  had  to  be 
forthwith  interpreted  iTito  three  other  languages.  Every  examination  or  cross- 
examination  had  to  Include  any  proper  questions  desired  by  moi'e  than  twenty 
lawyers  representing  defendants  and  four  for  the  prosecution,  and  these  were 
trained  in  live  different  legal  systems — English,  American,  French,  Russian,  and 
German.  Therefore,  in  the  interests  of  expedition  it  was  necessary  to  forego 
calling  of  witnesses  so  far  as  possible.  You  will  best  realize  the  extent  to  which 
we  avoided  relying  on  oral  proof  when  I  remind  you  that  all  four  prosecutors 
at  Niirnberg  called  only  33  witnesses  to  testify  orally  on  the  whole  case  against 
the  twenty  individual  defendants,  and  these  defendants,  in  addition  to  them- 
selves, called  only  61  witnesses.  You  have  ali-eady,  according  to  your  interim 
report,  orally  examined  81  witnesses  on  this  one  atrocity. 

Notwithstanding  these  considerations,  the  Soviet  prosecutor,  on  February  14, 
1946,  opened  the  subject  by  presenting  to  the  Tribunal  a  report  by  a  Soviet 
Extraordinary  State  Commission  of  its  investigation  of  the  Katyn  crime."  It 
recited  testimony,  including  a  good  deal  of  hearsay  and  medical  data,  as  to 
the  condition  of  the  exhumed  bodies.  On  this,  experts  based  opinions  that  the 
executions  took  place  during  the  period  of  German  occupation  and  therefore 
that  the  Germans  were  responsible.  Dr.  Stahmer,  counsel  for  Goering,  made 
a  prompt  request  to  call  witnesses  to  contradict  the  Soviet  report,  which  occa- 
sioned some  disagreement  between  the  Soviet  prosecutors  and  those  representing 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.  The  Soviet  lawyers  took  the  view  that, 
since  the  court  took  "judicial  notice"  of  the  report  of  the  Extraordinary  Com- 
mission as  a  state  document,  it  could  not  be  contradicted.  Under  Soviet  law 
it  probably  could  not  but  would  be  entitled  to  faith  and  credit — as  a  judgment, 
statute,  or  public-  act  would  be  here.  Nevertheless,  we  thought  that  its  nature 
was  such  that  it  was  clearly  open  to  contradiction.  Then  the  Soviet  lawyers 
proposed,  if  the  subject  were  opened,  to  call  ten  witnesses."  The  Tribunal, 
however,  ruled  that  it  would  "limit  the  whole  of  the  evidence  to  three  witnesses 
on  either  side,  because  the  matter  is  only  subsidiary  allegation  of  fact." '" 

Testimony  of  three  witnesses  for  each  was  heard  on  the  1st  and  2d  days  of 
July  1946.  What  it  was  is  a  matter  of  record,  and  what  it  is  worth  is  a  matter 
of  opinion."    At  the  conclusion,  neither  side  was  satisfied  with  its  own  showing 


2"  Telesrani  addressed  to  the  "Government  of  the  Government  General,  care  of  First 
Administrative  Counseller  Weirauch  in  Krakow."  It  is  marked  "Urgent,  to  be  delivered 
at  once,  secret"  : 

"Part  of  the  Polish  Red  Cross  returned  yesterday  from  Katyn.  The  employees  of  the 
Polish  Red  Cross  have  brou.sht  with  them  the  cartridge  cases  which  were  used  in  sliooting 
tite  victims  of  Katyn.  It  appears  that  these  are  German  munitions.  The  caliber  is  7.65. 
Tliey  are  from,  the  firm  Geco.  Letter  follows."  Signed  "Heinrich."  Doe.  No.  402-PS. 
17  Proceedings  365. 

So  far  as  I  know,  the  letter  referred  to  was  never  found,  but  the  prosecution  staff 
screened  approximately  100,000  captured  German  documents,  of  which  only  5.000  were 
selected  for  full  translation  for  use  at  the  trial.  It  is  impossible,  therefore,  to  say  that 
such  a  letter  is  not  in  existence. 

=ilt  is  USSR  Doc.  #54. 

=2  March  S.  1046,  9  Proceedings  3;  May  11,  1946,  13  Proceedings  431;  June  3,  1946, 
15  Proceedinss  289-293. 

23  17  Proceedings  273. 

^  The  verbatim  testimony  in  English  translation  is  found  in  17  Proceedings  275  et  seq. 

A  summary  of  the  evidence  will  show  its  inconclusive  character.  It  must  be  remembered 
that  the  Smolensk  area,  including  Katyn  Wood,  fell  to  the  Germans  on  or  about  .July  17, 
1941.  If  the  Polish  prisoners  bad  been  executed  before  that,  the  Soviet  must  have  been 
responsible:  if  they  were  then  alive  and  captured  by  the  Germans,  the  Germans  must  have 
been  responsible. 

The  German  defendants  led  with  the  witness  Ahrens,  Commanding  Officer  of  the  Signal 
Regiment  charged  witli  guilt  in  the  Soviet  report.  He  denied  that  Iiis  regiment  had  cap- 
tured any  Polish  prisoners  from  the  Russians,  denied  there  was  any  order  to  slioot  Polish 
prisoners,  or  that  any  were  shot.  He  testified  to  exluiming  the  bodies  in  1942.  The  weak- 
ness of  his  testimony  was  that  he  did  not  arrive  in  the  Smolensk  territory  until  about  the 
second  half  of  November  1041,  while  the  Soviet  claimed  the  executions  had  been  consider- 
ably earlier,  and  the  commander  he  succeeded  was  not  called. 

The  second  witness  was  Bichborn,  who  also  did  not  arrive  on  the  scene  until  September 
20,  1941.     He  denied  that  there  were  Polish  prisoners  taken  or  shot  and  said  he  would  have 


1976  THE    KATYN    FOREST    RIASSACRE 

and  both  asked  to  call  additional  witnesses.  The  Soviet,  especially,  complained 
that  they  had  been  allowed  to  call  only  three  of  the  120  witnesses  that  appeared 
before  the  Soviet  Commission.  The  Tribunal,  wisely  I  think,  refused  to  hear 
more  of  the  subject."^ 

The  Soviet  prosecutor  appears  to  have  abandoned  the  charge.  The  Tribunal 
did  not  convict  the  German  defendants  of  the  Katyn  massacre.  Neither  did  it 
expressly  exonerate  them,  as  the  Judgment  made  no  reference  to  the  Katyn 
incident.  The  Soviet  judge  dissented  in  some  matters  but  did  not  mention 
Katyn.-'' 

This  history  will  show  that,  if  it  is  now  deemed  possible  to  establish  responsi- 
bility for  the  Katyn  murders,  nothing  that  was  decided  by  the  Niirnberg 
Tribunal  or  contended  for  by  the  American  prosecution  will  stand  in  the  way. 


Exhibit  7 — Letter  From  the  Polish  Government  in  Exile  in  London  to  Justice 

Jackson 

Polish  Parliamentary  Group 
74,  Cornwall  Gardens,  London,  SW.  7 

London,  Fehriiary  15,  1946- 
Mr.  Justice  Rorert  J.  Jackson, 

Chief  American  Prosecutor,  Nuremberg. 
Sir:  We  have  the  honour  to  submit  to  your  attention  the  enclosed  copy  of  a 
letter  addressed  by  us  to  the  members  of  the  Parliaments  of  all  democratic 
Nations  throughout  the  world. 
We  are,  Sir, 

Yours  faithfully. 

On  behalf  of  the  Polish  Parliamentary  Group, 

A.  Zalewski. 
J.  Godlewski. 
Annexe. 


known  about  it  if  eithor  had  occurred.  His  testimony  was  attacked  by  U.  S.  S.  R.  Docu 
ment  No.  .3,  dated  Berlin,  October  29,  1941,  issued  by  the  chief  of  the  Security  Police  in 
relation  to  prisoners  of  war  in  the  rear  of  the  army,  which  set  up  task  force  groups  under 
the  leadership  of  an  SS,  leader.  These  irregular  groui)s,  not  a  part  of  the  army,  were  the 
usual  execution  teams.  This  witness  told  of  an  order  to  shoot  certain  prisoners  of  wai 
which,  he  said,  Field  Marshal  von  Kleuge  refused  to  carry  out  because  of  regard  for  th€ 
discipline  of  his  troops. 

The  third  witness  was  Gen.  Oberhauser,  in  command  of  the  area,  who  did  not  reach 
there  until  September  of  1941.  He  denied  that  there  were  Polish  prisoners  taken  or  shot 
and  denied  that  the  regiment  had  weapons  with  which  they  could  have  been  shot.  This 
closed  the  German  case  without  accounting  for  the  period  from  the  fall  of  Smolensk  in 
the  middle  of  .July  to  the  beginning  of  September  and  with  an  admission  that  an  execution 
squad  followed  the  army  into  that  area. 

The  Russians  took  over  and  called  the  Deputy  Mayor  of  Smolensk  during  the  German 
occupation,  a  professor  at  the  University  who  served  under  a  German  Mayor.  He  testified 
that  there  were  Polish  prisoners  of  war  in  the  vicinity  of  Smolensk  when  the  city  fell  to 
the  Germans,  that  he  had  a  conference  with  the  German  Mayor  in  which  he  was  informed 
that  a  very  severe  regime  should  prevail  with  respect  to  prisoners  of  war.  and  that  Polish 
ones  were  to  be  exterminated,  l)ut  that  it  should  be  kejit  a  secret,  and  thereafter  the  Mayor 
told  him  that  the  I'olish  prisoners  of  war  had  all  died.  On  cross-examination  it  was 
brought  out  against  his  crediliility  that  he  was  not  punished  by  the  Russians  for  his  ad- 
mitted collaboration  with  the  Germans,  and  not  only  remained  at  liberty  but  was  a  pro- 
fessor at  two  Universities  under  Russian  control. 

They  followed  with  a  witness  Markov,  a  Bulgarian  doctor  who  had  been  a  nw^mber  of 
the  commission  set  up  by  the  Germans  to  investigate  the  Polish  mass:H're  and  which 
charged  responsibility  to  the  Soviet.  Alarkov  gave  details  indicating  ;in  extremely  super- 
ficial examination  of  the  graves  and  testified  that  he  did  not  agree  with  the  report  but 
signed  it  under  German  comi)ulsion.  Ooss-examination  brouuht  out  the  weakness  of  his 
testimony  in  that  he  was  under  the  control  of  the  Russians  at   the  time  of  trial. 

The  last  witness  was  Prosorovski,  a  medical  legal  expert  of  the  Sovi(>t  ITnion.  Hi-s 
testimony  was  entirely  of  the  Ru.ssian  examination  of  the  trraves.  and  his  conclusions  that 
the  date  of  the  execution  as  evidenced  by  the  condition  of  the  bodies  must  have  been  during 
the  German  occup.ntion.  During  his  examination,  an  American-captured  document.  No. 
402-PS,  Kxhibit  V.  S.  S.  R.  nOT.  was  read  into  the  case,  being  a  telegram  from  Heinrich 
stating  that  the  employees  of  the  Polish  Red  Cross  had  found  cartridge  cases  used  in  shoot- 
ing the  victims  of  Katyn  from  which  it  ajipeared  that  these  were  German  munitions  of 
caliber  7.(i.T.  The  testimony  was  that  all  of  the  deaths  had  been  caused  by  bullet  wounds 
of  7.05  caliber. 

Dr.  Naville.  one  of  your  rommittee  witnesses,  was  allowed  to  defendant  Goerlng.  pro-' 
vided  he  could  l)e  located.  He  was  found  in  Switz(>rland.  hut  he  "informed  the  Tribunal 
that  he  sees  no  use  in  his  ocuning  Iier(>  as  a  witnesjf  for  Goering.  *  *  *  10  Pro- 
ceedings f!4S. 

^•17  Proceedings  ."71. 

==«  N.  C.  &  A.,  Opinion  and  .Tudgment  lOfi. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1977 

An  Appeal  to  Members  of  the  Parliaments  of  All  the  Nations  From  the 
Former  Deputies  and  Senators  of  the  Polish  Parliament 

74  Cornwall  Gardens, 
London,  SW.  7,  February  19Jf6. 
To  the  Members  of  the  Free  Nations  Parliaments. 

Dear  Sirs  :  The  German  war  criminals  at  present  on  trial  at  Nuremberg  are 
charged  witb  tlie  murder  of  about  11,000  Polish  officers  in  the  wood  of  Katyn 
near  Smolensk.  In  connection  with  this  case  the  undersigned,  former  Senators 
and  Deputies  in  Parliaments  of  the  Polish  Republic,  beg  to  point  out  certain 
events  and  to  make  a  number  of  I'emarks. 

On  September  17th  1939  Soviet  Forces  suddenly  and  unexpectedly  invaded 
Poland  and  attacked  the  Polish  armies  in  the  rear  while  these  armies  were  in  a 
most  difficult  position,  struggling  against  the  Germans,  overwhelmingly  superior 
in  number  and  in  material.  In  doing  so,  the  Soviet  broke  the  Pact  of  Non- 
Aggression  and  other  agreements,  freely  accepted  by  them  and  still  in  force  as 
between  the  USSR  and  Poland  sucli  as  the  Peace  Treaty  of  Riga  signed  on  March 
18th  1921,  The  Kellogg  Pact,  The  Moscow  Protocol  renouncing  war  as  an  in- 
strument of  national  policy,  signed  on  February  9th  1929,  by  Estonia,  Latvia, 
Poland,  Rumania  and  the  USSR,  the  Convention  on  the  definition  of  the  Aggressor 
signed  on  July  3rd  1933,  the  Moscow  Protocol  of  May  5th  1934,  on  the  Prolonga- 
tion of  the  Non-Aggression  Pact  till  December  31st,  1945.  These  agreements 
have  been  confirmed  twice  over,  by  an  exchange  of  notes,  on  September  10th  1934, 
and  by  a  common  communique  of  November  26th  1938,  and  finally  the  Pact 
of  the  League  of  Nations  was  also  binding  in  the  USSR. 

As  a  result  of  the  Soviet  attack,  Polish  resistance  collapsed  and  a  great  number 
of  soldiers  of  the  Polish  army  fell  into  Soviet  hands.  The  Soviet  autliorities 
grouped  the  Polish  officers  in  separate  camps,  the  largest  of  which  were  those  of 
Starobielsk,  Kozielsk,  and  Ostaszkow.  At  the  beginning  of  1940  the  camp  au- 
thorities informed  the  interned  officers  that  these  camps  would  be  broken  iip 
and  that  the  prisoners  of  war  would  return  to  their  families  in  Poland.  The 
prisoners  were  again  registered  in  great  detail.  From  April  to  the  middle  of 
May  1940  the  Soviet  authorities  removed  the  officers  from  the  camps  in  groups 
numbering  from  60  to  300  and  transported  them  in  unknown  directions.  At  the 
same  time  the  prisoners  correspondence  with  their  families  in  Poland  came  to  an 
end.  Whereas  in  the  preceding  months  letters  from  them  were  received  fairly 
regularly,  after  that  date  they  ceased  to  give  any  sign  of  life  and  they  were 
heard  of  no  more. 

After  the  conclusion  of  the  Polish-Soviet  agreement  of  July  30th,  1941.  and  of 
the  Polish-Soviet  military  convention  of  Augiist  14th  of  the  same  year,  when  the 
formation  of  the  Polish  army  was  undertaken  in  the  USSR,  out  of  the  total  of 
15.000  officers  taken  prisoner  by  the  Soviet,  only  2.500  reported  themselves  to  the 
Polish  recruiting  centres.  Of  these,  only  400  had  been  inmates  of  the  camp  of 
Kozielsk.  The  absence  of  the  remainder,  known  to  have  been  removed  to  unde- 
termined destinations,  produced  understandable  anxiety  among  their  country- 
men. The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  the  Polish  Ambassador  in  Kuybyshev, 
and  the  general  commanding  the  Polish  Army  in  the  USSR,  addressed  them- 
selves to  the  Soviet  authorities  asking  to  be  informed  of  the  whereabouts  of  these 
missing  officers.  The  Soviet  Government  in  the  persons  of  the  People's  Com- 
misar  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Mr.  Molotov,  and  his  deputy,  Mr.  Vishinsky,  answered 
repeatedly  that  these  officers  had  been  released  and  should  have  reported  them- 
selves to  the  diffreut  Polish  military  units.  On  December  3rd,  1941,  in  a  con- 
versation with  Marshal  Stalin  at  the  Kremlin,  General  Sikorski  raised  the  same 
question  and  presented  a  list  of  3,845  missing  officers  whose  names  had  been 
ascertained  by  the  Polish  authorities.  Marshal  Stalin  repeated  tlie  explanation 
given  by  Mr.  Molotov  and  Mr.  Vishinsky  and  assured  General  Sikorski  anew 
that  these  officers  had  been  released  long  since.  In  spite  of  these  declarations 
of  the  highest  Soviet  authorities  not  one  of  the  missing  officers  ever  made  his 
appearance  and  all  investigations  remained  fruitless. 

In  April  1943  the  Germans  published  the  news  that  in  the  wood  of  Katyn 
near  Smolensk  mass  graves  had  been  discovered  containing  the  bodies  of  about 
12.000  Polish  officers.  About  3,000  of  them  were  identified  and  it  followed  from 
the  checking  of  lists  that  they  were  prisoners  from  the  camp  at  Kozielsk.  As  is 
well  known,  the  German  authorities  did  not  hesitate  to  accuse  the  Soviet  Gov- 
ernment of  their  murder. 


1978  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

AVhen  the  German  armies  in  their  retreat  from  Russia  had  evacuated  the  dis- 
trict of  Smolensk,  the  Soviet  authorities  formed  a  commission  called  upon  to 
deal  vv^ith  the  Katyn  case.  This  commission  drew  up  an  official  report  which 
was  published  by  the  Soviet  Government. 

According  to  this  report  two  witnesses,  the  Soviet  camp  commander.  Major 
Vietoshnikov,  of  the  N.  K.  V.  D.,  and  the  engineer  in  control  of  traflBc  in  the 
Smolensk  sector  of  Western  railway  lines,  S.  Ivanov,  testified  that  the  Polish 
officers  detained  in  the  P.  o.  W.  camps  had  not  been  evacuated  in  the  timft 
and  that  the  camp  had  been  captured  by  the  advancing  German  army.  Other 
witiiesses,  Soviet  citizens,  gave  evidence  that  the  Gei'mans  murdered  the  Polish 
officers  in  Katyn  wood  and  buried  them  there. 

The  region  of  Smolensk  having  been  occujiied  by  the  Germans  in  July  1941,  the 
question  occurs  why  the  Soviet  Government  did  not  inform  the  foolish  authori- 
ties immediately  after  the  resumption  of  Polish-Soviet  relations,  in  the  summer 
of  1941,  that  many  Polish  officers,  who  were  prisoners  of  war,  had  fallen  into 
German  hands.  On  the  contrary,  the  Soviet  Government  answered  all  inquiries 
on  this  point  over  and  over  again,  even  as  late  as  March  1942,  with  the  assurance 
that  these  prisoners  of  war  had  been  released,  in  accordance  with  the  concluded 
agreement  and  should  have  reported  themselves  to  the  Polish  military  units. 

These  circumstances  show  that  the  fate  of  the  Polish  officers  in  the  Uussian 
P.o.W.  camps  has  not  yet  been  fully  elucidated. 

The  crime  perpetrated  upon  them  at  Katyn,  contrary  to  every  feeling  of  human- 
ity and  violating  international  law  and  custom,  does  not  only  concern  the  families 
of  the  victims.  The  entire  Polish  nation  is  entitled  to  demand  that  this  tragedy 
be  cleared  up. 

In  view  of  these  facts  and  circumstances  the  undersigned  would  like  to  express 
the  opinion  that  it  would  be  ill-advised  to  include  the  Katyn  case  in  the  tasks  of 
the  Nuremberg  tribunal.  This  case  is  of  a  special  character,  and  needs,  in  order 
to  be  fully  elucidated,  to  be  examined  ai)art  and  treated  independently  by  an 
international  judicial  body. 

SENATORS 

Ignacy  Balin.ski,  Croft  House,  Sudbury,  Suffolk. 
JozefGodlewski,  17,  Cleveden  Place,  S.W.I. 
Alexander  Heiman  Jarecki,  10"),  Hallam  Street,  W.l. 
Prof.  Wojciecli  Jastrzebowski,  41,  Belsize  Square,  N.W.3. 
Inz.  Jerzv  Iwanowski,  11.  Dora  Road,  Wimbledon.  S.W.19. 
Tadeusz  Katelbach,  112,  Eton  Hall,  Eton  College  Rd.,  N.W.S. 
Adam  Koc,  46  East  TOth  Street,  New  York,  N.Y.,  U.S.A. 
Wanda  Norwid-Neugebauer,  Eton  Hall,  Chalk  Farm,  N.W.S. 
Karol  Niezal.ytowski.  Hay  Lodge,  Peeble,  Scotland. 
Konstanty  Rdultowski,  Cairo,  Egypt. 
Stefan  Rosada,  7.  Glenorchy  Terrace,  Edinburgh.  9. 


Dr.  Konstanty  Dzieduszycki.  1.  Church  Hill  Place.  Edinburgh,  10. 

Stanislaw  Jozwiak,  70.  Clifton  t-ourt.  Edgware  Road.  W.2. 

Kornel  Krzeczunowicz.  14,  Inverleith  Row,  Edinburgh. 

Jerzy  Paciorkowski,  184,  l!e]siz(»  Road,  N.W.O. 

Tadeusz  Schaetzel.  Ankara.  Turkey. 

Antoiii  Zalewski,  8.1.  Eaton  Place,  S.W.I. 

P.ronisiaw  Wanke.  Rockcliffc  l)y  Dalbeattie,  Scotland. 

Marian  Zyndram-Koscialkowski.  2:>,  Greystock  Court.  Hanger  Lane,  W.fi 

Prof.  Wladyslaw  Wielhorski,  .l.  White  Hall  Gardens,  W.3. 

Witold  Zj'borski,  "Featherstones",  11,  Fairlawn  Road,  Lytham,  Lanes. 

AFTER  KE(1<:SS 

Chaii'inaii  M.vdden.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

T\w  first,  witness  will  be  Mr.  Elmer  Davis.  Will  you  take  the  stand. 
Ml".  Davis,  and  be  sworn? 

Do  yon  solemnly  swear  that  the  testimony  yon  will  give  in  the  hear- 
ing before  (he  connnittee  will  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing^ 
but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God? 

Mr,  Davis.  I  do. 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  1979 

TESTIMONY  OF  ELMER  DAVIS,  NEWS  BROADCASTER   AND  COM- 
MENTATOR, AMERICAN  BROADCASTING  CO.,  WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 

Chairman  Madoen.  Mr.  Davis,  will  you  state  your  full  name,  please? 

Mr.  Davis.  Elmer  Davis. 

Chairman  Madden.  And  your  address? 

Mr.  Davis.  1661  Crescent  Place,  Washington  9,  D.  C. 

Chairman  Madden.  And  your  business? 

Mr.  Davis.  News  broadcaster  and  commentator  for  the  American 
Broadcasting-  Co. 

Chairman  Madden.  All  right,  Mr.  Mitchell,  you  may  proceed. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman,  for. the  purpose  of  this  hearing  I 
would  like  to  have  now  read  into  the  record  by  Mr.  Pucinski,  the 
testimony  taken  by  the  congressional  committee  investigating  the  Fed- 
eral Communications  Commission.  This  is  the  testimony  of  Mr. 
Joseph  Lang,  which  was  taken  on  August  5  in  New  York  City. 

Mr.  Pucinski,  will  you  proceed,  please? 

Mr.  Pucinski.  Yes.  I  am  reading  from  page  387  of  volume  991  of 
the  House  committee  hearings.    This  volume  is  from  the  Senate  library. 

The  testimony  is  by  Mr.  Joseph  Lang. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  What  committee  and  what  date? 

Mr.  Pucinski.  This  testimony  was  taken  during  a  study  and  in- 
vestigation of  the  Federal  Communications  Commission  on  Thursday, 
August  5, 1943.    The  hearings  were  in  New  York  City. 

Now,  this  is  the  testimony  of  Mr.  Joseph  Lang,  general  manager  of 
radio  station  WHOM,  New  York,  N.  Y. 

The  question  being  propounded  to  Mr.  Lang  is  by  Mr.  Garey,  who 
was  the  committee  counsel  for  this  committee,  which  was  headed  by 
Congressman  Cox. 

Mr.  Garey  said : 

Mr.  Lang,  did  you  ever  have  a  meeting  with  Mrs.  Shea,  at  which  the  question 
of  the  policy  that  should  be  adopted  toward  Russia  was  discussetl? 

Mr.  Lang.  I  had  a  meeting  with  Mrs.  Shea  and  Alan  Cranston  in  my  office. 

Mr.  Garey.  We  know  who  Mrs.  Shea  is,  but  I  don't  think  this  record  shows  who 
Alan  Cranston  is.    Will  you  tell  us  who  Alan  Cranston  is? 

Mr.  Lang.  Alan  Cranston  is  head  of  the  Foreign  Language  Division  of  the 
Office  of  War  Information. 

Mr.  Garey.  And  about  when  did  this  conversation  take  place? 

Mr.  Lang.  I  believe  it  was  around  the  middle  of  May  1943. 

Mr.  Garey.  And  how  did  the  meeting  come  about? 

Mr.  Lang.  Mr.  Cranston  called  me,  I  believe  it  was  on  a  Monday,  and  asked 
if  he  could  meet  with  Mr.  Simon  and  me  regarding  what  he  described  as  the 
Polish  situation.    He  asked  if  he  could  meet  with  us  on  the  following  Wednesday. 

Mr.  Garey.  Where  did  the  meeting  take  place? 

Mr.  Lang.  At  my  office. 

Mr.  Garey.  Who  was  present  at  the  meeting? 

Mr.  Lang.  INIr.  Cranston,  Mrs.  Shea,  Mr.  Arthur  Simon,  myself,  and  I  be- 
lieve Mr.  Fred  Call,  who  handled  public  relations  for  the  foreign-language 
radio  wartime  control.  This  was  a  meeting  not  with  us  as  individual  station 
owners  but  representing  the  foreign-language  radio  wartime  control. 

Mr.  Garey.  And  Mr.  Arthui'  Simon  is  manager  of  the  Bulova  station  in 
Philadelphia,  designed  by  the  call  letters  WPEN? 

Mr.  Lang.  Yes. 

Mr.  Garey.  And  he  was  chairman  of  that  foreign-language  radio  wartime 
control  committee? 

Mr.  Lang.  He  was. 

Mr.  Garey.  Will  you  tell  us  what  was  said  at  that  meeting,  and  by  whom? 

Mr.  Lang.  Both  Mr.  Cranston  and  :Mrs.  Shea  were  concerned  with  the  sit- 
uation that  had  been  developing  between  Russia  and  Poland  in  regard  to  the 


1980  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

matter  of  boundaries,  and  the  fact  that  Poland,  I  believe,  through  its  Premier, 
its  Government  in  exile  in  London,  had  protested  to  Russia  about  the  slaying 
of  these  10.000  Polish  officers  in  Russia.  And  they  were  concerned  as  to  how 
the  situation  would  he  handled  on  different  radio  stations. 

Mr.  Garey.  What  did  Mr.  Cranston  want  you  to  do? 

Mr.  Lang.  He  asked  us — when  I  say  "us"  I  mean  the  foreign-;  guage  radio 
wartime  control — if  we  could  straighten  out  the  situation  in  Dei  >>it. 

Mr.  Garey.  What  situation  olitained  there? 

]\Ir.  Lang.  From  what  I  could  gather,  it  seemed  that  on  the  Polish  programs 
out  there  the  Polish  news  commentators  had  tal<en  a  rather  antagonistic  atti- 
tude toward  Russia  in  this  matter,  and  they  felt  that  it  was  inimical  to  the  war 
effort  find  should  be  straightened  out  in  some  way. 

Mr.  Garey.  And  they  wanted  to  know  what  you  could  do  about  getting  the 
program  content  on  those  Detroit  stations  to  conform  to  their  views  on  what 
should  be  put  over  the  air  in  the  United  States  about  t^e  Russian  situation? 
Thnt  is  the  sum  and  .substance  of  what  Cranston  was  trying  to  get  you  to  do? 

Mr.  Lang.  I  don't  know  that  it  was  expressed  that  way.  That  was  the 
thought. 

Mr.  Garey.  Is  your  answer  to  my  question  in  the  affirmative? 

Mr.  Lang.  Yes. 

IMr.  Garey.  Was  the  Office  of  Censorship  represented  at  this  meeting? 

Mr.  Lang.  No  ;  it  was  not. 

Mr.  Garey.  They  had  been  invited  to  attend,  but  had  reufsed  to  attend,  had 
they  not? 

Mr.  Lang.  I  don't  know  that,  sir. 

Mr.  Garey.  They  had  failed  to  attend? 

Mr.  Lang.  They  were  not  present. 

Mr.  Garey.  What  did  Mrs.  Shea  want  you  to  do? 

Mr.  Lang.  The  same  thing.     They  both  expressed  the  same  thoughts. 

Mr.  Garey.  They  wanted  the  gag  put  on  any  criticism  of  Russia,  insofar  as 
critic'zing  Russia's  ambitions  to  establish  a  new  Polish  Frontier  in  the  postwar 
days  was  concerned? 

Mr.  Lang.  Tliat  seemed  to  be  the  gist  of  the  talk. 

Mr.  Garey.  And  didn't  they  also  want  the  gag  put  on  any  news  concerning 
the  alleged  killing  of  the  10,000  Polish  Officers  by  the  Russians  in  Russia? 

Mr.  Lang.  That  was  not  expressed.  The  thought  was  that  if  commentators 
were  to  he  permitted  to  express  their  own  views,  there  was  no  limit  to  what 
they  could  say.  I  suggested  that  if  the  situation  were  handled  as  I  handled  it  on 
my  station,  whereby  commentators,  both  on  Russian  and  Polish  programs  were 
permitted  to  broadcast  only  the  news  as  it  came  off  the  teletype,  that  would  solve 
the  situation,  because  it  wouhl  mean  that  only  news  from  the  news  services 
would  be  broadcast,  and  not  anyone's  views. 

IVIr.  Garey.  What  was  the  result  of  the  meeting? 

Mr.  Lang.  Mr.  Simon  and  I  said  we  would  get  in  touch  with  our  committee 
member  in  Detroit  and  talk  to  him  and  see  if  we  could  get  the  matter  straightened 
out. 

Mr.  Garey.  And  did  you? 

Mr.  Lang.  AVe  did.    We  called  ^Ir.  James  Hopkins. 

Mr.  Garey.  Of  what  station? 

Mr.  Lang.  WGBK,  in  Detroit.  And  we  spoke  to  liim  along  these  lines,  sug- 
gesting that  his  station,  as  well  as  two  other  stations,  the  call  letters  of  which 
I  don't  recollect,  stick  strictly  to  their  authenticated  news  service,  and  not  permit 
any  individual  to  express  his  individual  views. 

Mr.  Garey.  Wliat  Ililde  Shea  and  Cranston  were  doing,  they  were  engaging 
in  the  censorship  of  program  content:  weren't  tliey? 

Mr.  Lang.  I  think  you  miglit  put  it  that  way.     I  wouVl  say  "Yes." 

Mr.  Gakey.  Certainly.  And  the  Communications  Act  of  1944  expressly  forbids 
tlie  Federal  Communications  Commission  to  censor  program  content;  doesn't  it? 

Mr.  Lang.  It  does. 

Mr.  (Jakey.  And  the  Office  of  War  Information  had  no  .iurisdiction  in  the  matter 
whatever  ;  did  it?  j,' 

Mr.  Lang.  Tliat  is  right.  i 

Mr.  MiTCiiKLL.  Mr.  Davis,  at  that  time  I  believe  you  were  lioad  of  '| 

IliP  DWT.     Could  you  tell  the  (.'oiiiniittee  when  you  took'  over  (he  | 

chnirmaiishi|)  of  the  OAVT?  |" 

Mr.  Davis.  The  l.'Uh  of  Juiu'  1042. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1981 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Who  was  your  predecessor  in  office  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  We  had  none.  We  were  a  combination  of  four  preceding 
agencies. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Will  you  explain  to  the  committee  how  the  OWI  was 
formed,  if ''>Hi  please? 

Mr.  DA^^P.'  It  was  put  together  by  a  combination  of  what  was  then 
the  Foreign  Information  Service  of  the  Coordinator  of  Information 
under  General  Donovan,  an  organization  which  had  previously  been 
combined  with  what  later  became  the  OSS,  the  Office  of  Facts  and  Fig- 
ures, under  Archibald  MacLeish,  the  Division  of  Information  of  the 
Office  of  Emergency  INIanagement,  under  Bob  Lorton,  and  the  Office 
of  Government  Eeports  under  Lowell  Mott.  They  were  all  brought 
in  together  into  a  new  organization. 

As  I  have  said  elsewhere,  I  felt  like  a  man,  at  times,  who  had  married 
a  four-time  widow  and  was  trying  to  raise  her  children  by  all  of  her 
previous  marriages. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Sir,  where  and  to  whom  did  you  report  as  the  head 
of  OWI  ?    What  was  the  chain  of  command  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  President  Roosevelt.  If  I  may  amplify,  INIr.  Counsel, 
we  reported  only  to  the  President  for  all  operations.  But  on  matters 
of  foreign  policy  we  had  to  consult  the  State  Department  and  conform 
to  their  views. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Could  you  explain  to  the  committee  how  the  liaison 
was  conducted  between  these  various  other  Government  agencies, 
which  affected  the  war  effort. 

Mr.  Davis.  We  had  various  people  assigned  to  contact  each  of  the 
Government  departments,  and  quite  a  number  of  people  would  con- 
sult different  officials  in  the  State  Department  on  different  issues  to 
see  what  the  Government  policy  was.  With  respect  to  major  issues, 
occasionally  I  had  to  take  them  up  with  the  President.  But  he  was 
pretty  busy,  and  I  didn't  bother  him  more  than  I  had  to. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Was  there  any  kind  of  a  Board  or  Commission 
established  for  policy  guidance  for  OWI  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  there  was  theoretically  such  a  Commission,  and  I 
was  directed  to  perform  my  duties  after  consulting  it.  It  was  set  up 
with  appointees  by  the  other  departments,  in  such  shape  that  it  seemed 
to  me  that  its  purpose  was  to  keep  us  from  ever  doing  anything  much. 
So,  after  two  consultations  with  them  in  the  first  month  that  I  held 
office,  I  performed  my  duties  according  to  the  Executive  order.  They 
never  met  again. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Then  could  you  explain  to  the  committee  how  policy 
respecting  the  OWI  was  accomplished?  How  did  you  get  your 
directives  of  advice  and  consultation  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  on  foreign  policy  matters,  as  I  say,  we  consulted 
the  State  Department.  On  specific  issues  it  was  usually  done  by  some- 
body from  our  overseas  branch  calling  up  somebody  in  the  State 
Department  who  was  concerned  with  that  particular  division.  I  had 
frequent  consultations  with  Mr.  Hull  and  Mr.  Welles,  myself,  on 
general  policies. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Was  this  on  over-all  policy,  your  consultations? 

Mr.  Davis.  On  the  way  we  should  handle  certain  matters  in  foreign 
propaganda,  so  that  we  would  conform  to  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
United  States. 

93744— 52— pt.  7 11 


1982  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

iMr.  Mitchell.  Then  liaison  was  otherwise  from  desk  to  desk? 

Mr.  Davis.  We  had  people  who  were  especially  associated  with  each 
of  the  other  departments,  but  with  most  of  them  our  problem  was 
to  see  that  the  news  they  handed  out  was  as  fresh  as  possible  and  as 
accurate  as  possible,  and  that  there  were  not  too  violent  conflicts 
between  the  departments  and  what  they  said. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  And  the  two  individuals  that  you  consulted  for 
over-all  policy  were  Mr.  Hull  and  Mr.  Welles  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  On  foreign  policy  only. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  On  foreign  policy  only  ? 

Mr.  Da^ts.  Yes. 

]Mr.  Mitchell.  Now,  could  you  tell  the  committee  the  exact  purpose 
or  function  of  OWI  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  it  is  all  set  forth  in  greater  length  and  detail  in 
the  Executive  order,  than  I  can  now  remember. 

JMr.  Mitchell.  Briefly. 

Mr.  Davis.  Its  object  was  to  tell  the  news  as  fully  and  as  accurately 
as  we  could  to  the  people  of  the  United  States,  a  function  in  which  we 
were  very  much  limited  by  the  fact  that  we  were  only  coordinators  of 
the  new^s  issued  by  the  other  departments,  and  also  to  inform  foreign 
nations,  both  hostile,  friendly  and  neutral,  about  the  policies  and 
business  of  the  United  States. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Where  did  you  get  the  new^s  coming  in  from  over- 
seas 'I    What  agencies  furnished  that  to  the  OWI  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  We  had  a  division  called  the  Foreign  News  Bureau, 
whicli  obtained  the  reports  of  the  Federal  Broadcast  Information 
Service  of  all  of  the  enemy  broadcasts,  and  all  broadcasts,  to  be  sure, 
but  primarily  the  enemy  broadcasts,  which  they  would  take  and 
analyze  principally  for  the  purpose  of  pointing  out  where  the  enemy 
was  telling  a  different  story  to  one  part  of  the  world  than  to  another. 
They  issued  their  reports  on  those  broadcasts,  and  they  were  made 
available  to  the  press.  That  was  the  only  news  we  obtained  from 
overseas. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Was  your  organization  broken  up  in  such  a  way 
as  to  have  individuals  responsible  country  by  country  or  area  by  area? 

Mr.  Davis.  In  our  propaganda  to  those  countries,  yes.  The  infor- 
mation that  we  obtained  from  abroad,  as  I  sa}^,  was  only  through 
this  one  channel,  the  Foreign  Broadcast  Information  Service,  and  was 
analyzed  by  our  own  people  and  put  out  for  availability  to  tlie  press 
here. 

Mr.  Mitchell,  The  subject  matter  being  investigated  by  this  com- 
mittee concerns  Katyn  and  Poland.  Can  you  tell  the  committee  who 
was  in  charge  of  that  operation  in  your  Department? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  I  don't  know  what  you  mean  b}'  "that  operation." 

Mr.  Mitchell.  The  overseas  broadcasts. 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  that  would  be  under  the  general  direction  of 
Robert  Sherwood,  who  was  then  the  head  of  the  Overseas  Branch. 
As  to  the  people  who  were  underneath  him,  there  were  quite  a  number 
of  them. 

The  policy  was  supposed  to  be  laid  down  in  Washington  and  fol- 
lowed by  our  opei'ating  staffs  in  various  points  around  the  world — New 
York,  Sail  Fi-ancisco,  the  Southwest  Pacific,  London,  Algiers,  and  so 
on — although  in  Algici-s  and  in  the  Southwest  Pacific,  of  course,  we 
were  under  military  direction. 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  1983 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  have  as  part  of  your  organization  a  desk 
or  an  individual  who  was  responsible  for  reporting  to  the  American 
people,  country  by  country? 

Mr,  Davis.  No. 

Mr.  ^IiTCHELL.  Responsible  for  reporting  the  news  that  came  in  ? 

JNlr.  Davis.  No  ;  we  did  not. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  didn't  have  an  area  desk? 

Mr.  Davis.  Not  for  reports  to  the  American  people.  We  had  area 
desks  for  propaganda  overseas.  But  normally,  we  did  not  produce 
much  news  for  the  American  people.  The  great  volume  of  news 
printed  in  the  American  press  and  used  on  the  radio  at  that  time  came 
from  the  news  services  and  special  correspondents  in  foreign  countries. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Then  how  can  you  explain  what  was  read  into  the 
record  a  few  minutes  ago  about  Mr.  Cranston,  who  was  a  member  of 
.3"our  staff,  having  this  meeting  in  New  York  with  members  of  the 
Foreign  Language  Radio  Wartime  Control? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  I  can't  recall  that  I  have  ever  heard  of  that  episode 
until  it  was  read  to  me.  But  I  should  say  that,  in  the  first  place,  the 
declaration  made  by  the  counsel  of  that  commit  tee  seems  to  have  been 
contradicted  by  a  statement  of  one  of  the  broadcasters  a  little  earlier, 
that  it  was  indicated  that  the  news  analysts  or  commentators  on  those 
stations  could  handle  the  news  the  way  they  wanted  to,  but  JNIr.  Crans- 
ton merely  hoped  that  they  would  not  handle  it  in  such  a  way  as  to  stir 
up  antipathy  between  two  of  our  allies. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  cannot  quite  understand  why  Mr.  Cranston's  par- 
ticular function  fitted  in  with  this  capacity,  since  it  was  not  the  func- 
tion of  the  OWI  to  handle  news  within  the  country. 

Mr.  Davis.  Strictly  speaking,  he  had  no  authority,  and  as  I  think 
that  excerpt  makes  clear,  he  made  no  attempt  to  impose  any  authority. 
He  merely  suggested  that  as  a  matter  of  moving  toward  the  winning 
of  the  war,  they  should  try  to  avoid  stirring  up  trouble  between  our 
allies. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  But  that  was  the  function  of  the  Office  of  Censor- 
ship? 

Mr.  Davis.  No.  The  Office  of  Censorship  was  supposed  to  tell  them 
what  they  could  not  print  or  what  they  could  not  broadcast.  We 
didn't  attempt  to  do  that,  and  I  think  that  the  excerpt  read  will  indi- 
cate that  Mr.  Cranston  didn't  attempt  to  do  that. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  I  can't  understand  why  Cranston  was  engaged 
in  that  particular  function  of  curtailing  news  within  the  United  States. 
The  job  of  the  OWI  was  outside,  was  it  not  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  The  job  of  the  OWI  was  to  provide  Government  news 
inside  the  United  States,  not  news  from  abroad.  This  was  a  function 
which  had  been  held  over  from  one  of  our  predecessor  organizations  in 
an  attemi^t  to  reason  with  some  of  the  foreign  language  broadcasting 
stations  which  at  the  beginning,  immediately  after  Pearl  Harbor,  and 
long  before  OWI — one  or  two  of  them,  still  had  some  persons  of  rather 
f ascistic  tendencies  on  their  staffs ;  and  I  believe  that  that  work  was 
started  then  to  try  to  persuade  them  to  present  their  broadcasts  so 
as  to  contribute  to  the  winning  of  the  war.  We  went  very  much  less 
far  in  that  direction  than  did  George  Creel  who,  by  the  simple  ex- 
pedient of  getting  hold  of  the  man  who  controlled  all  of  the  advertis- 
ing for  the  foreign  language  press,  managed  to  get  the  foreign  lan- 
guage piess  to  say  about  what  Creel  wanted  it  to  say. 


1984  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  was  George  Creel's  function  at  that  time  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  That  was  in  the  old  war,  it  was  substantially  the  same 
as  the  one  I  had  then. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  But  it  had  nothinfy  to  do  with  this  one? 

Mr.  Davis.  Oh,  no.    The  previous  one. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  still  can't  understand  why,  under  the  charter 
of  the  OWI,  any  individual  employed  by  the  OWI  would  take  it  upon 
himself,  or  else  by  policy  direction,  or  in  some  way,  to  contact  anyone 
within  the  United  States  concerning  broadcasts  of  news.  Was  it  with- 
in the  charter  ? 

Mr.  Davis,  I  should  have  to  read  the  charter  again  to  find  out 
whether  that  authority  may  have  lain  there.  As  I  say,  I  didn't  know 
•about  this  situation.  But,  as  I  think  this  testimony  will  indicate,  JNIr. 
Cranston  was  merely  talking  to  them  by  way  of  suggesting  that  they 
try  not  to  create  too  much  disharmony  among  two  of  our  allies.  It 
really  did  not  attempt  to  give  any  instructions,  and  he  did  not  propose 
to  tell  them  what  to  say.  It  is  stated  in  there  that  the  commentators 
could  say  anything  they  liked. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  if  I  recall  correctly,  Poland  was  an  ally  at  that 
time. 

Mr.  Davis.  What  is  that? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  If  I  recall  correctly,  Poland  was  an  ally  at  that 
time  i 

Mr.  Davis,  I  said  "between  two  of  our  allies." 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  I  still  can't  understand  why  Cranston,  in  his 
capacity  in  the  OWI,  would  in  any  way — that  was  a  function  of  some- 
body else,  wasn't  it?    Wasn't  it?    Was  it  a  function  of  the  OWI? 

Mr.  Davis.  No  ;  it  certainly  wasn't  a  f miction  of  anybody  else  that 
I  can  think  of.  I  don't  know  whether  it  was  properly  a  function  of  the 
OWL  As  to  why  he  did  this,  you  had  better  ask  Cranston.  As  I  say, 
I  didn't  remember  this  episode. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Thank  you,  sir.    We  will  have  Mr.  Cranston. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  now  like  to  have  Mr.  Pucinski  read  into  the 
record  a  broadcast  that  Mr.  Elmer  Davis  made  on  May  3, 1943. 

Chairman  Madden.  How  long  is  it? 

Mr.  Davis.  It  is  15  miiiutes,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  This  is  only  concerned  with  the  Katyn  affair. 

Chairman  Madden.  -All  right. 

Mr.  Pucinski.  Maybe  we  had  better  have  Mr.  Davis  read  it.  It  is 
his  exact  words,  and  he  will  probably  like  to  refer  to  it  while  you  are 
talking  to  him. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  appear  to  be  quoting  from  myself  on  May  3,  1943.  I 
may  say,  Mr.  Chairman,  tliat  I  don't  believe  I  have  seen  the  scripts 
of  this  broadcast  since  that  date,  but  I  have  no  doubt  that  it  is  correct 
(reading)  : 

The  Allied  s((ueeze  is  on  in  Tunisia,  and  is  going  to  be  slow  and  hard.  The 
enemy  is  fighting  with  great  skill  and  stubbornness,  and  dispatches  from  the 
front  report  heavy  casualties.  This  part  of  Tunisia  will  have  to  be  taken  hill 
by  hill,  and  every  hill  means  a  hard  struggle.  The  critical  jioiiit  of  the  Hue  is 
the  center,  where  the  P.ritish  First  Army  is  pushing  northeastward  from  Med.jez 
el  Hal).  Here  an  advance  of  only  a  few  kilometers  will  brin^-  them  into  tint 
country  much  easier  for  tank  operations.  The  Germans  realize  that  danger; 
here  their  counterattacks  are  most  persistent  and  vigorous.  Nevetheless  the 
enemy  is  fighting  a  losing  light.  The  Allied  air  forces  and  the  British  naval 
forces  are  knocking  oil"  ships  and   i)laiu's  on  which   the  Axis  must  depend  I'"i' 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1985 

suitplies  and  reinforcements,  and  this  with  the  steady  pressure  on  the  front  will 
eventually  break  the  enemy  down. 

The  Pacific  was  quiet  last  week,  but  the  Russians  started  an  offensive  on  the 
southern  end  of  their  front  across  the  straits  from  the  Crimea.  When  the  Ger- 
mans retreated  from  the  Caucasus  they  held  on  to  some  territory  there  which 
they  might  use  as  a  springboard  for  another  drive  against  the  Caucasus  from  it. 
It  seems  doubtful  if  they  can  ever  again  put  on  a  general  offensive  against 
Russia. 

Mr.  Mitchell,.  Will  you  go  down  now  to  the  part  about  Katyn  ? 
Mr.  Davis.  I  am  reading  it  along  as  it  comes,  INIr.  Counsel. 
Mr.  Mitchell.  Just  a  minute.    Please  start  right  there  [indicating]. 
Mr.  Davis  (reading)  : 

But  while  the  German  armies  are  finding  it  pretty  tough  going,  the  German 
piopaganda  won  a  striking  success  last  week  when  it  succeeded  in  bringing 
about  a  break  in  diplomatic  relations  between  Russia  and  the  Polish  Govern- 
ment in  exile.  The  way  the  Germans  did  this  is  a  good  example  of  the  doctrine 
Hitler  preached  in  Mein  Kampf,  that  it  is  easier  to  make  most  people  swallow 
a  big  lie  than  a  little  one.  When  the  Germans  had  beaten  Poland  in  September 
1939,  tlie  Russians  moved  in  and  occupied  eastern  Poland,  taking  thousands  of 
Polish  troops  prisoners.  In  June  1941,  when  the  Germans  attacked  Russia,  they 
overran  all  of  this  territory  and  have  held  it  since.  Now,  almost  2  years  later, 
they  suddenly  claim  to  have  discovered  near  Smolensk  the  corpses  of  thousands 
of  Polish  officers,  who,  according  to  the  Germans,  were  murdered  by  the  Russians 
I]  years  ago.  In  several  respects,  this  story  looks  very  fishy.  At  first  the  Germans 
were  quite  uncertain  about  the  number  of  killed.  At  one  time  the  Japanese  and 
the  Vichy  French  came  up  with  a  story  of  Rumanians  murdered  in  Odessa,  not 
I'oles  in' Smolensk.  First  they  said  10,000,  then  2,000,  and  then  5,000,  before 
finally  deciding  on  12,000.  Rome  and  Berlin  disagreed  as  to  how  they  had  been 
killed.  The  remains  must  have  been  better  preserved  than  is  usual  after  3  years. 
The  Russians  were  said  to  have  tried  hard  to  conceal  the  graves,  yet  they  buried 
every  man  in  uniform  with  his  identification  tag.  Suggestions  of  an  investiga- 
tion by  the  International  Red  Cross  mean  nothing,  for  the  Germans  control 
the  area.  It  would  be  easy  for  them  to  show  the  investigators  corpses  in  uniform 
with  identification  tags.  There  is  no  way  the  investigators  could  determine 
whether  these  men  were  killed  by  Russians  or  by  Germans,  as  they  probably 
were. 

I  might  say,  Mr.  Counsel,  that  after  the  lapse  of  9i/^  years,  I  am 
convinced  that  they  were  killed  by  the  Russians ;  but  this  was  a  state- 
ment made  at  the  time,  with  the  evidence  then  available. 

The  Germans  are  known  to  have  slaughtered  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Poles 
after  the  fighting  was  over.  If  they  found  a  camp  full  of  Polish  prisoners,  when 
they  attacked  Russia,  it  would  have  been  the  most  natural  thing  in  the  world 
for  them  to  murder  them,  too — if  not  at  the  moment,  then  later,  when  they  needed 
the  corpses  for  propaganda. 

Remember  that  when  the  Germans  invaded  Poland,  they  told  the  world  that 
they  had  found  the  graves  of  thousands  of  German  civilians  massacred  by  the 
Poles.  Few  people  believed  that  story :  It  is  all  the  more  remarkable  that  any 
Poles  who  remember  it  should  believe  this  one,  especially  as  its  motives  are  so 
obvious.  The  first  motive  is  to  distract  the  attention  of  the  world  from  the  mass 
murders  which  the  Germans  have  been  steadily  committing  in  Poland  for  3i/^ 
years — murders  by  now  so  numerous  that  they  look  like  a  deliberate  attempt  to 
exterminate  the  Polish  people.  Another  purpose  would  be  to  arouse  suspicion 
and  distrust  between  Russia  and  the  rest  of  the  United  States,  which  would  help 
the  Germans  in  two  ways.  Directly,  it  might  hamper  the  prosecution  of  the 
war  we  are  all  fighting  against  Germany.  Indix'ectly,  it  might  help  to  prop  up 
German  morale  at  home.  There  is  plenty  of  evidence  among  the  German  civilian 
population — yes,  even  among  the  Army — that  there  is  less  belief  that  they  can 
ever  win  a  decisive  victory  over  all  their  enemies.  But  the  German  propaganda 
has  persuaded  many  Germans  that  any  day  now  America  and  Britain  might  call 
off  the  war,  make  a  compromise  peace,  and  leave  Germany  free  to  turn  on  Russia. 
And  of  course,  more  people  will  believe  that  if  there  is  trouble  between  Russia 
and  the  other  United  Nations.  Anything  that  creates  division  among  the  United 
Nations,  concerns  every  one  of  those  nations — the  United  States  included^ 
because  we  must  hold  together  to  win  the  war. 


1986  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  tliink  that  is  enough,  Mr.  Davis.  Thank  you  very 
much. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  now  like  to  read  a  memorandum  from  the 
Department  of  State  dated  April  22,  1943,  which  was  approximately 
8  days  previous  to  the  broadcast  that  Mr.  Davis  has  just  put  on  the 
record. 

In  the  upper  left-hand  corner  of  this  memorandum  is  the  stamp 
of  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  State,  dated  April  22,  1943,  being  the 
stamp  of  Mr.  Berle. 

The  first  name  from  this  memorandum  has  been  deleted,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  agreement  with  the  Department  of  State. 

At  the  request  of  Mr.  Berle,  So-and-So  called  to  ask  whether  he  had  any  objec- 
tion to  Stockholm  air.ffram  No.  so-and-so  heins  given  to  the  OWI,  apparently  for 
the  purpose  of  using  information  contained  therein  regarding  German  atrocities 
against  Jews  in  Poland  in  a  propaganda  campaign  which  OWI  wishes  to  start 
in  order  to  counteract  the  German  propaganda  story  regarding  the  alleged  exe- 
cution of  some  10,000  Polish  officers  by  the  Soviet  authorities.  It  is  felt  that 
because  of  the  extremely  delicate  nature  of  the  question  of  the  alleged  execution 
of  these  Polish  officers,  and  on  the  l)asis  of  the  various  conflicting  contentions 
of  all  parties  concerned,  it  would  appear  to  be  advisable  to  refrain  from  taking 
any  definite  stand  in  regard  to  this  question.  Although  it  is  realized  that  the 
story  emanates  from  German  sources,  and  is  being  used  by  the  German  propa- 
ganda machine  in  an  effort  to  divide  the  members  of  the  United  Nations,  it  should 
be  borne  in  mind  that  whether  the  story  is  true  or  not,  it  is  known  that  the 
Polish  Government  has,  without  success,  for  the  past  year  and  a  half  been  en- 
deavoring to  ascertain  from  the  Soviet  Government  the  whereabouts  of  some 
S,000  Polish  officers  who,  on  the  best  of  available  evidence,  were  captured  by  the 
Soviet  forces  in  1939. 

In  this  connection,  the  Polish  Government  in  the  summer  of  1942,  specifically 
asked  the  American  Ambassador  to  Moscow  to  intervene  with  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment in  an  effort  to  cause  the  latter  to  release  the  S,000  Polish  officers,  who  were 
reportedly  still  being  held  by  the  Soviet  authorities.  According  to  the  Polish 
officials  here,  the  Soviet  authorities  have  never  released  one  of  the  officers  on  the 
list  presented  by  the  Polish  Government.  Furthermore,  according  to  a  telegram 
of  April  20,  7  p.  m.,  from  Berne,  it  appears  that  the  International  Red  Cross 
has  agreed  to  send  a  delegation  to  Smolensk  to  investigate  the  German  allega- 
tions. It  would  appear,  therefore,  that  until  further  and  more  conclusive  evi- 
dence is  available,  it  would  be  Inadvisable  for  OWI  to  take  a  definite  stand  in 
this  regard. 

Now,  Mr.  Davis,  it  is  evident  that  the  Department  of  State 

Chairman  Madden.  Pardon  me.  Did  you  want  that  introduced  as 
an  exhibit? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Davis.  Is  that  a  memorandum  to  me  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  just  a  straight  memorandum  setting  forth 
the  State  Department's  policy  at  that  time. 

Chairman  Madden.  Identify  it  and  mark  it  as  an  exhibit. 

Mr.  MrrciiELL.  Yes,  sir. 

This  is  a  memorandum  setting  forth  the  policy  of  the  Department 
of  State,  with  respect  to  the  massacre  of  the  Polish  officers  in  Katyn. 
It  is  an  unsigned  memorandum,  the  original  of  which  is  in  the  Depart- 
ment of  State's  files. 

If  you  desire  to  see  the  original,  sir,  I  will  ask  Mr.  Ben  Brown  of 
the  Department  of  State  to  produce  that. 

Ml'.  Davis.  I  trust  you  have  had  a  certified  copy  made  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  This  is  a  photostatic  copy  of  it,  sir. 

Mr.  Davis.  All  right. 

Chairman  Madden.  Will  you  mark  that  as  an  exhibit  and  intro- 
duce it? 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1987 

Mr.  Mitchell.  This  will  be  exhibit  8A,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Chairman  Madden.  Do  you  want  to  have  the  portion  of  Mr.  Davis' 
broadcast  marked  as  an  exhibit  and  introduce  it  in  evidence? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Let  us  do  it  in  reverse.  We  will  mark  this  as  8  and 
this  as  8A. 

Chairman  Madden.  Exhibit  8  is  Mr.  Davis'  broadcast  and  exhibit 
8A  is  the  State  Department  memorandum.  Those  documents  will  be 
accepted  in  evidence  as  exhibits  8  and  8A. 

(Exhibits  8  and  8 A  were  received  and  follow  here :) 

Exhibit  8 — Mr.  Elmer  Davis'  Radio  Broadcast  of  Mat  3,  1943 

{Enclosure  No.  2  to  despatch  No.  1873  dated  June  21,  1943,  from  the  Legation  at  Stock- 
holm. Submitted  as  Enclosure  2  to  Department  on  Embassy  Despatch  1008,  June 
0,  1952.] 

American  Legation 
Stockholm 

COMMENTS  FROM  THE  AMERICAN  PRESS 

No.  51  Vol.  II.  May  3,  1943. 

The  Weekly  War  Survey 

lu  his  weekly  l)roadcast,  the  Director  of  the  Office  of  War  Information,  Elmer 
Davis,  sixike  as  follows  : 

"The  Allied  squeeze  is  on  in  Tunisia  and  is  going  to  be  slow  and  hard.  The 
enemy  is  fighting  witli  great  skill  and  stubborness,  and  dispatches  from  the  front 
report  lieavy  casualties.  This  part  of  Tunisia  will  have  to  be  taken  hill  by  hill, 
and  every  iiill  means  a  hard  struggle.  The  critical  point  of  the  line  is  the 
center  wiiere  the  British  First  Army  is  pushing  northeastward  from  Medjez 
El  Bab :  liere  an  advance  of  only  a  few  kilometers  will  bring  them  into  flat  coun- 
try much  easier  for  tank  operations.  The  Germans  realize  that  danger;  here 
their  counterattacks  are  most  persistent  and  vigorous.  Nevertheless  the  enemy 
is  fighting  a  losing  fight.  The  Allied  air  forces  and  the  British  naval  forces 
are  knocking  off  ships  and  planes  on  which  the  Axis  must  depend  for  supplies 
and  reinforcements,  and  this  with  the  steady  pressure  on  the  front  will  even- 
tually break  the  enemy  down. 

"The  Pacific  was  quiet  last  week,  but  the  Russians  started  an  offensive  on 
the  southern  end  of  their  front  across  the  straits  from  the  Crimea.  When  the 
Germans  retreated  from  the  Caucasus  they  held  on  to  some  territory  there  which 
they  might  use  as  a  springboard  for  another  drive  against  the  Caucasus  this 
suinmer.  It  seems  doubtful  if  they  can  ever  again  put  on  a  general  offensive 
against  Riissia,  but  they  may  have  enough  force  this  summer  for  regional  at- 
tacks, and  the  Caucasus  with  its  oilfields  is  perhaps  the  most  probable  target. 
The  present  Russian  attack  seems  aimed  at  breaking  down  that  springboard  be- 
fore anybody  can  .lump  oft"  from  it. 

"But  while  the  German  armies  are  finding  it  pretty  tough  going,  the  German 
propaganda  won  a  striking  success  last  week  when  it  succeeded  in  bringing  about 
a  break  in  diplomatic  relations  between  Russia  and  the  Polish  government  in 
exile.  The  way  the  Germans  did  this  is  a  good  example  of  the  doctrine  Hitler 
preached  in  Mein  Kampf,  that  it  is  easier  to  make  most  people  swallow  a  big 
lie  than  a  little  one.  When  the  Germans  had  beaten  Poland  in  September  1939, 
the  Russians  moved  in  and  occupied  eastern  Poland,  taking  thousands  of  Polish 
troops  prisoners.  In  June  1941  when  the  Germans  attacked  Russia,  they  overran 
all  this  territory  and  have  held  it  since.  Now,  almost  two  years  later  they  sud- 
denly claim  to  have  discovered  near  Smolensk  the  corpses  of  thousands  of  Polish 
officers,  who,  according  to  the  Germans,  were  murdered  by  the  Russians  three 
years  ago.  In  several  respects  this  story  looks  very  fishy.  At  first  the  Germans 
were  quite  uncertain  about  the  number  of  killed;  at  one  time  the  Japanese  and 
the  Vichy  French  came  up  with  a  story  of  Rumanians  murdered  in  Odessa,  not 
Poles  in  Smolensk.  First  they  said  10,000,  then  2,000  and  then  5,000,  before 
finally  deciding  on  12,000.  Rome  and  Berlin  disagreed  as  to  how  they  had  been 
killed.  The  remains  must  have  been  better  preserved  than  is  usual  after  three 
years.  The  Russians  were  said  to  have  tried  hard  to  conceal  the  graves,  yet 
they  buried  every  man  in  uniform  with  his  identification  tag.  Suggestions  of  an 
investigation  by  the  International  Red  Cross  mean  nothing,  for  the  Germans 


1988  THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE 

control  the  aroa.    It  would  be  easy  for  them  to  show  the  investigators  corpse 
in  uniform  with  identification  tags.     There  is  no  way  the  investigators  couN 
determine  whether  these  men  were  killed  by  Russians,  or  by  Germans  as  the; 
probably  were.     The  Germans  are  l<nuwn  to  have  slaughtered  hundreds  of  thou 
sands  of  Poles  after  the  fighting  was  over.     If  they  found  a  camp  full  of  Polish 
prisoners  when  they  attacked  Russia,  it  would  have  been  the  most  natural  thing 
in  the  world  for  them  to  murder  them,  too,  if  not  at  the  moment,  then  later  when 
they  needed  the  corpses  for  propaganda. 

"Remember  that  when  the  Germans  invaded  Poland  they  told  the  world  that 
they  had  found  the  graves  of  thousands  of  German  civilians  massacred  by  the 
Poles.  Few  people  believed  that  story ;  it  is  all  the  more  remarkable  that  any 
Poles  who  remember  it  should  believe  this  one,  especially  as  its  motives  are  so 
obvious.  The  first  motive  is  to  distract  the  attention  of  the  world  from  the  mass 
murders  which  the  Germans  have  been  steadily  committing  in  Poland  for  three 
and  a  half  years — murders  by  now  so  numerous  that  they  look  like  a  deliberate 
attempt  to  exterminate  the  Polish  people.  Another  purpose  would  be  to  arouse 
suspicion  and  distrust  between  Russia  and  the  rest  of  the  United  Nations — which 
would  help  the  Germans  in  two  ways.  Directly,  it  might  hamper  the  prosecu- 
tion of  the  war  we  are  all  fighting  against  Germany.  Indirectly,  it  might  help 
to  prop  up  German  morale  at  home.  There  is  plenty  of  evidence  among  the 
German  civilian  population — yes,  even  among  the  army — that  there  is  less  belief 
that  they  can  ever  win  a  decisive  victory  over  all  their  enemies.  But  German 
propaganda  has  persuaded  many  Germans  that  any  day  now  America  and  Britain 
might  call  off  the  war,  make  a  compromise  peace  and  leave  Germany  free  to  turn 
on  Russia.  And  of  course  more  people  will  believe  that  if  there  is  trouble  between 
Russia  and  the  other  United  Nations.  Anything  that  creates  division  among  the 
United  Nations  concerns  every  one  of  those  nations — the  United  States  included — 
because  we  must  all  hold  together  to  win  the  war.  After  the  war,  if  the  United 
Nations  continue  to  hold  together  in  some  sort  of  collective  security  system,  there 
will  be  less  danger  that  any  of  the  great  powers  may  feel  it  has  to  safeguard  its 
individual  security  at  the  expense  of  its  weaker  neighbors.  That  is  the  only  way 
this  issue  can  be  treated — as  one  phase  of  the  problem  of  world  security. 


Exhibit  8A — State  Department  Memorandum  Which  Bore  a  Ruhijer  Stamp 
Mark  Indicating  It  Had  Been  Delivered  to  Me.  Beele  on  April  22,  1943 

Department  of  State. 
Division  of  European  Affairs, 

April  22,  J9',J. 
memoranduji 

of  FC,  at  the  request  of  Mr.  Berle,  called  to  ask  whether  Eu 


had  any  objection  to  Stockholm's  airgram  No.  A-lSl,  April  5,  4  p.  m.,  being  given 
to  OWI  apparently  for  the  purpose  of  using  information  contained  therein 
regarding  German  atrocities  against  Jews  in  Poland  in  a  propaganda  campaign 
which  OWI  wishes  to  start  in  order  to  counteract  the  German  propaganda  story 
regarding  the  alleged  execution  of  some  10,000  Polish  officers  by  the  Soviet 
authorities. 

It  is  felt  that  because  of  the  extremely  delicate  nature  of  the  question  of  the 
alleged  execution  of  these  Polish  oflicers  and  on  the  basis  of  the  various  con- 
flicting contentions  ol"  all  parties  concerned,  it  would  appear  to  be  advisable  to 
refrain  from  taking  any  definite  stand  in  regard  to  this  question. 

Although  it  is  realized  that  the  story  emanates  from  German  sources  and  is 
being  used  by  the  German  propaganda  machine  in  an  effort  to  divide  the  members 
of  the  United  Nations,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  whether  the  .story  is  true 
or  not,  it  is  known  that  the  I'ollsh  (lovernment  has,  without  success,  for  the  past 
year  and  a  half  been  endeavoring  to  ascertain  from  the  Soviet  (Joveriunent  the 
whereabouts  of  some  8,000  Polish  oflicers  who  on  the  best  avnilal>le  evidence  were 
captured  by  the  Soviet  forc(>s  in  ID.'^O.  In  this  connection  the  Polish  (Jovernmeut 
in  tlie  summer  of  1942  specifically  asked  that  the  American  Ambassador  to 
Moscow  intervene  with  the  Soviet  Government  in  an  effort  to  cause  tlie  latter 
to  release  the  8,000  Polish  oflicers  who  were?  purportedly  still  being  lH>ld  by  the 
Soviet  authorities.  According  to  Polish  oflicials  here  the  Soviet  authorities  have 
never  released  one  of  the  oflicers  on  the  list  presented  by  tlie  Polish  Government. 

Furthermore,  according  to  telegram  No.  2471,  April  20,  7  p.  m.,  from  Bern,  it 


THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE  1989 

apiJears  that  the  International  Red  Cross  has  agreed  to  send  a  delegation  to 
Smolensk  to  investigate  the  German  allegations. 

It  would  appear,  therefore,  that  until  further  and  more  conclusive  evidence  is 
available  it  would  be  Inadvisable  for  OWI  to  take  a  definite  stand  in  this  regard. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  felt  that  it  is  imperative  to  counteract  the  German 
propaganda  it  is  suggested  that  such  action  should  be  limited  to  a  campaign 
liointing  out  that  the  American  Government  and  the  American  people  refuse  to 
allow  German  propaganda  stories  regarding  the  alleged  execution  of  the  Polish 
officers  to  detract  their  attention  from  the  many  and  continuing  crimes  which 
have  been  committed  by  the  German  authorities  since  the  beginning  of  the  war. 
In  this  connection  OWI  could  repeat  the  many  authenticated  stories  such  as  that 
of  Lidice  and  might  even  quote,  without  giving  the  source  or  stating  that  the 
information  has  been  completely  verified,  pertinent  information  from  the  attached 
telegram  from  Stockholm.  It  is  not  believed  that  the  information  in  this  tele- 
gram should  be  attributed  as  coming  from  official  sources  since  in  the  last  para- 
graph doubt  is  thrown  on  the  accuracy  of  the  information  reported. 

As  of  possible  interest  in  this  connection  there  is  attached  a  copy  of  the  Polish 
National  Council's  statement  which  follows  in  some  way  the  line  suggested  for 
OWI. 

(Committee  Note. — A  copy  of  the  Polish  National  Council's  statement  referred 
to  in  the  last  paragraph  of  exhibit  8A  appears  as  exhibit  21  on  p.  678  of  pt.  4  of 
this  committee's  published  hearings.) 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr,  Davis,  you  have  told  us  previously  that  on  over- 
all policy  and  on  high-level  policy  matters,  you  discussed  those  with 
Mr.  Hull  and  Mr.  Welles.  I  would  like  to  ask  you  now  whether  you 
ever  discussed  this  matter  specifically  at  this  time  with  the  Department 
of  State  or  any  official  therein? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  don't  remember.  I  may  say,. Mr.  Counsel,  that  this 
was  not  one  of  the  major  issues  that  I  had  to  deal  with  at  that  time, 
from  my  point  of  view.  To  a  Pole  it  was  certainly  the  most  impor- 
tant issue  in  the  world,  but  to  me,  as  to  the  head  of  every  department 
or  agency  of  Government,  about  that  time  ol  year  the  principal  ques- 
tion was  how  his  budget  was-  going  to  get  through  Congress,  and  that 
absorbed  most  of  my  time.  So  whether  I  asked  advice  on  this  question 
from  either  INIr.  Hull  or  Mr.  Welles,  I  don't  remember.  I  don't  recall 
seeing  this  memorandum  from  Mr.  Berle,  although  it  is  conceivable 
that  I  might  have.    I  don't  know. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  think  the  records  of  the  broadcast  are  avail- 
able today — who  prepared  it  for  you?    You  didn't  prepare  it? 

Mr,  Dwis,  Of  course — I  wrote  my  own. 

Mr.  Mitchell,  Then  you  wrote  that  broadcast  ? 

Mr,  Davis,  Yes. 

Mr,  Mitchell,  'WHiere  did  you  get  the  information  concerning  the 
Polish  situation  at  that  time? 

Mr.  Davis.  Do  you  mean  the  information  in  here  [indicating  ex- 
hibit 8]  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes, 

Mr.  Davis.  There  doesn't  seem  to  be  much  about  the  Polish  situation. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  mean  the  propaganda, 

Mr,  Davis,  A  good  deal  of  it  was  printed  in  the  newspapers  at  the 
time.  Some  of  it  may  even  have  been  in  my  broadcasts,  I  imagine 
that  the  correlation  of  different  stories  told  by  different  Axis  Powers 
probably  came  from  recorded  broadcasts  by  the  FBIS  wliich  came 
through  our  Foreign  News  Bureau. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  since  there  was  a  question  of  doubt  at  that 
particular  time,  and  since  the  International  Ked  Cross  was  becoming 
involved  in  this,  and  since  it  was  after  the  Polish-Soviet  relationship 


1990  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

was  severed,  wliy  did  you  see  fit  at  that  time  to  take  the  stand  yon 
took  in  this  broadcast  ? 

Mr.  DA^^s.  Because  I  beh'eved  it  at  that  time  to  be  correct.  It  w:is 
a  matter  of  news.  For  a  period  of  about  3  months  I  did  a  weekly 
broadcast  on  an  over-all  survey  of  the  war  situation,  which  I  even- 
tually dropped  because  I  could  never  be  quite  sure  who  was  broad- 
casting. It  was  not  the  executive  branch  of  the  Government  of  the 
United  States.  That— if  that  would  have  been  the  case,  I  would  have 
had  to  have  Presidential  approval  for  all  I  said.  It  wasn't  me,  be- 
cause I  felt  that  in  justice  to  other  broadcasters  I  should  not  use. 
even  for  background  interpretation,  any  confidential  information  that 
came  to  me  as  a  result  of  my  Government  service.  Some  of  that 
confidential  information  I  probably  could  have  picked  up  if  I  had 
been  a  reporter,  by  going  around,  so  it  was  not  as  good  as  Davis 
would  have  been  normally,  and  it  was  not  as  authoritative  as  repre- 
sentations of  the  Government  of  the  United  States.  So  about  the 
end  of  3  months,  I  dropped  it,  but  I  was  doing  it  at  this  time.  This 
was  a  matter  of  news. 

With  regard  to  the  suggestion  of  Mr.  Berle,  as  I  say,  I  don't  remem- 
ber whether  I  saw  it  or  not,  but  this  was  an  issue  which  a  news  organ- 
ization could  hardly  overlook.  One  of  our  difficulties  with  the  De- 
partment of  State  Avas  that  there  was  only  the  question  of:  AVliere  is 
the  boundary  line  between  policy  and  implementation  of  that  policy 
by  propaganda?  They  could  tell  us,  unquestionably,  the  general 
line,  but  when  they  attempted  to  tell  us  how  we  could  handle  it  in 
propaganda  overseas,  they  Avere  dealing  with  something  which  very 
often  they  didn't  know  very  much  about.  I  do  not  think  any  news 
organization  could  have  overlooked  this.  If  I  had  not  happened  to 
be  broadcasting  once  a  week  at  that  time,  I  would  undoubtedly  have 
had  nothing  to  say  about  this  domestically,  as  it  was  outside  of  our 
field.  But  we  were  handling  it  in  our  foreign  propaganda — we 
couldn't  overlook  it.  I  mean  that  is  a  case  where  silence  would  be 
about  the  worst  ]jossible  propaganda  you  could  make. 

At  the  time  I  made  this  broadcast,  the  evidence  rested  almost  en- 
tirely on  the  word  of  Josef  Goebbels.  a  man  whose  reputation  for 
veracity  was  extremely  low. 

Now,  it  appears,  with  all  of  the  subsequent  evidence,  that  has  be- 
come available,  that  this  was  the  one  time  he  was  right;  but  I  had 
no  reason  to  believe  so  at  the  time.  I  have  never  been  able  to  accept 
the  argument  that  I  should  have  believed  the  story  of  the  Propaganda 
Minister  of  a  Government  with  which  the  Goverinnent  of  the  I"^nited 
States  was  at  war,  without  some  corroboration. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  But  the  Polisli  Government  in  exile  had  alrciidy  re- 
quested the  International  Red  Cross  to  investigate? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  they  had  requested  that;  but,  as  I  remember,. the 
Commission  of  Physicians  that  finally  went  in  there — was  that  ap- 
pointed by  the  International  Red  Cross?     I  don't  remember. 

Mr.  MiTciiElL.  No. 

Mr.  Davis.  That  Avas  a  Gei-man  group  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  The  International  Red  Cross  was  prevented  from 
going  in  there  because  of  the  fact  thai  the  Soviets  refused  to  partici- 
pate. Conse(iuently,  the  (Germans  formed  an  International  Medical 
Commission.  But  Poland  Avas  an  ally  at  tliat  time.  Poland  had  re- 
quested at  that  time  an  International  Red  Cross  investigation.     Re- 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1991 

latioiLsliiiDS  AYere  broken  off  between  the  Poles  and  the  Soviets  on 
April  ^6  1043  Yonr  broadcast  is  dated  May  2.  So  there  mnst  have 
been  son'ie  donbt  or  question.  Otherwise  the  Polish  Governn^nt 
wouldn't  have  gone  to  the  extent  of  asking  for  an  International  iied 

Cross  investigation.  ■,     ,  x  i    ^  t  ^  i^  ^i    . 

Mr  D  WIS.  Oh,  there  may  have  been  some  doubt,  but  1  telt  that  as 
at  that  moment  the  doubt  should  be  resolved  against  the  Propaganda 
Minister  of  the  enemy. 

I  mav  say  that  that  broadcast  earned  me  three  columns  of  denunci- 
ation from 'the  Daily  Worker  and  also  three  columns  of  denunciation 
from  the  Polish  paper,  or  at  least  I  was  told  it  was  denunciation.  I 
couldn't  read  it.  At  that  moment  both  the  Polish  newspaper  and  the 
Daily  Worker  knew  of  what  I  had  said. 

Ml'.  Mitchell.  I  have  no  further  questions. 

Chairman  Madden.  INIr.  Machrowicz? 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Mr.  Davis,  how  long  did  you  remain  with  the 
Office  of  War  Information  ?  When  did  you  sever  your  relationship 
with  the  Office  of  War  Information  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  September  15,  1945. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  During  the  time  that  you  were  m  the  Office  of 
War  Information,  had  you  ever  known  of  the  reports  of  Colonel  Van 
Vliet  and  Colonel  Stewart  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Never,  sir.  As  far  as  I  can  recall  now,  I  never  heard  ol 
those  reports  until  they  came  out  in  the  investigations  of  this  com- 
mittee. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Those  reports,  which  indicated  Russian  guilty 
were  never  made  known  to  you  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Now,  how  large  a  staff  did  you  have  in  the  Office 
of  War  Information  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  at  the  peak  we  had  about  9,000  here  and  abroad, 
5,000  Americans,  and  about  4,000  of  what  we  called  locals,  chauffeurs 
and  interpreters,  and  things  like  that. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  3^011  have  a  so-called  Polish  Section  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  How  were  these  people  selected? 

]\Ir.  Davis.  A  good  many  of  them  were  there  when  I  came.  They 
had  come  from  the  predecessor  organization,  the  Coordinator  of  In- 
formation. I  don't  remember  who  selected  the  man  who  was  the  head 
of  our  Polish  desk  in  Washington,  Mr.  Ludwig  Krzyzanowski,  but  he 
was  a  very  sound  man. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  know  the  late  Congressman  John 
Lesinski  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  have  had  some  correspondence  with  ]Mr.  Lesinski. 

Mr.  Machrowicz,  Was  it  at  the  time  you  were  in  the  Office  of  War 
Information? 

Mr.  Davis.  No  ;  just  recently — I  mean  2  or  3  years  ago. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Do  you  have  a  recollection  that  Congressman 
John  Lesinski,  the  late  Congressman — I  mean  the  senior  Mr.  Lesinski — 
having  warned  you  about  the  fact  that  there  were  several  Commu- 
nists in  the  Office  of  War  Information? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  don't  recall  that.  I  recall  that  he  made  a  speech  in 
the  summer  of  1943  which  contained  more  lies  than  were  ever  com- 
prised in  any  other  speech  made  about  the  Office  of  War  Information, 


1992  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

and  that  is  saying  quite  a  lot.  I  may  say  that  I  have  made  that  state- 
ment to  Mr.  Lesinski  before  he  died.  I  mean  that  I  have  not  waited 
until  after  he  is  dead.  I  told  him  so  in  writing  when  he  repeated 
some  of  those  statements  2  or  3  years  ago.  I  asked  him  where  he  got 
the  information,  because  that  was  a  perfectly  absurd  speech  to  be 
made  by  a  Member  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  who  knows 
anything  about  American  politics  or  the  American  news  business. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Now,  let  me  ask  you  w^hether  you  received  any 
warnings  from  the  then  Polish  Ambassador  to  the  United  States, 
iVmbassaclor  Ciechanowski,  warning  you  about  the  fact  that  there 
were  some  Communist  employees  in  the  OWI  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  received  a  great  number  of  allegations  from  Mr. 
Ciechanowski.  I  can't  remember  all  of  them  now,  but  they  were  in- 
vestigated, and,  as  I  recall,  there  was  no  convincing  evidence  to 
support  them. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Do  you  know  Irene  Belinska,  who  was  in  the 
Polish  Section? 

]\Ir.  Davis.  I  don't  remember  here. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  For  your  information,  she  was  at  that  time  one 
of  the  members  of  the  Polish  Section  in  your  office. 

Mr.  Davis.  Was  she  here  or  in  New  York  ? 

Mr.  INIaciirowicz.  In  Washington.  She  is  the  daughter  of  Ludwig 
Rajchman,  who  was  the  first  consul  of  the  Polish  Communist  Em- 
bassy in  Washington  in  1945.  Rajchman  engineered  the  surrender 
of  the  Polish  Government  in  exile's  files  to  to  the  Polish  Communist 
Government  in  Washington.  In  194:7,  this  same  Miss  Balinska  re- 
turned to  Poland — she  was  then  employed  by  the  Office  of  War 
Information — returned  to  Communist  Poland  and  then  came  back  to 
the  United  States  and  is  now  with  a  Polish  Communist  publishing 
house  which  publishes  an  anti-American  newspaper.  Did  vou  know 
that? 

Mr.  Davis.  She  could  not  have  been  employed  by  the  Office  of  War 
Information  in  1947,  because  we  had  folded  up. 

Mr.  ]VL\ciirowicz.  No,  not  in  1947.    It  was  prior  to  that  time. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  don't  remember. 

Mr.  MachSowicz.  You  don't  remember  having  been  warned  by 
Ambassador  Ciechanowski  or  by  anyone  else  about  the  fact  that  she 
w^as  in  your  employ  and  that  she  was  a  Communist? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  don't  remember.  It  may  have  happened.  I  don't 
know ;  it  is  a  long  time  ago. 

]Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  know  a  Mira  Zlotowski,  who  was  in  your 
employ  in  1945  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  don't  recall.  Mr.  Krzyzanowski  was  the  only  man  I 
ever  had  much  dealing  with,  as  I  say,  as  the  head  of  our  Polish  desk 
in  Washington. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  know  Mrs.  Zlotowski,  the  wife  of  Prof. 
Ignatius  Zlotowski,  the  coiniselor  of  the  Polish  Conununist  Embassy 
in  Washington,  who  was  denounced  as  a  Communist  by  General  Mo- 
delski  of  the  Polish  Embassy,  who  had  resigned?  He  testified  before 
the  House  Un-American  Activities  Connnittee  that  Mrs.  Zlotowski 
was  a  Communist  agent. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  have  no  doubt  of  that. 

IVIr.  Machrowicz.  You  don't  remember  her  being  employed  by  the 
Office  of  War  Information? 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  1993 

■'  Mr.  Davis.  She  may  well  have  been.  I  don't  remember.  As  I  say, 
the  only  man  I  dealt  with  Avas  Mr.  Krzyzanowski,  who  after  he  left  us, 
went  to  the  United  Nations.  For  3  or  4  years  the  Polish  Communist 
Government  tried  to  get  him  out  of  his  job  at  the  United  Nations 
because  he  was  working  for  us.  I  don't  know  whether  he  is  still 
employed  there. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  know  a  Stefan  Arski,  alias  Arthur 
Salman  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  For  your  information,  he  was  also  employed  by 
the  Office  of  War  Information  in  1945.  He  is  now  in  Warsaw,  Poland, 
and  is  editor  in  chief  of  the  Communist  paper  Robotnik,  which  means 
The  Worker,  tlie  most  outspoken  anti-American  organ  in  Warsaw.  He 
at  that  time  was  also  an  employee  of  the  Office  of  War  Information. 
You  have  no  recollection  of  him  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  have  no  recollection  of  either  Ambassador 
Ciechanowski  or  Congressman  Lesinski  warning  you  about  the  fact 
that  these  three  persons  were  known  Communists,  and  were  in  the 
employ  of  the  Office  of  War  Information  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  don't  remember  that  Mr.  Lesinski  ever  warned  me 
about  anything,  Mr.  Cieclianowski,  perhaps  by  his  excessive  number 
of  warnings,  made  me  forget  which  particular  ones  he  especially 
spoke  about. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Would  it  refresh  your  recollection  if  I  told  you 
that  you  told  Ambassador  Ciechanowski  to  keep  away  from  that 
matter  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  don't  know,  but  I  do  know  that  I  was  often  tempted 
to  tell  various  of  the  representatives  of  the  governments  in  exile  to 
stay  out  of  our  business,  because  almost  eveiy  one  of  them  seemed  to 
think  that  it  was  our  duty  to  carry  out  the  policies  of  his  government 
and  not  those  of  the  United  States.  There  were  only  two  exceptions 
to  that  that  I  can  remember,  of  the  governments  in  exile,  the  Czechs, 
that  is,  the  good  Czechs,  Benes,  and  Masaryk  and  the  Filipino  Govern- 
ment. 

I  will  anticipate  your  next  question.  Mr.  Hof  meister,  who  was  head 
of  our  Czechoslovak  desk  in  New  York,  after  the  Communists  seized 
power,  became  a  Communist  and  is  now,  I  believe,  the  Czechoslovak 
Ambassador  in  Paris.  But  he  showed  no  signs  of  that  inclination 
while  he  was  with  us  that  I  ever  heard  of. 

Mr;  Machrowicz.  You  took  that  attitude,  even  though  they  had 
warned  you  of  the  presence  of  Communist  agents  in  the  Office  of  War 
Information  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  If  I  had  taken  seriously  all  of  the  stories  about  agents  of 
the  Communists  in  the  Office  of  War  Information  I  would  have  had 
nothing  else  to  do  but  to  fire  the  whole  staff.  We  investigated  every- 
thing as  much  as  we  could,  and  we  found  that  99  percent  of  the  allega- 
tions were  without  foundation.  I  remember  that  at  one  time  I  re- 
ceived a  very  serious  warning  in  the  summer  of  1944  about  some  of  our 
people  in  Hollj^wood  who  were  associating  with  a  dangerous  and  sub- 
versive character  who  at  that  time  happened  to  be  the  chairman  of  the 
Dewey  comniittee  in  Hollywood,  and  who  had  also  written  the  most 
effective  anti-Communist  picture  that  was  ever  put  on  the  screen. 


1994  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Mr,  Machrowicz.  Do  you  have  any  doubt  about  the  fact  that  these 
three  persons  whom  I  have  mentioned  were  actually  Communists  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  have  no  doubt  that  they  are  now.  They  may  be  band- 
wagon Communists,  like  a  lot  of  others  who  wanted  to  be  on  the 
winning  side. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  think  that  in  commenting  on  the  testimony 
taken  before  the  House  committee  in  1943,  you  referred  to  the  fact 
that  Mr.  Cranston  was  only  expressing  his  hope  as  to  what  these  com- 
mentators would  say ;  is  that  correct  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  that  was  the  way  it  sounded  to  me.  Counsel  for 
the  committee  phrased  it  a  little  differently,  but  it  seemed  to  me  that 
the  testimony  of  one  of  the  witnesses  will  indicate  that  it  was  as  you 
say. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  will  refer  you  to  this  question  and  answer : 

Mr.  Gaket.  And  they  wanted  to  know  what  you  could  do  about  getting  the 
program  content  on  those  Detroit  stations  to  conform  to  their  views  of  what 
should  be  put  over  the  air  in  the  United  States  about  the  Russian  situation? 
That  is  the  sum  and  substance  of  what  Cranston  was  trying  to  get  you  to  do? 

Mr.  Lang.  I  don't  know  tliat  it  was  expressed  that  way.  That  was  the 
thought. 

Would  you  say  that  Mr.  Cranston  was  right  in  trying  to  get  any  sta- 
tion in  Detroit — or  any  other  station — to  conform  to  the  views  on 
Avhat  should  be  put  over  the  air? 

Mr.  Davis.  No.  What  should  be  broadcast  over  the  air  in  the 
United  States  about  the  Russian  situation? 

Mr,  Machrowicz.  Yes. 

Mr.  Davis.  No;  that  would  be  quite  beyond  our  authority  or  quite 
beyond  my  desires.  But  if  you  Avill  look  back  a  little  further,  you  will 
find  that  one  of  these  gentlemen  testified  rather  to  the  opposite. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  am  just  referring  to  this  particular  question : 
You  would  say  that  if  he  acted  in  the  manner  that  has  been  described 
here,  he  acted  improperly  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  think  he  acted  improperly  in  that  case,  j'es — if  he  so 
did. 

Mr,  Machrowicz.  Did  you  at  any  time  after  your  original  broad- 
cast in  May  1943,  broadcast  any  information  indicating  the  receipt 
of  information  showing  Russian  guilt  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  don't  remember. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  What  information  did  you  liave  otlier  than  wliut 
you  have  already  said,  upon  which  to  base  your  belief  as  to  tlie  truth 
of  the  contents  of  tliat  statement  of  May  3, 1943  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Just  what  I  have  here,  the  conflicting  stories  told  by  the 
various  Axis  Nations,  and  the  general  uiuvliability  of  Joseph  Goeb- 
bels. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Now,  is  it  still  your  opinion,  as  expressed  in  that 
bi'oadcast,  that  the  request  by  the  Polish  Government  for  an  impartial 
Red  Cross  investigation  was  a  maneuver,  brought  about  by  German 
propaganda? 

Mr.  Davis.  No.  I  except  to  that  to  the  extent  that  the  German 
])i'()pagaiida,  bringing  in  the  whole  story,  touched  off  the  chain  re- 
action. I  am  certainly  not  implying  that  the  Polish  Government  was 
responsive  to  German  })ro])aganda ;  but  it  was  a  very  smart  thing  by 
Joseph  Goebbels,  which  brought  an  obvious  reaction. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1995 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  As  I  remember  your  broadcast,  you  indicated 
that  you  thouofht  tlie  request  of  the  Polish  Government  for  an  im- 
partial investigation  was  a  smart  maneuver  by  the  German  propa- 
ganda. 

Mr.  Davis.  Well  now,  wait  a  minute.     Let  me  see  this.     It  says : 

*  *  *  German  propoganda  won  a  strikinj:  success  last  week  when  it  suc- 
ceeded in  bringing  about  a  break  in  diplomatic  relations  between  Russia  and  the 
Polish  Government  in  exile. 

I  don't  think  that  that  implies  that  the  Polish  Government  was 
responsive  to  German  propaganda,  as  such;  that  the  story  that  was 
broken  by  German  propaganda,  which  had  not  been  broken  before 
then,  was  responsible  for  this,  and  that  the  refusal  of  the  Kussians 
to  consider  the  International  Red  Cross  investigation  was  responsible 
for  the  breaking  off  of  relations. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  And  you  don't  believe — do  you? — that  the  re- 
quest by  the  Polish  Government  for  an  impartial  investigation  was 
at  all  caused  by  German  propaganda? 

Mr.  Davis.  Oh,  certainly  not. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  That  is  all. 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Dondero  ? 

Mr.  Dondero.  Mr.  Davis,  there  lias  been  handed  to  me,  since  I  came 
into  the  committee  room  at  noon,  a  pamphlet  which  contains  this  state- 
ment [reading]  : 

One  of  the  greatest  OWI  scandals  broke  when  Frederick  Woltman  published 
his  article  entitled  "A.  F.  of  L.  and  CIO  Charge  OWI  Radio  as  Conununistic." 

Woltman's  article  appears  in  the  New  York  World-Telegram  of  October  4,  1943. 
It  showed  that  the  A.  F.  of  L.  as  well  as  the  CIO,  the  two  great  American  labor 
organizations,  which  nobody  but  the  Comuuinists  ever  accused  of  being  reaction- 
ary, withdrew  their  cooperation  from  the  OWI's  labor  desk  because  of  the  latter's 
outspoken  Communist  attitude. 

Do  you  want  to  comment  on  that  ? 

Mr.  Davis,  That  is  correct.  We  removed  the  man  at  the  head  of 
the  desk. 

Mr.  Dondero.  Who  was  that  man? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  have  forgotten  his  name  now,  but  I  remember  that  it 
happened. 

May  I  ask  what  the  pamphlet  is,  sir? 

Mr.  Dondero.  Yes ;  it  is  a  ])ami)hlet  entitled  "The  OWI  and  Voice 
of  America,"  by  Julius  Epstein. 

Mr.  Davis.  That  statement  is  correct,  and  we  did  remove  the  man. 
We  had  to  fire  a  few  people  now  and  then. 

Mr.  Dondero.  How  many,  Mr.  Davis,  did  you  have  to  fire  because 
of  their  communistic  attitude  ? 

Mr.  DA\^s.  I  think  it  was  about  a  dozen.  We  fired  the  head  of 
the  Greek  desk  in  Xew  York  because  he  violated  a  directive  sent  from 
Washington  about  the  liandling  of  the  news  of  Greece.  I  have  for- 
gotten his  name,  but  it  happened.  There  were  a  few  others  here 
and  there. 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Sheehan. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Mr.  Davis,  can  you  tell  us  how  vou  were  selected  for 
the  OWI  job? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  I  was  selected  by  the  President.  I  don't  know 
how  he  came  to  the  conclusion.      New  Yorker  magazine  was  my 


1996  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

original  sponsor.  I  wrote  to  the  editor  afterward  and  told  him  that 
he  seemed  to  be  the  man  who  did  it.  He  said  that  he  was  "delighted," 
because  that  was  the  second  public-service  campaign  he  had  ever 
conducted,  both  successful.  The  first  one  was  to  get  the  information 
booth  in  the  Pennsylvania  Station  moved  to  the  middle  of  the  con- 
course. He  seemed  to  think  that  these  two  achievements  were  of  about 
equal  importance. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  You  stated  in  the  beginning  that  you  reported  only 
to  the  President? 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Therefore,  the  President  must  have  given  you  some 
directives,  or  some  ideas  of  what  he  wanted  you  to  do,  or  what  job 
he  wanted  you  to  accomplish.     Can  you  relate  that  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  Mr.  Roosevelt  was  a  pretty  busy  man.  I  didn't 
bother  him  any  more  than  I  had  to.  I  think  it  is  fair  to  say  that  he 
was  not  very  much  interested  in  propaganda,  so  that  I  didn't  get  very 
many  directives  from  him  about  specific  matters. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  What  do  you  mean  by  "not  verj-  much  interested  in 
propaganda"? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  don't  think  that  he  regarded  it  as  of  any  major  im- 
portance. For  example,  I  don't  think  that  he  attached  anything  like 
the  weight  to  it  that  President  Wilson  did. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  In  other  words,  you  just  had  a  cursory  talk  with 
him.     The  President  didn't  lay  down  any  specific  principles  ? 

Let's  be  specific.  Did  he  say  at  any  time  the  way  in  which  you 
should  treat  Russia  or  any  of  our  otlier  allies? 

Mr.  Davis.  No  ;  not  other  than  to 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Then  the  whole  policy  of  OWI  was  entirely  within 
your  lap  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  We  had  to  check  with  the  State  Department,  as  I  say, 
on  specific  issues;  but,  very  often,  we  found  that  the  Government 
had  no  policy.  When  I  say  "very  often"  that  is  a  little  exaggeration, 
but  there  were  certain  cases  in  which  we  found  that  the  Government 
had  not  decided  on  policy.  We  had  to  keep  on  presenting  news  to 
and  about  certain  countries,  and  there  we  just  had  to  "roll  our  own." 

Mr.  Sheehan.  The  State  Department,  then,  did  not  lay  down  any 
policy  for  you  at  any  time  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Oh,  yes;  they  did  on  various  points,  quite  a  lot  of  them. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  To  be  specific,  did  they  lay  down  any  policy  or  ask 
you  to  follow  any  particular  line  with  reference  to  the  treatment  of 
Russian  news? 

JNIr.  Davis.  No. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  German  news? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  naturally,  we  regarded  German  news  with  con- 
siderable suspicion.  We  were  at  war  with  Germany,  and  what  came 
out  of  Germany  was  Avhat  was  permitted  by  Joe  Goebbels.  We  didn't 
have  very  much  confidence  in  him  as  a  news  source. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  I  would  like  to  get  back  to  this  talk  about  F.  D.  R. 

It  seems  inconceivable  to  he  that  Mr.  Roosevelt  would  have  called 
you  in  and  would  have  said  "Hero,  Mr.  Davis;  you  take  over  the  OWI. 
It  is  yours,"  with  no  specific  instructions,  or  anything.  It  seems  to 
me  that  Mr.  Roosevelt  was  a  strong-enough-willed  man  that,  if  he 
believed  he  did  not  Mant  your  pro[)agun(la,  he  would  have  put  the 
OWI  out  of  existence. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    IVIASSACRE  1997 

Mr.  Davis.  The  propaganda  agency  had  been  in  existence  before 
that.  The  problem  when  OWI  was  "formed  was  to  unify  the  four 
Government  agencies  that  were  then  in  existence.  That  was  the  prin- 
cipal thing  that  I  was  concerned  with. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Did  you  agree  with  Mr.  Roosevelt  that  propaganda 
wasn't  worth  much? 

Mr.  Davis.  No;  though  I  think  that  its  value  often  has  been  over- 
rated. Propaganda  never  won  a  war  by  itself.  It  can  be  an  extremely 
useful  auxiliary  to  military  operations,  but  it  never  w^on  a  war  single- 
handedly. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  On  the  basis  of  your  experience  in  OWI — and  you 
have  probably  followed  its  course  since  you  left  it — do  you  think  that, 
as  a  whole  generally,  they  have  done  a  worthwhile  job  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Whom  do  you  mean  ? 

Mr.  Sheehan.  The  propaganda  agencies,  the  OWI  and  the  Voice 
of  America  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  do. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  You  think  it  has  been  effective  with  the  people  over- 
seas ? 

Mr.  Davis.  It  has  been  about  as  effective  as  it  could  be. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  That  may  be  nothing. 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  it  is  more  effective  than  that.  It  has  been  very 
valuable  at  times. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Do  you  think,  in  your  own  opinion,  that  we  are 
getting  our  money's  worth  for  the  large  amount  of  money  we  are  put- 
ting into  this  propaganda  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Then,  if  you  were  a  taxpayer,  you  would  want  to 
continue  the  Voice  of  America  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  am  a  taxpayer,  Mr.  Sheehan. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Do  you  think  it  should  be  continued? 

Mr.  Davis.  It  should  be  continued.  It  may  be,  as  some  have  said, 
that  a  psychological-warfare  program  will  crack  the  Communist  front 
in  Korea.  I  very  much  doubt  that.  It  will  help,  but  it  won't  do  it  by 
itself,  in  my  opinion.    However,  it  will  help. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Now,  this  Congress — and  I  myself,  having  been 
fortunate  enough  to  be  reelected — will  have  to  face  the  fact  that  we  are 
voting  some  appropriations  for  the  Voice  of  America.  From  what  I 
have  seen  and  heard — and  I  am  giving  you  my  own  personal  opinion — 
I  am  not  too  confident.  I  mean  that  it  is  big  in  size  and  it  is  a  large 
amount  of  money  that  is  being  spent.  Someday  we  should  have  some- 
one, an  expert  like  yourself,  resolve  in  our  own  minds  that  maybe 
propaganda  is  in  itself  valuable.  That  I  would  not  question.  i3ut 
whether  we  should  have  9,000  employees  and  spend  billions  of  dollars 
are  points  that  a  man  with  your  experience  should  be  able  to  tell  us 
about,  more  or  less  "off  the  cuff." 

Mr.  Davis.  I  don't  think  there  is  any  proposal — any  informed  pro- 
■posal — to  spend  billions  of  dollars.  Two  or  three  amateurs  have  sug- 
gested that  we  need  billion-dollar  programs.  I  do  not  think  it  is 
worth  an  investment  of  billions,  by  any  means,  but  I  do  think  that  it 
is  worth  the  investment  of  the  money  that  is  going  into  it  now. 

Remember  that  expenses  are  considerably  higher  than  they  were  a 
few  years  ago  when  I  was  operating.    The  Voice  of  America  at  present 

93744— 52— pt.  7 12 


1998  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

gets  more  money  than  the  OWI  ever  had,  but  that  is  largely  due  to 
the  increase  in  costs. 

Mr.  SiiEEHAN.  I  don't  have  the  facts,  and  that  is  why  I  am  asking 
you  these  questions. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  remember  those  statements,  Mr.  Sheehan,  by  outsiders ; 
that  is,  about  how  we  ought  to  pour  billions  of  dollars  into  a  great 
campaign  of  truth.  I  do  not  believe  you  would  get  value  received  for 
billions,  but  I  do  believe  that,  for  the  kind  of  money  that  is  going  into 
it  now,  you  do. 

Mr.  Shp:eiiax.  For  instance,  one  of  the  criticisms — and  it  will  bear 
investigation,  because  as  it  stands  in  my  mind  I  do  not  have  the  exact 
facts — is,  for  instance,  that  in  the  radio  end  of  the  Voice  of  America 
at  the  present  time  there  are  more  employees  than  the  combined  net- 
works in  America.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  combined  networks  in 
America  are  doing  a  wonderful  job  of  news  saturation  and  dissemi- 
nation. 

Mr.  Davis.  The  combined  networks  operate  in  one  language.  The 
Voice  of  America  overseas  probably  operates  in  40.  That  is  one 
difference  right  there. 

They  have  to  have  relay  stations  abroad  to  pick  up  their  short-wave 
stuff  and  transmit  it  to  medium  waves,  so  that  it  can  reach  the  audi- 
ences.   So,  it  is  a  far  more  expensive  operation. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  That  is  all  I  have. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  I  have  one  more  question. 

Chairman  Madden.  ATr.  Dondero. 

Mr.  Dondero.  Mr.  Davis,  how  many  people  are  employed  by  the 
OWI — that  has  gone  out  of  business — the  Voice  of  America,  today? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  don't  know  how  many  they  have  today.  As  I  say,  at 
our  peak,  we  had  about  9,000  here  and  overseas.  But  that  was  when 
we  had  some  30  oversea  stations,  and  there  were  some  4,000  of  those 
who  were  local  people,  j^orters,  chauffeurs,  translators,  and  things 
like  that. 

Mr.  Dondero.  Our  investment  in  the  Voice  of  America  is  about 
$85,000,000  annually  now.  Do  you  understand  that  to  be  about 
correct  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir;  but,  as  I  say,  the  costs  have  vastly  gone  up. 
Then  there  are  also  certain  things  such  as,  for  instance,  wlien  Luxem- 
burg was  liberated,  our  psychological  warfare  was  partly  OWI  and 
partly  British.  They  liad  the  great  advantage  of  Kadio  Luxemburg. 
But  now  Kadio  Luxemburg  lias  been  given  back  to  Luxemburg,  and 
our  people  have  had  to  build  their  own  relay  stations. 

Chairman  Madden.  As  a  conunent,  T  might  say  this:  I  think  that 
the  Voice  of  America  and  any  medium  to  send  truth  behind  the  iron 
curtain  is  a  good  investment.  But,  referring  to  some  of  the  ridiculous 
ideas  of  even  some  Members  of  our  Congress  on  expenditures  for 
propaganda  and  truth,  it  has  been  revealed  by  the  people  over  in 
Euroi)e  that  our  committee,  through  our  testimony  over  there,  put 
the  liussian  proj)aganda  nuichine  on  the  defensive.  Our  conunittee' 
will  not  cost  the  Amei-ican  taxi)ayers  ovei'  $S0,000.  Yet,  when  the 
resolution  was  up  on  the  iloor  ol"  (he  House  to  i)erniit  our  conunittee 
to  go  overseas,  tliere  were  U)(i  Members  who  voted  against  the  reso- 
lution. A  great  number  of  them  thought  the  exi)enditure  involved 
was  too  nnich.    We  only  won  jjermission  to  go  overseas  by  nine  votes. 

When  you  consider  the  millions  of  dollars  that  have  been  spent  by 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  1999 

Congress  for  propaganda,  I  do  not  think  the  opinions  of  some  Mem- 
bers of  Congress  are  of  very  much  value  when  you  consider  that  our 
resohition  won  by  only  nine  votes. 

Mr.  Davis.  If  I  might  just  offer  a  sort  of  supplementary  paragraph 
to  that,  propaganda  has  to  have  something  to  work  on.  The  most 
powerful  propaganda  is  the  truth;  and  the  facts  about  this  Katyn 
business  which  your  committee  has  brought  to  light  will  undoubtedly 
be  of  enormous  value  to  the  Voice  of  America  from  now  on. 

Chairman  Madden.  Are  there  any  further  questions? 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Mr.  Davis,  were  you  warned  through  several  dif- 
ferent sources  that  you  had  Connnunists  in  the  Office  of  War  Infor- 
mation ?  One  statement  that  you  made  was  that  in  Mr.  Lesinski's 
warning,  for  example,  there  were  more  lies  in  that  article  than  you 
ever  saw  before. 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Is  it  your  contention  that  there  were  no  Commu- 
nists in  the  OWI  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  sir.  But  the  statements  made  by  Mr.  Lesinski  were 
itlmost  all  demonstrably  false.  As  I  say,  we  found  about  a  dozen,  and 
Ave  fired  them. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Do  you  recall  a  Mr.  Peter  Lyons? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  know  the  name. 

Mr.  O'KoxsKi.  Do  you  recall  a  Mr.  Barnes? 

Mr.  Davis.  Joe  Barnes — certainly. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  AVhat  was  your  estimate  of  Mr.  Barnes? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  thought  he  was  a  very  able  man,  but  he  was  too  much 
addicted  to  what  we  called  in  the  war  "localitis."  He  was  head  of  the 
New  York  office,  and  it  was  eventually  found  desirable  to  remove  him 
because  he  didn't  seem  to  be  quite  sufficiently  in  sympathy  with  the 
policies  laid  down  in  Washington.  But  I  never  had  the  slightest 
question  about  his  loyalty. 

Mr.  O  KoNSKi.  I  am  quoting  now  from  the  labor  report  that  we 
had  reference  to.    It  says  here  [  reading]  : 

It  developed  that  the  labor  broadcasting  desk  under  Mr.  Barnes,  through  the 
OWI,  had  broadcast  to  Europe  songs  of  the  Almanac  Sailors,  who  are  virtually 
the  official  songsters  of  the  American  Communist  Party. 

In  other  words,  for  a  while  there  we  actually  had  Communist  songs 
going  out  over  the  OWI. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  don't  know  about  that,  Mr.  O'Konski.  I  would  hesi- 
tate to  believe  it  without  corroboration,  because  so  many  lies  were  told 
about  us.  As  I  say,  I  didn't  know  anything  about  it,  and  I  doubt 
whether  Joe  Barnes  knew  anything  about  it.  It  is  conceivably  true, 
but  we  did  remove  the  head  man. 

Mr.  O'KoxsKi.  Did  you  know  that  the  Ahnanac  Sailors  were 
broadly  proclaiming  their  anti-American  attitude  with  such  tuneful 
songs  as  "Plow  under  every  fourth  American  boy"  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  can't  remember  that  I  ever  heard  of  those  singers 
having  their  songs  go  out  over  the  OWI. 

Mr.  O'Konski.  In  other  words,  you  do  admit,  though,  that  the  Office 
of  War  Information  did  have  Connnunist  sympathizers? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes;  we  had  a  few,  and  we  fired  them  when  we  caught 
them. 


2000  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Was  the  initiative  in  firing  them  started  by  your 
organization  or  was  it  always  by  some  outside  pressure,  such  as  the 
CIO  and  the  A.  F.  of  L.? 

Mr.  Davis.  It  was  almost  always  started  by  our  organization.  We 
had  our  own  security  service,  and  when  they  found  evidence  against 
somebody  we  threw  them  out. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  That  is  all. 

Chairman  Madden.  Are  there  any  further  questions? 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  And  you  never  heard,  Mr.  Davis,  of  any  of  these 
people  whom  I  mentioned  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  sir ;  evidently  not,  because  they  didn't  find  evidence 
sufficient  to  justify  firing  them  at  that  time.  As  you  say,  no  doubt 
they  are  Communists  now,  but  that  was  not  necessarily  true  then.  I 
admit  that  we  missed  one  or  two. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  caught  10,  but  you  do  not  know  how  many 
you  missed  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  as  I  say,  I  admit  that  we  missed  one  or  two.  They 
have  since  shown  themselves  to  have  become  Communists.  They  are 
not  the  ones  that  you  mentioned.  I  prefer  not  to  mention  their  names, 
although  I  would  be  glad  to  give  them  to  the  committee  in  private. 
We  missed  them  only  because  they  didn't  show  any  evidence  of 
communistic  activities  at  that  time,  but  have  shown  them  since.  I 
don't  think  there  were  very  many. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Subsequently,  since  your  connection  with  the  OWI 
and  the  unearthing  of  all  of  this  evidence,  conclusive  as  it  was,  and  as 
you  now  observe  conditions,  do  you  think  that  if  you  had  to  do  it 
over  again  you  would  have  handled,  say,  for  instance,  the  Katyn 
story,  in  the  OWI,  as  you  did,  knowing  what  you  know  now  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Oh,  no.  You  mean  in  the  broadcast?  No;  certainly 
not. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Would  you  have  handled  that  broadcast  in  the 
same  way  had  you  known  the  facts  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  sir.  These  reports,  which  seem  to  me  convincing, 
as  far  as  I  know,  were  never  heard  of  by  me  until  they  appeared  in 
the  hearings  of  this  committee  this  spring. 

Chairman  Madden.  Have  you  finished? 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Davis,  you  have  already  told  the  committee 
that  the  function  of  Alan  Cranston  was  outside  the  scope  of  his 
specific  duties  when  he  attended  this  meeting  in  New  York  and  tried 
to  get  them  to  conform  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  if  he  did  as  you  say.  I  think  that  if  you  will 
read  that  you  will  find  some  conflict  in  the  testimony  about  that. 

Mr.  MncHELL.  All  right. 

I  would  like  to  place  in  the  record  now  from  the  same  set  of  hear- 
ings— and  I  will  ask  Mr.  Pucinski  to  read  it — testimony  concerning  a 
man  by  the  name  of  Lee  Falk.    Do  you  know  Mr.  Falk  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  I  remember  the  name.  I  don't  remember  what 
he  did. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  In  OWI  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  remember  him  as  somebody  in  OWI;  yps. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Will  you  proceed  to  read  that,  please,  Mr.  Pucinski? 

Mr.  Pucinski.  I  am  reading  from  page  494  of  the  same  testimony 


THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE  2001 

as  exhibit  2.  This  is  from  volume  991  of  the  House  committee  hear- 
ings.   This  is  testimony  sworn  to  by  Mr.  Robert  K.  Richards. 

Chairman  Madden.  Testimony  before  what  committee? 

Mr.  PuciNSKi.  The  House  committee  investigating  the  Federal 
Communications  Cormnission,  headed  by  Congressman  Cox.  This  is 
testimony  sworn  to  by  Mr.  Robert  K.  Richards,  Assistant  to  the  Di- 
rector of  the  Office  of  Censorship.  Mr.  Richards  is  rehiting  a  mem- 
orandum that  he  had  written  immediately  after  a  conference  he  had 
with  Sidney  Spear,  an  attorney  for  the  Federal  Communications 
Commission,  at  2  p.  m.  August  25,  1942.  I  am  just  going  to  read  the 
part  of  Mr.  Richards'  memorandum  which  he  prepared  following 
that  meeting  with  Spear. 

Mr.  Spear  is  talking  about  a  meeting  that  he  had  with  Lee  Falk. 
I  am  quoting : 

He  related  his  experiences  with  Mr.  Lee  Falk  of  the  Foreign-Language 
Section,  Radio  Division,  Office  of  War  Information.  He  said  that  Mr.  Falk 
originally  had  taken  on  the  job  of  removing  unsavory  personnel  from  foreign- 
language  stations,  because  he,  Mr.  Falk,  believed  such  a  job  had  to  be  done, 
and  no  one  else  seemed  to  want  to  do  it. 

Mr.  Spear  told  me  the  following :  "We  worked  it  this  way.  If  Lee,  meaning 
Lee  Falk,  found  a  fellow  he  thought  was  doing  some  funny  business,  he  told  me 
about  it.  Then  he  waited  until  the  station  applied  for  renewal  of  license.  Say 
the  station  was  WBNX  and  the  broadcaster  in  question  was  Leopold  Hurdski." 

there  is  a  note  here  that  Hurdski  is  a  fictitious  name  being  used  just 
for  the  purpose  of  illustration.    I  am  continuing  quoting : 

Well,  when  WBNX  applied  for  renewal,  we  would  tip  off  Lee,  and  he  would 
drop  in  on  Mr.  Alcorn,  the  station  manager.  He  would  say  "Mr.  Alcorn,  I 
believe  you  ought  to  fire  Leopold  Hurdski."  Then  he  would  give  Mr.  Alcorn 
some  time  to  think  this  over.  After  a  couple  of  weeks,  Mr.  Alcorn  would  begin 
to  notice  he  was  having  some  trouble  getting  his  license  renewed.  After  a 
couple  of  more  weeks  of  this  same  thing,  he  would  begin  to  put  two  and  two 
together  and  get  four.  Then  he  would  fire  Leopold  Hurdski,  and  very  shortly 
after  that  his  license  would  be  renewed  by  the  Commission.  This  was  a  little 
extralegal,  I  admit,  and  I  had  to  wrestle  with  my  conscience  about  it,  but  it 
seemed  the  only  way  to  eliminate  this  kind  of  person,  so  I  did  it.  AVe  can 
cooperate  in  the  same  way  with  you — meaning  with  the  Office  of  War  Censorship. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Davis,  would  you  say  that  the  function  of  Lee 
Falk,  as  described  therein,  that  is,  in  the  congressional  committee  in- 
vestigation, was  within  the  scope  of  his  duties  at  OWI  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  sir.  If  that  is  a  correct  report  of  what  he  did,  I 
would  say  that  he  exceed  his  proper  field. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Thank  you,  sir.     I  have  no  further  questions. 

Chairman  Madden.  Are  there  any  further  questions? 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Mr.  Davis,  your  handling  of  the  Katyn  story  was 
in  conformity  with  the  United  States  military  and  foreign  policy  at 
that  time,  was  it  not  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  I  don't  know  that  the  military  policy  came  into 
it  at  all.  This  memorandum  from  Mr.  Berle  would  suggest  that  they 
wanted  nothing  said  about  it.  As  I  say,  for  a  news  organization,  it 
was  impossible  to  say  nothing  about  it. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  If  it  had  not  been  in  conformity  with  the  over-all 
policy  at  that  time,  you  would  have  heard  from  him,  would  you  not 
have? 

Mr.  Daa^s.  Well,  I  should  imagine  so.  As  I  say,  I  heard  about 
it  only  from  the  Polish  paper  and  the  Daily  Worker,  neither  of  which 
liked  it. 


2002  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Mr.  O'KoNSKT.  Tlie  reason  I  mentioned  that  is  because  all  of  this 
evidence  started  to  pile  up  in  the  various  divisions  of  our  Govern- 
ment. They  were  not  correlated.  There  was  a  liush-hush  policy  on 
the  Katyn  massacre  all  the  way  throufrh,  so  that  at  that  time,  even 
if  you  liad  tried  to  get  the  truth  about  the  Katyn  massacre,  you 
woidd  have  been  unable  to  do  so. 

Mr.  Davis,  I  certainly  wouldn't  have  been  able  to  get  the  critical 
documents,  the  reports  of  Colonel  Van  Vliet  and  of  these  other  people 
because,  as  I  understand,  they  were  only  available  after  the  Oerman 
collapse  in  1945. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  In  our  investigation,  Ave  found  out  that  there  was 
no  correlation  between  the  various  departments.  It  seems  certain 
that  there  were  never  any  documents  or  any  bit  of  evidence  pinning 
the  crime  on  the  Germans.  It  was  just  not  available  for  anyone  to 
see.  So  you  couldn't  have  spoken  truthfully.  The  propaganda  in 
your  broadcast  were  based  very  largely  on  the  suspicion  of  Goebbels. 
Did  you  ever  have  any  suspicion  about  Stalin  ? 

But  as  you  observe  this  whole  picture  now,  don't  you  think — and 
you  do  not  have  to  comment  on  this  if  you  do  not  want  to — that  the 
over-all  policy  in  handling  the  Katyn  affair  by  all  of  the  brandies  of 
the  United  States  Government  who  were  concerned,  was  very  badly 
handled? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  don't  think  they  had  much  evidence  until  May  or 
June  of  1945,  and  the  Van  Vliet  report.  Wliat  happened  after  that 
I  wouldn't  know,  because  at  that  time  we  were  principally  concerned 
with  the  Japanese  war.  Then  I  went  out  of  office  on  the  15th  of  Sep- 
tember of  1945. 

Mr.  SiiEEiiAx.  May  I  sa^^  that  in  the  belief  of  our  committee,  the 
Voice  of  America  followed  the  policy  of  hiding  the  Katyn  affair  until 
pretty  nearly  1950,  although  the  documents  were  there. 

We  understand  that  there  was  not  much  use  made  of  them  in  the 
Voice  of  America. 

Mr.  Davis,  The  OWI  could  not  have  concealed  that  after  Septem- 
ber 1945  because  after  that  we  did  not  exist. 

Mr.  Sheeiian.  I  said  the  Voice  of  America. 

Mr.  Davis.  Whether  any  division  of  our  office  ever  got  the  Van  Vliet 
report,  I  don't  know.  I  very  much  doubt  it.  I  do  so,  because,  if  some- 
body had  gotten  it,  I  would  have  been  told. 

Chairman  Madden,  Are  there  any  other  questions? 

Mr.  Davis,  we  are  grateful  to  you  for  coming  up  here  today, 

Mr.  Davis,  Thank  you,  gentlemen. 

Chairman  Madden,  The  next  witnesses  will  be  Joseph  Lang  and 
Arthur  Simon, 

We  will  hear  Mr,  Joseph  Lang  first.  Will  you  come  forward,  Mr. 
Lang,  please? 

I  will  ask  the  photographers  to  take  their  pictures  now,  in  conform- 
ance with  the  rules. 

TESTIMONY  OF  JOSEPH  LANG,  JENKINTOWN,  PA. 

Chairman  Madden,  Mr.  Lang,  do  you  solemnly  swear  that  the  testi- 
mony you  are  about  to  give  the  committee  will  be  the  truth,  the  whole 
truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God? 

Mr.  Lang.  I  do. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  2003 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Lang,  will  you  state  your  name  and  address^ 
please,  for  the  reporter? 

Mr.  Lang.  Joseph  Lanrr,  Jenkintown,  Pa. 

Chairman  Madden,  Mr.  Lang,  what  is  your  business? 

Mr.  Lang.  I  am  in  the  broadcasting  business. 

Chairman  Madden.  ^Vliere  are  you  employed  now?  For  whom? 
What  company? 

Mr.  Lang.  I  am  vice  president  of  radio  station  WIBG  in  Philadel- 
phia. 

Chairman  Madden.  Will  you  proceed,  Mr.  Mitchell? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Lang,  where  were  you  employed  in  May  1943  ? 

Mr.  Lang.  I  was  vice  president  and  general  manager  of  radio  sta- 
tion WHOM,  New  York  City. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Were  you  present  this  afternoon  when  the  testimony 
was  read  into  the  record  from  the  congressional  investigation  of  1943  ? 
Have  you  read  it? 

Mr.  Lang.  I  have  read  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Then  you  are  familiar  with  that  statement? 

Mr.  Lang.  Yes. 

Mr.  IMiTCHELL.  Do  you  now  state  before  this  committee  that  the 
statements  contained  therein  are  true  ? 

Mr.  Lang.  I  do. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  Mr.  James  F.  Hopkins  was  contacted  in 
Detroit? 

Mr.  Lang.  I  do. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  Mr,  Alan  Cranston  and  Mrs,  Hilda  Shea  visited 
your  office? 

]Mr.  Lang.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  xVnd  that  present  at  that  meeting  was  Mr.  Simon? 

Mr,  Lang.  Yes ;  that  is  true. 

Mr.  Mitchell,  And  that  no  member  of  the  Office  of  Censorship  was 
present  ? 

Mr,  Lang,  They  were  not. 

]Mr.  Mitchell.  And  that  the  substance  contained  therein,  that  is, 
what  you  have  read  from  the  congressional  hearing — and  since  you 
were  the  witness,  you  should  certainly  know  what  you  said — is  defi- 
nitely true  ? 

Mr.  Lang.  That  is  correct, 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  have  no  further  questions. 

Chairman  Madden.  Are  there  any  questions? 

Mr.  OTvonski? 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Tn  this  conversation  that  you  had,  Mr.  Lang,  did 
any  conversation  develop  along  these  lines — that  these  foreign-lan- 
guage stations  are  on  a  temporary  license,  and  that  if  they  didn't  con- 
form, somehow  it  would  be  made  known  to  them  through  the  Federal 
Communications  Commission  that  the  renewal  of  their  license  might 
be  endangered?  Did  any  conversation  or  hints  ever  develop  when 
you  were  meeting  with  these  people  about  getting  these  foreign-lan- 
guage stations  to  conform  with  OWI  policy  ? 

Mr.  Lang.  I  would  say  actual  conversations  took  place  encompas- 
sing words  like  those.  But  we  all  knew  in  the  foreign-language  field, 
since  there  were  so  many  people  suspect  of  different  leanings,  whether 
they  were  Fascists,  Fascist  leanings  or  Communist  leanings,  that  we 


2004  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

were  held  on  the  string,  you  might  say,  until  a  lot  of  these  things  could 
be  cleared  up. 

As  far  as  hints  go,  I  wouldn't  say  there  were  hints ;  but  it  was  gen- 
erally known  and  discussed  among  station  owners,  or  station  man- 
agers, that  that  was  the  situation. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Now,  you  are  in  the  radio  business  as  I  am.  Sup- 
pose you  owned  a  foreign-language  station  and  somebody  hinted  to 
you  that  as  long  as  you  had  John  Jones  as  an  announcer  or  as  a  news- 
caster on  your  radio  station  you  might  run  into  a  little  difficulty  in 
getting  your  license  renewed.  As  a  radio-station  operator,  how  long 
would  it  take  you  until  you  would  fire  that  announcer  or  newscaster  ? 

Mr.  Lang.  Well,  frankly,  Mr.  O'Konski,  there  isn't  any  such  thing 
as  a  foreign-language  station.  These  are  American  stations  broad- 
casting in  foreign  languages. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  That  is  right.     I  will  correct  the  record. 

Mr.  Lang.  I  could  not  be  intimidated  by  any  such  talk  or  threat. 
I  have  been  in  the  broadcasting  business  since  1928.  I  have  attended 
a  great  many  hearings  before  the  Federal  Communications  Commis- 
sion. In  my  estimation,  the  owner  or  the  licensee  of  a  radio  station 
is  the  sole  person  responsible  for  that  license,  and  it  is  up  to  him 
to  use  his  own  best  judgment  as  to  whether  the  person  should  be  fired 
or  not.  I  know  that  when  it  came  to  a  final  analysis,  no  governmental 
agency  could  take  a  license  away  from  a  station  because,  in  their  judg- 
ment, they  saw  fit  to  keep  a  person  on  who  might  be  inimical  to  the 
country's  interests  or  the  country's  security.  If  he  was,  that  would 
be  a  case  for  the  FBI,  and  that  is  the  way  I  judge  matters  like  that. 

Mr.  O'Konski.  That  was  true  in  your  case.  But  take  some  of  these 
stations  that  are  barely  hanging  on  economically,  having  a  hard  time 
making  ends  meet.  If  it  was  generally  hinted  to  them  almost  by  any- 
body, that  they  would  run  into  difficulty  in  getting  their  license  re- 
newed as  long  as  they  had  this  person  commenting  on  the  news,  what 
do  you  think  most  of  those  owners  would  do?  Would  they  run  the 
risk  of  antagonizing  the  Government  agency  or  would  they  call  in  the 
commentator  and  say  "I  am  sorry,  but  my  business  is  in  jeopardy,  and 
I  cannot  take  the  chance.     I  will  have  to  dismiss  you." 

Mr.  Lang.  I  don't  know  whether  I  can  answer  that.  In  other 
words,  I  would  be  just  venturing  an  opinion,  when  you  ask  me  what  I 
think  the}^  would  do. 

Mr.  O'Konski.  Yes ;  I  understand. 

Mr.  Lang.  The  only  thing  I  can  really  state  definitely  is  what  I 
would  do. 

Mr.  O'Konski.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Lang.  I  suppose  they  would  be  very  much  tempted  to  take  the 
easiest  wav  out,  and  to  let  the  person  go,  if  they  felt  that  their  license 
was  in  jeopardy. 

Chairman  Madden.  Are  there  any  further  questions? 

Mr.  Machkowicz.  INIr.  Lang,  as  the  result  of  the  conference  you 
had  with  Mr.  ('ranston,  did  you  contact  Mr.  Hopkins,  Mr.  James  F. 
Hopkins,  of  Station  WJBK,  in  Detroit? 

Mr.  Lang.  Yes;  I  did. 

Mr.  Macjiuowicz.  Wliy  did  you  contact  him? 

Mr.  Lang.  Because  Mr.  Cranston  and  IVIrs.  Shea  called  me  from 
Washington  to  arrange  this  meeting,  saying  that  they  would  like  to 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  2005 

iret  tlie  foreign  language,  or  rather,  the  Polish  situation  straightened 
(lilt  in  Detroit,  and  asking  me  whether  I  could  help. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  "What  did  they  tell  you  about  the  so-called  foreign 
language  situation  in  Detroit? 

Mr.  Lang.  That  the  Polish  commentators  were — I  don't  remember 
the  exact  language — but  they  used  the  colloquial  expression — "going 
haywire"  and  making  comments  on  a  great  many  subjects  that  they 
felt  were  not  in  line  with  what  our  general  thinking  should  be. 

Mr.  Maciirowtcz.  Did  they  specificall}'  refer  to  the  Katyn 
massacre  ? 

Mr.  Lang.  The  two  subjects  mentioned  were  the  Katyn  massacre 
and — yes,  they  did  refer  to  that. 

Mr.  Maohrow^icz.  So  that  Mr.  Cranston  objected  to  the  commen- 
tator on  Station  WJBK  making  comments  indicating  Russian  guilt 
for  the  massacre ;  is  that  correct  ? 

Mr.  Lang.  Yes. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  And  he  wanted  you  to  put  a  stop  to  that? 

Mr.  Lang.  Well,  he  couldn't  ask  me  to  put  a  stop  to  it,  because  I  had 
no  authority.  I  was  chairman  of  the  foreign  language  committee  of 
the  National  Association  of  Broadcasters  and  we  had  no  power,  as  an 
industry  committee,  a  voluntary  industry  committee,  we  had  no  power 
to  discipline  anyone.  We  simply  tried  to  have  our  programs  in  the 
national  interest.  Mr.  Cranston  asked  me  what  my  ideas  were  on  it, 
and  I  said  that  I  would  apply  the  same  procedures  and  rules  that  I 
had  used  there,  and  had  used  for  a  good  many  years,  that  is,  that  I 
would  only  permit  to  be  broadcast  in  these  foreign  languages  at  a 
critical  time,  the  dispatches  we  got  oif  the  services  that  we  subscribed 
to.  At  that  time  they  were  the  Associated  Press  and  the  International 
News  Service. 

The  reason  for  that  was  that  I  felt  that  they  were  checked  at  the 
source.  We  received  them  by  teletype  in  our  station.  Frankly,  there 
was  more  reliability  to  those  reports,  more  reliability  than  we  could 
ascertain  by  checking  ourselves,  for  which  we  had  no  facilities. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  we  permitted  people  to  comment  on  matters, 
they  were  giving  their  own  versions,  their  own  reports,  and  I  didn't 
know  where  those  ideas  were  coming  from. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  In  other  words,  what  Mr.  Cranston  wanted  you 
to  do  was  to  use  your  good  efforts  to  try  to  convince  Station  WJBK 
in  Detroit  not  to  permit  these  comments,  which  would  indicate  Russian 
guilt? 

Mr.  Lang.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  And  wasn't  that  a  form  of  censorship  ? 

Mr.  Lang.  Yes ;  I  would  suppose  you  could  call  it  that. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Was  that  not  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the  Federal 
Communications  Act  ? 

Mr.  Lang.  Yes. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  And  you  did  call  Mr.  Hopkins  ? 

Mr.  Lang.  Yes ;  I  did. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Wliat  did  you  tell  Mr.  Hoplrins  ? 

Mr.  Lang.  I  told  him  that  I  thought — I  didn't  suggest  any  way  to 
run  his  station.  I  told  him  what  I  was  doing,  and  thati  thought  that 
would  be  a  course  to  pursue  which  would  satisfy  the  public  in  getting 
proper  news  without  having  it  slanted;  thatI  had  used  that  method, 
and  that  I  felt  it  very  satisfactory. 


2006  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Wliat  did  Mr.  Hopkins  tell  you  ? 

Mr.  Lang.  As  I  recollect — I  do  not  remember  his  exact  words — he 
said  that  he  would  think  it  over,  and,  naturally,  make  his  own  de- 
cision, as  he  was  the  owner  of  that  station. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  That  is  all. 

Let  me  ask  this.  Mrs.  Shea  was  definitely  not  representing  the  poli- 
cies of  the  Federal  Communications  Commission.  What  she  did,  she 
did  on  her  own  ? 

Mr.  Lang.  Yes. 

Chairman  Madden.  Are  there  any  further  questions  ? 

You  may  proceed,  Mr.  Mitchell. 

Mr.  MiTCHEix,.  Mr.  Lang,  in  an  interview  conducted  by  the  commits 
tee  staff  in  September  of  this  year  with  Mrs.  Shea,  the  following  ques- 
tion was  asked : 

Unless  Mr.  Lang  is  not  telling  the  truth  or  unless  he  is  confused,  or  unless  the 
regulation  is  not  corrected,  it  would  appear  that  you  were  really  not  exploring. 
You  had  your  mind  pretty  well  made  up.  From  what  he  said  earlier,  you  were 
concerned  about  the  boundaries,  the  question  of  boundaries  between  Poland  and 
Russia  ? 

to  that  Mrs.  Shea  replied : 

I  would  like  to  repeat,  I  would  like  again  to  repeat  that  Mr.  Lang  is  quite 
mistaken  in  saying  that  I  .ioined  with  Mr.  Cranston  in  the  recommendation 
that  any  station  could  take  any  position  on  this  Polish-Russian  controversy. 

Would  you  like  to  comment  on  that,  please?  Did  she  join  with 
Cranston  ? 

Mr.  Lang.  Well,  the  fact  that  she  was  at  that  meeting,  whether  she 
said  a  w^ord  or  not,  would  certainly  indicate  to  me  that  she  was  in 
agreement  with  what  Cranston  thought  and  expressed  to  me. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Was  your  license  up  for  consideration  at  that  time? 

Mr.  Lang.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Was  she  present,  then,  in  that  capacity,  that  is,  in 
connection  with  your  license,  or  was  she  there  on  tliis  Katyn-Polish 
question  ? 

Mr.  Lang.  Well,  she  was  there,  as  I  understand  it,  to  accompany 
Mr.  Cranston.  I  don't  know  what  her  official  position  was.  She 
had  no  official  position,  as  far  as  I  was  concerned,  except  that  they 
Mere  both  interested  in  this  situation. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  Cranston  have  anything  to  do  with  the  granting 
of  licenses  ? 

Mr.  Lang.  No. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Why  do  you  think  that  Cranston  was  at  that  meet- 
ing, other  than  for  that  Katyn  affair? 

Mr.  Lang.  I  do  not  know. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Is  Mrs.  Shea  correct  in  her  statement  tluit  she  did 
not  participate  in  this  dicussion? 

Mr.  Lan(}.  Well,  she  was  certainly  there,  and,  as  far  as  I  am  con- 
ceined,  that  is  participating  in  a  discussion.  I  don't  recollect  any 
exact  words,  but  anyone  who  was  present  had  to  participate  in  the 
discussion. 

]\Ir.  MrrciiKLL.  Thank  you.    I  have  no  further  questions. 

Cliairman  Madden.  Are  there  any  further  questions? 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Lang,  for  ai)pearing  as  a  witness. 

Chairman  Madden.  Arthur  Simon,  please. 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  2007 

TESTIMONY  OF  ARTHUR  SIMON,  FOREST  HILLS,  N.  Y. 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Simon,  do  you  solemnly  swear  that  the 
testimony  you  are  about  to  give  the  committee  will  be  the  truth,  the 
whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God? 

Mr.  Simon.  I  do. 

Chairman  Madden.  Will  you  state  your  name,  please,  Mr.  Simon? 

Mr.  Simon.  Arthur  Simon. 

Chairman  Madden.  And  your  address? 

Mr.  Simon.  7714  One  hundred  and  thirteenth  Street,  Forest  Hills, 
N.  Y. 

Chairman  Madden.  And  your  business  ? 

Mr.  Simon.  I  am  a  special  representative  for  the  Radio  and  Tele- 
vision Daily,  a  publication  that  covers  the  radio  and  television  news 
of  the  industry. 

Chaiiman  Madden.  Will  you  proceed,  Mr.  Mitchell  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Simon,  you  have  been  present  this  afternoon 
and  heard  the  discussion  of  the  meeting  held  in  New  York  in  May, 
1943,  have  you  not  ? 

Mr.  Simon.  I  have. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  participate  in  that  meeting  in  New  York? 

Mr.  Simon.  I  did. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  subscribe  to  the  statements  that  have  been 
made  here  by  Mr.  Lang? 

Mr.  Simon.  I  do. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  subscribe  to  the  statements  that  were  made 
in  that  congressional  hearing? 

Mr.  Simon.  I  do. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Can  you  shed  any  further  light  to  this  committee 
on  that  particular  meeting  that  was  held  in  New^  York? 

Mr.  Simon.  No ;  I  don't  believe  I  can  add  any  more  to  it  with  two 
exceptions,  namely,  that  also  present  was  a  Mr.  Fred  Call,  who  handled 
publicity  for  the  committee,  and  who  came  in  at  the  latter  part  of  the 
meeting,  and  a  program  director  who  was  called  in  by  Mr.  Lang  dur- 
ing the  course  of  th.e  meeting. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  did  the  program  director  have  to  say  there? 

Mr.  Simon.  He  was  asked  by  INIr.  Lang  how  he  ha-ndled  his  news 
broadcasts,  and  he  repeated  in  substance  the  fact  that  he  just  took  it 
off  the  new^s  tickers  and  gave  it  just  as  it  came  off  those  tickers. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  And  when  you  were  present  there  at  that  meeting, 
were  you  participating  in  the  discussion  of  the  Katyn  affair,  or  were 
you  participating  in  the  discussion  of  Mr.  Lang's  license? 

Mr.  Simon.  It  concerned  the  Katyn  affair  and  the  boundaries  be- 
tween Eussia  and  Poland,  both  subjects. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  AVhen  you  were  present,  was  his  license  discussed? 

Mr.  Simon.  No ;  it  was  not. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  When  you  were  present  at  this  particular  meeting, 
the  sole  subject  of  conversation  was  the  Katyn  affair  and  the  Polish 
boundary  question  ? 

Mr.  Simon.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  And  Mrs.  Shea  was  present? 

Mr.  Simon.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  she  have  any  comments  to  make  that  you  can 
recall ? 


2008  THE    KATYN    FOREST    RIASSACRE 

Mr.  SiiyiON.  I  just  recall  her  concurring  in  Mr.  Cranston's  state- 
ments. To  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  she  joined  in  that  conversation, 
1  know  she  was  present  from  the  beginning  to  the  end. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Thank  you.    I  have  no  further  questions. 

Chairman  JVIadden.  Are  there  any  questions? 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  have  one  question. 

Mr.  Simon,  didn't  you  consider  this  request  of  Mr.  Cranston  as  an 
attempt  to  gag  the  radio  commentators  ? 

Mr.  Simon.  I  did. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Didn't  you  consider  that  to  be  a  violation  of  the 
spirit  of  the  Federal  Communications  Act  ? 

Mr.  Simon.  I  did. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  That  is  all  I  have. 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Dondero  ? 

Mr.  DoNDERo.  No  questions. 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Mitchell,  you  may  proceed. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Simon,  did  you  ask  Mrs.  Shea  what  she  was 
doing  there  ? 

Mr.  Simon.  No.  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  I  did  not.  She  ap- 
peared with  Mr.  Cranston.     They  were  both  there  together. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  she  give  any  justification  for  her  reason  for 
being  there? 

Mr.  Simon.  No.  There  was  no  justification,  outside  of  the  fact 
that  she  concurred  in  Mr.  Cranston's  statement.  I  recall  no  other 
reason  for  her  being  there,  except  to  be  with  Mr.  Cranston  when  this 
discussion  was  taken  up.  She  was  there,  as  I  understand  it,  represent- 
ing the  Federal  Communications  Commission. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Woud  you  call  her  presence  there  indirect  intimi- 
dation ? 

Mr.  Simon.  In  my  opinion? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes. 

Mr.  Simon.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Thank  you,  sir.     I  have  no  further  questions. 

Chairman  Madden.  Are  there  any  other  questions  ? 

Thank  you  for  appearing  to  testify,  Mr.  Simon. 

Mr.  James  F.  Hopkins. 

TESTIMONY  OF  JAMES  E.  HOPKINS 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Hopkins,  will  you  raise  your  right  hand 
and  be  sworn? 

Do  you  solemnly  swear  that  the  testimony  you  are  about  to  give  the 
committee  will  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth, 
so  help  you  God? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  I  do. 

Chairman  Madden.  There  will  be  a  5-minute  recess. 

(At  this  point  a  short  recess  was  taken,  after  which  the  hearing 
was  resumed.) 

Chairmnn  Madden,  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

Mr.  Hopkins,  you  have  been  sworn,  have  you  not? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  Yes. 

Chairman  Madden,  And  did  you  give  your  name  and  address? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  James  F.  Hopkins,. Detroit,  Mich. 

Chairman  Madden.  Your  street  address? 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  2009 

Mr.  Hopkins.  15865  Rosemont  Road. 

Chairman  Madden.  New  York  City  ? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  Detroit. 

Chairman  Madden.  Wliat  is  your  business  ? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  I  am  the  president  of  the  Michigan  Music  Co.,  the 
franchise  holder  for  Muzak  in  Detroit  and  president  of  tlie  Herrans 
Valley  Broadcasters,  radio  station  in  Ann  Arbor. 

Chairman  Madden.  Did  you  formerly  own  a  radio  station? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  I  was  the  manager  and  part  owner  of  WJBK,  Detroit. 

Chairman  Madden.  Proceed. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Hopkins,  have  you  been  present  this  afternoon 
when  the  testimonj^  of  Mr.  Joseph  Lang  and  Mr.  Arthur  Simon  was 
heard  ? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  I  have. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  concur  in  the  remarks  or  the  statements  that 
ihey  made  under  oath  ? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  I  do. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  were  contacted  by  Mr.  Joseph  Lang  ? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  I  was. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  On  the  subject  matter  of  Katyn? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  I  was. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Will  you  speak  a  little  louder  ? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  I  was. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  heard  me  ask  Mr.  Elmer  Davis  about  an  indi- 
vidual by  the  name  of  Mr.  Lee  Falk.  Could  you  shed  any  light  on  the 
type  of  activities  that  Mr.  Falk  was  engaged  in,  when  you  were  the 
part  owner  of  WJBK? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  I  talked  to  Mr.  Falk  at  one  time  in  Washington  rela- 
tive to  the  foreign-language  personnel.  Another  time  he  came  to  De- 
troit and  suggested  that  I  discharge  certain  individuals. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Wliat  was  his  method  and  way  of  doing  that  ?  Be- 
cause he  was  with  the  Office  of  War  Information  ? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  I  didn't  take  him  too  seriously  and  told  him  so  in 
so  many  words,  and  that  I  didn't  want  any  part  of  him. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Why  do  you  not  get  the  names  of  the  persons  he 
wanted  to  have  removed  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Could  you  give  us  the  names  of  the  individuals  he 
wanted  removed  ? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  One  of  them  was  Leon  Wyszatycki. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Could  you  explain  what  position  Mr.  Wyszatycki 
had  in  your  station  at  that  time  ? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  He  ran  one  of  the  Polish  hours  broadcasting  over 
WJBK. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Why  did  Mr.  Falk  want  him  removed  ? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  He  didn't  give  me  any  concrete  reasons.  He  just 
said  he  thought  we  should  get  rid  of  him. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  he  mention  the  Katyn  affair  ? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  No  ;  I  believe  this  was  before  the  Katyn  affair,  if  my 
recollection  serves  me  properl3^    It  was  before  that. 

Mr,  Mitchell.  Did  you  have  in  your  employ  at  that  time  a  Mr. 
Marian  Kreutz  ? 
,  Mr.  Hopkins.  Not  in  my  employ.    He  was  broadcasting  over  the 
station,  but  was  actually  in  the  employ  of  Mr.  Wyszatycki. 


2010  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Coukl  you  explain  the  connection  between  you  and 
Mr.  Kreutz  at  that  time  ? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  Well,  only  that  the  station  made  rules  as  to  what 
could  be  or  could  not  be  broadcast  in  light  of  the  fact  that  we  were 
waging  a  war. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  have  any  direct  contact  Avith  Mr.  Marian 
Kreutz  ? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  If  I  insisted  he  be  discharged  for  one  reason  or  an- 
other, he  would  come  to  the  office  and  we  would  see  if  he  would 
straighten  it  out.    In  that  regard,  yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Was  he  ever  discharged  ? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  When?    Do  you  recall? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  I  can't  give  you  the  exact  time. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  ^Vliy? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  We  felt  that  he  was  more  interested  in  broadcasting- 
actual  concrete  news,  whether  that  story  had  the  proper  etfect  on  the 
Polish  audience  or  not,  and  we  were  concerned  on  whether  the  stoi-y 
would  in  any  way  curtail  the  war  efl'ort  of  the  Polish  segment  of  the 
population  of  the  area. 

Mr.  IVfiTCHELL.  Was  Mr.  Kreutz  ever  suspended  from  the  air? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  I  think  he  was,  for  several  days,  but  not  for  any 
lengthy  time. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  yon,  yourself,  suspend  him  or  could  you  tell  us 
how  the  suspension  was  accomplished? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  Well,  inasmuch  as  he  was  not  working  for  me,  but 
working  for  Leon  Wyszatycki,  I  would  have  to  call  him  in  and  tell 
him  to  do  the  dirty  work. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Mr.  Wyszatycki  rented  an  hour  from  you ;  is  that 
correct  ? 

]\f  r.  Hopkins.  No ;  it  wasn't — he  was  actually  a  representative  of  the 
station,  but  an  individual  contractor. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  But  he  had  the  right  to  employ  radio  com- 
mentators ? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  And  he  employed  Mr.  INIarian  Kreutz  as  a 
connnentator? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  Within  certain  dictates  of  the  station  :  that  is  cori-ect. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  And  then  you  received  your  call  from  whom? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  From  Lang. 

IVfr.  Machrowicz.  Stating  that  the  nature  of  the  broadcasts  of  Mr. 
Kreutz  Avere  not  satisfactory  ? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  No;  not  necessarily  that. 

INIr.  Machrowicz.  What  did  they  tell  you  about  his  broadcasts? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  He  told  me  that  there  Avere  certain  stories  breaking, 
and  that  it  Avas  a  geneial  consensus  of  the  group  that  he  has  named, 
he  in  no  Avay  implicated  himself,  in  Avhat  he  said  but  that  it  Avas  gen- 
erally felt  tiiat  perha])s  the  broadcast  of  this  story  Avould  create  such 
a  feeling  among  the  Polish  people  that  it  Avould  detract  from  their  Avar 
elloi-t. 

Mi-.  Machrowicz.  Mr.  Kreutz  Avas  known  in  the  coimnunity,  was  he 
not,  foi'  his  violent  anti-(\)minunist  feelings? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  Well,  he  may  have  been,  but  I,  of  course,  can't  speak 
or  understand  Polish,  so  I  can't  tell  you  that. 


THE    IvATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  2011 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Do  you  know  that  you  had  been  receivino  coni- 
pLaints  from  certain  Conniiunist  grouiDS  in  Detroit  ? 

Mr.  HoPKixs.  I  didn't  hear  you,  sir. 

Mr.  Mactirowicz.  You  received  complaints  about  the  nature  of  his 
testimony  from  certain  Polish  Communist  groups  in  Detroit? 

Mr.  HoPKixs.  Yes:  I  think  I  did.    I  remember  a  couple  of  them. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  The  Connnunists  objected  to  the  way  he  com- 
mented on  certain  news  events  ? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  That  is  probably  substantially  true,  but  I  can't  re- 
member the  exact  nature,  apparently. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Then  these  people  that  called  you  took  it  upon 
themselves  to  censure  his  broadcasts  ? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  They  tried  to,  they  would  never  get  by  with  that, 

Mr.  IMachrow^cz.  They  succeeded  in  getting  him  suspended. 

Mr.  Hopkins.  No  ;  I  don't  think  they  did. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  He  was  suspended. 

Mr.  Hopkins.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Why  ? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  I  had  a  full-time  employee,  an  attorney,  by  the  name 
of  Morris  Luskin,  whose  business  it  was  to  check  over  his  opinion  on 
the  effect  of  certain  stories  that  were  proposed  to  be  broadcast.  And 
it  was  on  his  recommendation  that  Mr.  Kreutz  was  suspended  when 
he  was  suspended. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  were  interested  in  maintaining  good,  proper 
connections  w^ith  the  Federal  Communications  Commission? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  Yes,  sir. 

IVIr.  Machrowicz.  And  when  you  knew  the  Federal  Communica- 
tions Commission  was  interested  in  having  this  man  suspended  you 
thought  it  would  be  good  policy  to  suspend  him  ? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  No  ;  that  is  not  true. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  knew  they  objected  to  the  nature  of  the 
broadcasts. 

Mr.  Hopkins.  That  who  objected? 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  The  Federal  Communications  Commission. 

Mr.  Hopkins.  No ;  I  didn't. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Well,  when  Mr.  Simon  or  JNIr.  Lang  called  you, 
they  told  you  they  had  talked  to  Mv.  Cranston. 

Mr.  Hopkins.  I  never  heard  of  Cranston  up  until  today  or  yes- 
terday. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  What  did  Mr.  Simon  tell  you? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  I  didn't  talk  to  Simon. 

Mr.  ]\L\chrowicz.  Mr.  Lang.    What  did  Lang  tell  you? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  Lang  and  Simon  and  myself,  and  a  few  other  station 
managers,  were  affiliated  in  the  foreign-language  group,  who  tried  to 
keep  the  foreign-language  broadcasts  clean  and  aboveboard  and  to 
further  the  effort  of  the  war.  When  Joe  called  me  and  told  me  that 
he  had  had  a  meeting  with  the  group,  and  I  don't  think  he — he  may 
have  told  me  but  if  he  did  tell  me  who  he  had  met,  I  don't  remember, 
but  he  did  tell  me  he  met  with  a  group,  and  the  culmination' was  as  I 
have  stated,  that  this  story  would  perhaps  serve  the  war  effort  better  if 
it  was  not  broadcast. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  read  the  translations  of  Mr.  Kreutz' 
broadcasts? 


2012  THE    KATYN    FOREST    IVIASSACRE 

Mr.  Hopkins.  Not  all  of  the  time.    Mr.  Luskin  did,  as  a  rule. 
Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  read  the  translations  of  those  which 
were  considered  as  somewhat  objectionable? 
Mr.  Hopkins.  Yes ;  I  think  I  did. 
Mr.  Machrowicz.  What  did  you  find  objectionable  in  them,  if 


any 


Mr.  Hopkins.  Well,  if  a  story  went  out  in  Detroit,  claiming  that 
the  Russians  had  murdered  X  number  of  thousands  of  Polish  officers 
and  soldiers,  it  certainly  would  turn  the,  naturally,  Polish  audience 
against  one  of  our  allies. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Was  that  objectionable,  if  the  facts  were  true? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  Yes,  and  no.  As  far  as  the  war  effort  is  concerned, 
and  the  winning  of  the  war,  it  might  have  had  a  material  effect,  and 
an  adverse  one.  After  all,  the  thing  had  occurred,  as  bad  as  it  was, 
as  atrocious  as  it  was,  the  very  fact  that  the  story  should  be  told,  you 
can't  compound  an  evil,  and  that  would  be  exactly  what  happened. 
If  the  Polish  people  were  in  any  way  thrown  away  from  furthering 
the  war  effort,  no  good  would  be  done.  Certainly  the  fact  that  they 
knew  it  couldn't  bring  the  people  back  to  life  that  had  been  murdered. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Then  you  felt  that  the  news,  even  if  it  may  be 
true,  of  Russian  guilt,  should  be  withheld  from  the  Americans  of 
Polish  descent? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  And  you  felt  that  it  was  proper  because  if  such 
news,  even  if  true,  was  disseminated,  the  person  who  disseminated  it 
should  be  suspended? 

Mr.  Hopkins.  I  didn't  say  I  suspended  him  on  that  cause,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  What  did  you  suspend  him  on  ? 

Mr,  Hopkins.  I  can't  tell  you.  That  was  8  years  ago  or  10  years 
ago. 

Chairman  Madden.  Any  further  questions? 

Thank  you  for  appearing  here  as  a  witness,  Mr.  Hopkins. 

Marian  Kreutz.  Will  you  be  sworn,  Mr.  Kreutz  ?  Do  you  solemnly 
swear  the  testimony  you  give  before  this  committee  shall  be  the  truth, 
the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  JAN  MARIAN  KREUTZ.  DETROIT,  MICH. 

Chairman  Madden.  State  your  name. 

Mr.  Kreutz.  Jan  Marian  Kreutz,  11558  La  Salle  Boulevard,  Detroit, 
Mich. 

Chairman  Madden.  What  is  your  business  ? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  I  am  a  radio  news  commentator,  foreign  language, 
Polish. 

Chairman  Madden.  In  the  city  of  Detroit  ? 

Mr.  Kreutz,  In  the  city  of  Detroit,  emploj'ed  now  by  Station 
WJLB,  where  I  am  a  coordinator  of  a  Polish  program  and  a  radio 
news  commentator. 

Chairman  Madden.  Proceed. 

Mr,  Mit('iiell,  Mr.  Kreutz,  have  you  been  present  at  the  hearings 
this  afternoon  held  in  this  room  ? 

]Mr.  Kreutz.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr,  Mitchell,  You  are  fully  aware  of  the  subject  matter  under 
discussion  ? 


THE   KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 


2013 


t  f^Z^J^t^^^^l  Polisl.  commentator  in  Detroit  in  May 
Its,  when  the  Katyn  affair  first  became  known  i 
Mr.  IvREUTZ.  Yes,  sir.  .  -iA7TT»Tr.  ia 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  At  that  time  you  were  with  btation  WJiiiv,  is 

it  correct? 

Nil-  Kreutz.  That  is  correct. 

Mr'.  Machrowicz.  Was  it  within  the  province  or  the  scope  ot  your 
ties  to  make  comments  on  news  events? 

Mr  Kreutz  Well,  I  had  been  advertised  as  a  news  commentator, 
ilrit  naturally  I  should  have  the  right  to  make  some  comments. 
Mr.  Maciirowitz.  Did  you  make  any  comments  on  your  station 
at  ive  to  the  Katyn  massacre?  t         n  fi  „f 

Mr  Kreutz.  In  reference  to  the  Katyn  massacre,  I  would  say  that 
followed  in  this  order  :  First  broke  the  news  given  by  the  (jermans, 
d  we  ^ave  that  news  without  any  commentary,  with  one  exception, 
at  we^aid  this  is  an  enemy  source.  Of  course,  the  news  was  too 
uesome  and  really  didn't  lend  itself  to  any  commentary,  ihen,  a 
w  days  after,  we  had  this  Russian  note  to  the  Polish  Government 
cer  the  Polish  Government  asked  for  this  Red  Cross  investigation. 
■  that  time  we  gave  the  Russian  view  on  it,  and  naturally  followed 
th  the  Polish  view  which  we  took  from  the  Polish  telegraph  agency, 
lat  Avas  the  third  service  we  employed.  We  employed  Associated 
-ess,  and  I  believe  the  International  News  Service  at  the  time,  and 
■3  Polish  Telegraph  Agency,  which  is  PAT. 

Mr.  Maciirowitz.  Explain  what  the  Polish  telegraph  agency  is; 
erated  by  whom  ? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  That  is,  or  rather  it  was,  an  ofticial  press  agency  ot  the 
olisii  exiled  government,  operated  from  New  York,  just  like,  let  s 
^,  Russian  Tass  that  operates  from  New  York. 

I^lr.  Machrowttz.  Then  what  happened?  Did  you  make  any  fur- 
"er  comments  on  it  ? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  Well,  we  didn't  have  time  to  make  many  comments, 
^ause  it  was  a  matter  of  just  10  days  when  we  got  through  with 
lOse  three  phases  of  it.  We  had  news  from  Mr.  Hopkins,  through 
y  program  manager,  or  program  director,  that  we  were  supposed  to 
op  using  the  PAT,  to  use  only  Associated  Press  and  International 
jews  Service,  and  in  such  a  way  cut  off  all  the  news  about  Katyn. 
Mr.  Machrowitz.  Was  that  specifically  mentioned  to  you  ? 
Mr.  Kreutz.  That  was  definitely  said  to  me,  that  that  Katyn  story 
id  to  be  out. 

Mr.  Maciirowitz.  What  happened  after  that? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  Well,  after  that  we  tried  our  best.  We  asked  Mr. 
opkins  if  it  was  possible  to  use,  let's  say,  press  articles  from  American 
•ess,  or  maybe  from  the  Polish  press,  so  he  said,  "Well,  if  those  arti- 
js  had  been  published  already,  naturally  you  can  use  it."  I  mean,  he 
du't  say  this  to  me,  he  said"  that  to  the  program  director.  I  want 
at  to  be  understood.  So,  as  far  as  w^e  were  referring  to  Katyn,  we 
ere  trying  to  take  up  these  stories  from  the  Polish  Daily  News  in 
etroit,  or  some  other  articles  that  we  could  find  in  American  press. 
Well,  it  turned  out  to  be  very  unsatisfactory  because  the  station, 
:obably  in  a  few  weeks,  I  don't  remember  exactly  the  dates,  objected 
?aiii  and  said,  "No  more  articles  from  any  press  because  this  is  still 
Iking  Katyn,"  and  by  that  time  we  started  also  picking  up  from 

03744— 52— pt.  7 13 


2014  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

the  press  articles  on  the  Polish  boundaries  that  was  the  controvei 
that  came  later  on.  Generally  speaking,  this  censorship  fight  on  a 
off  was  going  on  for  over  2  years,  and  finally  in  1945  the  day  afi 
the  United  States  Government  recognized  Warsaw  communistic 
gime,  we  had  already  come  to  a  point  where  the  station  had  put 
monitors  on  our  broadcasting.  In  other  words,  there  were  always  t- 
copies  of  the  broadcast.  One  copy  went  to  me  and  one  copy  to  t 
station.  If  I  deleted  anything  or  if  I  went  with  a  few  words  o^ 
the  copy,  the  monitor  would  cut  off  my  voice  from  the  air.  In  otl 
words,  it  was  a  foolproof  proposition. 

Well,  by  that  time,  we  couldn't  say  anything  and  I  was  afraid  tl 
I  couldn't  stand  any  more  withholding  any  real  truth  and  inforn 
tion  from  my  listeners,  because  after  all  a  Polish  commentary  is  a  lit 
different,  probably,  than  American  commentary.  We  have  to  ha 
listeners,  otherwise  we  can't  stay  on  the  air.  And  if  we  can't  U 
about  the  Polish  question,  then  we  won't  have  any  listeners,  becai 
they  can  pick  up  any  general  news  from  somewhere  else. 

So  on  that  day,  the  day  after  the  Warsaw  regime  was  recognize 
I  managed  to  put  in  one  sentence  inside  of  my  broadcast.  I  just  sa 
"Due  to  the  existing  censorship  on  the  station,  I  am  not  going  to  t? 
any  more  on  this  microphone,"  and  I  just  got  up  in  the  middle  of  t 
broadcast  and  walked  out  from  the  studic  and  I  never  returned  to  t 
station  again.     That  was  the  end  of  the  fight. 

Mr.  Macheowicz.  Then  you  were  not  suspended  ? 
Mr.  Kreutz.  Oh,  in  the  meantime  yes,  we  had  three  suspensio 
liemember,  that  was  a  span  of  time  of  about  2  years.  I  had  been  si 
pended  three  times.  I  have  been  informed  by  Mr.  Wyszatycki  tl 
Mr.  Hopkins,  James  F.  Hopkins,  told  him  on  a  certain  day,  I  do 
remember  tlie  date,  that  because  of  the  fact  that  I  didn't  keep  exaci 
to  the  censorship  orders  I  couldn't  go  on  the  air.  I  was  never  out  i 
a  few  days  like  Mr.  Hopkins  said.  I  think  he  just  forgot  the  exr 
terms.  Usually  about  10  minutes  before  broadcast  I  was  told  "J 
right,  you  can  go  on  again." 

I  think  this  was  usually  after  a  long  conference  between  my  direct( 
between  Mr.  Konstantynowicz  who  was  another  director  on  that  st 
tion,  and  Mr.  Hopkins.  They  usually  prevailed  on  him  that  he  shou 
keep  me  on.  But  it  wasn't  pleasant  to  go  on  the  air  when  you  didi 
know  10  minutes  before  if  you  were  going  on  the  air. 

]Mr.  Machroavicz.  You  know  that  there  have  been  a  number 
complaints  to  your  station  from  the  Communist  groups  in  Detr( 
with  regard  to  your  broadcasts ;  is  that  right  ? 

Mr.  Krkutz.  Yes,  I  know  about  that,  and  I  don't  know  if  th 
should  go  inside  these  hearings  here,  but  I  have  got  a  personal  feelii 
that  the  person  that  was  actually  monitoring  ni}^  connnentary  nui 
have  been  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party  in  Detroit.  I  thii 
it  must  have  been  monitored  by  somebody  outside  the  station  fro 
this  bunch  on  Chene  Street,  from  the  Communist  Party.  This  is,  ' 
course,  only  my  private  opinion. 

Mr.  Maciirowicz.  Were  the  suspensions  ever  for  any  other  reasc 
other  than  your  attitude  against  the  Communist  Govermnent? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  No.  All  the  suspensions  were  on  account  of  eitb 
Katyn,  either  Polish  boundaries,  or  the  Polish  relations.  That  w:j 
entirely  on  the  account  of  those  questions.  I 


THE    KATYN' FOREST   MASSACRE  2015 

Chairman  Madden.  I  might  make  an  announcement.  I  have  re- 
ceived inquiries  regarding  tlie  program  for  today  and  tomorrow.  The 
committee  has  three  more  witnesses  today,  and  tomorrow  morning  the 
committee  will  meet  at  10  o'clock,  and  we  will  have,  as  the  first  wit- 
ness, Ex-Ambassador  William  Standley,  former  Under-Secretary  of 
State  Sumner  Welles,  Mrs.  Mortimer,  John  Melby,  and  Averell  Harri- 
man.     We  will  meet  at  10  o'clock  in  the  morning. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Over  this  station,  where  you  were  employed,  were 
there  any  broadcasts  in  a  Russian  language  during  that  period? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  No  ;  I  don't  believe  so.  But  there  has  been  a  half-hour 
program,  I  think  it  was  between  5 :  30  and  6  in  the  evening 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  That  is  what  I  Avant  to  ask  you  now.  Were  there 
any  broadcasts  over  this  station  by  well-known  pro-Soviet  or  pro- 
Communist  groups  ? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  Well,  certainly  there  were.  I  was  just  trying  to  men- 
tion that.  Between  5 :  30  and  6  I  believe  in  the  evening,  there  was  a 
program  they  called  it  in  Polish  Promienie  Prawdy,  which  was  Eay  of 
Truth. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Coming  from  the  pro-Communists  ? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  Well,  the  only  people  that  talked  on  that  program 
were  well-known  Communists. 

Mr.  OTvoNSKi.  Well-known  Communists? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKT.  Now  let  me  ask  you  this  question :  Were  they  told 
and  called  in  like  you,  and  were  they  told  to  lay  off  of  mentioning  or 
commentating  on  the  Katyn  thing  or  on  the  Polish-boundary  question, 
or  did  they  have  free  sway  ? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  I  would  say  in  this  way :  For  a  long  time  they  didn't 
have  any  trouble  at  all  because  they  were  giving  the  Russian  point 
of  view  on  Polish  questions. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  And  they  had  no  trouble  at  all? 

^  ]\Ir.  Kreutz.  They  didn't  have  any  trouble  in  putting  that  point  of 
view  over. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  They  weren't  called  in  and  told  10  minutes  before 
they  went  on  the  air  that  they  could  go  on,  no  censorship  ? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  Not  to  my  knowledge. 

Mr.  Ol^ONSKT.  They  could  tell  the  Russian  side  of  the  story,  and 
blame  it  onto  the  Germans,  and  they  had  no  trouble. 

Mr.  Kreutz.  This  is  right.  At  the  end  of  the  period  afterward,  I 
may  mention,  they  had  been  taken  off  the  air  but  that  was,  I  believe, 
around  1945. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  They  were  taken  off  in  1945  ? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  Yes. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKT.  I  remember  that,  because  I  spoke  in  Detroit  in  1945 
and  they  were  still  on. 

Mr.  Kreutz.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  O'KoKSKi.  And  they  took  me  to  task  for  denouncing  Yalta  as 
the  crime  of  the  ages.  I  remember  that  distinctly.  But  doesn't  it 
seem  rather  incredible  to  you  that  you,  here,  a  good  American,  trying 
to  tell  the  truth,  trying  to  defend  another  ally  far  more  glorious  than 
the  Russian  ally,  who  made  far  more  sacrifices  than  the  Russian  ally, 
that  here  you  are  trying  to  come  a  little  bit  to  their  defense  and  you 


2016  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

were  closely  scrutinized  and  censored,  but  at  the  same  time  those  that 
went  on  the  air  to  pronounce  pro-Soviet  lines  had  no  trouble  at  all  ? 
Doesn't  that  seem  rather  incredible? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  That  was  quite  incredible  at  first.  We  just  didn't 
loiderstand  why  all  this  censorship  happened.  Afterward,  we  came 
to  the  conclusion  there  must  have  been  a  strong  Communist  influence 
somewhere  in  Washington,  because  we  knew  it  was  coming  from 
Washington  somehow. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Now  let  me  ask  you  another  question.  A  statement 
was  made  here  a  little  while  ago  that  one  of  the  reasons  why  they 
insisted  on  censoring  you  was  because  they  were  afraid  of  the  effect 
that  the  truth  would  have  on  the  Polish  population,  particularly  in 
Hamtramck,  which  is  about  95  percent  Polish. 

Mr.  Kreutz.  That  is  true. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Do  you  go  along  with  that  line  of  reasoning,  that 
if  the  Poles  knew  the  truth  that  they  would  stop  in  their  war  effort, 
they  would  quit  their  factory  jobs,  they  would  quit  their  defense  jobs, 
they  would  quit  volunteering,  quit  dying  and  bleeding  for  their  coun- 
try ?     Do  you  think  that  is  a  correct  estimate  of  the  Polish  population  ? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  I  think  that  is  all  wrong,  and  as  a  matter  of  fact  I 
remember  talking  to  Mr.  Hopkins  on  it  many  times  during  these  2 
years  that  we  ai-e  talking  about  between  1943  and  1945.  As  a  journalist 
I  had  been  a  foreign  correspondent  for  a  newspaper  in  Warsaw,  and 
I  had  been  trained  to  get  information  and  give  the  information  to 
the  people,  and  to  believe  that  if  the  people  get  the  information  and 
the  truth,  they  will  always  get  to  the  right  conclusions. 

Now,  in  this  case  our  program  has  been  very  strongly  anti-Nazi 
before  this  Katyn  question  happened,  and  it  remained  anti-Nazi 
until  the  end  of  the  war.  My  commentary  with  that  prog'ram  was 
in  the  same  way.  But  when  we  found  out  that  the  Russian  ally  had 
killed  so  many  Polish  officers,  we  thought  that  this  is  something  that 
should  be  given  to  the  people,  because  this  would  not  stop  anybody 
from  working  for  the  war  effort,  I  couldn't  believe  it,  anyhow.  That 
was  Mr.  Hopkins'  contention. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  You  are  so  sure  of  the  weakness  of  that  argument. 
When  the  Polish  Army  was  reorganized  in  Russia,  General  Anders 
and  all  of  the  leaders  of  the  Polish  Army,  they  knew  that  those  Polish 
officers  had  disappeared,  didn't  they? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  They  definitely  knew  it. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  And  still  thev  fought  on  the  side  of  Russia,  didn't 
they? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  O'Kc^nski.  Wlien  they  were  sold  down  the  river  at  Yalta  and 
stabbed  in  the  back,  thev  still  fought,  didn't  they? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  They  still  fought. 

]Mr.  O'KoNSKT.  Even  when  tliey  knew  they  were  handed  over  to 
Russia  they  still  fouglit,  didn't  they? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  When  England  was  being  invaded  with  German 
bombs,  you  heard  of  the  Polish  air  brigade,  didn't  you,  that  saved 
London  ? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKT.  They  served  on  the  side  of  Russia. 

Mr.  Kreutz.  They  definitely  did. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  2017 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  The  Polish  Army  fought  in  Normandy  alongside 
Russia  as  an  ally,  didn't  they? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Even  after  they  knew  that  their  officers  were  mas- 
sacred, they  knew  that  hundreds  of  thousands  of  their  people  disap- 
peared, they  still  fought  alongside  Russia  as  an  ally,  didn't  they  ? 

INIr.  Kreutz.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  And  then  they  come  over  here  and  they  say  that 
the  reason  why  they  censored  you  was  because  they  were  afraid  of 
what  Polish  reaction  might  be  if  they  learned  the  truth  about  Katyn. 
Doesn't  that  seem  rather  thin  ? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  I  believe  that  this  was  the  Communist  line  handed 
over  to  the  station  managers,  because  the  station  managers  usually 
didn't  know  anything  about  the  Polish  politics  or  about  Russia  or 
about  actually  anything  outside  the  United  States. 

Mr.  O'KoxsKi.  "Well,  is  it  very  significant  that  you  were  censored, 
and  the  pro-Communist  line  was  not  censored?  It  is  incredible. 
That  is  all. 

Mr.  Sheeiian.  Mr.  Kreutz,  were  you  ever  questioned  by  any  of 
our  Government  officials  from  the  Federal  Communications  Com- 
mission ? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  No  ;  I  never  had  any  contact  with  them.  I  don't  know 
why,  but  they  never  asked  me  anything. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  "Were  you  ever  questioned  by  any  members  from 
the  Office  of  War  Information,  OWI? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  No. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  In  your  discussions,  you  said  you  had  discussed  some 
of  these  matters  with  Mr.  Hopkins. 

Mr.  Kreutz.  That  is  right, 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Did  you  discuss  them  with  him  personally  ? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Did  you  have  any  particular  arguments  with  him 
about  it  ? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  Well,  there  were  a  few  occasions  when  he  called  up  a 
meeting  of  all  of  the  Polish  broadcasters  and  newscasters,  and  he  tried 
to  tell  us  that — for  example,  I  can  say  here  on  one  of  those  meetings, 
and  it  must  have  been  in  1944, 1  think,  or  maybe  even  1945,  after  Yalta, 
he  said,  "Well,  the  Polish  goose  is  cooked  forever,  and  so  why  don't 
you  forget  it  and  why  don't  you  stop  worrying  about  Poland." 

That  was  the  beginning.  Naturally  after  that  we  had  a  very  heated 
discussion  and  I  just  walked  out  of  the  office.  But  that  was  about  the 
way  it  was  discussed. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  In  these  suspensions  that  you  talked  about,  what  do 
you  mean  by  suspensions  ? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  Well,  in  other  words  as  I  said  my  program  director 
would  call  me  up  and  say,  "Kreutz,  you  are  not  going  on  the  air  today." 
You  know,  it  takes  a  few  hours  to  prepare  that  material.  I  would  say, 
"Why,"  and  he  would  say,  "Well,  Mr.  Hopkins  objects  to  it." 

I  would  say,  "I  will  come  down  to  the  station  and  see  what  is  going 
on." 

I  would  go  down  to  the  station  and  try  to  prepare  material,  and  wait 
until  about  10  minutes  before  broadcast  and  sometimes  5  minutes,  and 
they  would  come  in  there  and  say,  "O.  K.,  you  can  go  on  the  air;  we 
settled  the  matter  with  Hopkins." 


2018  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Maybe  you  can  help  me  on  this.  Didn't  we  ask  Mr. 
Hopkins  whether  he  had  any  connection  with  the  so-called  firing  of 
Mr.  Kreutz,  and  he  said  he  had  nothing  to  do  with  it  ? 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  He  said  Wyszatycki  did  the  firing. 

Mr.  Sheehan,  I  think  we  ought  to  get  Hopkins  back  and  see  if  he 
gave  this  gentleman  instructions,  because  he  tells  us  he  talked  with 
Hopkins  directly  about  it,  and  Hopkins  censored  the  program  and 
stopped  him. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Only  after  he  was  suspended  or  dismissed,  only  after 
he  was  dismissed  on  one  occasion. 

Mr.  I^EUTZ.  Not  even  then.  I  talked  to  Hopkins  only  on  certain 
conferences  when  he  called  up  the  whole  staff  and  started  to  talk  on 
the  Polish  question.  Then  I  started  to  discuss  the  Polish  question, 
because  I  was  the  one  to  talk  about  it.  On  suspensions  and  those  things, 
whatever  Mr.  Hopkins  was  doing  he  was  doing  through  Mr.  Wyszatycki 
the  way  it  was  being  done. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Mr.  Hopkins  led  me  to  believe  that  he  had  nothing 
to  do  with  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  No  ;  he  said  he  went  through  the  program  director. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  But  according  to  this  gentleman's  testimony  he  in- 
structed the  program  director  what  to  do. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  And  Mr.  Hopkins  didn't  say  that.  He  led  us  to  be- 
lieve generally  that  the  program  director  did  this,  is  that  right  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  I  stand  corrected.  I  would  like  to  ask  one  more 
question.  You  said  that  you  used  the  AP  and  UP  releases  with  refer- 
ence to  the  Polish  situation.  Were  they  the  American  AP  and  UP 
releases  or  those  coming  from  Moscow  ? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  No,  the  American  releases.  Naturally  the  news  was 
from  Moscow  in  it,  because  on  the  Polish  questions  all  of  the  news  was 
coming  from  Moscow  or  from  Tass. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Well,  for  the  members  of  our  committee  Henry 
Cassidy  brought  out,  when  we  questioned  him  some  time  ago,  when  he 
was  the  head  of  the  AP  there,  that  the  dispatches  they  sent  from 
Moscow  were  completely  censored.  They  were  only  allowed  to  send 
from  Moscow  what  the  Russian  Government  permitted.  So  then,  when 
you,  as  a  news  broadcaster  or  radio  broadcaster,  were  sending  out  dis- 
patches from  Moscow,  you  were  reading  only  what  the  Communists 
permitted  to  come  out,  because  Cassidy  specifically  told  us  that  any- 
thing the  Russians  didn't  like  they  didn't  permit  to  come  out.  So  you 
were  reading  censored  dispatches. 

Mr.  Kreutz.  Actually,  if  I  may  say,  on  the  Katyn  question  in  par- 
ticular, anythinij  that  would  come  from  Moscow  on  AP  or  UP  or  Inter- 
national News  Service,  would  be  purely  a  Russian  propaganda,  some- 
thing I  couldn't  use  for  the  Polish  people  because  they  wouldn't  believe 
me. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Yet  that  is  what  they  wanted  to  have  you  use. 

Mr.  Kreutz.  Yes.    But  the  people  wouldn't  believe  me. 

Mr.  O'Konski.  One  more  question :  The  witness,  Mr.  Hopkins,  that 
we  had  on  the  stand  seems  to  be  a  very  upright  and  fine,  honornble 
man.  In  his  defense  I  want  to  ask  you  this  question  :  Do  you  think  that 
he  or  his  people  under  him  who  censored  you  did  it  of  their  own  voli- 


THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE  2019 

tion,  or  do  you  think  that  pressure  was  put  on  them  from  some  outside 
source,  that  they  were  extremely  worried  about  it? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  I  would  answer  that  in  two  ways :  As  far  as  Mr. 
Hopkins  is  concerned,  I  am  quite  certain  that  he  was  sick  with  all  of 
that  proposition,  that  he  simply  didn't  know  enough  about  the  political 
issues,  that  there  had  been  some  pressure  from  outside  on  him,  and 
he  was  doing  it  only  under  duress.  That  was  the  definite  impression 
that  I  had.  He  wasn't  happy  with  it.  But,  if  we  come  to  Mr.  Luskin, 
who  was  mentioned  by  JMr.  Ho])kins,  I  would  say  that  I  would  have 
some  doubts  as  to  tlie  fact,  if  he  liked  it  or  not. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi,  But  as  far  as  the  ownership  of  the  station  was  con- 
cerned, you  are  convinced  that  in  all  respects  and  he  appeared  so,  no 
question  about  it,  he  is  honorable  and  upright  and  that  it  was  a  great 
pain  on  his  part  to  have  to  do  what  he  did,  and  very  likely  he  did  it 
because  he  wanted  to  stay  in  business? 

Mr.  Kreutz.  There  is  no  question  about  it. 

Chairman  Madden.  Any  further  questions?  I  wish  to  thank  you 
for  testifying  here,  Mr.  Kreutz. 

Is  Mr.  Simon  still  in  the  room  ?    Mr.  Simon  ? 

TESTIMONY  OF  ARTHUR  SIMON— Resumed 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Mr.  Simon,  the  Federal  Communications  Com- 
mission had  special  investigators,  did  it  not? 

Mr.  Simon,  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Do  you  know  of  your  own  knowledge  whether 
any  of  these  special  investigators  questioned  the  foreign  language 
commentators,  investigated  their  background  ? 

Mr.  Simon.  To  the  best  of  my  ability,  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  I 
believe  that  they  did. 

Mr,  Machrowicz.  What  do  you  know  about  their  investigating  the 
commentators  of  Polish  origin? 

Mr.  Simon.  Well,  I  think  Mr.  Lang  probably  would  have  been  in  a 
better  position  to  talk  about  the  Polish  announcers.  I  think  he  had 
some  controversy  with  the  Polish  programs.  As  far  as  Polish  pro- 
grams are  concerned,  I  think  Mr.  Lang  is  here  and  he  would  be  better 
qualified  to  talk  about  that  than  I  would. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Well,  can  we  have  Mr.  Lang  take  the  stand  ? 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Lang  ?  Is  Mr.  Lang  here  ?  Will  you  take 
the  stand,  Mr.  Lang. 

TESTIMONY  OF  JOSEPH  LANG— Resumed 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Without  the  preliminaries,  what  do  you  know 
about  the  Federal  Communications  Commission  investigators  ques- 
tioning Polish  commentators  ? 

Mr.  Lang.  I  remember  that  in  New  York  they  questioned  the  Polish 
people  very,  very  thoroughly. 

Mr.  Machrowicz,  With  what  in  mind  ? 
'  Mr.  Lang.  As  expressed  to  me  by  one  or  two  members  who  came 
back,  who  would  talk  about  it,  they  seemed  to  want  to  find  out  just 
what  their  attitude  would  be  if  a  Polish-Kussian  crisis  came  about. 


2020  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

They  tried  to  find  out  whether  they  had  any  leanings  toward  being 
pro-Russian. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Well,  in  other  words,  would  you  say  that  they 
wanted  to  have  commentators  who  would  be  friendly  or  unfriendly  tc 
the  Polish  regime  in  Warsaw,  the  so-called  Soviet-dominated 
regime  ? 

Mr.  Lang.  That  would  be  a  very  difficult  question  for  me  to  answer 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  In  these  meetings  you  had,  Mr.  Lang,  w^as  there 
any  concern  shown  over  pro-Communist  broadcasts  in  the  United 
States  ?    Was  that  subject  ever  brought  up  ? 

Mr.  Lang.  No  ;  I  don't  think  it  was. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Just  anti-Communist  broadcasts? 

Mr.  Lang.  That  is  right.  That  is  right.  I  might  cite  an  experi- 
ence— you  may  stop  me  if  it  is  not  relative — I  had  an  organization  that 
bought  some  time  called  the  International  Workers  Order,  who  bought 
some  time  on  the  Polish  programs,  and  who  I  thought  were  a  fra- 
ternal and  social  order,  as  their  name  implies.  They  went  on  twice,  on 
a  Sunday  afternoon  period.  But  it  was  so  filled  with  pro-Communist 
material  that  I  had  to  reject  them  and  break  their  contract  and  take 
them  off  the  air,  because  it  was  so  biased  that  it  was  ridiculous.  In 
other  words,  as  I  say,  I  put  them  on  the  air  thinking  they  w^ere  going 
to  broadcast  and  propagate  their  social  benefits,  if  one  belonged  to 
their  order.  But  there  was  no  criticism  to  any  great  extent  that  I 
recollect  of  any  procommunism. 

Chairman  Madden.  That  is  all.    Thank  you. 

Casimir  Soron. 

Will  your  raise  your  hand  and  be  sworn.  Do  you  solemnly  swear 
that  the  testimony  you  are  about  to  give  before  this  committee  will  be 
the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 

Mr.  SoRON.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  CASIMIR  SOEON,  BUFFALO,  N.  Y. 

Chairman  Madden.  If  you  wi]\  just  sit  down,  Mr.  Soron,  and  state 
your  full  name. 

Mr.  SoRON.  Casimir  Soron. 

Chairman  Madden.  And  your  address  ? 

Mr.  SoRON.  U6  Middlesex,  Buffalo,  N.  Y. 

Chairman  Madden.  And  wdiat  is  your  business,  Mr.  Soron  ? 

Mr.  SoRON.  I  have  two  businesses,  one  is  broadcasting,  buying  time, 
I  am  a  program  director  on  Station  WXRA,  and  I  own  a  furniture 
store  in  Buffalo. 

Chairman  Madden,  Proceed,  Mr.  Counsel. 

Mr,  Mitchell.  Mr.  Soron,  have  you  been  present  this  afternoon  in 
this  hearing  room  ? 

Mr.  Soron,  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Have  you  heard  all  of  the  testimony  that  has  been 
given  ? 

Mr.  Soron.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  would  like  to  have  you  state  briefly  what  your 
position  was  in  194;5,  and  the  years  following. 

Mr.  Soron.  In  1943  I  was  employed  by  radio  station  WBNY  in 
Buffalo  as  ])rogram  director  and  commentator, 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  language  was  that  in? 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  2021 

Mr.  SoRON.  Polish  radio  program. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Will  you  state  briefly  for  this  committee  what  hap- 
pened to  you  in  the  course  of  your  engagement  in  that  work  ? 

Mr.  SoRON.  Before  being  on  the  radio  I  used  to  be  a  newspaperman 
in  Detroit  for  8  years,  with  Polish,  and  I  knew  how  to  read  news 
and  how  to  commentate  on  it,  you  see.  When  I  read  the  news  about 
Russia  striking  Poland — well,  I  was  commentating  exactly  the  way 
it  was,  you  see.  And  then  when  there  was  this  Katyn  case  I  told 
the  public  openly  that  everything  indicates  that  the  Russians  did  it 
because  there  are  facts  here  and  there  that  show  that  nobody  else 
could  do  it. 

Now,  the  owner  of  the  station,  Mr.  Albertson,  told  me  a  few  times 
1  should  stop  talking  like  tliat,  because  he  had  instructions  from 
Washington,  he  told  me,  that  they  don't  like  it.  Now,  that  was 
going  on  for  a  few  months.  Then  finally  he  told  me,  in  fact,  he 
showed  me  a  letter  from  Washington,  that  they  wrote  to  him,  you  see, 
that  this  has  to  be  stopped,  you  know,  because  I  am  talking  against 
our  allies. 

Finally,  you  see,  he  gave  me  2  months'  notice  to  continue  the  pro- 
gram. I  had  a  big  business  there.  I  had  about  a  $60,000-a-year 
business. 

Mr.  JNliTCHELL.  Were  you  removed  from  the  air  ? 

Mr.  SoRON.  I  was  removed  from  the  air. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Could  you  tell  the  committee  when  you  were  removed 
from  the  air? 

Mr.  SoRON.  I  was  removed — he  gave  me  notice  by  the  end  of  1943, 
and  I  stopped  broadcasting  early  in  1944. 

Chairman  Madden.  Do  you  know  who  this  letter  was  from? 

Mr.  SoRON.  Well,  I  really  don't  remember.  It  seems  to  me  it  was 
from  the  Radio  Communications  Commission,  but  I  am  not  sure.  I 
believe  he  told  me  it  was  from  the  Radio  Communications  Commission. 

Chairman  Madden.  Did  you  see  the  letter  yourself? 

Mr.  SoRON.  Well,  he  showed  it  to  me,  you  see,  but  I  am  not  sure 
whether  that  was  from  the  Radio  Communications  Commission. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Is  Mr.  Albertson  still  alive? 

Mr.  SoRON.  Yes ;  he  owns  the  station. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  think  he  would  have  that  letter  in  his  pos- 
session today? 

Mr.  SoRON.  I  imagine  he  would ;  yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Thank  you. 

Chairman  Madden.  Any  questions  ? 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Were  there  any  pro-Communist  broadcasts  over  the 
station  that  you  were  on  by  any  pro-Communist  organizations  ? 

Mr.  SoRON,  On  the  same  station?  No,  sir;  I  don't  believe  there 
were  any. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Were  there  any  over  any  other  station  of  foreign 
language  in  the  Buffalo  area  ? 

Mr.  SoRON.  Not  that  I  remember. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  It  is  very  possible  that  Buffalo  would  not  have  very 
much  of  a  Communist  cell  among  those  people.  It  is  quite  different 
in  Detroit.  I  am  not  casting  any  reflections  on  my  good  brother  liere. 
You  didn't  have  the  problem  over  there,  so  that  wouldn't  apply. 

That  is  all. 


2022  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

Chairman  Madden.  Would  you  be  in  a  position  to  find  out  whether 
or  not  this  person  has  that  letter  ? 

Mr.  SoRON.  Well,  I  wouldn't  be  in  a  position  because  we  parted 
very  badly  with  Mr,  Albertson  on  account  of  that. 

Chairman  Madden.  You  what? 

Mr.  SoRON.  We  parted  in  a  bad  way,  you  see. 

Chairman  Madden.  What  is  Mr.  Albertson's  address? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  believe  I  have  it. 

Chairman  Madden.  All  right.  Are  there  any  further  questions? 
Thank  you  for  testifying  here. 

Chairman  Madden.  Mrs.  Hilda  Shea.  If  you  will  be  sworn,  Mrs. 
Shea.  Do  you  solemnly  swear  that  the  testimony  you  shall  give  be- 
fore this  committee  will  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  notliing  but 
the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  MRS.  HILDA  SHEA,  WASHINGTON,  D.  C.       . 

Chairman  Madden.  Mrs.  Shea,  please  sit  down.  What  is  your 
present  address? 

Mrs.  Shea.  4000  Cathedral  Avenue. 

Chairman  Madden.  Washington? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Washington,  D.  C. 

Chairman  Madden.  And  what  is  your  business? 

Mrs.  Shea.  I  am  a  housewife  now. 

Chairman  Madden.  A  housewife? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Chairman  Madden.  Proceed,  Mr.  Counsel. 

Mr.  MrrcHELL.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  read  a  letter  I  re- 
ceived from  Mrs.  Shea  after  the  invitation  I  extended  on  your  behalf 
for  her  to  appear  before  this  committee.  The  letter  is  from  the 
Westchester,  Washington,  the  date  November  8, 1952.  It  is  addressed 
to  me  as  chief  counsel  of  this  committee : 

Dear  Mr.  Mitchell:  Before  talking  to  you  in  yoiu-  office,  I  had  not  reread, 
since  1944,  the  testimony  that  I  gave  in  that  year  l)efore  the  select  committee 
appointed  by  the  House  of  Representatives  in  the  Seventy-eighth  Congress  to 
investigate  tlie  Federal  Communications  Commission.  This  testimony  was  given 
on  April  18,  19,  and  20,  1944,  and  api)ears  at  pages  30&1-3059,  3063-30S8,  3083- 
3119  of  the  official  report  of  the  hearings  of  that  committee.  On  rereading  my 
testimony  I  find,  as  might  be  expected,  that  my  recollection  in  1944  was  much 
clearer  about  the  events  that  happened  in  1943  than  it  is  now,  and  the  reading 
of  the  transcript  has  refreshed  my  recollection  on  several  points  that  you  asked 
me  about  in  our  informal  conference.  If  there  are  any  inconsistencies  between 
what  I  lold  you  in  our  informal  conference  and  my  testimony  before  the  House 
committee  in  1944.  and  to  the  extent  that  my  testimony  before  that  committee 
covers  details  of  which  I  no  longer  have  an  independent  recollection,  I  believe 
that  the  testimony  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  more  reliable  source  of  information 
because  it  was  given  at  a  point  of  time  much  closer  to  the  events  which  I  was 
discussing.  While  I  shall  be  glad  to  assist  the  committee  in  any  way  I  can, 
I  am  inclined  to  thiidv  that  I  am  not  now  in  a  position  to  add  anything  to  the 
testimony  that  I  gave  to  the  House  committee  in  1944,  because  1  find  that  with 
the  passage  of  time  my  recollection  on  many  of  these  events  has  l)ecome  vague. 
I  assume  that  you  know  my  prior  testimony,  but  in  the  circumstances  I  thought 
I  should  like  to  call  it  to  your  attention. 
Sincerely  yours, 

Hilda  D.  Shea. 

Mr.  O'Konski.  May  I  make  just  one  remark.  One  of  my  prior 
statements  where  I  made  the  remark  concerning  INIr.  Shea,  I  was  con- 


THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE  2023 

fused  with  names.     It  was  not  Mr.  Shea  I  meant,  it  was  Mr.  Cranston 
I  meant.     So  will  you  correct  the  record. 
Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mrs.  Shea,  when  did  you  first  enter  Government 
employment? 

Mrs.  Shea.  March  1934. 

Mr.  INIiTCHELL.  Where  were  you  employed  at  that  time,  and  in 
what  position  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  At  the  Agricultural  Adjustment  Administration,  as  an 
assistant  attorney,  I  believe. 

JNIr.  Mitchell.  How  long  were  you  there  at  that  agency  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  From  March  1934  to  July  1935. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  was  your  next  employment  ? 

Mi's.  Shea.  At  the  Resettlement  Administration,  until  I  believe 
January  1936. 

INIr.  Mitchell.  In  what  capacity  were  you  employed  at  that  agency  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  As  an  attorney. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  was  your  next  position  in  Government  serv- 
ice? 

Mrs.  Shea.  I  then  went  to  the  National  Labor  Relations  Board,  as 
an  attorney. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  How  long  were  you  at  the  National  Labor  Relations 
Board? 

Mrs.  Shea.  With  the  lapse  of  about  9  months,  I  was  there  until  the 
fall  of  1942. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  were  employed  as  an  attorney  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  Government  agency  did  you  go  to  in  the  f  aU 
of  1942? 

Mrs.  Shea.  The  Federal  Communications  Commission. 

]\Ir.  Mitchell.  What  was  your  employment  there,  as  an  attorney? 

Mrs.  Shea,  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Who  was  responsible  for  your  employment  at  the 
FCC  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Mr.  Denny  appointed  me,  I  believe. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Who  was  the  counsel  when  you  reported  there? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Mr.  Denny,  Charles  Denny.  ' 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  have  been  present  in  the  hearing  room  this 
afternoon  during  the  course  of  the  testimony  that  has  been  taken 
here  today  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  I  arrived  in  the  middle  of  Mr.  Davis'  testimony. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Davis'  testimouA^? 

Mrs.  Shea,  Ye.s,  about  2  o'clock, 

Mr.  MiTCiirXL.  Then  you  have  been  here  through  a  majority  of  the 
testimony  and  practically  all  of  it.  Do  you  deny  having  attended 
that  meeting  in  New  York  that  was  referred  to  by  Mr.  Lang  and  Mr. 
Simon  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  have  heard  the  comments  that  they  had  to  make 
this  afternoon.  Would  you  like  to  make  a  statement  in  that  con- 
nection ? 

Chairman  Madden.  In  what  connection?     Be  more  specific  on  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  They  have  said  that  you  were  present  at  this  meet- 


2024  THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE 

ing  in  New  York  when  a.license  of  Mr.  Lang,  although  up  for  renewal 
at  that  time,  was  not  discussed  at  the  meeting.  Weren't  you  attending 
that  meeting  as  an  attorney  for  the  FCC  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Could  you  explain  to  the  committee  how  you  came 
to  attend  such  a  meeting  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  I  was  employed  at  the  time  as  head  of  the  Foreign 
Language  Studies  Section  in  the  Law  Department  of  the  FCC,  and 
part  of  my  job,  as  I  understood  it,  was  to  work  in  liaison 

Chairman  Madden.  Could  you  speak  a  little  louder,  please?  We 
can't  hear  you. 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir.  With  my  opposite  numbers  in  other  agencies 
handling  similar  problems.  I  am  a  little  puzzled  at  this  point  on  how 
far  afield  to  go.    Do  you  want  my  version  on  what  happened? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  want  to  know  si:)ecifically.  Did  you  know  Allen 
Cranston  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  I  had  met  Allen  Cranston  as  head  of  the  foreign  lan- 
guage problems  in  the  OWL    I  knew  him  in  that  capacity. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  have  many  conferences  with  Allen 
Cranston  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Very  few. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Will  you  explain  to  the  committee  how  you  came 
to  attend  this  meeting  in  New  York  with  Allen  Cranston  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir.  Mr.  Cranston  called  me  and  said  that  he  had 
been  informed  by  letter  from  the  OWI  oflice  in  Detroit,  that  a  broad- 
caster in  the  Polish  language  on  a  station  there  was  upsetting  the 
Polish  population  by  pro-Kussian  broadcasts,  and  asked  me  whether, 
as  a  lawyer  in  the  field,  I  knew  of  anything  that  might  be  done  about 
it.  I  told  him  that  the  FCC  itself  had  no  power  to  do  anything  in  a 
situation  of  that  kind,  and  that  the  Office  of  Censorship  in  Washing- 
ton had  expressed  no  interest  in  problems  of  that  kind,  and  the  one 
group  that  might  be  of  any  assistance  if  it  cared  to  be  on  a  purely  vol- 
untary basis  was  the  radio  wartime  control,  headed  by  Mr.  Simon  and 
Mr.  Lang. 

Mr.  Cranston  then  called  them  and  made  an  appointment  and  I 
went  along  as  an  observer  for  the  FCC. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Why  did  you  go  along  as  an  observer  for  the  FCC 
when  it  was  not  a  problem  or  in  any  way  connected  with  the  FCC, 
which  you  have  just  stated  to  the  committee? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Well,  I  just  told  the  connnittee  that  the  FCC  is  with- 
out power  to  interfere  in  anything  that  is  said  by  a  broadcaster  on 
the  air.  But  it  is  interested  in  knowing  what  he  says,  and  in  how 
the  station  handles  problems  of  the  kind  for  purposes  of  evaluating 
the  stations'  use  of  its  license.  And  so,  I  was  instructed  to  go  as  an 
observer,  purely,  but  not  to  put  forward  any  views  or  suggestions. 

Mr.  MrrcHELL.  Who  instructed  you  to  go  to  that  meeting? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Mr.  Denny. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  present  this  problem  to  Mr.  Denny  in  such 
a  way  tJiat  lie  thoroughly  understood  it  at  that  time? 

Mrs.  SiiEA.  I  don't  believe  I  am  in  a  position  to  say  whether  he  did. 
He  seemed  to.    He  generally  is  very  able  to  understand  things. 

Mr.  JMitchell.  Did  he  have  access  to  the  German  propaganda 
broadcast  on  Katyn  at  that  time? 
Mrs.  Shea.  I  don't  know,  sir. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE  2025 

Mr.  Mitchell.  They  came  in  and  they  were  monitored  right  within 
the  FCC.    FBIS,  wasn't  that  under  FCC  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir.  I  think  matters  of  Mr.  Denny's  knowledge 
ought  to  be  referred  to  Mr.  Denny.  Tlie  record  shows  that  before  the 
conference  I  had  asked  Mr.  Denny's  permission  to  go,  and  the  per- 
mission was  expressly  given.  That  is  on  page  2802,  of  part  3  of  the 
House  committee  record. 

I^Ir.  Mitchell.  Page  2802? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Do  you  refer  to  the  record  of  the  committee  to 
investigate  the  Federal  Communications  Commission? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mrs.  Shea,  notwithstanding  your  statement,  you  will 
recall  we  had  that  informal  talk  in  my  office,  at  that  time  you  made  the 
following  statement  to  me.  Well,  1  asked  you  this :  "How  did  yon 
come  to  get  into  this  meeting  in  New  York?"  "Mrs.  Shea:  In  New 
York?" 

I  said,  "Yes,  in  May  of  1943  with  Cranston." 

"Mrs.  Shea :  Well,  Lang's  license  was  up  for  renewal.  We  were 
inquiring  about  the  type  of  material  that  was  going  out  over  his 
foreign-language  radio  programs.  The  held  staif  was  doing  a  study 
on  it,  and  I  believe  I  went  up  there  in  connection  with  that  study." 

Now,  this  afternoon  two  witnesses  appeared  here  who  specifically 
stated  that  there  was  no  discussion  concerning  the  license  at  this  par- 
ticular meeting.     Could  you  explain  that,  please  ? 

JNIrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir.  When  you  questioned  me  a  few  weeks  ago  I 
had  forgotten,  as  I  stated  in  the  letter  that  you  read  into  the  record, 
this  whole  Katyn  incident,  and  it  was  only  after  I  read  the  record 
that  I  recalled  those  details.  However,  while  I  was  in  New  York  on 
that  occasion  I  was  at  the  New  York  offices  of  the  FCC  and  I  did  talk 
over  with  them  pending  cases. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  knew  at  the  time  that  this  meeting  was  set  up 
by  Cranston  that  this  did  not  concern  the  licensing  of  Mr.  Lang,  the 
purpose  of  the  meeting  that  Cranston  arranged. 

Now,  Mr.  Elmer  Davis  this  afternoon,  when  he  testified  here,  said 
that  he  thought  that  Allen  Cranston  was  outside  the  scope  of  his  duties. 

Mrs.  Shea.  Well,  I  can't  comment  on  the  scope  of  Mr.  Cranston's 
duties. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Don't  you  think  that  you  should  have  inquired 
about  the  scope  of  his  duties  at  the  time  when  he  brought  this  to  your 
attention  ?     You  were  an  attorney  employed  by  the  FCC  then. 

Mrs.  Shea.  I  was  concerned  with  the  scope  of  my  duties,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Don't  you  think  that  you  should  inquire  about  the 
scope  of  an  individual's  duties  that  3^011  are  going  to  go  into  a  con- 
ference with,  if  he  has  the  power  to  do  that?  You  are  an  attorney. 
I  always  like  to  know  what  an  attorney  is  going  to  do  who  accom- 
panies me,  or  what  the  individual  does,  has  he  got  the  power  to  do 
it,  or  has  he  not  got  the  power  to  do  it. 

Mrs.  Shea.  Do  you  wish  to  know  what  assumption  I  made  at  the 
time? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes. 

Mrs.  Shea.  I  don't  recall.  I  was  questioned  by  Mr.  Cranston  as  to 
whether  the  FCC  had  any  power  to  do  anything  about  his  problem. 


2026  THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE 

My  answer  was  unequivocably  no.  He  said  "Well,  who  might?"  I 
said  "Well,  if  the  radio  wartime  control  wants  to  do  anything  about 
it,  perhaps  it  will." 

Mr.  Mitchell.  All  right,  then,  why  did  you  go  near  that  meeting 
at  all  is  what  I  would  like  to  find  out  definitely. 

Mrs.  Shea.  Well,  I  can  answer  that  question. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Just  a  minute  until  I  tell  you  something. 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  had  investigators  at  that  time  who  were  em- 
ployed in  the  field  for  that  specific  purpose  of  finding  out  if  the  radio 
stations  were  conforming  with  their  licensing  arrangement.  You 
were  an  attorney,  you  were  not  an  investigator.  You  went  along  on 
this  particular  meeting,  after  having  tokl  Cranston  that  this  was  not 
within  the  scope  of  the  FCC's  functions.  I  would  like  to  know  why 
you  decided  to  do  that. 

Mrs.  Shea.  Well,  I  went  along  partly  because  I  had  a  problem, 
described  here  in  the  record,  which  was  also  without  the  scope  of  the 
Commission's  power,  and  I  raised  that  problem  with  Mr.  Simon  and 
Mr.  Lang  as  well.  Our  field  people  in  Texas  had  reported  that  the 
war-bond  drives  and  so  forth,  were  using  the  slogan  "Remember  the 
Alamo,"  and  the  persons  of  Mexican  extraction  were  very  incensed  by 
this  reference  to  a  past  unfortunate  incident. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  But  that  wasn't  raised  at  this  particular  meeting? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir,  at  great  length.  Mr.  Simon  so  testified  at 
length.     The  State  Department  had  written  us  about  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Where  did  Mr.  Cranston  fit  in  with  that  particular 
j)roblem  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Not  at  all,  sir.  After  Mr.  Cranston  had  talked  about 
the  Polish  problem,  I  said,  "Here  is  another  problem  that  you  people 
at  the  wartime  control  could  do  something  about  if  you  wished  to,"  and 
left  it  there. 

It  was  a  purely  voluntary  matter.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  as  far  as  I 
know  the  control  did  nothing  about  it,  and  we  did  nothing  about  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  participate  in  this  discussion  on  the  Katyn 
or  the  Polish  situation  in  Detroit,  the  radio  station  there  during  this 
meeting,  you  specifically  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  realize  at  that  moment  that  by  your  pres- 
ence there  you  were  in  the  position  of  lending  support  to  Cranston's 
position  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Mr.  Mitchell,  I  did  not  think  so,  and  may  I  tell  you  why  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Go  right  ahead. 

Mrs.  Shea.  Mr.  Lang,  as  he  just  told  you  on  the  stand,  was  not  an 
ordinary  broadcaster.  He  was  very  well  acquainted  with  the  scope  of 
the  authority  of  all  of  the  agencies  in  AVashington,  working  on  the 
matter,  and  had  sliown  complete  independence  of  judgment  and  action 
all  the  way  through.  And  he  did  in  tliis  case.  He  was  not  a  man  to 
be  intimidated  and  I  don't  believe  he  was  intimidated.  He  testified 
he  was  not  intimidated. 

Mr.  Machhowicz.  Let  me  see  if  I  understand  your  situation  cor- 
rectly. Mrs.  Shea,  as  an  attorney  you  had  advised  the  Federal  Com- 
munications Commission  that  they  had  no  authority  to  censor  editorial 
comment? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  2027 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  And  that  is  your  opinion  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  And  you  told  them  also  that  the  only  body  that 
could  do  that  would  be  the  foreign-language  wartime  control? 

Mrs.  Shea.  In  effect,  yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  So  then,  since  Mr.  Cranston,  or  Mr.  Denny, 
M^anted  to  do  something  about  it,  and  couldn't  do  it  legally,  you  sug- 
gested meeting  with  the  Federal  foreign-language  radio  wartime  con- 
trol and  do  indirectly  what  you  couldn't  do  directly? 

Mrs.  Shea.  No,  sir.  We  were  unable  to  handle  the  matter,  so  we 
passed  it  on,  openly,  and  without  any  color  or  pressure,  to  a  group  that 
could  handle  it  if  it  wished  to. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Well,  your  desire  was  to  control  or  to  censor  these 
editorial  comments,  and  you  knew  you  couldn't  do  it,  so  you  suggested 
a  meeting  with  the  foreign-language  radio  wartime  control  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Is  that  not  what  you  told  us  before  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  My  desire  was  to  get  the  problem  off  my  desk,  into  the 
hands  of  the  group  that  could  act  on  it  if  they  wished  to. 

Mr.  ]\Iachrowicz.  And  in  order  to  see  that  it  would  be  acted  upon 
by  them,  both  you  and  Mr.  Cranston  went  to  a  meeting  with  that 
committee  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  No,  sir;  we  went  there  or  I  went  there — I  can  only 
speak  for  myself — in  order  to  call  the  matter  to  the  attention  of  that 
body. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Call  it  what  you  may.  But  now  I  notice  you 
have  a  copy  of  the  volume  of  the  hearings  of  the  committee  investigat- 
ing the  Federal  Communications  Commission.  I  wish  you  would  open 
that  book  to  page  3076.   Do  you  have  that  page  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  There,  if  you  note,  you  identified  a  letter  that 
was  sent  out  on  the  week  of  May  24, 1944,  as  a  result  of  that  conference 
you  and  Mr.  Cranston  had  with  the  foreign-language  radio  wartime 
control.    Am  I  correct  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Would  you  read  the  question  again,  please,  sir? 

Mr.  Machrowicz,  As  a  result  of  the  conference  that  you  and  Mr. 
Cranston  had  with  the  members  of  the  foreign-language  radio  war- 
time control,  this  letter  was  sent  out,  which  I  am  about  to  read.  If 
you  will  follow  me,  I  will  ask  you  if  it  is  correct : 

It  is  urgently  recommended  by  the  ofRcers  of  the  foreign-language  radio  war- 
time control  that  news  and  war  commentators  be  requested  to  cease,  immedi- 
ately, the  broadcasting  of  editorial  or  personal  opinion. 

Am  I  correct  in  that  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  That  is  what  the  letter  says ;  yes. 

Mr.  Machrow^itz.  That  is  what  the  Federal  Communications  Act 
says  you  cannot  do,  so  you  passed  it  on  to  the  foreign-language  radio 
wartime  control  to  do  what  you  couldn't  do  legally  yourself;  am  I 
right? 

Mrs.  Shea.  That  is  your  view  of  it,  Mr.  Congressman. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Well,  you  are  asking  them  to  cease  immediately 
the  broadcasting  of  editorial  and  personal  opinion,  and  you  say 
further  this  is  especially  hazardous  in  the  Russian,  Polish,  and  Croa- 
tian situation ;  right  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Sir,  this  isn't  my  letter. 


2028  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Mr.  Macheowicz.  But  that  is  the  letter  that  resulted  from  the  con- 
ference you  and  Mr.  Cranston  had  with  the  members  of  the  foreign- 
language  radio  wartime  control  after  you  advised  the  FCC  that  they 
couldn't  do  this  veiy  thing  legally;  am  I  right? 

Mrs.  Shea.  This  is  the  letter  that  went  out  after  that  conference, 
sir ;  yes. 

Mr.  Maciirowicz.  And  that  was  after  you  advised  the  Federal 
Communications  Commission  they  coukbi't  do  that  very  thing  legally. 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Now,  you  have  referred  to  page  2802,  previously 
in  your  testimony.    What  is  that,  on  page  2802  ?    Is  that  the  letter  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  No;  this  is  part  of  the  testimony  of  Mr.  Denny,  the 
General  Counsel. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  referred,  in  your  testimony  a  while  ago,  to 
a  commentator  in  Detroit  who  was  known  for  his  pro-Communist 
comments ;  is  that  right  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Was  his  name  Mr.  Novak? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  And  you  knew  about  the  fact  that  he  was  a  pro- 
Communist  commentator  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  He  never  was  suspended  was  lie  i 

Mrs.  Shea.  Mr.  Congressman,  the  immediate  matter  that  occasioned 
Mr.  Cranston's  calling  me,  and  my  subsequent  course  of  action  in  this 
connection  were  the  broadcasts  of  Mr.  Novak.  He  was  the  commenta- 
tor in  Detroit  who  was  complained  about  by  the  local  Detroit  office  of 
the  OWI,  and  the  question  that  was  put  before  the  radio  wartime 
control  was  precipitated  precisely  by  Mr.  Novak's  broadcasts. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  consider  his  comment  as  derogatory  to 
the  best  interests  of  the  United  States  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  As  I  testihed,  this  was  Mr.  Cranston's  j^roblem.  Mv. 
Cranston  put  the  question  to  the  i-adio  wartime  control.  I  did  not 
participate  in  that  part  of  the  discussion  at  that  meeting. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  But  you  do  know  that  Mr.  Novak  was  the  pro- 
Communist  commentator  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Now,  I  will  refer  to  that  very  page  that  you  testi- 
fied to,  page  2802,  Mr.  Denny's  testimony.  I  will  refer  you  to  what 
was  said  then,  "No  specific  complaints  against  Novak's  alleged  com- 
munism were  ever  received  by  the  Connnission  in  Washington.'' 

Do  you  find  that  in  the  third  paragraph  on  the  page  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz   (reading)  : 

No  specific  complaints  against  Novak's  alleged  conimnnisni  were  ever  received 
by  the  Commission  in  Washington.  The  Commission's  field  representatives  who 
were  apprised  of  the  general  situation  in  the  Detroit  area  reported  nothing  in 
Novak's  program — 

that  is,  the  pro-Communist  program — 

which  could  be  considered  propaganda  detrimental  to  the  war  effort,  or  other- 
wise contrary  to  the  public  interest  of  the  United  States. 

Is  that  correct? 

Mrs.  Shea.  As  far  as  you  are  reading,  sir,  yes. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  2029' 

Mr.  IMACiiROWicz.  That  is  Mr.  Denny's  testimony,  is  it  not  ? 
Mrs.  SiiEA,  Mr.  Denny  goes  on  to  testify  further  on  that. 
Mr.  Machrowicz  (reading)  : 

However,  in  any  event  there  was  no  occasion  for  a  Commission  investigation 
of  Novalv's  alleged  communism. 

There  was  evidently  some  reason  to  investigate  the  acts  of  Mr. 
Kreutz,  who  was  anti-Communist,  but  there  was  no  occasion  for  a 
Commission  investigation  of  Novak's  alleged  communism.  It  was  a 
matter  of  public  knowledge  that  Novak  had  been  fully  investigated 
by  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  for  Communist  affiliations. 
He  had  been  indicted  on  December  11,  1942,  in  proceedings  for  de- 
naturalization.    Is  that  correct  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  That  is  the  testimony ;  yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  didn't  think  it  was  hazardous  or  your  Com- 
mission didn't  think  it  was  hazardous  to  the  best  interests  of  the  United 
States  to  permit  a  pro-Communist  commentator  to  continue  his  broad- 
casts in  Detroit,  but  you  thought  it  necessary  to  send  letters  to  the 
various  radio  stations  warning  against  commentators  who  were  anti- 
Communist  ? 

Mrs.  Shea,  Mr.  Congressman,  the  letter  of  Mr.  Lang  which  you 
previously  read  was  occasioned  precisely  by  Mr.  Cranston's  calling 
Mr.  Novak's  broadcast  to  the  attention  of  the  radio  wartime  control. 
.Vnd  may  I  point  out  that  ]\Ir.  Denny's  testimony  goes  on  to  say,  "Mr. 
Novak's  program  was  canceled  in  February  1944." 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  But  that  was  by  no  action  of  the  Federal  Com- 
munications Commission  or  by  the  foreign-language  radio  wartime 
control,  was  it? 

]Mrs.  Shea.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  But  the  broadcasts  which  were  anti-Communist 
were  censored  and  suspended  because  of  action  of  the  Federal  foreign- 
language  radio  wartime  control. 

Mrs.  Shea.  No,  sir.    I  must  disagree,  sir. 

jNIr.  Machrowicz.  You  heard  the  testimony  of  these  two  gentlemen 
that  testified  this  afternoon  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  They  testified,  so  far  as  I  followed  their  testimony,  that 
INIr.  Lang's  letter  suggested  a  policy  to  the  stations  of  curbing  editorial 
comment  by  both  pro-Soviet  and  pro-Polish  commentators,  and  that 
whatever  action  was  taken  against  people  who  failed  to  follow  the 
recommendation  was  taken  exclusively  by  the  station  owners,  not  the 
Commission. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  After  a  little  prodding  by  the  Federal  Communi- 
cations Commission,  right. 

Mrs.  Shea.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  agree  with  ]Mr.  Denny's  statement  that 
Mr.  Novak,  the  Communist — 

Mr.  Novak's  programs  could  not  be  considered  propaganda  detrimental  to  the 
war  effort  or  otherwise  contrary  to  the  public  interests  of  the  United  States? 

That  is  the  third  paragraph  of  page  2802, 

Mrs,  Shea.  Mr.  Denny  is  simply  summarizing  here  the  results  of 
analyses  made  of  Novak's  programs. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Of  course,  in  his  opinion,  the  Communists  like 
Mr.  Novak  were  much  less  dangerous  than  anti-Communists  like  Mr. 

93744— 52— pt.  7 14 


2030  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

Kreutz,  who  tried  to  point  out  the  Russian  <Tuilt  of  the  Katyn 
massacre. 

Mrs.  Shea.  Mr.  Kreutz  is  a  radio  personality  I  had  never  encoun- 
tered before,  sir ;  and  I  hesitate  to  testify  at  all  on  whether  Mr.  Denny 
knew  of  him  or  what  he  thought  of  him.     I  can't. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Have  I  misstated  Mr.  Denny's  analysis  of  Mr. 
Novak's  broadcasts. 

Mrs.  Shea.  Well,  I  think  the  statement  speaks  for  itself. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  I  think  so,  too. 

That  is  all,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Now,  this  report  that  my  colleague  read  from,  Mr. 
Denny's  report,  did  you  have  anything  to  do  with  the  compiling  of 
that  report? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir ;  I  compiled  part  of  that  material. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  You  did? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Are  you  positive,  in  your  statement,  that  whenever 
you  were  confronted  with  a  question  of  what  can  the  FCC  do  about 
these  broadcasts,  are  you  positive  in  your  statement  that  you  always 
said  as  far  as  the  FCC  was  concerned  you  were  powerless  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  I  am  very  glad  to  hear  that,  because  if  it  isn't  that 
would  be  very  bad. 

Did  you  have  anything  to  do  with  the  drafting  of  that  letter  that 
Mr.  Machrowicz  read? 

Mrs.  Shea.  No,  sir ;  nothing  whatever. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  In  other  words,  your  contention  is  that  your  posi- 
tion in  this  entire  matter  was  one  of  representing  the  legal  arm  of  the 
FCC,  of  that  branch,  and  whenever  you  were  confronted  with  the 
question  of  what  can  you  do  about  this  objectionable  commentator  or 
that  objectionable  commentator,  your  answer  was  always  that  as  far 
as  the  Commission  was  concerned  under  the  Federal  Communications 
Act  of  19.34,  thev  are  powerless  to  do  anything  about  it? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  And  to  your  knowledge,  Mrs.  Shea,  you  don't  know, 
do  you,  of  any  attempt  that  was  ever  made  by  the  FCC  by  you  or 
any  other  employee  to  use  the  FCC  to  browbeat  these  radio  station 
owners  who  discharged  what  they  considered  to  be  objectionable 
people? 

Mrs.  SiTEA.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  That  is  your  contention? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir ;  that  is. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  interrupt  for  a  mo- 
ment.   Will  you  refer 

Chairman  Madden.  Wait  a  minute.    Let  the  Congressman  finish. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Go  ahead. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Would  you  refer  to  part  1  ?  You  have  it  there,  I  be- 
lieve. Page  ()03.  I  would  like  to  start  reading  for  the  members  of 
the  committee.  Mr.  Richards  is  testifying  before  the  same  House 
committee  investigating  the  FCC,  page  603  : 

Mr.  Howard  was  the  hoad  of  tlie  press  section  of  censorship  at  that  time.  He 
had  some  discussions  with  the  Office  of  War  Information  with  refiard  to  censor- 
ship. I  am  not  familiar  with  tlie  discussion  except  that  it  toolc  place  on  the  basis 
of  whether  Office  of  War  Information  was  getting  into  our  field,  or  whether  we 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  2031 

-were  getting  into  their  field,  and  wliat  the  relationship  should  be  under  the 
agreement  we  had  reached. 

Mr.  Garey,  the  counsel  to  the  committee,  resumed  reading,  and  he 
had  this  to  say : 

Mrs.  Shea  called  to  ask  whether  or  not  it  was  true  that  this  Office  had  relaxed 
its  censorship  requirements  among  foreign-language  stations  by  withdrawing 
our  request  for  English  translations.  I  told  her  we  had,  after  consultation  with 
Mr.  Jack,  of  our  censorship  operating  board.  In  reconstructing  our  conversation 
from  that  point,  I  am  relying  on  notes,  and  there  mitiht  be  some  slight  error 
but  the  general  idea  is  as  follows :  Mrs.  Shea  said :  "If  you  are  not  to  ask  the 
managers  of  radio  stations  to  examine  the  material  on  their  stations,  what  curb 
will  there  be  on  opinions  expressed  by  some  of  these  foreign-born  broadcasters?" 
I  told  her  that  in  censorship  we  did  not  recommend  any  restrictions  on  expres- 
sion of  opinion,  as  long  as  such  opinion  did  not  cloak  facts  which  would  cross 
codes.  I  reproved  her  mildly  for  suggesting  that  there  should  be  such  censor- 
ship, and  she  said  maybe  she  didn't  mean  opinion,  maybe  she  meant  propaganda 
or  the  Government  line.  "Who,"  she  asked,  "is  going  to  force  these  managers  to 
see  to  it  that  the  propaganda  on  their  stations  follows  the  right  pattern?" 

"Somebody  else,  not  us,"  I  said. 

This  is  a  member  of  the  Office  of  Censorship  talking,  who  had 
written  this  memorandum : 

She  said  that  there  was  a  definite  shadow  zone  in  censorship  which  went 
beyond  the  definitions  contained  in  our  codes,  and  some  supervision  should  be 
exercised  in  this  zone  "for  the  good  of  the  war  effort  and  for  the  good  of  the 
people."  I  held  stoutly  to  our  function  as  censors  for  security.  This  bit  had 
the  melody  if  not  the  lyrics  of  the  score  that  the  Office  of  War  Information  sang 
to  Mr.  Howard. 

"What  would  you  think,"  Mrs.  Shea  asked,  "if  we  in  the  Federal  Communica- 
tions Commission  undertook  to  censor  programs  in  this  shadow  zone."  I  told 
Mrs.  Shea  I  thought  she  would  want  to  mull  that  over  a  long  time  before  she 
took  definite  action,  because  this  office  was  charged  with  censoring.  She  then 
rephrased  her  hypothesis.  "What  if  we  should  merely  suggest  to  station 
managers  that  they  should  maintain  only  English  ti'anslations  in  order  to  guide 
properly  the  propaganda  output  of  their  stations?" 

"That  is  coming  pretty  close  to  dictatorship  in  radio." 

That  is  a  comment  by  the  counsel. 

I  told  Mrs.  Shea  that  suggestion  from  the  Federal  Communications  Commission 
might  be  unfortunate  since  it  would  countermand  this  office  request,  but  that  I 
wouldn't  presume  to  advise  her  on  what  the  Federal  Communications  Com- 
mission should  do,  beyond  the  fact  that  it  should  leave  censoring  to  us.  Mrs. 
Shea  said  the  Federal  Communications  Commission  would  not  attempt  to  censor, 
it  would  merely  encourage  managers  to  take  fuller  cognizance  of  their  own  re- 
sponsibility. She  asked  me  to  think  it  over  for  a  couple  of  days  and  see  if  my 
mind  changed.  I  assured  her  it  wouldn't,  and  she  recommended  she  check  my 
opinion  by  talking  it  over  with  Mr.  Ryon. 

Mrs.  Shea,  it  seems  that  you  were  terribly  interested  as  an  attorney 
for  FCC  in  the  censorship  problem  during  the  course  of  these  hearings 
that  we  have  been  quoting  here.  Now,  Mr.  Machrowicz  has  asked  you 
was  Mr.  Novak  removed  from  the  air,  in  Detroit,  the  pro-Communist? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Was  he  removed  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  He  was  removed. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  When? 

Mrs.  Shea.  His  contract  was  canceled 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  mean  his  contract  was  canceled  and  wasn't 
renewed,  is  that  right  ? 


2032  THE  KATYN  FOREST  AIASSACRE 

Mrs.  Shea.  On  page  2803  of  part  3  of  the  House  committee  record, 
Mr.  Denny  testified  that — 

on  February  7,  1944,  the  management  of  the  station  WJBK  canceled  its  contract 
with  the  Kay  of  Truth  program. 

That  was  Novak's  program.  Novak  then  sought  a  court  injunction 
against  this  action,  and  he  failed  to  get  judicial  relief.  He  also  asked 
the  Commission  to  intervene  and  the  Commission  replied  that  the 
matter  was  outside  its  jurisdiction. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  But  the  thing  that  this  committee  is  trying  to  find 
out  is  this :  that  the  subject  matter  referred  to  the  Polish  commenta- 
tors who  were  also  our  allies  at  that  time,  who  were  anti-Connnunist. 
They  seemed  to  be  the  ones  that  were  having  the  difficulty,  not  Novak. 

Mrs.  Shea.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  am  sticking  strictly  on  Polish.  I  am  not  speaking 
of  Italian  or  anything  else. 

Mrs.  Shea.  Mr.  Denny's  testimony,  if  you  will  read  on  page  2803  to 
2804,  and  my  testimony  at  the  time — I  can't  testify  on  it  from  present 
recollection — my  testimony  at  the  time  was  that  in  point  of  fact  the 
pro-Polish  commentators  continued  very  actively  to  present  their 
point  of  view  in  many  instances. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  And  under  very  difficult  conditions. 

Now,  why  were  you  so  specifically  interested  in  the  censorship  policy 
when  you  as  an  attorney  for  the  FCC  shouldn't  have  been  in  that  field, 
as  Mr.  Machrowicz  pointed  out  from  the  statement  of  ^Ir.  Denny,  and 
as  you,  yourself,  have  admitted  when  you  talked  to  Cranston  about  it. 
You  said,  "That  isn't  our  i^roblem."  Yet  here  is  a  memorandum  to  an 
official  committee  of  Congress,  quoting  members  of  the  Office  of  Cen- 
sorship. 

Mrs.  Shea.  The  memorandum  from  which  you  read  was  a  memo- 
randum, I  believe,  bv  Mr.  Richards? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  is  correct. 

Mrs.  Shea.  After  numerous  inaccuracies  and  personalities,  he  con- 
cluded with  one  of  the  few  accurate  statements  in  the  memorandum, 
reasserting  my  recognition  of  the  limitations  of  FCC  authority  in 
the  field. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  are  you  reading  from?     What  page? 

Mrs.  Shea.  House  committee  hearings,  page  604 : 

Mrs.  Shea  said  the  Federal  Communications  Commission  would  not  try  ta 
censor.  It  would  merely  encourage  managers  to  take  fuller  cognizance  of  tlieir 
own  responsibilities. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  And  that  was  in  the  line  of  duties? 

Mrs.  Shea.  My  duty  was  to  make  int^uiries  as  to  whether  managers 
were  exercising  their  licensing  powers  in  the  public  interest. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Their  licensing  powers,  that  is  correct? 

Mrs.  Shea.  No,  sir.     I  mean  their  licenses,  excuse  me. 

Mr.  IVIiTCiiELL.  Their  licenses. 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Now,  if  I  am  correct  in  this — and  maybe  I  am  not 
thoi-ougldy  familiar  with  the  operations  of  the  FCC,  1  understand 
that  they  have  field  offices  for  that  specific  job.  I  understand  that  they 
also  had  investigators  for  that  particular  job. 

Mrs.  Shea.  Do  you  moan  the  FCC? 

Mr.  MrrcHELL,  The  FCC. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE  2033 


Mrs.  Shea,  May  I- 


Mr.  Mitchell.  And.  they  had  monitoring  stations. 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir.  May  I  amplify  that  statement?  The  prob- 
lem under  discussion  in  this  memorandmn  was  specifically  whether 
station  managers  should  require  English  translations  of  foreign- 
language  progi-ams  and  monitoring  of  the  programs,  so  they  could  see 
that  their  submitted  scripts  were  adhered  to.  Now,  that  is  a  pro- 
cedural problem,  not  related  to  the  substance  of  the  broadcast. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  know. 

Mrs.  Shea.  And  our  inquiries  as  to  whether  the  managers  were 
doing  that,  I  think,  were  well  within  the  scope  of  our  authority. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  As  to  procedure? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Not  as  to  substance  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  No,  and  that  is  not  censorship. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  As  to  procedure. 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  was  your  sole  scope. 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  The  commentator  always  files  his  broadcast,  right, 
Avhat  he  is  going  to  talk  about  on  the  air?  It  is  filed?  It  is  just  as 
these  Polish  commentators  had  to  file  theirs  ?  If  they  complied  with 
what  they  filed,  then  they  were  in  line,  as  far  as  the  FCC  is  concerned. 
That  is  procedure,  as  I  understand  it. 

Mrs.  Shea.  Well,  that  was  one  of  the  questions  we  inquired  into. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  What  that  commentator  had  to  say  didn't  make  any 
difference  to  the  FCC ;  correct? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Precisely. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  But  yet  all  afternoon  w^e  have  been  getting  at  the 
point  that  these  Polish  commentators  were  having  their  difficulties, 
they  were  suspended,  they  were  taken  off  the  air,  all  because  of  this 
meeting  in  New  York. 

Now,  let  me  ask  you  a  question :  Wliy  wasn't  the  Office  of  Censorship 
present  at  that  meeting  in  New  York  ?  Were  they  invited  to  attend 
that  meeting  in  New  York  with  Simon  and  Lang,  Cranston  and  your- 
self, by  you?     Did  you  invite  them  to  attend?     You? 

Mrs.  Shea.  I  don't  remember  precisely  whether  I  invited  them  to 
attend,  but  the  record  is  clear  that  they  were  invited,  and  the  Wash- 
ington group  refused  to  go. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Why  did  they  refuse  to  go  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Well,  I  don't  believe  I  am  the  person  to  answer  that 
question,  Mr.  Mitchell. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Well,  didn't  you  extend  the  invitation  to  them? 
You  must  have  gotten  a  reason  why  they  didn't  want  to  go, 

Mrs.  Shea.  I  don't  recall  extending  it.  The  invitation  was  extended, 
but  just  now  I  can't  recall  who  extended  it, 

Mr,  Mitchell,  No  further  questions. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Mrs.  Shea,  these  meetings  that  we  have  reference  to 
over  here,  particularly  the  one  that  we  have  discussed  most,  the  one 
in  New  York,  was  that  meeting  initiated  by  the  OWI,  or  was  it  initi- 
ated by  the  FCC  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  By  Mr.  Cranston. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  He  was  with  the  OWI  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 


2034  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

Mr.  SiiEEHAisr.  In  other  words,  the  FCC  had  nothing  to  do  with  ini- 
tiating that  particular  meeting,  is  that  correct? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  It  was  at  the  invitation  of  the  Office  of  War 
Information  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  That  clears  up  a  lot  of  things.  Did  you  personally 
have  any  hand  in  fixing  the  FCC  policies  in  this  respect,  or  were  you 
told  to  go  and  attend  that  meeting  as  a  legal  representative  of  that 
division  of  the  Federal  Communications  Commission?  In  other 
words,  was  your  attendance  at  that  meeting  of  your  own  volition  or 
were  you  instructed  to  go  by  a  higher  authority  in  the  Federal  Com- 
munications Commission  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  I  called  Mr.  Denny's  office,  and  he  authorized  me  to  go. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  After  you  were  invited  by  the  Office  of  War  Infor- 
mation to  go  to  that  meeting? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  And  you  got  his  authority  to  go  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Did  you,  Mrs.  Shea  have  any  personal  feelings  of 
your  own  pertaining  to,  well,  particularly  the  Polish-Russian  contro- 
versy over  Katyn  ?  Did  you  have  any  personal  feelings  in  that  matter 
at  ail? 

Mrs.  Shea.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Did  any  of  your  feelings  ever  come  into  that  matter, 
any  of  the  decisions  that  you  had  to  make  when  this  matter  came  up? 

Mrs.  Shea.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  It  was  purely  on  your  standing,  legal  standing,  rep- 
resenting the  Federal  Communications  Commission? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Now,  this  meeting  that  was  finally  called,  in  New 
York,  was  that  the  result  of  OWI  just  calling  the  meeting,  or  was  that 
meeting  called  as  a  result  of  some  complaints  that  they  were  receiving 
over  certain  broadcasts? 

Mrs.  Shea.  The  local  office  of  OWI  wrote  Cranston  saying  that  it 
had  come  to  their  attention  that  the  Poles  in  Detroit  were  being  upset 
by  this  acrimonious  controversy. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  That  clears  up  a  lot  of  things  for  me. 

Again,  as  far  as  you  know,  Mrs.  Sliea,  there  definitely  was  not  any 
FCC  threat  to  hold  the  license-renewal  proposition,  which  is  the  blood 
stream  of  the  radio  industry,  as  fas  as  you  know  there  was  no  attempt 
to  scare  them  into  thinking  that  their  license  would  not  be  renewed, 
if  they  did  not  conform  ?     You  don't  know  of  any  such  thing  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Well,  did  you  have  a  feeling  in  these  feelings  that 
have  been  outlined,  Mrs.  Shea,  tliat  probably  the  OWI  was  going 
too  far  afield  in  its  attempt  to  censoi-  these  broadcasts?  That  will 
have  to  be  conjecture  on  your  part.  Did  you,  anywhere  down  the 
line,  as  these  things  developed,  you  yourself  being  a  leo;al  repre- 
sentative of  that  division  of  FCC,  get  an  inkling  that  somewhere  down 
the  line  they  were  trying  to  exert  too  much  pressure  down  the  line 
of  censorship?  Did  that  feeling  ever  occur  to  you  in  the  develop- 
ments that  transpired  ? 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  2035 

Mrs.  Shea.  Actually  I  had  little  contact  with  the  OWI.  My 
predecessors  had  worked  more  closely  with  them.  I  saw  Mr.  Cran- 
ston very  few  times,  and  had  barely  a  nodding  acquaintance  with  him. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Did  you  at  any  time  get  the  feeling  that  probably 
the  OWI,  with  your  presence  at  this  meeting  representing  a  certain 
legal  division  of  the  FCC,  didn't  you  get  the  idea  that  probably,  un- 
knowingly to  you  but  purposely  known  to  them,  the  fact  that  they  had 
you  there,  that  they  could  hold  over  their  heads  that  you  were  repre- 
senting the  FCC,  although  you  openly  were  not  in  any  way  connected 
and  you  told  them  that  you  had  no  legal  authority  ?  But  didn't  you 
get  the  idea  that  with  your  very  presence  there  that  probably  the  OWI 
was  using  you  as  a  handle  to  whip  these  people  into  line?  Did  you 
get  that  impression  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  Well,  I  might  have  felt  that  had  the  persons  involved 
not  been  Mr.  Lang  and  Mr.  Simon.  They  had  so  repeatedly  demon- 
strated their  complete  immunity  from  intimidation  of  any  kind, 
particularly  from  the  FCC. 

]\ir.  Machrowicz.  May  I  ask  you,  were  there  any  attempts  of 
intimidation  ? 

Mrs.  Shea.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  How  could  they  show  immunity  from  intimida- 
tion if  there  were  no  attempts  of  intimidation? 

Mrs.  Shea.  The  Cox  committee  hearing  shows  that  there  were 
several  disagreements  on  policy  between  the  FCC  and  the  Wartime 
Control,  and  the  OWI,  and  the  Wartime  Control,  and  that  Mr.  Simon 
and  Mr.  Lang  stuck  to  their  position  and  carried  it  through  every  time. 

Chairman  Madden.  Is  there  anotlier  witness? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes ;  there  is  one,  but  I  would  like  to  put  just  one 
other  statement  in. 

Chairman  Madden.  Wait  a  minute.  Is  there  another  witness  after 
this  one  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes;  just  one. 

Mrs.  Shea  is  in  Washington.  We  can  recall  her  if  we  want  to.  I 
would  like  to  put  Mr.  Richards  on  now. 

Chairman  Madden.  Well,  Mrs.  Shea,  you  stand  by  just  for  a  little 
while,  and  we  will  have  Mr.  Richards'  testimony.  If  there  are  no 
further  questions  of  Mrs.  Shea,  she  can  stand  by. 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Richards,  will  you  be  sworn.  Do  you  soL- 
emnly  swear  the  testimony  you  shall  give  before  this  committee  will  be 
the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God? 

Mr.  Richards.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  ROBERT  K.  RICHARDS,  WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 

Chairman  Madden.   State  your  name,  please,  your  full  name. 
Mr.  Richards.  Robert  K.  Richards. 
Chairman  Madden.  Where  do  you  live,  Mr.  Richards? 
Mr.  Richards.  3458  Macomb  Street  NW.,  Washington. 
Chairman  Madden.  What  is  your  business  ? 

Mr.  Richards.  I  am  assistant  to  the  president  of  the  National  Asso- 
ciation of  Radio  and  Television  Broadcasters. 
Chairman  Madden.  All  right,  Mr.  Counsel. 
Mr.  Mitchell.  What  was  your  position  during  the  wartime  years  f 


2036  THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE 

Mr.  Richards.  Well,  during  most  of  them  I  was  in  the  Office  of 
Censorship  as  the  assistant  to  the  Assistant  Director  in  charge  of 
broadcasting. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  was  the  Office  of  Censorship  ? 

Mr.  Richards.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Therefore  you  had  a  great  deal  of  business  or  work, 
then,  between  the  FCC  and  the  OWI ;  is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Richards.  Yes,  yes ;  of  course. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Will  you  briefly  state — I  know  it  is  already  in  the 
record  of  the  congressional  committee  which  investigated  the  FCC 
in  194.3,  l)ut  I  would  like  you  to  briefly  summarize  for  the  committee 
the  difficulties  that  the  Office  of  Censorship  had  to  the  extent  where  the 
problem  had  to  be  referred  to  the  Attorney  General. 

Mr.  Richards.  Well,  you  carry  me  back  pretty  far,  Mr.  Mitchell,  but 
I  will  tell  3^ou  as  my  memory  serves  me  about  the  specific  problem  we 
encountered,  some  of  which  has  emerged  in  testimony  I  have  been 
able  to  hear  this  afternoon.  The  OfKce  of  Censorship  was  established 
by  Executive  order  of  the  President,  and  his  wartime  power  as  the 
censor  over  domestic  communications  was  passed  along  by  Executive 
order  to  the  Director  of  Censorship,  Mr.  Price,  who  in  turn  delegated 
such  actions  as  he  wished  to  delegate  to  various  staff  members.  Censor- 
ship was  established  under  Mr.  Price's  direction,  and  the  advice  of 
our  policy-control  board,  domestically,  among  the  press  and  the  broad- 
casters as  a  voluntary  effort.  We  established  voluntary  procedures 
for  stations,  for  example,  to  follow,  areas  in  which,  as  unit  identifica- 
tion of  ships  sailing,  the  security  of  the  Nation  could  be  violated. 
Broadcasters  were  asked  to  voluntarily  observe  these  guidepoints. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  was  the  code. 

Mr.  Richards.  That  was  the  voluntary  code  of  wartime  practices. 
In  the  course  of  establishing  this  system  among  the  broadcasting  sta- 
tions of  the  country,  we  had  one  specific  problem  that  was  peculiar 
to  broadcasting,  I  guess,  because  we  were  dealing  with  about,  150  to 
200  so-called  foreign-language  broadcasting  stations  employing  as 
many  as  35  or  40  different  languages.  The  committee  may  even  be 
interested  in  knowing  that  one  of  those  languages  we  encountered  was 
Cajon,  and  it  was  pointed  out  to  us  that  it  wasn't  a  foreign  language 
and  they  didn't  have  an  alphabet.  We  set  up  these  special  controls 
i-n  the  case  of  foreign-language  broadcasting  stations.  In  the  course 
of  operating  this  vohmtary  system  we  did  encounter,  if  I  may  use  the 
term,  an  inclination  on  the  part  of  other  executive  agencies,  and  I 
ascribe  no  idterior  motives  to  them,  to  invade  the  area  of  censorship 
which  properly  was  vested  in  the  Office  of  Censorship.  We  felt  this 
was  dangerous,  not  that  we  were  jealous  of  our  authority,  but  most  of 
us  being  out  of  the  public  media  we  were  zealous  about  what  would 
happen  to  that  authority  after  the  war  was  over.  Among  the  agencies 
where  we  encountered  this,  and  I  believe  your  record  in  the  select- 
conunittee  investigation  reflects  this,  were  the  OWI  and  the  Federal 
(]omnuinications  Connnission.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  at  one  time,  the 
situation  reached  a  point  where  Mr.  Price,  as  Director  of  tlie  Office 
of  Censorship,  asked  Mr.  Ryan,  as  assistant  in  charge  of  broadcasting, 
who  in  turn  asked  Mr.  Bronson  and  me  to  find  out  what  was  going  on, 
and  if  there  was  an  invasion  of  censorship  and  if  we  were  sacrificing 
our  responsibility  to  some  other  agency,  to  stop  it. 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  2037 

We  did  investigate  it,  and  again  I  say,  ascribing  no  motives,  we  did 
encounter  an  interest  on  the  part  of  the  Other  agencies  in  censorship, 
and  it  was  stopped,  in  an  agreement  between  INIr.  Price  and  Mr.  Davis, 
and  certainly  in  agreement  between  Mr.  Price  and  the  Commission. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Could  you  give  us  then  a  few  specific  ilhistrations, 
not  too  elaborate,  but  just  one  that  you  can  recall,  where  the  occasion 
was  necessary  to  go  to  the  extent  of  getting  the  Attorney  General  to 
rule,  barring  these  other  agencies  from  the  field  of  censorship  ^ 

Mr.  Richards.  Well,  yes.  Again  this  is  going  back  quite  a  way,  and 
I  think  the  record  in  the  select-committee  investigation  would  be 
more  accurate  than  my  recollection.  But  I  recall  that  at  least  one 
foreign-language  broadcaster,  I  believe  his  name  was  Andre  Luotto, 
w^as  either  removed  from  the  air  or  his  reputation  was  apparently 
somewhat  damaged,  as  a  result  of  the  enthusiasm  of  people  employed 
by  agencies  other  than  ours  to  enter  into  a  consideration  of  the  type 
of  broadcasting  that  was  going  on  the  air. 

By  that,  I  mean  opinion,  the  opinions  that  were  being  expressed. 
I  think  that  is  one  specific  case.  Doubtless  there  are  others.  They 
must  be  available  to  you. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  a  member  of  the  Office  of  Censorship  attend 
this  meeting  in  Xew  York  with  JNIr.  Simon  and  Mr.  Lang^ 

Mr.  Richards.  Well,  if  I  am  thinking  of  the  same  meeting  tluit  you 
have  been  discussing  here,  no. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Were  they  invited  to  attend,  do  you  recall  ? 

Mr.  Richards.  It  is  my  recollection  we  were  invited  to  attend ;  yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  recall  why  you  did  not  attend  ''i 

Mr.  Richards.  Well,  yes.  We  felt  that  it  wasn't  properly  within 
the  scope  of  our  activity  to  discuss  what  should  be  done  about  a  com- 
mentator, expressing  an  opinion  on  the  air.  unless  that  opinion  con- 
tained facts  endangering  the  security  of  the  Nation. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Therefore,  the  primary  duty  of  censorship  was  in 
the  Office  of  Censorship ;  it  rested  in  the  hands  of  your  organization. 
That  was  determined. 

Mr.  Richards.  Absolutely ;  definitely. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Therefore,  this  particular  meeting  in  New  York, 
to  which  the  OC  was  invited,  but  which  no  member  of  the  OC  at- 
tended was — Did  you  hear  all  of  the  testimony  this  afternoon  here? 

Mr.  Richards.  I  came  in  toward  the  end  of  Mr.  Lang's  testim.ony, 
I  believe. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  All  right.  In  your  opinion,  on  recollection  today, 
it  was  in  the  field  of  censorship,  Ijecause  it  concerned  comments  by  a 
Polish  commentator? 

Mr.  Richards.  Well,  any  time  you  use  any  method  to  stop  freedom 
of  speech,  it  enters  into  the  area  of  abridging  it,  and  that,  I  presume, 
constitutes  censorship,  yes.  In  other  words,  it  was  our  assumption, 
gentlemen,  that  taking  a  man  off  the  air  was  censorship  as  much  as 
putting  a  blue  pencil  on  his  copy. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  would  like  to  read  for  the  record,  page  612  of  the 
committee  investigation,  part  I,  Federal  Communications  Commission. 
Mr.  Garey  is  talking  to  you. 

Chairman  Madden.  When  was  this  letter  sent? 


2038  THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE 

Mr.  Mitchell.  This  memorandum  is  dated  May  15,  1943 — 

Now,  you  received  from  Mr.  Bronson  a  memorandum  dated  May  15,  1943,  on 
the  further  talk  he  had  with  Mrs.  Shea,  did  you  not? 

Mr.  Richards  replies,  "Yes,  sir." 

Mr.  Garey.  That  memorandum  is  dated  May  15,  1943.  It  is  addressed  to  Mr. 
Ryan  and  Mr.  Richards,  and  it  is  from  Mr.  Bronson.  The  subject  is,  Now  My 
Week  Is  Complete.  It  reads :  "Up  until  3 :  IG  p.  m.  today  there  had  been  some- 
thing lacking  in  the  week's  activities,  and  then  the  phone  rans  and  it  was  Mrs. 
Shea,  attorney  for  the  FCC.  She  asked  if  I  was  retaining  my  figure — personal 
item — and  then  went  on  to  inquire  if  we  would  be  interested  in  the  latest  wrinkle 
between  the  Office  of  War  Information,  Federal  Communications,  and  the  Foreign 
Language  Radio  Wartime  Control.  I  assured  her  I  was  the  kind  of  a  person 
who  was  interested  in  just  an  average  wrinkle,  but  one  like  that  was  most 
intriguing.  She  went  on  to  say  that  the  Federal  Communications  Commission 
(herself),  the  Oflice  of  War  Information  (Mr.  Cranston),  and  the  Foreign  Lan- 
guage Radio  Wartime  Control  Committee  (Mr.  Simon  and  Mr.  Lang)  had  met 
in  New  York  last  Wednesday  for  a  cozy  little  chat  on  what  to  do  about  the 
broadcasters  coming  to  blows  over  the  Russian-Polish  situation.  It  was  agreed 
in  this  event  that  the  foreign-language  broadcasters  would  read  only  the  news  as 
received  in  the  stations,  via  the  recognized  news  printers,  and  not  allow  any 
commentary  on  this  topic.  She  wanted  to  know  if  I  had  been  asked  to  attend 
would  I  have  gone." 

Evidently  they  didn't,  I  am  sorry. 

"I  said  that  most  likely  I  would  have,  or  that  someone  from  this  Office  would 
have  done  so,  but  I  supposed  the  parties  involved  assumed  it  was  a  discussion 
that  did  not  involve  censorship,  therefore  we  weren't  asked.  Mrs.  Shea  rallied 
quickly  by  saying  that  it  was  Mr.  Cranston  who  put  out  the  invitation.  I  later 
learned  from  Mr.  Ryan  that  we  had  been  invited  to  send  a  representative  but 
had  declined.  Mr.  Ryan  said  Mr.  Cranston  had  asked  us  to  attend  but  due  to 
pressure  of  other  work,  and  the  unlikelihood  that  the  meeting  would  concern 
censorship,  no  one  from  this  Office  went.  Then  she  said  that  she  recalled  seeing 
a  letter  by  Mr.  Price  or  Mr.  Ryan  urging  the  controversial  issue  should  be  treated 
quietly  and  not  ballooned  up,  as  it  were.  (She  is  referring  here  to  the  Russian- 
Polish  impasse,  I  believe.)  I  said  I  was  unfamiliar  with  such  a  letter,  and  then 
she  said  Mr.  Marks  at  her  elbow  had  just  advised  that  the  letter  was  signed  by 
Mr.  Ryan  and  would  be  in  Mr.  Ryan's  files.  She  then  said  that  she  siipposed 
Mr.  Simon's  outfit  was  putting  out  something  about  the  New  York  office  and 
was  that  all  right  with  us.  I  said  this  office  was  not  concerned  with  it  since  we 
had  no  part  of  the  meeting,  unless  the  bulletin  crossed  into  censorship  problems 
or  quoted  or  inferred  that  we  were  a  party  to  such  a  release.  In  the  latter 
event,  it  should  be  submitted  here.  She  said  she  didn't  know  just  how  the  Foreign 
Language  Radio  Wartime  Control  Committee  went  about  such  things,  and  we 
both  rambled  along  about  what  we  didn't  know.  She  then  said  that  our  relations, 
Government  agencies  involved  and  broadcasters,  should  be  more  formalized  so 
that  we  would  all  know  what  was  going  on.  Having  had  the  feeling  now  for  9 
months  that  I  was  trying  to  watch  the  entire  field  of  play  through  a  knothole,  and 
a  sturdy  oak  knothole  at  that,  I  agreed,  as  we  have  agreed  to  such  things  before. 
She  then  hung  up  on  our  mutual  pledges  of  cooperation.  Two  minutes  later  at 
3 :  31  she  called  back  to  say  she  had  forgotten  something." 

That  was  on  another  subject  matter  other  than  the  Polish-Russian 
situation. 

Now,  that  letter  in  the  record  definitely  shows  that,  (1)  no  member 
of  OC  went  to  the  New  York  meeting;  (2)  the  reason  for  not  going  to 
that  meeting  was  because  no  censorship  problem  was  supposed  to  have 
been  involved. 

Now  that  you  have  heard  the  testimony  of  this  afternoon,  and  par- 
ticularly that  of  Mr.  Kreutz — did  you  hear  his  testimony? 

Mr.  Richards.  I  was  here,  but  I  didn't  hear  it  very  well.  I  was  in 
the  back  of  the  room.    But  I  think  I  sot  it. 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  2039 

Mr.  Mitchell.  "Would  you  say  that  the  subject  matter  was  within 
the  scope  of  censorship  or  within  the  scope  of  FCC  and  OWI  ?  I  am 
asking  for  an  opinion. 

Mr.  Richards.  Well,  I  would  say  it  is  my  opinion  it  was  not  within 
the  scope  of  censorship.  Others  would  have  to  speak  as  to  whether  or 
not  they  thought  it  was  within  their  scope. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  I  have  no  further  questions. 

Chairman  Madden.  Any  further  questions  ? 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  It  is  your  opinion  that  the  section  of  the  FCC 
attempting  to  control  the  commentaries  on  this  matter  was  strictly 
improper,  irregular,  and  outside  of  their  jurisdiction,  is  it  not? 

Mr.  Eichards.  Yes,  sir.  Of  course  the  Communications  Act  forbids 
censorship. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  That  is  right.  And  that  was  your  impression  at 
this  time? 

Mr.  Eichards.  It  was  certainly  our  impression  that  that  was  their 
intent,  and  that  they  shouldn't  do  it.    It  was  our  proper  responsibility. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Can  you  see  anything  that  was  outlined  here, 
other  than  an  attempt  to  intimidate  these  broadcasters  ? 

Mr.  Eichards.  I  have  testified  to  that  at  some  length  before,  Mr. 
Congressman,  and  I  think  that  my  answer  is  evident  in  the  record  that 
was  previously  made  at  the  time. 

Chairman  Madden.  Thank  you  for  your  testimony. 

We  will  adjourn  until  10  o'clock  tomorrow  morning. 

(Whereupon,  at  5 :  25  p.  m.  the  hearing  was  recessed,  to  reconvene 
at  10  a.  m.,  Wednesday,  November  12,  1952.) 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 


WEDNESDAY,   NOVEMBER   12,    1952 

House  of  Representatives, 
Select  Committee  on  the  Katyn  Forest  Massacre, 

Washington,  D.  G. 

The  committee  met  at  10  a,  m.,  pursuant  to  call,  in  room  1301,  House 
Office  Building,  Hon.  Ray  J.  Madden  (chairman)  presiding. 

Present:  Messrs.  Madden,  Machrowicz,  Donclero,  O'Konski,  and 
Sheehan. 

Also  present :  John  J.  Mitchell,  chief  counsel  to  the  select  commit- 
tee, and  Roman  Pucinski,  chief  investigator. 

Chairman  Madden.  The  committee  will  come  to  order.  Will  you 
proceed,  Mr.  Mitchell  ? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman,  the  purpose  of  today's  hearings 
before  the  committee  is  to  put  forth  the  documentation  of  the  records 
that  were  in  the  Government  agencies  on  the  subject  of  the  Katyn 
massacre  and  \\\^  missing  Polish  officers. 

You  will  recall  that  yesterday  Mr.  Jackson  said  that  if  sufficient 
documentation  had  been  available  at  the  time  of  Nuremberg,  the  case 
would  not  have  been  brought  up  at  Nuremberg.  At  least  the  hands  of 
the  United  States  Government,  namely,  Mr.  Justice  Jackson  at  that 
time,  would  have  been  able  to  prevent  it  or  would  have  been  strength- 
ened. 

Now,  through  the  cooperation  of  the  Department  of  State,  the  com- 
mittee has  had  made  available  to  it  all  of  the  records  that  have  been 
in  the  file  since  early  1942.  This  morning  we  have  as  the  first  witness 
former  Ambassador  William  Standley,  a  retired  admiral  of  the  United 
States  Navy. 

At  the  time  that  Admiral  Standley  was  Ambassador,  he  had  con- 
ferences with  Maj.  Joseph  Czapski  and  General  Anders,  and  he  had 
instructions  from  the  State  Department  to  assist  the  Polish  cause. 

Admiral  Standley,  in  the  opinion  of  the  committee  staff,  having 
carefully  read  all  of  the  documentation,  predicted 

Chairman  INIadden.  Let  him  testify.     That  will  be  his  testimony. 

Mr.  Dondero.  Let  him  take  the  stand. 

Chairman  ]NLvdden.  I  should  think  that  the  witness  himself,  if  he 
desires  to  refresh  his  mind,  can  refer  to  the  letters.  We  can  then 
introduce  the  letters  in  evidence ;  and,  if  the  witness  desires  to  refresh 
his  mind,  we  will  be  glad  to  submit  the  letters  to  him. 

Mr,  Mitchell.  Call  the  first  witness,  please. 

Chairman  ISIadden.  Admiral  Standley. 

2041 


2042  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

TESTIMONY  OF  ADMIRAL  WILLIAM  H.  STANDLEY,  UNITED  STATES 
NAVY,  RETIRED,  CORONADO,  CALIF. 

Chairman  Madden.  Admiral,  will  you  raise  your  riglit  hand  and  be 
sworn.  Do  you  solemnly  swear  that  the  testimony  you  are  about  to 
give  the  committee  will  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing 
but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 

Admiral  Standlet.  I  do. 

Chairman  Madden.  Admiral,  for  the  record,  will  you  state  your 
full  name,  please  ? 

Admiral  Standley.  William  H.  Standley. 

Chairman  Madden.  And  your  address,  please? 

Admiral  Standley.  862  G  Avenue,  Coronado. 

Chairman  Madden.  California? 

Admiral  Standley.  Yes,  California. 

Chairman  Madden.  What  is  your  capacity  now  ? 

Admiral  Standley,  I  am  an  admiral  on  the  retired  list. 

Chairman  Madden.  Will  you  proceed,  Mr.  Counsel. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Admiral  Standley,  will  you  please  tell  the  committee 
what  date  you  reported  to  Moscow  as  the  Ambassador  for  the  United 
States  ? 

Admiral  Standley.  I  think  it  was  the  14th  of  April  1942. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Would  you,  at  this  time,  like  to  make  a  statement 
-to  the  committee  of  your  knowledge  of  the  missing  Polish  officers  and 
the  Katyn  massacre,  stating  what  efforts  you  made  and  what  instruc- 
tions you  may  have  had,  sir?    A  brief  statement,  if  you  wish. 

Admiral  Standley.  Of  course,  the  committee  will  recognize  that 
this  situation  occurred  some  10  or  11  years  ago  and  that,  naturally, 
my  memory  is  rather  deficient  in  the  facts  of  the  case.  I  have  told 
your  counsel  that  I  had  made  a  complete  statement  concerninj}:  my 
relations  with  the  Polish  situation,  including  the  Katyn  Forest 
nmrder,  and  that  it  was  published  in  the  Naval  Institute  Proceedings 
of  October.  That  statement,  that  article  in  the  Institute  contains  a 
complete  notation  of  my  connections  with  the  Polish  situation  in 
Moscow  and  the  Katyn  Forest  murder. 

Chairman  Madden.  Admiral,  October  of  what  year? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  This  year. 

Admiral  Standley.  That  was  October  of  this  year,  the  current 

Now,  naturally,  my  association  or  connection  with  the  Polish  situa- 
tion began  even  before  I  was  named  as  the  future  Ambassador  to 
Moscow.  When  I  went  into  Moscow  with  the  Beaverbrook-Harriman 
mission  in  September,  1941,  the  Polish  situation  was  being  discussed 
there  then,  and  I  became  cognizant  of  the  general  situation,  the  fact 
that  the  Russians  had  seized  a  great  many  Polish  soldiers  when  they 
invaded  east  Poland  and  had  taken  some  10,000  Polish  officers. 

The  effort  was  being  made  then  to  locate  these  Polish  officers 
especially. 

When  I  was  named  as  Ambassador  to  Pussia  in  the  latter  part  of 
1941  and  when  I  was  confirmed,  I  was  immediately  importuned  by 
many  agencies  or  many  individuals  who  were  interested  in  the  10,000 
Polish  officers,  that  is,  in  their  location  and  in  whether  or  not  thoy  were 
alive,  and  everything  concerned  with  them. 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  2043 

As  soon  as  I  arrived  in  Moscow — I  had  received  a  briefing  before  I 
left  Washington  as  to  the  questions  I  should  take  up.  Even  before  I 
made  my  report  to  Mr.  Kalinin,  the  President  of  the  Soviet  Union, 
I  received  a  message  from  the  State  Department  advising  me  that  I 
was  not  to  take  up  any  of  those  questions  that  I  had  previously  been 
briefed  upon,  a  message  which  I  didn't  understand,  and  about  which 
I  protested  immediately. 

But  that  left  me  in  a  position  where  I  couldn't  take  up  the  Polish 
question  on  my  first  interview  with  Mr.  Molotov. 

Chairman  Madden.  Who  gave  you  those  admonitions  or  instruc- 
tions? 

Admiral  Standley.  They  were  general  instructions  and  briefing 
from  various  individuals  in  the  State  Department.  I  think  Mr.  Sum- 
ner Welles  was  one  of  them,  the  Secretary  himself.  There  were  various 
other  officials.  I  can't  now  recall  just  who  they  were,  but  they  were 
from  various  individuals  in  the  State  Department. 

So,  as  I  say,  I  could  not  and  I  did  not  take  up  these  Polish  questions. 

INIy  first  interview  with  Mr.  JNIolotov  and  my  first  interview  with 
Mr.  Stalin — I  would  like  to  refresh  my  memory  from  this  article — ■ 
the  first  occasion  when  I  took  this  matter  up  was  in  an  interview  with 
Mr.  Stalin  some  time  in  April  1942.  At  that  time  I  told  Mr.  Stalin 
of  the  knowledge  I  had  of  the  missing  Polish  officers. 

Well,  let  me  go  back.  Even  before  that,  on  my  way  into  Moscow, 
on  arrival  at  Teheran,  I  found  that  there  were  28,000  Polish  soldiers 
that  had  been  evacuated  with  their  families  and  children  from  Russia. 
I  ins])ected  this  camp  with  their  children  and  with  their  people  in  it,, 
and  observed  the  terrible  condition  that  these  people,  and  particularly 
the  children,  were  in.  They  were  in  all  stages  of  malnutrition,  some 
of  them  practically  dying.  It  was  a  terrible  situation,  indicating  the 
conditions  under  which  the  Poles  had  been  existing,  particularly  the 
women  and  children,  in  Russia. 

As  I  say,  my  first  interview  with  Mr.  Molotov  in  which  I  mentioned 
this  was  some  time  after  the  14th  of  April.  Then  I  advised  him  of  my 
knowledge  of  the  situation  and  of  my  interest  in  the  Polish  situation. 

No  satisfaction  whatever  was  obtained  from  Mr.  Molotov  at  that 
time,  and  there  was  only  a  casual  mention  of  the  fact  that  I  was 
interested  in  the  Polish  question,  and  that  I  came  from  the  United 
States  Government,  whicli  was  also  interested  in  this  question  of  tlit 
situation  and  location  of  these  Polish  officers. 

At  that  tim.e  the  interpreter,  Mr.  Pablov,  advised  me  that  Mr. 
Molotov  had  a  question  which  he  wished  to  take  up  wdth  me,  and  that 
it  was  the  desire  of  the  American  Government  to  set  up  in  Moscow 
an  American  officer  as  liaison  between  the  Russians  and  the  Poles. 
Mr.  Molotov  expressed  the  view  that  he  saw  no  reason  for  such  liaison 
as  the  naval  attaches  and  the  military  attaches  were  there  and  that 
the  Poles  had  their  own  liaison.  I  knew  nothing  of  the  question,  so 
I  did  nothing  about  that. 

As  you  will  recall,  the  Government  had  been  evacuated  to  Kuibyshev, 
and  the  representatives  there  were  Mr.  Vyshinski  and  Mr,  Lozovski, 
Mr,  Molotov  had  gone  to  Kuibyshev,  but  had  returned  to  Moscow. 
]Mr,  Stalin  had  never  gone  to  Kuibyshev,  but  had  remained  in  Moscow. 

So  we  had  to  start  our  negotiations  with  the  seat  of  government  in 
Moscow  or  rather  in  Kuibyshev,  and  then  go  up  to  Moscow  to  get 


2044  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

the  answer  because  Mr.  Vyshinski  and  Mr.  Lozovski  never  made  any 
decision  on  anything.  So  we  had  to  go  to  Moscow  to  get  your  answer 
from  Mr.  Molotov  and  Mr.  Stalin.  That  necessitated  trips  back  and 
forth. 

When  I  went  down  to  Kuibyshev,  I  met  Dr.  Kot.  Dr.  Kot  at 
that  time  was  the  Polish  Ambassador  or  Minister,  I  think  "  «  \vas,  to 
the  Soviet  Government.  Immediately  began  a  contact  with  tiit  r^olish 
representative  in  regard  to  the  missing  Polish  officers  and  me:  From 
then  on  there  was  almost  a  constant  conversation  between  ir.  Kot 
and  myself  as  long  as  he  stayed  there — Mr.  Kot,  the  Polish  repre- 
sentative, and  the  Ambassador. 

My  next  contact  with  the  Russian  authorities  was  on  May  27,  1942, 
when  I  went  to  see  Mr.  Vyshinski.  My  conversation  at  that  time  with 
Mr.  Vyshinski  was  along  these  lines :  That  our  Government  was  con- 
cerned with  the  welfare,  situation,  and  location  of  these  officers  and 
was  very  anxious  tliat  there  should  be  friendly  relations  between  the 
exiled  Polish  Government  in  London  and  the  Russians,  and  I  urged 
that  there  should  be  close  cooperation  and  a  greater  effort  on  tlie  part 
of  the  Russians  to  conform  to  the  agreements  they  had  made  with  the 
Poles  in  regard  to  the  release  of  Polish  officers  and  men. 

There  was  an  agi-eement  at  that  time  in  regard  to  the  release  of  these 
officers  in  order  that  they  could  serve  under  General  Anders  in  the 
war  effort.  The  28,000  Polish  soldiers  that  had  been  released,  the 
troops  that  had  been  released  and  that  I  had  found  in  Teheran  later 
served  with  General  Anders  in  the  Italian  campaign ;  and  there  was  an 
understanding  that  more  of  these  officers  and  men  should  be  released. 

My  efforts  in  the  beginning  were  to  obtain  further  cooperation  with 
the  Polish  Government.  Then  later  I  souglit  an  interview  with  ISIr. 
Molotov  in  the  Kremlin. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  What  was  the  reaction  of  Mr.  Molotov  and  of  INIr. 
Vyshinski  at  that  time  to  your  requests? 

Admiral  Standley.  As  I  expressed  it  then  and  as  I  have  quoted, 
Mr.  Vyshinski  was  silent  for  a  long  time  while  looking  doAvn  at  his 
hands  folded  on  the  table  before  him.  The  color  flooded  into  the  thin 
face.  Finally  he  looked  around  at  me  and  said,  'T  will  present  your 
views  to  my  government." 

Later  I  had  an  interview  with  Mr.  Molotov,  and  I  presented  tlie 
same  views  to  Mr.  Molotov.  Mr.  INIolotov  made  a  long  statement  in 
reply.  It  was,  in  substance,  that  the  Polish  question  was  a  very  diffi- 
cult question  to  deal  with,  that  to  evacuate  these  women  and 
children 

At  that  time  our  Government  had  a  proposition  to  evacuate  these 
Poles  from  Russia  and  relieve  the  Russians  from  taking  care  of  theuT 
and  sending  tliem  down  somewhere  in  Africa,  North  Africa,  or  some- 
where else.  That  was  part  of  my  interview  with  Mr.  Molotov  at  this 
time. 

Mr.  Molotov's  reply  was  in  substance  as  follows :  "If  we  had  evacu- 
ated the  Polish  women  and  children  in  the  beginning,  it  would  have 
been  all  right.  Put  to  evacuate  them  now  would  give  the  Germans 
the  idea  tliat  we  couldn't  take  care  of  them.  It  would  create  a  dis- 
turbance, and  we  just  feci  that  we  are  not  in  a  position  now  to  evacu- 
ate these  women  and  children  and  soldiers." 

Chairman  Maddkn.  Will  you  pardon  me.  Ambassador.  I  hand  you 
a  telegram  dated  Moscow,  July  5,  1942,  to  the  Secretary  of  State, 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  2045 

Washington,  signed  "Standley,"  and  ask  if  that  is  the  telegram  that 
you  sent  to  Washington  as  of  that  date  ? 

Admiral  Standley.  That  is  the  telegram. 

Chairman  Madden.  I  will  ask  the  reporter  to  mark  it  as  exhibit  9 
and  insert  it  at  this  point  into  the  record. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  exhibit  9  and  follows :) 

Exhibit  9-  -Tf'^.egram  From  Ambassador  Standley  to  the  Departments  of  State 

-i) 
jr  [Paraphrase  of  telegram] 

Moscow,  July  5,  1942. 
Secret  art  of  State, 

Washington. 

In  describing  to  Molotov  the  Polish  evacuation  project,  I  expressed  the  sincere 
hope  of  the  U.  S.  Government  that  the  Soviet  authorities  would  allow  the 
evacuation  of  the  Polish  women  and  children  concerned.  I  based  this  on  the 
opinion  of  the  U.  S.  Government  that  the  women  and  children  in  question  could 
be  taken  care  of  more  easily  in  a  country  where  there  was  no  lighting  in  progress, 
and  also  on  the  fact  that  the  evacuation  of  these  women  and  children  would 
make  it  unnecessary  for  the  Soviet  Union  to  feed  and  care  for  them. 

This  was  not  a  simple  evacuation  question,  Molotov  said,  which  would  not 
be  an  important  matter.  The  question  involved  was  really  a  fundamental  problem 
affecting  the  basic  relations  between  the  Soviet  Union  and  Poland.  He  added 
that  the  question  might  have  been  satisfactorily  disposed  of  if  this  group  had 
been  evacuated  along  with  the  first  group,  although  there  was  no  certainty  that 
this  would  have  solved  the  matter,  since  there  were  always  difficulties  where 
Poles  were  concerned.  A  second  evacuation  could  create  added  difficulties  and 
instability  among  the  Poles  in  the  Soviet  Union,  and  unfriendly  comment  against 
the  Soviet  Union  among  the  Poles  in  that  part  of  Poland  which  was  occupied 
by  Germany,  as  well  as  in  the  world  in  general,  inasmuch  as  it  would  most 
certainly  be  said  that  the  Soviet  Union  was  not  able  to  feed  and  care  for  the 
Poles  in  question  and  therefore  had  to  send  them  to  Africa.  Molotov  said  that 
during  his  recent  visit  to  London  he  had  suggested  to  Sikorski  that  an  attempt 
be  made  to  better  the  situation  of  the  Poles  in  the  Soviet  Union,  but  he  did  not 
elaborate  to  me  about  how  this  should  be  done.  Molotov  said,  however,  that 
the  Poles  could  and  would  be  fed  by  the  Soviet  Government.  He  stated  that 
he  would  bring  our  interests  in  the  matter  to  the  attention  of  his  government. 

Later  Molotov  referred  to  the  general  Polish  question  with  a  certain  animosity, 
saying,  in  effect :  "Since  there  are  many  too  many  contradictory  elements  con- 
cerned in  Polish  politics,  there  is  always  trouble  whenever  Polish  questions  arise." 

Some  of  these  elements  are  conducting  policies  unfriendly  to  the  Soviet  Union 
in  contradiction  to  the  policies  of  the  London  Polish  Government.  Molotov  said, 
and  even  the  sternest  measures  failed  to  subordinate  these  elements  to  Soviet 
law.  Although  other  elements  wished  to  foster  friendly  relations  with  the 
Soviet  Government,  and  tried  to  do  so,  it  is  in  general  impossible  to  reconcile  the 
two  groups. 

My  impression  on  leaving  was  similar  to  that  I  received  when  I  last  discussed 
Polish  matters  with  Vyshinski,  namely,  that  the  Soviet  Government  has  a  purely 
political  view  of  this  whole  question,  and  that  it  is  not  influenced  by  considera- 
tions of  humanity.  It  is  displeased  and  even  irritated  when  another  power  takes 
an  interest  in  Soviet-Polish  relations. 

( Signed )   Standley. 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Ambassador,  if  you  have  no  further  com- 
ment, I  will  ask  you  to  identify  a  message  from  Secretary  of  State 
Hull  to  you  of  August  19, 1942. 

Admiral  Standley.  This  is  a  portion  of  a  telegram.  I  would  like 
to  say  that  this  covers  an  interview  which  comes  later  on. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  The  Ambassador  says  that  he  has  some  further  com- 
ments to  make  apropos  exhibit  9. 

Chairman  Madden.  All  right;  proceed,  Admiral. 

Admiral  Standley.  In  the  succeeding  months  after  this  interview 
with  Mr.  ]\Iolotov,  my  notes  show  that  the  Polish  situation  in  con- 

93744— 52— pt.  7 15 


2046  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

nection  witli  the  Polish  military  units  and  civilians  still  in  Russia 
steadily  worsened.  When  the  Nazis  and  the  Italians  became  estab- 
lished in  Egypt  that  fall  and  almost  stabbed  into  Alexandria, 
threatened  the  whole  Middle  East,  the  Russian  Govermnent  agreed 
to  allow  three  divisions  of  Poles  and  members  of  their  families  to 
leave  Russia  for  the  Middle  East. 

The  Polish  military  authorities  were  trying  to  obtain  the  release 
of  10,000  officers  whom  they  needed  badly,  but  were  rejjeatedly  ]Hit 
off.  No  reasons  or  excuses  were  given.  General  Anders  and  Dr.  Kot 
were  not  informed.    That  is  hearsay ;  I  can't  testify  as  to  that. 

I  w^as  informed  that  General  Anders  and  Dr.  Kot  were  not  informed 
that  the  Germans  had  captured  the  prison  camps  before  the  Poles 
could  be  evacuated  or  that  they  had  been  transferred  to  other  camps 
or  indeed  anything  at  all  as  far  as  the  Polish  authorities  could  learn. 

These  officers  had  suddenly  and  completely  disappeared  from  the 
face  of  the  earth.  That  was  shortly  after  my  interview  with  Mr. 
Molotov. 

Chairman  Madden.  x\bout  what  date  was  that.  Admiral? 

Admiral  Standley.  My  interview  with  jSIr.  jNIolotov  was  after  July. 
That  was  about  August,  I  think,  1942.  It  was  after  my  interview 
and  after  that  telegram  that  I  sent  in  regard  to  my  interview  with 
Mr.  Molotov. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Admiral,  I  would  like  to  ask  you  this :  Do  you  know 
who  made  the  decision  to  forget  the  idea  of  having  Colonel  Szymanski 
go  to  Moscow  as  the  liaison  officer? 

Admiral  Standley.  The  decision  came  through  a  telegram  from  the 
State  Department.     I  don't  know  who  made  the  decision. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Thank  you,  sir. 

Admiral  Standley.  A  telegram  of  that  kind  ahvays  came,  of  course, 
from  the  State  Department;  so,  I  presume  the  Secretary  of  State  made 
the  decision. 

Chairman  Madden.  Admiral,  we  will  mark  this  exhibit  10,  and  I 
will  ask  the  court  reporter  to  insert  exhibit  10  at  this  point  in  the 
record. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  10"  and  is  as 
follows:) 

ExHIltIT    10 
POUTION    OF   ]\Il<:SSAGE  FKOM    SkcKETARY   OF   STATE   HUI.T.   TO   THE   AmKKIOAN 

Ambassador  at  Kuibyshev  of  August  19,  1942 

*  *  *  On  instructions  fi-om  the  Polisti  Government,  tlie  I'olish  Amhassjidor 
in  Washington  lias  asked  tlie  I'residenfs  intei'veiition  witli  the  Soviet  Gov- 
ernment in  or<l(M'  to  effect  an  improvement  in  I'olisli-Soviet  relations.     *     *     * 

*  *  *  Referring  to  the  hope  which  he  expi'essed  on  several  occasions  that 
the  Soviet  Government  would  tind  it  jiossihle  to  interpret  as  liberally  as  cir- 
cumstances would  permit  its  agreements  with  the  Polish  Government,  the 
Ambassador  iiarticularly  mentioned  the  desire  of  the  Polish  (Jovernment  to 
restart  recruitinii  of  its  nationals  in  Russia  for  the  Polish  armed  forces  and 
filKo  to  tlie  f/r.s-//T  for  the  rrlcdsr  of  some  fire  to  rif/lit  tlioiiKiiu<]  J'olifih  officcru 
who  are  reported  still  lieJtl  Inj  the  Sloriet  authorities.     *     *     * 

*  *  *  You  are  therefore  authorized  to  raise  witii  the  Soviet  authorities 
the  ([uestion  of  Soviet-Polish  relations.  You  should  point  out  that  this  Gov- 
ernment liojies  liiat  the  spirit  of  collaboration  evidenced  jji  (he  removal  to  the 
Middle  East  of  additional  Polish  divisions  may  be  promoted  to  the  utmost  and 
that  there  will  I)e  found  for  the  various  prol)lems  mutually  beneficial  solu- 
tions.    ♦     ♦     * 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  2047 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Now,  Admiral,  you  have  told  us  that  they  were 
forming  the  Polish  Army  in  Russ'ia  at  that  time.  Can  you  tell  us 
something  about  the  formation  of  that  army  that  you  may  have 
found  out  from  your  discussions  with  General  Anders  and  Dr.  Kot? 

Admiral  Standley.  My  onlj^  information  in  connection  with  that 
was  very  general.  I  have  no  detailed  knowledge  of  the  military  set- 
up or  organization  except  through  my  conversation  with  Dr.  Kot. 

Now,  I  would  like  to  inject  there  as  part  of  this,  before  I  get  to 
that  message,  what  was  happening  in  the  interim.  The  Polish 
situation,  as  I  stated,  was  definitely  worsening,  as  was  the  ques- 
tion  of  the  Polish  representatives  receiving  Polish  supplies  that  Avere 
being  sent  in  for  the  Polish  citizens  into  Murmansk  and  into  Arch- 
angel. The  Soviet  authorities  eventually  seized  those  officials  and 
finally  got  rid  of  all  of  them,  and  there  was  no  oiie  there  to  repre- 
sent the  Polish  interests  in  receiving  goods  that  were  sent  in  for  the 
Poles. 

Our  rejiresentative  there  endeavored  to  take  that  over,  but  he 
eventually  found  that  the  problem  Avas  one  that  he  couldn't  handle. 
So  that  was  part  of  the  situation. 

The  Polish  situation  was  worsening  up  to  the  time  this  message  was 
sent.  Then  I  have  this  message  in  August  1942,  when  I  received  the 
dispatch  that  you  have  just  read.  I  have  quoted  here  extracts  from 
that  dispatch.  ^  Shall  I  read  that? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes,  sir,  if  you  please. 

Admiral  Standley.  In  August  1942,  I  received  a  dispatch  from 
our  State  Department,  the  conclusion  of  which  may  be  paraphrased  as 
follows.    I  am  not  quoting,  but  rather  paraphrasing.     [Reading:] 

The  question  of  Polish-Soviet  relations  may  be  bi-ought  up  at  your  discretion 
with  the  Soviet  authorities.  While  the  United  States  Government  does  not 
wish  to  interfere  in-this  matter,  you  may  point  out  it  nevertheless  hopes  that 
the  splendid  collaboration  shown  in  transferring  additional  Polish  divisions  to 
the  ^Middle  East  may  l)e  furthered  to  the  maximum.  It  is  also  hoped  that  solu- 
tions whii-h  are  mutually  beneticial  may  be  found  for  the  various  problems  under 
discussion. 

At  the  same  time,  it  is  realized  tliat  only  direct  negotiations  between  the  two 
governments  involved  can  effect  a  solution  of  some  of  these  extremely  compli- 
cated problems. 

That  is  the  end  of  the  paraphrase. 

Chairman  Maddex.  "Will  you  proceed,  Mr.  Slieehan. 

Mr.  SnEEiiAx.  Ambassador,  just  to  get  the  situation  straight,  as 
I  understand,  when  you  left  Washington  from  Moscow  you  were 
given  insti'uctions  to  be  concerned  with  Polish  affairs.  After  you 
got  to  Moscow,  as  you  said,  you  got  instructions  not  to  pay  any  atten- 
tion to  Polish  affairs. 

Admiral  Staxdley.  It  didn't  mention  Polish  affairs  specifically. 

Mr.  SiiEEHAX.  The  missing  officers? 

Admiral  Staxdley.  When  I  was  being  briefed  I  was  given  infor- 
mation on  matters  that  I  should  take  up,  and  the- Polish  question 
was  one  of  them.  "When  I  got  to  Moscow  and  before  I  submitted  my 
credentials  in  Moscow,  I  received  a  telegram  from  the  State  Depart- 
ment saying  that  I  was  not  to  take  up  any  of  these  questions  that 
I  had  been  briefed  on  before  I  left.  -They  didn't  mention  the  Polish 
question  specifically. 


2048  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Then  in  1942,  accorcling  to  the  telegram  that  yon 
jnst  read,  you  o:ot  instructions  to  go  forward  with  the  Polish  qi'u's- 
tion ;  namely,  the  Polish  officers  ? 

Admiral  Standley.  Yes. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Now,  did  they  give  you  any  information  as  to  why  j 
they  were  interested  n  the  Polish  officers  at  that  time?     Was  it  for 
humanitarian  reasons  or  was  it  for  military  reasons? 

Admiral  Standi>ey.  They  w^ere  interested  both  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  military  as  well  as  because  of  the  humane  reason  of  getting  the 
Polish  citizens  out. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  In  other  words,  we  had  now  reached  a  position 
where  we  needed  the  Polish  divisions  and  thereby  needed  the  officers 
to  man  the  divisions;  is  that  right? 

Admiral  Standley.  That  is  as  I  understood  the  message  to  me; 
yes. 

Now,  in  order  to  get  that  message  across,  I  sought  an  interview  with 
Mr.  Lozovski,  and  I  met  Mr.  Lozovski  on  September  9,  1942. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Will  you  explain  who  Mr.  Lozovski  is? 

Admiral  Standley.  JNIr.  Lozovski  was  one  of  the  Soviet  Foreign 
Office  representatives  in  Kuibyshev.  As  I  previously  stated,  Mr. 
Vyshinski  and  Mr.  Lozovski  remained  in  Kuibyshev  as  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Soviet  Government.  So,  I  sought  an  interview  with 
Mr.  Lozovski,  which  was  granted  on  September  9,  1942. 

In  that  interview,  as  I  stated  in  the  paraphrase,  our  Government 
stated  that  they  did  not  want  to  interfere.  Mr.  Lozovski  came  right 
back  and  said,  "'Tliis  is  the  best  thing  that  the  American  Government 
could  do." 

In  furthering  the  purpose  as  expressed  in  that  paraphrased  message, 
I  still  pressed  the  question  of  the  status  of  the  Polish  relief  and  that  of 
the  180  Polish  officers  that  had  been  delegates  and  who  had  been 
arrested  in  Murmansk  and  Archangel.  Mr.  Lozovski  again  came  right 
back  bluntly  and  said,  "This  work  can  be  carried  on  by.  the  remaining 
delegates  in  a  perfectly  satisfactory  manner.  There  were  too  many 
delegates  in  the  first  place.  We  can't  have  a  bunch  of  hostile  Poles 
running  all  over  the  Soviet  Union  unsupervised." 

Again  I  expressed  to  Mr.  Lozovski  the  hope  that  they  could  collabo- 
rate with  us  further. 

Chairman  Madden.  I  will  ask  the  reporter  to  mark  this  document 
^'Exhibit  11",  and  I  will  ask  the  admiral  if  he  can  identify  it.  It  is 
a  message  from  the  Secretary  of  State. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  11"  and  is  as 
follows:) 

Exhibit  11 

Portion  of  Message  from  the  Secretary  of  State  to  the  American  Ambassadob 
AT  Kuibyshev,  Dated  September  5,  1942 

Mr.  Willkie  was  requested  by  the  President  to  consult  with  you  and  Mr.  Hender- 
son and  then  express  to  Stalin  the  American  Government's  hope  that  all  efforts 
will  he  made  to  effect  an  improvement  in  Polish-Soviet  relations.  *  *  * 

The  Polish  Ambassador  today  asked  whether  there  had  been  any  representa- 
tions for  the  release  of  "3,400"  I'olish  otficcrs  who  are  reportedly  still  held  by  the 
Soviet  authorities  in  Arctic  areas.  .You  may  make  these  representations  to- 
gether with  Mr.  Willkie  or  separately.  *  *  * 

Mr.  Mitchell,.  Admiral,  can  you  tell  us  something  about  what  tran- 
spired at  that  time?    How  did  Mr.  Willkie  get  into  this  picture? 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  2049 

Admiral  Standley.  As  I  stated  in  that  message  which  I  recognize 
as  one  received  from  the  State  Department,  Mr.  Willkie  arrived  in 
Moscow  witli  his  statf,  I  think,  on  September  17.  I  immediately  took 
Mr.  Willkie  to  call  upon  Mr.  Molotov.  At  that  meeting  Mr.  Molotov 
was  asked  to  arrange  for  a  meeting  of  Mr.  Willkie  and  Mr.  Stalin,  to 
which  he  agreed.  As  we  were  leaving,  Mr.  Willkie  said  to  Mr.  Stalin, 
"How  will  I  be  informed  of  that  meeting  ?" 

Chairman  Madden.  Not  to  Mr.  Stalin  ? 

Admiral  Standley.  To  Mr.  Molotov,  "How  will  I  be  informed  of 
that  meeting?" 

Mr.  Molotov  replied,  "You  will  be  informed  through  the  American 
Embassy." 

I  waited  for  some  time.  In  the  meantime  Mr.  Willkie's  plans  had 
been  made  so  that  he  could  visit  certain  plants,  and  one  morning  we 
were  to  go  out  to  visit  an  aircraft  battery.  Before  leaving — I  had  left 
Eddy  Page  behind ;  Eddy  Page  was  my  State  Department  represent- 
ative who  spoke  Russian  fluently — I  said  to  Eddy,  "I  am  going  to 
accompany  Air.  Willkie  to  this  aircraft  battery,  and,  if  they  have  not 
heard  anything  about  Mr.  Willkie's  interview  with  Mr.  Stalin,  I  want 
you  to  make  an  appointment  for  me  to  see  Mr.  Molotov,  because  I  don't 
understand  the  delay.  When  a  special  representative  from  a  foreign 
government  arrives  here  and  asks  to  see  Mr.  Stalin,  I  don't  understand 
why  there  is  this  delay." 

So,  I  went  over  to  Mr.  Willkie's  residence,  the  residence  that  is  kept 
there  for  Americans.  They  had  a  guard  at  the  door,  a  Russian  who 
spoke  English.  When  I  went  in  and  asked  Commander  Peale,  who  was 
Mr.  Willkie's  brother-in-law  and  who  had  accompanied  him,  whether 
Mr.  Willkie  had  received  any  word  about  a  visit  with  Mr.  Stalin, 
Commander  Peale  replied  "No." 

But  the  man  at  the  door  had  said,  "Oh,  yes,  Mr,  Willkie  has  informa- 
tion.    He  is  going  to  see  Mr.  Stalin  tonight." 

That  was  the  hrst  I  had  heard  of  Mr.  Willkie's  visit  to  Mr.  Stalin. 
Later  I  understood  that  this  meeting  was  arranged  by  Mr.  Joe  Barnes, 
who  accompanied  Mr.  Willkie,  and  through  some  of  the  Reds  over 
tliere,  the  reddest  of  the  Reds,  Mr.  Omanski,  and  Mr.  Lozovski  and 
some  of  those  other  Red  Russians.  They  had  arranged  for  this  meet- 
ing with  Mr.  Willkie. 

So,  I  promptly  telephoned  Page  to  never  mind,  that  the  meeting 
had  been  arranged.  On  the  way  out  I  said  to  Mr.  Willkie,  "I  under- 
stand that  you  have  received  an  invitation  to  call  on  Mr.  Stalin.  You 
remember  that  you  were  informed  that  you  would  get  that  information 
through  the  Embassy,  but  I  have  received  no  information  about  it,  Mr. 
Willkie.  I  wonder  if  you  had  anything  to  do  with  this  interview?" 

His  reply  was,  "No,  I  had  nothing  to  do  with  it." 

Then  I  said,  as  this  had  been  arranged  for  Mr.  Willkie  entirely 
without  my  knowledge,  "I  presume  that  I  am  not  supposed  to  go  with 
you  ? " 

Mr.  Willkie  said,  "That  is  correct.    You  are  not  supposed  to  go." 

I  said,  "Well,  Mr.  Willkie,  I  am  going  to  make  some  inquiries  about 
that,  because  I  can't  understand  how  the  Ambassador  has  been  by- 
passed here  by  a  special  representative,  and  I  want  to  know  why." 

"Oh,"  he  said,  "Admiral,  you  mustn't  do  that.  I  think  you  are  a  big 
man,  but,  if  you  do  that  I  think  you  are  a  little  man." 


2050  THE    KATYX    FOREST    MASSACRE 

I  give  you  that  because  that  in  a  sense  describes  my  rehitions  with 
Mr.  Willkie  durinfr  his  time  there.  He  entirely  bypassed  me,  and  later 
on  he  went  to  see  Mr.  Stalin.  They  brought  Mr.  Barnes  and  Mr.  Coles 
in  and  had  their  pictures  taken  together,  from  which,  of  course,  the 
Ambassador  was  excluded.  Their  whole  attitude  there  was  one  to  dis- 
credit the  American  representative  in  the  Soviet  Union.  Those  were 
really  my  relations  with  Mr.  Willkie  while  he  was  there. 

Now,  after  that  interview^,  Mr.  Willkie  was  leaving  the  next  morn- 
ing at  4  o'clock  to  go  to  the  front.  So,  about  11  o'clock  at  night  he 
called  me  up  and  asked  if  he  could  come  back  and  tell  me  what  Mr. 
Stalin  had  said. 

I  said,  "Well,  Mr.  Willkie,  it  is  too  late  now.  You  are  going  to 
leave  at  4  o'clock.     Tell  me  when  you  come  back." 

So,  when  he  did  come  back  he  came  over  and  gave  me  some  informa- 
tion and  then  told  me  that  he  had  received  some  other  information 
which  was  so  secret  that  lie  couldn't  even  tell  it  to  the  American 
Ambassador. 

As  a  result  of  this  whole  episode  of  IMr.  Willkie,  I  asked  the  State 
Department  to  bring  me  home  for  consultation  in  that  the  situation 
had  gotten  sort  of  out  of  hand  and  I  felt  that  I  needed  some  evidence 
of  confidence  in  the  representative  from  the  President  of  the  United 
States  if  I  were  to  remain  in  Moscow.  So,  I  came  home  for  consul- 
tation. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  When  did  you  come  home,  sir? 

Admiral  Standley.  I  left  there  in  September  of  1942.  I  am  sorry. 
That  should  be  October  10,  1942.  I  came  home  then,  I  went  back 
in  January  and  reported  back  on  January  6,  1943. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman,  at  this  time  I  would  like  to  introduce 
this  document. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  While  the  Chairman  is  looking  that  over,  may  I  ask 
the  admiral  Avhether  all  of  this  took  place  in  Moscow  or  in 
Kuibyshev  ? 

Admiral  Standley.  It  was  mostly  in  Moscow.  You  are  getting 
me  into  a  long  story,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  Don't  blame  the  chairman.  It  Avas  me  that  asked 
the  question. 

Admiral  Standley.  Oh  yes,  you.  Mr.  Dondero. 

iNIr.  Willkie's  controversy,  or  rather  the  controversy  with  Mr. 
Willkie  started  before  he  even  got  into  ^Moscow.  When  he  arrived 
in  Turkey  I  received  a  message  from  ^Ir.  Willkie  stating  that  he  did 
not  w^ant  to  go  to  Kuibyshev  but  that  he  did  want  to  come  to  Moscow. 
He  wanted  to  come  dii-ect  to  see  Mr.  Stalin.  I  replied  that  the  seat 
of  government  was  in  Kuibyshev. 

Mind  you,  I  had  already  made  application  for  visas  for  Mr.  Willkie 
to  enter,  and  I  had  told  the  Ivussiau  authorities  of  his  coming.  They 
had  made  plans  and  had  arranged  for  him  to  visit  state  farms,  collec- 
tive farms,  factories,  and  had  arranged  quartei's  for  him  in  Kuibyshev. 
So  I  replied  to  Mr.  Willkie  that  the  seat  of  government  was  in 
Kuibyshev  and  that  there  was  the  proper  place  for  representatives 
of  foreign  governments  to  make  their  entry,  stating  that  ''The  Soviets 
have  made  plans  for  your  visit  here,  and  unless  you  have  instructions 
which  are  contraiy  to  those  I  received  when  1  obtained  your  visas, 
1  insist  that  you  come  to  Kuibyshev." 

So  Mr.  Willkie  then  came  to  Kuibyshev,  under  protest. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  2051 

Chairman  Madden.  This  is  off  the  the  record. 
(There  was  a  brief  statement  off  the  record.) 
Chairman  Madden.  I  will  hand  yon  exhibit  7. 

Mr.  DoNDERo.  Jnst  a  moment.  Admiral  Standley,  I  have  one  qnes- 
tion.  What  was  the  purpose  of  Mr.  Willkie's  visit  to  Moscow  or 
to  Kuibyshev^  Was  it  a  visit  on  the  part  of  a  representative  of 
the  Government  or  was  it  a  personal  visit  of  his  own? 

Admiral  Standley.  Do  you  want  my  opinion  or  the  statement  made 
by  the  State  Department? 

Mr.  Dondero.  I  want  whatever  is  the  fact. 

Admiral  Standley.  There  are  two  facts.  There  are  the  facts  made 
by  the  State  Department's  message  when  it  came  in.  The  other  facts 
are  my  opinion  based  on  what  happened  while  he  was  there.  Now, 
which  do  yon  Avant? 

Mr.  OTvoNSKi.  Tell  us  both. 

Mr.  Dondero.  Whatever  the  truth  is. 

Admiral  Standley.  The  State  Department  stated — and,  of  course, 
this  is  11  years  ago  and  my  memory  may  be  a  little  bit  faulty — but, 
in  effect,  the  State  Department  said,  "Mr.  Willkie  is  contemplating  a 
visit  to  the  Middle  Last  to  mingle  among  the  people  and  see  for 
himself  and  get  for  himself  information  from  the  people  as  to  their 
attitude  toward  the  war  effort.  In  that  connection  Mr.  Willkie  would 
like  to  visit  Moscow,  and  I  request  that  you  obtain  visas  for  Mr. 
Willkie  to  enter  Moscow." 

Then  it  continued:  "'Mr.  Willkie  was  my  opponent  in  the  last  cam- 
paign. Mr.  Willkie  received  a  large  number  of  American  votes.  But 
Mr.  Willkie  is  now  interested  in  getting  on  with  the  war  effort,  and 
I  feel  that  this  visit  will  further  the  war  effort.  So  I  would  like 
you  to  furnish  every  opportunity  for  Mr.  Willkie  to  accomplish  the 
purpose  for  which  he  is  coming  there." 

Now,  that  was  practically  the  statement  on  the  basis  of  which  he 
came.  He  was  a  special  representative  of  the  President.  That  is  the 
way  he  was  spoken  of. 

Mr.  Willkie  came  to  Kuibyshev  under  protest,  as  it  were.  We  made 
a  trip  up  the  river.  I  took  him  about  50  miles  up  the  Volga  River  to 
a  state  collective  farm,  and  so  forth.  At  that  time  Mr.  Willkie  was 
talking  about  the  second  front  practically  everywhere  he  went. 
Nearly  everyone  he  spoke  to  would  come  right  back,  ''Mr.  Willkie,  how 
about  this  second  front?'" 

Now,  after  I  had  insisted  that  Mr.  Willkie  come  to  Kuibyshev,  he 
acquiesced  and  came  to  Kuibyshev.  But  he  said  in  his  message, 
"There  will  be  no  interviews  and  no  press  releases  from  Kuibyshev." 

When  it  came  to  the  newspaper  boys,  the  only  one  who  came  down 
was  Shapiro.  Eddy  Gilmore  didn't  come  and  none  of  the  other  ne^N-s- 
paper  boys  came.  Apparently  they  had  the  idea  that  Mr.  Willkie  was 
going  to  Moscow.  So  as  long  as  they  didn't  come,  INIr.  Willkie 
obviated  the  question  of  the  press  release  by  saying  that  there  would 
be  no  press  releases  from  Kuibyshev. 

Later  on,  as  was  the  custom  at  that  time  whenever  a  special  repre- 
sentative of  the  President  came,  as  Mr.  Willkie  was,  when  they  had 
completed  their  mission,  Mr.  Stalin  gave  him  a  Kremlin  banquet.  It 
was  at  this  Kremlin  banquet  that  one  of  the  representatives  of  Mr. 
Willkie,  after  we  had  left  the  banquet  room  and  had  gone  out  into 
the  smoking  room  and  were  sitting  around  the  table — and  at  that  table 


2052  THE    KATlTsT    FOREST   MASSACRE 

was  Mr.  Stalin,  Mr.  Willkie,  Mr.  Molotov,  Mr.  Vershilov,  General 
Bradley,  and  myself,  and  one  other  whose  name  I  can't  recall  now. 

Mv.  Coles  and  Mr.  Barnes  were  sitting  over  at  another  table.  One 
of  them  pointed  over  and  said,  "There  is  the  next  President  of  the 
United  States." 

From  the  events  that  happened  there  it  was  my  opinion  that  Mr. 
Willkie  was  over  there  furthering  his  political  fences  rather  than 
primarily  for  the  Government's  interests.  Now,  that  was  my  personal 
view  of  the  situation. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  now  introduce  exhibit  12  ? 

Chairman  Madden.  Yes. 

Mr,  Mitchell.  This  is  a  portion  of  the  message  from  the  Ambas- 
sador at  Kuibyshev  dated  September  10,  1942. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  12"  and  follows:) 

Exhibit  12 

Portion  of  Message  from  the  American  Ambassador  at  Kuibyshev  Dated 

September  10,  1912 

*  *  *  On  a  number  of  occasions  I  have,  as  instrncted.  taken  up  with  Soviet 
authorities  different  Polisli  problems  such  as  tlie  evacuation  of  cliiidren,  recruit- 
ment for  the  army,  the  release  of  five  thousand  to  eight  thousand  Polish  ofiicers, 
relief,  and  the  question  of  moving  soldiers  together  witli  their  fanulies  from 
Tashkent  to  Iran. 

As  instructed,  I  liave  said  that  my  government  did  not  desire  to  interfere  in 
Polish-Soviet  relations  Early  in  July,  I  reported  that  Molotov  was  considerably 
irritated  when  I  spoke  of  the  Polish  question.  Yestei'day  wlien  I  again  s;iid  my 
government  did  not  wish  to  interfere  in  Soviet-Polish  relations  Mr.  Lozovski 
remarked,  "that  is  the  best  tiling  for  it  to  do." 

*  *  *  It  is  my  judgment  that  Mr.  Vv'illkie  or  other  representatives  should 
approach  the  Premier  in  a  firm  and  frank  manner  and  as  a  party  iu  interest 
and  not  apologetically.  The  attitude  might  be  expressed  that  the  friction  which 
has  developed  between  officials  of  the  two  governments,  i.  e.,  Polisli  and  Soviet 
in  the  Soviet  Union  is  distressing  to  our  government  and  that  friction  of  this 
kind  between  allies  will  be  detrimental  to  our  cause  and  will  profit  Hitler;  that 
the  President  therefore  wants  it  frankly  stated  that  our  government  hopes  both 
parties  will  make  every  effort  to  resolve  their  problems  generously  and  in  a 
friendly  manner,  realizing  that  knowledge  of  the  dispute  in  the  hands  of  the 
Axis  will  be  a  valuable  weapon;  that  a  review  by  l)oth  parties  of  the  problems 
can,  the  President  is  confident,  lead  to  an  understanding  provided  there  is  present 
a  spirit  of  good  will  and  mutual  confidence.     *     *     * 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Now,  Admiral,  that  message  is  from  you,  dated 
September  10, 1942.  Did  Mr.  Willkie  approach  the  Premier  in  a  firm 
manner? 

Chairman  Madden.  Wait  a  minute.  You  might  ask  the  admiral 
if  that  is  the  message  he  sent  ? 

Admiral  Standley.  Yes;  that  is  the  message  I  sent. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Now,  did  Mr.  Willkie  approach  the  Premier,  by 
whom  I  assume  you  mean  Mr.  Stalin,  in  a  firm  and  frank  manner, 
and  as  a  party  in  interest  and  not  apologetically,  to  your  knowledge? 

Admiral  Standley.  I  have  no  knowledge  of  Mr.  Willkie's  attitude 
when  he  approached  Mr.  Stalin  because  I  was  not  there.  Later,  before 
I\Ir.  Willkie  left,  and  in  an  effort,  as  I  told  him,  to  be  put  into  the 
I)ositi()n  of  knowledge  of  the  questions  which  he  had  taken  up  with 
^Lr.  Stalin  so  that  I  could  carry  on,  I  asked  him  what  had  developed, 
Avhat  had  happened  between  him  and  Mr.  Stalin. 

The  answer  that  I  got  was  that  "I  have  told  you  some  of  it,  but 
the  rest  of  it  is  so  secret  that  I  can't  even  tell  you." 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  2053 

So  I  ^ot  very  little  information  from  Mr.  Willkie  about  what  hap- 
pened between  him  and  Mr.  Stalin. 

Mr.  DoNDEKO.  Mr.  Chairman,  unless  the  visit  of  Mr.  AVillkie  can 
be  connected  up  with  the  Katyn  massacre,  it  seems  to  me  that  the 
whole  matter  ouf^ht  to  be  expnniied  from  the  record.  I  cannot  see 
the  slightest  relevancy  between  Mr.  Willkie's  visit — and  this  is  no 
reflection  on  you,  Ambassador — but  unless  it  can  be  connected  up 
so  that  it  is  in  some  way  associated  with  the  Katyn  massacre,  it  has 
nothiuir  to  do  with  the  picture  at  all,  and  ought  to  be  stricken  from 
this  record. 

]\Ir.  Machkowicz.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  disagree.  I  think  we  should 
have  the  entire  picture.  A  lot  of  this  nuitter  may  have  no  direct 
bearing  on  the  Katvn  atFair,  but  it  certainly  has  an  indirect  bearing; 
and  I  don't  see  how  we  could  get  a  complete  picture  without  having 
the  Willkie  incident  in  the  record. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  Unless  you  can  associate  it  in  some  way,  I  shall 
ask 

Mr.  Maciirowicz.  It  has  already  been  associated.  The  matter  of 
the  missing  Polish  officers  was  at  issue  at  this  time. 

Mr.  DoxDERo.  That  miglit  have  been  an  issue  at  that  time,  but  what 
did  Mr.  Willkie  have  to  do  with  it? 

]\[r.  Maciirowicz.  I  think  it  has  already  been  established  that  the 
question  of  the  missing  Polish  officers  was  an  issue  that  was  dis- 
cussed at  the  time,  and  the  messages  between  the  American  Ambas- 
sador and  the  Department  of  State  indicate  that.  I  see  no  reason 
why  the  fact  that  it  hapj^ened  to  be  Mr.  Wendell  Willkie  should 
mean  that  that  should  be  excluded  from  the  record.  With  all  of  the 
rest  of  it  included,  that  would  give  us  a  very  incomplete  picture. 

Mr.  Dondero.  Well,  I  still  insist  that  there  is  the  question  of  rele- 
vancy. The  subject  of  Mr.  Willkie's  visit  there  had  nothing  to  do  with 
the  Katyn  massacre  at  all.  He  was  not  a  representative  of  the 
Government. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Oh,  yes:  he  was  a  representative  of  the  Gov- 
ernment. 

Mr.  Dondero.  I  did  not  so  understand. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Was  he  a  representative  of  the  Government, 
Admiral  ? 

Admiral  Staxdley.  I  have  so  stated,  that  is,  that  he  represented 
the  President  of  the  United  States  and  was  so  treated. 

Chairman  Maddex.  Admiral,  does  this  testimony  that  you  are  pre- 
senting lead  up  to  the  Katyn  controversy  or  the  Katyn"  question  in 
any  way? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Did  you  discuss  the  Polish  situation  with  Mr. 
Willkie? 

Admiral  Staxdley.  Yes;  I  discussed  the  Polish  situation  with  Mr. 
Willkie  and  the  ett'orts  that  I  had  made.    I  discussed  that  with  him. 

Chairman  Madden.  I  think  the  admiral  should  proceed. 

Mr.  MiTCHEix.  IVIay  I  have  this  document  marked  as  ''Exhibit  1-3"? 

Admiral  Staxdley.  I  would  like  to  add,  gentlemen,  that  Mr.  Will- 
kie's visit  and  the  fact  that  he  had  entirely  bypassed  the  American 
Ambassador  made  it  difficult  for  me  to  continue  the  discussions  in 
regard  to  the  Polish  situation. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  That  is  with  regard  to  the  missing  Polish  officers  ? 


2054  THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE 

Admiral  Standley.  Yes;  with  regard  to  the  missing  Polish  offi- 
cers, because  I  did  not  know  what  Mr.  Willkie  had  said  to  ^Ir.  Stalin 
and  what  Mr.  Stalin,  in  turn,  had  said  to  Mr.  Willkie. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  Did  he  mention  that  subject  to  you? 

Admiral  Standley.  I  asked  him  in  rejiard  to  it,  and  he  stated  in 
regard  to  the  Polish  question,  "I  have  other  matters  that  are  so  secret 
that  I  can't  tell  you  about  them." 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  now  like  to  introduce  ex- 
hibit 13. 

Admiral,  this  is  a  report  from  the  Ambassador  in  Moscow  regard- 
ing Mr.  Willkie's  conversation  with  Stalin  concerning  the  Polish 
situation. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  13"  and  follows:) 

Exhibit  13 

Report  Fhom  the  American  Ambassador  at  Moscow  Regarding  Mb.  Willkie's 
Conversation  With  Stalin  Concerning  the  Polish  Situation 

Mr.  Willkie  called  at  the  Embassy  on  September  25  (1942)  and  informed  the 
Ambassador  that  he  had  taken  np  the  Polish  qnestion  with  Mr.  Stalin  along  the 
line  that  had  been  indicated  in  the  Department's  telegram  of  September  10, 
pointing  out  particularly  that  it  was  in  the  conmion  interest  of  the  United  Nations 
that  there  should  be  the  maximum  cooperation  and  the  least  possible  cause  for 
friction  between  the  different  nations  fighting  against  the  Axis,  that  Mr.  Stalin 
had  asked  specific  questions  in  regard  to  the  Polish  complaints  but  that  he  had 
replied  that  he  did  not  wish  to  argue  the  details  of  the  case.  Mr.  Stalin  finally 
said  that  he  would  be  willing  to  discuss  the  Polish  qnestion  with  Polish  officials 
with  a  view  towards  ironing  out  existing  difficulties. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  When  you  refer  to  the  Polish  question,  you  refer 
to  the  question  of  the  missing  Polish  officers,  do  3^011  not? 

Admiral  Standley.  I  couldn't  say  definitely  that  I  did,  but,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  Polish  officers  were  always  in  the  foreground. 

Mr.  Maciiroa\^cz,  That  was  the  most  im]>ortant  i')roblem  that  caused 
the  differences  between  the  Polish  Government  and  the  Russians? 

Admiral  Standley.  Yes. 

Chairman  Madden.  I  believe  the  admiral's  testimony  is  apropos. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  If  tlie  admiral  states,  as  he  now  states,  that  it  had  to 
do  with  the  missing  Polish  officers,  I  iiave  no  objection.  I  just  wanted 
the  thing  straightened  out.    That  was  all. 

Admiral  Standley.  It  had  so  nnich  importance  that  innnediately 
upon  Mr.  Willkie's  leaving  I  asked  to  be  sent  home  for  consultation 
because  the  situation,  as  a  result  of  Mr.  AVillkie's  visit,  had  developed 
to  the  point  that  I  felt  I  could  no  longer  remain  there  without  further 
evidence  that  the  Dei)artment  had  confidence  in  me  and  wanted  me 
to  continue. 

Ml'.  DoNDERO.  There  is  one  question  I  Avant  to  ask.  Did  you  discuss 
this  Polish  question — and  I  refer  to  the  missing  Polish  officers — with 
Stalin  up  to  that  time? 

Admiral  STANDLt:Y.  I  don't  think  I  CA'er  discussed  the  Polish  quevS- 
tion  with  Mr.  Stalin.  It  was  always  with  Mr.  ]\Iolotov.  I  don't  recall 
that  T  ever  discussed  it  Avitli  Mr.  Stalin. 

Mr.  DoNDLKo.  Now,  at  the  time  you  discussed  it  with  Mr,  Molotov, 
was  a  inaii  by  the  name  of  Beria,  who  was  the  head  of  the  secret  police 
of  Ivussia,  present,  or  any  other  officer  of  that  organization? 

Admiral  Standley.  Not  obviously  present,  but  many  times  they 
are  present  when  you  don't  know  about  it. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  2055 

Chairman  Madden.  What  do  you  mean  by  that,  Admiral? 

Admiral  Standley.  Well,  you  ahvaj's  ha  Ye  somebody  around  when 
you  ai'e  in  Russia.  There  are  ahAays  some  NKVD  boys  around.  Some- 
times, though,  3'ou  know  where  they  are,  and  sometimes  you  don't. 
So  I  can't  say  when  they  were  there. 

Chairman  Madden.  You  mean  that  they  were  concealed  some  place  i 

Admiral  Standley.  Yes,  probably  concealed  or  in  a  room  where 
they  could  hear.  That  is  one  of  the  conditions  in  the  Soviet  Union  as 
has  been  described  by  Bedell  Smith,  by  Kirk,  and  by  everybody  else. 
The  American  Ambassador  is  always  followed  by  the  XICVD  boys. 

Mr.  MACHROA\acz.  Now,  Admiral,  one  matter  that  we  are  particu- 
larly interested  in  is  to  know  whether  or  not  the  Department  of  State 
or  the  Department  of  Defense  or  any  other  o-overnmental  agency  had 
information  in  11)42,  1943,  and  in  1944  regarding  the  missing  Polish 
officers.  I  want  to  ask  you  in  connection  with  that  whether  you,  on 
P^bruary  7,  1942,  transmitted  to  the  Department  of  State  a  report  by 
Major  Czapski  witli  regard  to  these  missing  Polish  officers. 

Admiral  Standley.  1  was  not  in  Moscow  at  that  time.  I  was  not 
there  at  that  time.    I  was  in  Washington. 

Chairman  Madden.  Show  this  to  the  admiral  and  see  if  he  can 
identify  it. 

Mr.  Maciirowicz.  Can  you  identify  that  photostatic  copy? 

Admiral  Standley.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Who  was  your  predecessor  ? 

Admiral  Standley.  Ambassador  Steinhardt. 

He  maj'  not  have  been  tliere,  because  Steinhart  came  out  and  the 
counselor  was  Walter  Thurston,  and  he  might  have  been  charge 
d'affaires  at  that  time.    I  am  not  sure. 

Mr.  Mrjx'HELL.  Admiral,  when  did  you  report  to  Moscow  as  the 
United  States  Ambassador? 

Admiral  Standley.  In  April  1942.  It  was  April  14  I  presented  my 
credentials  and  became  the  Ambassador.  I  presented  my  credentials 
to  Mr.  Kalinin  of  the  Soviet  Republic  and  became  the  Ambassador. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Wlien  you  were  being  briefed  by  the  Department 
of  State  officials,  as  you  told  us  this  morning,  before  you  went  over 
there,  I  assume  that  would  be  in  February  1942,  since  you  reported 
in  April  of  1942? 

Admiral  Standley.  I  cannot  recall  just  the  date  that  I  was  con- 
firmed here,  but  I  was  confirmed  by  the  Senate  here  before  I  reported 
to  Moscow,  and  I  remained  in  Washington  here  until  February  1942. 

Mr.  MrrcHELL.  But  you  were  being  briefed  by  the  State  Depart- 
ment officers  as  to  what  your  functions  and  duties  were  going  to  be, 
were  you  not? 

Admiral  Standley.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Were  you  ever  shown  this  message  at  that  time? 

Admiral  Standley.  I  do  not  recall  ever  having  seen  any  messages 
of  that  kind. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman,  this  is  an  official  State  Department 
document  dated  February  7,  1942,  with  no  signature.  It  comes  from 
the  Foreign  Service  of  the  United  States  of  America,  American 
Embassy,  Moscow,  U.  S.  S.  R.,  February  7,  1942,  subject,  "Trans- 
mitting memorandum  concerning  Polish  prisoners  of  war  in  the 
Soviet  Union." 


2056  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

We  have  already  received  the  information  contained  in  this  docu- 
ment on  the  record  in  our  hearings.  The  import  of  this  whole  thing 
is  that  before  Admiral  Standley  went  to  Moscow,  this  was  in  the  files 
of  the  Department  of  State. 

Chairman  Madden.  Admiral  Standley  could  not  identify  it. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  He  said  he  never  saw  this  before  he  went  over  there. 
Certainly  a  man  who  was  going  to.  represent  the  United  States 
Government 

Chairman  Madden.  I  would  like  to  have  that  identified  if  you  want 
it  in  the  record  here. 

Is  that  already  in  the  record  ? 

Mr.  JNIlTCHELL.   No. 

Chairman  Madden.  If  you  can  identify  it  we  will  submit  it  for  the 
record. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  IVIr.  Chairman,  may  I  suggest  that  probably  we 
have  Mr.  Brown,  of  the  Department  of  State,  identify  this  instrument, 
and  then  Admiral  Standley  can  continue  his  testimony.  That  will 
save  a  lot  of  time. 

TESTIMONY  OF  BEN  H.  BROWN,  JR.,  ACTING  ASSISTANT  SECRE- 
TARY OF  STATE  FOR  CONGRESSIONAL  RELATIONS 

Chairman  JNIadden.  Mr.  Brown,  will  you  state  your  full  name, 
please  ? 

Mr,  Brown.  Ben  H.  Brown,  Jr. 

Chairman  Madden.  And  your  address  ? 

Mr.  Brown.  3501  North  Edison  Street,  Arlington,  Va. 

Chairman  jMadden.  ^h\j  we  have  the  capacity  in  which  you  are 
acting  here  ? 

Mr,  Brown.  I  am  Acting  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Con- 
gressional Relations. 

Chairman  Madden,  Will  you  raise  your  hand  and  be  sworn,  please? 

Do  you  solemnly  swear  to  tell  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  noth- 
ing but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 

Mr.  Brown.  I  do. 

Chairman  Madden.  You  may  submit  that  copy  to  Mr.  Brown, 
counsel. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Brown,  will  you  kindly  identify  that  document 
for  the  committee,  please  ? 

Mr.  Brown.  Mr.  Chairman,  this  is  a  photostatic  copy  of  a  dispatch 
from  the  American  Embassy  in  Moscow,  dated  February  7,  1942, 

I  am  identifying  this  on  the  basis  of  my  knowledge  of  the  original 
of  this  document  in  the  Department's  files,  and  the  fact  that  it  was 
on  niy  instruction  that  this  document  was  photostated  aiul  the  photo- 
static copy  turned  over  to  the  committee. 

Chairman  Madden.  What  is  that  document? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Whose  signature  appears  on  that  document? 

Mr.  Brown.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  will  have  to  look  at  the  original  of 
the -document  to  determine  whose  signature  appears  on  it.  I  would 
assume  it  was  the  charge  d'affaires  or  the  Ambassador  at  the  time. 

Mr,  Machrowicz.  As  far  as  this  committee  is  concerned,  I  do  not 
think  it  is  tremendously  im])ortant  who  signed  the  document.  The 
fact  is  that  on  February  7,  11)42,  the  l)ei)artment  of  State  did  receive 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  2057 

from  the  charge  d'affaires  or  the  Ambassador  at  Moscow  a  letter 
transmitting  a  report  by  Major  Czapski  concerning  these  missing 
Polish  officers;  is  that  correct? 

jVIr.  Brown.  No,  sir.  The  date  stamp  on  this  document  shows  that 
it  was  received  in  the  Department  of  State  on  April  13,  1942,  at  some- 
thing after  2  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  Now,  the  document  was  dated 
February  7,  but  the  date  of  receipt  was  April. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  But  in  April  1942  the  Department  of  State  would 
have  in  its  possession  Major  Czapski's  extensive  report  regarding  these 
missing  Polish  officers;  is  that  not  correct? 

Mr.  Brown.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Chairman  Madden.  Will  you  mark  that  as  an  exhibit  and  receive 
it  in  evidence.  Counsel? 

Mr.  Mitchell.  This  is  exhibit  14. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  as  "Exhibit  14"  for  identi- 
fication and  is  as  follows:) 

Exhibit  14 — Letter  and  One  Enclosure  Forwarded  to  United  States  State 
Department  by  American  Ambassador  to  Moscow  on  February  17,  1942, 
Detailing  Search  fob  Polish  Officers 

The  Foreign  Service  of  the  United  States  of  America 

American  Embassy, 
Moscoiv,  U.  S.  S.  R.,  Fehruary  7,  19^2. 
No.  11. 
Subject:  Transmitting  nu-moranduni  ciJiiceiiiing  Polish  prisoners  of  war  in  the 

Soviet  Union. 
The  Honorable  the  Secretary  of  State, 

Washington,  D.  C. 

Sir  :  I  have  the  honor  to  enclose  herewith  a  translation  prepared  by  this  office 
of  a  memorandum  on  Polish  prisoners  of  war  in  the  Soviet  Union  which  was 
handed  to  me  by  its  author,  Jozef  Czapski,  a  captain  in  the  Polish  Army  in  the 
Soviet  Union.  Captain  Czapski  informed  me  in  strict  confidence  that  not  only 
had  Stalin  promised  the  Polish  Ambassador  that  the  Polish  officers  concerned 
would  be  liberated  but  that  he  had  given  the  most  solemn  assurance  to  this 
effect  to  General  Sikorski.  Captain  Czapski  came  to  Moscow  in  an  effort  to 
obtain  the  implementation  of  these  promises  but  has  been  unable  to  obtain  any 
further  information  as  to  the  whereabouts  of  these  prisoners.  He  thinks  it  pos- 
sible, however,  that  some  of  them  may  be  imprisoned  on  Franz  Joseph  Island 
and  as  it  would  be  impossible  to  bring  them  back  from  there  before  the  month 
of  June,  there  is  a  slight  possibility  that  the  Soviet  authorities  are  withholding 
any  information  until  such  time  as  they  can  actually  release  the  prisoners.  As 
illustrative  of  the  attitude  taken  by  the  Soviet  authorities  on  this  question, 
Captain  Czapski  told  me  in  the  strictest  confidence  that  two  officers  of  the 
Polish  army  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  were  suddenly  arrested  in  Kuibyshev  and  re-im- 
prisoned without  notice  to  the  Polish  Embassy  or  Military  Authorities.  The 
Polish  Embassy  has  been  unable  to  secure  their  release  despite  the  most  strenu- 
ous efforts.  The  Soviet  authorities  have  merely  stated  that  the  officers  in  ques- 
tion are  believed  to  be  pro-German.  Captain  Czapski  said  he  thought  the  real 
reason  for  their  arrest  was  the  fact  that  they  were  members  of  the  Polish  Bund. 
Captain  Czapski,  who  was  himself  a  prisoner  of  war,  said  that  he  had  been  for- 
tunate in  being  imprisoned  in  a  camp  where  the  prisoners  received  relatively 
good  treatment.  He  said  that  the  reason  for  this  special  consideration  was  the 
desire  of  the  Soviet  authorities  to  prepare  a  nucleus  of  Poles  who  would  be  fa- 
vorably disposed  toward  the  Soviet  Union  and  would  be  useful  to  the  Soviet 
Government  after  the  war,  possibly  for  intervention  in  Polish  internal  afCairs. 
He  said  that  while  he  had  no  direct  evidence  he  suspected  that  similar  tactics 
were  being  used  with  respect  to  German  prisoners  of  war.  Some  support  to  this 
theory  is  furnished  by  the  recent  visit  of  American  correspondents  to  a  Soviet 


2058  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

prison  camp  near  Gorky,  where  the  German  prisoners  receive  a  more  liberal 
ration  than  the  citizens  of  Moscow,  although  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  conditions 
of  life  there  would  be  likely  to  win  adherents  to  the  Communist  Regime. 
Respectfully  yours, 


(Committee  Note. — The  signature  on  this  document  was  deleted  by  the  State 
Department.     See  previous  testimony.) 

[Translation] 
Aide  M]6moike  Concerning  Missing  Polish  Prisoners  of  War 

The  prisoners  of  war  concentrated  at  Starobielsk,  Kozielsk,  and  Ostachkow  in 
the  year  1939-40  (April-May)  amounting  to  over  15,000  men,  of  which  8,700 
were  oflBcers,  have  not  returned  from  their  captivity  and  the  place  where  they 
were  located  is  absolutely  unknown  with  the  excei)tion  of  400  or  500  men,  about 
3  percent  of  the  total  number  of  prisoners  of  war  at  Starobielsk,  Kozielsk,  and 
Ostachkow  who  were  freed  in  1941  (most  of  them  having  passed  through  the 
camp  at  Griazowietz). 

THE  CAMP  AT  STAROBIELSK 

The  prisoners  arrived  at  the  camp  of  Starobielsk  from  the  thirtieth  of  Septem- 
ber to  the  first  of  November  1939.  At  the  beginning  of  the  liquidation  of  the 
camp,  about  April  5,  1940,  the  number  of  prisonA's  of  war  amounted  to  3,920  men, 
aside  from  the  generals  and  colonels  who  lived  apart.  In  this  number  there 
were  some  dozens  of  civilians  for  the  most  part  judges,  lawyers,  and  civil  ser- 
vants, and  about  20  officer  candidates  (Podehorazy).  All  of  the  rest  were 
oflSeers  of  whom  at  least  50  percent  were  regular  officers,  8  generals,  more  than 
100  colonels  and  lieutenant  colonels,  nearly  250  ma.lors,  about  1,000  captains, 
nearly  2,500  lieutenants  and  sublieutenants  distributed  among  all  branches  of 
the  service ;  among  others,  380  of  the  most  outstanding  doctors  of  Poland,  some 
university  professors,  etc. 

Kozielsk  and  Ostachkow  were  similar  prison  camps  and  were  liquidated  about 
the  same  time  and  in  the  same  manner  as  Starobielsk. 

OSTACHKOW 

When  the  liquidation  of  this  camp  began  on  April  6,  1940,  there  were  a  total 
of  6,570  men,  of  which  380  were  Polish  officers,  in  addition  to  Polish  frontier 
guards  and  frontier  regiments. 

LIQUIDATION    OF    STAROBIELSK 

On  the  fifth  of  April  1940  liquidation  was  announced  and  the  first  group,  195 
men,  were  sent  from  Stai'obielsk.  The  Soviet  commander.  Colonel  Berejkow, 
and  the  commissar,  Kirehin,  assured  our  camp  directors  that  the  camp  was  in 
process  of  final  liquidation  and  that  everyone  would  be  sent  to  centers  of  depart- 
ure from  which  all  would  be  sent  to  their  own  country,  the  Russian  side  as  well 
as  the  German  (none  of  them  were  sent). 

They  were  sent  from  the  fourtli  of  April  to  the  twenty-sixth  of  April  in  groups 
of  from  C5  to  240  persons.  On  April  25,  after  the  customary  lecture,  more  than 
100  persons  were  to  leave.  There  was  read  a  special  list  containing  the  names 
of  63  persons  who  were  ordered  to  hold  themselves  completely  apart  during  the 
departure  at  the  station. 

After  this  there  was  a  pause  between  the  twenty-sixth  of  April  and  the  second 
of  Miiy.  On  the  second  of  May  200  more  were  sent  by  little  groups  of  8,  11,  12 
(my  own  departure  took  place  in  a  group  of  16)  and  the  rest  were  sent.  This 
group  in  which  I  found  myself  was  taken  to  Pawlichtchew  Bor  (Smolensk  Oblast) 
and  we  there  met  the '"spt'cial  group"  of  63  persons.  We  were  accordingly  79 
otficers  of  Starobielsk  all  freed  in  1941  (including  some  otlicer  candidates 
"Podehorazy").  If  we  add  to  tins  number  the  oliicers  sent  from  Starobielsk 
individually  during  the  winter  of  1939-1940  ((Jeneral  Jarnuszkiewicz,  Colonel 
Koc,  C^olonel  Gielgud-Aksentowicz,  Chaplain  Tyczkowski,  Colonel  Szymanski, 
Captain  Rytel,  Lieutenant  Evert)  and  who  have  been  freed,  we  have  all  together 
86  out  of  3,920,  (I  little  over  2  j)ercent  of  the  total  ntinifjrr  of  prisoners  of 
Starobielsk. 

The  li(iuidati(m  of  the  camps  of  Kozielsk  and  Ostachkow  was  carried  out  in  a 
similar  manner. 


THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE  2059 

In  the  camp  of  Pavvlichtchew  Bor  there  were  about  200  officers  from  Kozielsk 
and  about  120  persons  from  Ostachkow  (police,  subofficers,  and  some  officers  and 
civilians) .  The  ratio  between  the  number  of  men  that  came  to  Pawlichtchew  and 
the  total  number  of  prisoners  in  the  camps  of  Kozielsk  and  Ostachkow  differed 
little  from  those  I  have  cited  for  Starboielsk. 

THE  CAMP  OF  GRIAZOWIETZ  NE^Ul  VOLOGDA 

After  a  stay  of  a  month  at  Pawlichtchew  the  whole  camp,  amounting  to  about 
400  persons,  was  transferred  from  Pawlichtchew  to  Griazowietz,  where  they 
remained  from  April  IS,  1940,  to  the  time  of  their  liberation  (on  July  2,  1941,  a 
group  of  1,250  officers  and  soldiers  interned  in  Lithuania,  Latvia,  and  Estonia 
arrived  at  Griazowietz).  According  to  our  information  the  camp  of  Griazowietz 
is  the  only  camp  existing  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  after  June  1940,  in  which  the  officer 
prisoners  of  war  were  in  the  majority,  which  was  liquidated  in  September  1941. 

It  will  soon  have  been  six  months  since  the  day  of  the  proclamation  of  the 
armistice  of  Polish  prisoners  on  the  twelfth  of  August  1941.  The  Polish  army 
in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  is  constantly  receiving,  whether  by  groups  or  individually, 
officers  and  soldiers  of  the  Polish  army  who  had  been  arrested  on  the  spot  or  at 
the  time  of  their  passage  of  one  of  the  frontiers  after  September  1939  and  who 
now  are  free  to  come  to  us  from  Siberia,  from  Kolyma,  from  Workuta,  Komi, 
ASSR,  from  Karagande,  from  all  Russia,  but  contrary  to  the  solemn  promises 
given  to  our  Ambassador  by  Stalin  himself  in  November  K)41,  categoric  promises 
of  Stalin  given  to  General  Sikorski  on  December  4,  1941,  to  search  for  and  deliver 
to  us  the  missing  prisoners  and  soldiers  of  Kozielsk,  Starobielsk,  and  Ostachkow, 
tJiere  is  not  a  single  prisoner  of  war  of  Starobielsk,  Kozielsk,  Ostachkow  (aside 
from  the  group  named  above)  who  has  returned.  Not  a  single  cry  for  help  has 
come  to  us  from  them.  Having  questioned  thousands  of  compatriots  who  came 
from  camps  and  prisons  all  over  the  Soviet  Union,  we  have  no  news  whatever  of 
their  location  apart  from  vague  rumors,  usually  carried  third  hand,  such  as: 
that  six  to  twelve  thousand  officers  and  subofficers  were  sent  to  Kolyma  in  1940 : 
that  more  than  five  thousand  officers  have  been  concentrated  on  Franz  Joseph 
Island  and  Nowaya,  Zemlya ;  that  transports  have  been  sent  to  Tschukotka, 
Kamtschatka ;  that  630  prisoners  of  Kozielsk  are  located  ISO  kilometers  from 
Piostraya  Dreswa  (Kolyma)  ;  that  on  the  thirtieth  of  August  1941,  150  men  in 
tattered  officers'  uniforms  were  seen  on  the  banks  of  the  Gari  north  of  Soswa 
( tributary  of  the  river  Ob)  :  that  Polish  officers  were  sent  to  islands  in  the  north 
in  large  barges  containing  1,700  to  2,000  men  each  and  that  three  of  these  b:irges 
were  sunk.  But  none  of  this  information  is  completely  certain  although  tliat 
concerning  the  northern  islands  and  Kolyma  seems  the  most  probable. 

Can  it  be  that  the  solemn  promises  of  Stalin  himself  would  not  allow  us  to 
hope  that  we  shall  at  least  know  where  our  prisoners  of  war  companions  are 
and  if  they  have  perished  where  that  took  place?  It  is  more  than  improbalile 
that  the  heads  of  the  N.  K.  V.  D.  should  not  know  where  these  15, 000  men  are. 
During  our  stay  at  Starobielsk,  Kozielsk,  and  Ostachkow  (19:>9-1940)  lists  of 
prisoners  of  war  were  made  many  times  on  special  paper  with  numerous  and 
detailed  printed  questions.  These  papers  were  sent  to  the  places  of  detention 
of  the  iirisoners  everywhere.  To  them  were  added  the  records  of  numerous 
examinations  on  the  past,  tlie  political  views,  etc.,  of  each  prisoner.  Verified 
photographs  were  added  to  the  documents,  and  papers  of  each  prisoner  were  kept 
in  a  special  dossier  "Dielo,"  which  included  such  documents  as  the  officer's 
certificate,  passport,  etc. 

The  point  to  which  these  registrations  were  made  with  care  is  shown  by  a 
detail :  many  Polish  officers  received  all  of  their  papers  in  December  1941, 
documents  which  had  been  taken  from  them  at  Starobielsk,  Kozielsk,  and 
Ostachkow  two  yeai'S  earlier. 

THE    OFFICERS 

The  dav  of  the  beginning  of  the  liquidation  of  the  camp  of  Starobielsk, 
April  5,  1940 : 

The  number  of  prisoners,  all  officers  except  some  dozens  of 
civilians,  and  about  thirty  candidate  officers  (Podchorazy) 
amounted  to 3,  920  persons. 

The  number  of  prisoners  of  Kozielsk  the  day  of  its  liquida- 
tion, April  3,  1940,  was  5,000  officers 4,  500  officers. 

The  number  of  prisoners  at  Ostachkow  the  day  of  its  liquida- 
tion was  6,570  of  which 380  officers. 

Total S,  SOO 


2060  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

Subtracting  the  dozens  of  civilians  at  Starobielsk  we  have 
at  least 8,  700  officers. 

There  have  returned  to  the  Polish  army  some  3(K)  officers  of 
Griazowietz  (ex-prisoners  of  Starobielsk,  Kozielsk,  and 
Ostachkow)  and  some  dozens  of  prisoners  sent  from  prisons 
where  they  had  been  held  individually  after  Starobielsk, 
Kozielsk,  and  Ostachkow,  in  all  not  more  than 400  oflScers. 

Accordingly  the  officer  prisoners  of  war  who  have  not  returned 
from  the  camps  Starobielsk,  Kozielsk,  and  Ostachkow 
amounted  to  the  figure  of 8,  300  oflScers. 

All  the  officers  of  the  Tolish  Army  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  of  which  the 
number  amounted  to  2,300  more  or  less  on  January  1,  1942,  are  with  the 
exception  of  the  group  of  400  officers  mentioned  above  not  as  prisoners 
of  war  but  political  prisoners  arrested  after  the  campaign  of  1939  as  well 
as  those  interned  from  Lithuania,  Estonia,  and  I^atvia. 

This  note  sets  forth  the  status  of  the  officer  prisoners  of  war  not  liberated. 
With  regard  to  the  soldier  prisoners  of  war  not  liberated,  the  question  cannot  be 
described  in  such  a  precise  manner.  According  to  official  Soviet  information 
(Krasnaya  Zvezda,  September  IS,  1940),  on  the  Ukraine  front  alone  the  Soviet 
army  took  181,223  soldiers  and  more  than  4,000  under  officers  prisoners.  The 
soldiers  have  been  partially  sent  back,  the  rest  having  been  held  in  work  camps 
in  Komi,  A.  S.  S.  R.,  in  Siberia,  in  the  DonBass,  in  Soviet-occupied  Poland,  in 
Kazakstan,  and  in  all  the  prisons  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  A  part  of  these  men  have 
been  liberated  and  have  formed  the  cadre  of  our  army  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  Another 
part  not  being  able  to  be  received  in  the  army  drifted  toward  the  south  seeking 
their  families  exported  to  Kazakstan.  A  large  part  have  perisiied  in  work  camps 
as  well  as  being  freed  from  cold  and  from  hunger. 

Accordingly,  it  is  only  the  prisoners  of  war  of  Kozielsk,  Starobielsk,  and 
Ostachkow,  for  the  most  part  officers,  that  we  have  been  able  to  determine  in 
exact  figures.  In  enlarging  the  cadres  of  our  army  in  the  South,  the  need  for 
these  officers  becomes  more  and  more  pressing.  We  lose  in  them  the  l^est  that 
we  had  of  military  specialists,  men  of  character,  and  patriots.  In  increasing  our 
army  the  quality  of  the  army  is  tied  to  this  question  of  the  disappearance  of 
our  best  cadres  of  officers,  to  say  nothing  about  how  much  more  difficult  this 
makes  the  creation  of  confidence  in  our  army  towards  our  Soviet  allies,  con- 
fidence so  necessary  for  the  decisive  moment  when  our  army  goes  into  action 
again. 

JozEF  CzAPSKi,  Captain. 

Moscow,  January  29,  19'i2. 

Mr,  Brown.  Is  that  all  for  me  at  this  time,  sir? 
Chairman  Madden.  That  is  all,  Mr.  Brown.    Thank  you. 

TESTIMONY  OP  WILLIAM  H.  STANDLEY— Resumed 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Admiral,  we  have  now  reached  the  point  in  your 
career  as  Ambassador  where  you  asked  to  be  called  home  as  a  result 
of  the  visit  Mr.  Willkie  made. 

Could  you  tell  us  what  happened,  briefly,  in  Washington,  at  the 
time  you  came  back,  which  I  believe  you  stated  was  October  1942? 

Admiral  Standley.  When  I  returned  to  Washington,  I  reported, 
of  course,  directly  to  the  State  Department  and  then  had  an  inter- 
view with  the  President.  I  reported  to  the  President  virtually  what 
I  have  told  this  committee  about  ]\Ir.  Willkie's  activities  over  there. 

TluMi  I  told  the  President  that  I  had  asked  to  be  recalled  because  of 
the  situation  Mr.  Willkie  left  me  in,  and  that  if  I  returned  to  Russia 
I  must  go  back  with  increased  prestige  and  evidences  of  that. 

And  I  told  him  three  tilings  that  must  hapj)en  to  indicate  that 
evidence.  One  was  that  my  naval  attache,  who  was  a  captain,  should 
be  made  an  admiral ;  that  my  military  attache  should  be  made  a  gen- 
eral, and  that  General  Faymonville,  the  representative  of  Lend-Lease, 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  2061 

should  be  directed  to  report  to  the  Ambassador  and  not  act  independ- 
ently, as  lie  had  been  doing. 

Those  things  were  accomplished  before  I  went  back. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  In  other  words,  you  are  telling  the  committee  this 
morning  that  all  of  your  requests  were  granted  by  the  President;  is 
that  right? 

Admiral  Standlet.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell,  And  that  you  then  returned  in  your  official  ca- 
pacity ? 

Admiral  Standley.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Xow,  during  your  conversation  with  the  President, 
was  the  subject  matter  of  the  missing  Polish  othcers  discussed? 

Admiral  Standley.  I  cannot  recall  generally,  but  I  did  discuss  it 
with  the  President.  I  cannot  remember  in  detail  what  the  discussion 
was,  but  it  was,  in  general,  along  the  lines  that  I  have  indicated  to  the 
committee  here.  I  informed  the  President  of  the  situation  as  it  had 
developed  up  to  that  time. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  In  October  1942? 

Admiral  Standley.  Yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Now,  will  you  proceed  to  tell  the  committee  what 
happened  upon  your  return  to  Moscow,  confining  it  to  the  Polish 
question  ? 

Admiral  Standley.  When  I  returned  to  Moscow,  I  found  that  Dr. 
Kot,  who  had  informed  me  before  I  left  that  he  had  asked  to  be  re- 
called, had  been  recalled  as  the  Polish  representative,  and  that  Dr. 
Homer  had  been  assigned  as  the  Polish  representative  in  Moscow. 

Upon  my  return,  Mr.  Romer  made  the  usual  call,  and  he  seemed  very 
much  pleased  because  he  felt  that  the  Polish  situation  had  improved, 
and  he  felt  encouraged  and  felt  that  he  was  going  to  accomplish  some 
results  in  connection  with  that  question. 

Then  IMr.  Homer  informed  me  that  on  subsequent  visits  the  attitude 
of  Mr.  Molotov  seemed  to  stiffen  again,  and  then  the  Polish  question 
became  again  a  sore  point  and  became  quite  a  question  of  controversy. 

Later  on  Mr.  Romer  brought  a  message  which  stated  that  their 
Polish  Government  in  London  had  been  informed  that  the  British 
Ambassador  and  the  American  Ambassador  would  receive  identical 
notes,  which  they  were  supposed  to  present  to  the  Soviet  Government. 

And  in  due  time,  I  think  in  about  a  week,  those  messages  were  re- 
ceived and  the  British  Ambassador  and  myself  made  appointments 
to  see  Mr.  Molotov. 

We  did  not  go  together  on  this  occasion,  and  when  I  went  into  the 
office — we  had  appointments  and  mine  was  after  the  British  Ambas- 
sador's— as  I  went  in,  the  British  Ambassador  was  coming  out.  And 
the  British  Ambassador  stated : 

I  have  talked  with  Mr.  Molotov  in  regard  to  the  Polish  situation.  I  have  urged 
that  they  withhold  their  statements  in  regard  to  the  Polish  situation  and  not 
make  it  public. 

And,  of  course — 

he  said — 

I  did  not  have  much  success.     I  hope  you  will  have  better  success. 

That  was  in  connection  with  the  note  that  the  Soviet  Government 
was  going  to  make  in  regard  to  the  breaking  of  relations  with  the 
Polish  Government. 

93744 — 52— pt.  7 16 


2062  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Chairman  Madden.  We  have  here  now  a  document  wliich  should  be 
marked  as  the  next  exhibit. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  That  will  be  exhibit  15. 

Chairman  Madden.  Wait  just  a  minute.  I  think  the  admiral  lia.d 
something  further  to  say. 

Admiral  Standley.  I  had  gotten  ahead  there. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Yes;  I  think  you  had.  I  would  like  to  bring  you 
up  to  the  point. 

I  have  here  a  paraphrase  of  a  telegram  from  Moscow,  dated  April 
26,  1943 ;  which  I  would  like  to  introduce  at  this  point  as  exhibit  15. 

(The  document  referred  to  Mas  marked  "Exhibit  15"  and  is  as 
follows :) 

Exhibit  15 

[Paraphrase  of  telegram  from  Moscow] 

Moscow,  April  26.  1943. 
Seceetaey  of  State, 

Washington. 

Two.  I  called  on  Molotov  at  his  request  this  afternoon.  As  I  arrived  Clark 
Kerr  was  leaving  and  he  said  in  passing  "see  if  you  can  persuade  him  to  delay 
the  publication  of  the  note.  This  is  madness — I  have  been  trying  for  the  past 
hour  but  I  am  afraid  I  was  not  successful." 

Molotov  told  me  of  a  mesHUfie  of  April  21  addressed  to  Churchill  and  to  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  concerning  Polish-Soviet  relations.  He  said  that  in  the  absence 
of  the  President  and  of  Air.  Hull  this  message  ivas  given  to  Mr.  Welles  on  the  2Jfth. 
The  message,  he  said,  was  almost  identical  to  the  note  which  he  was  "forced" 
to  give  last  night  to  Ambassador  Romer.  The  message  was  sent  to  the  President 
to  explain  the  position  of  the  Soviet  Government  in  the  present  controversy,  and 
he  felt  certain  that  the  Soviet  position  would  be  understood  by  the  American 
Government.  After  reading  the  note  Molotov  said,  in  reply  to  my  question, 
that  no  answer  to  Stalin's  message  had  been  received  from  the  President.  I 
said  that  the  President's  absence  would  account  for  the  lack  of  a  reply,  and 
added  that  I  was  certain  the  President  would  be  greatly  disturbed  at  this  devel- 
opment. When  informed  that  the  note  would  be  published  this  evening,  I  said 
that,  speaking  without  instructions,  I  was  certain  the  American  and  British 
Governments  were  exporing  the  question  of  Polish-Soviet  relations  in  an  attempt 
to  find  a  solution  which  would  make  unnecessary  a  rupture  in  relations.  I  added 
that  I  sincerely  hoped  that  publication  of  the  note  could  be  held  up  long  enough 
to  permit  a  complete  examination  of  the  question. 

(Signed)     Standley. 

Chairman  Madden.  That  will  be  received  as  exhibit  15. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  acknowledge  having  sent  that  message, 
Admiral  ? 

Admiral  Standley.  Yes.  And  tliat  brings  me  back.  I  had  gotten 
ahead  of  that  in  ni}^  testimony. 

As  I  stated,  Mr.  Romer  found  tliat  conditions  Avere  worsening  as 
he  wont  along,  and  eventually,  on  A])ril  11^,  194;),  came  the  break. 
And  at  that  time,  Mr.  Goebbels,  the  German  representative,  had  an- 
nounced tlie  finding  of  these  5,000  or  8,000  Poli.sh  officers  and  that  they 
had  been  murdered  by  the  Russians. 

At  that  time  it  was  announced  that  the  Polish  Government  in  exile 
had  requested  the  International  Red  Cross  to  investigate  this  murder 
to  determine  who  had  committed  the  nnirder,  whether  it  was  the  Rus- 
sians or  the  Germans. 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  2063 

My  next  knowledge  in  connection  with  that  was  when  Mr.  Romer 
•came  into  my  office  the  next  or  following  day  and  asked  to  see  me. 
He  made  this  statement : 

Mr.  Ambassador,  I  would  like  to  get  your  advice.  I  was  called  for  an  appoint- 
ment with  Mr.  Molotov  last  evening,  at  which  time  I  was  presented  with  a  letter 
of  such  tenor  that  after  I  had  read  it  I  handed  it  back  to  Mr.  Molotov,  and  I  said, 
"Mr.  Molotov,  that  letter  is  couched  in  language  which  no  ambassador  can  re- 
ceive," and  I  refused  to  receive  it.     And  I  left  the  ofBce. 

He  continued,  "About  12  o'clock,  between  12  and  2  o'clock  last 
night" — I  think  he  told  me  about  12  o'clock — 

a  messenger  rapped  at  my  door  in  the  hotel,  and  when  he  opened  the  door  he 
presented  me  with  a  letter  from  the  Russian  Foreign  Office.  And  the  messenger 
left.  When  I  opened  the  letter,  I  found  it  was  the  identical  letter  that  he  had 
given  me  in  the  afternoon,  with  no  change  whatever  in  it.  It  was  the  identical 
letter. 

"So,"  he  said,  "I  came  over  to  ask  what  you  would  do  about  it." 

I  first  said  to  Mr.  Romer,  "Have  you  seen  the  British  Ambassador?" 

"Yes." 

"Probably,"  I  said,  "it  will  be  no  use  for  me  to  tell  you  what  I  would 
do,  but  if  you  asked  me,  if  it  was  my  case,  I  would  take  that  letter 
back  to  the  Kremlin  gate  and  say  to  the  messenger  that  it  was  the 
identical  letter  I  had  refused  to  receive,  and  I  could  not  receive  it  and 
was  returning  it,  evidently  it  had  been  sent  to  me  by  mistake." 

As  I  anticipated,  Mr.  Romer  did  not  take  my  advice.  He  referred 
the  matter  to  the  Polish  Government,  and  so  that  was  the  breaking  of 
relations,  and  in  a  short  time  JVIr.  Romer  left  IMoscow  for  home. 

Chairman  LIadden.  At  this  time  I  will  have  the  next  document 
marked  "Exhibit  16,"  which  is  entitled  "Private  and  Confidential 
Message  of  Premier  Joseph  V.  Stalin  to  President  Franklin  D. 
Roosevelt." 

The  docmnent  will  be  received  for  the  record. 

(The  document  referred  to  w^as  marked  "Exliibit  16"  for  identifica- 
tion, and  is  as  follows :) 

Exhibit  16 

Marshall  Stalin's  Personal  Letter  to  President  Franklin  D. 

Roosevelt 

(Note  in  panel  in  upper  right  hand  corner  states  the  message  was 
received  in  the  State  Department  "about  3  p.  m.,  April  24,  lols") 

The  recent  conduct  of  the  Polish  Government  towards  the  Soviet  Union  is 
regarded  by  the  Soviet  Government  as  absolutely  abnormal  and  contrary  to  all 
rules  and  standards  governing  relations  between  allied  countries. 

The  campaign  of  calumny  against  the  Soviet  Union,  initiated  by  the  German 
fascists  regarding  the  Polish  officers  they  themselves  slaughtered  in  the  Smolensk 
area,  on  German-occupied  territory,  was  immediately  taken  up  by  the  Sikorski 
government  and  inflated  in  every  possible  way  by  the  official  Polish  press.  The 
Sikorski  government,  far  from  taking  a  stand  against  the  vile  fascist  slander 
of  the  Soviet  Union  did  not  even  see  fit  to  ask  the  Soviet  government  for  in- 
formation or  explanations. 

The  Hitlerite  authorities,  after  perpetrating  an  atrocious  crime  against  the 
Polish  officers,  are  now  engaged  upon  an  investigation  farce  for  the  staging  of 
which  they  have  enlisted  the  help  of  certain  pro-fascist  Polish  elements  picked 
up  by  them  in  occupied  Poland,  where  everything  is  under  Hitler's  heel  and  where 
honest  Poles  dare  not  lift  their  voices  in  public. 


2064  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

The  governments  of  Sikorski  and  Hitler  have  involved  in  these  "investigations" 
the  International  Red  Cross  which  is  compelled  to  take  part,  under  conditions 
of  a  terroristic  regime  with  its  gallows  and  mass  extermination  of  a  peaceful 
population,  in  this  investigation  farce,  under  the  stage  management  of  Hitler. 
It  should  be  clear  that  such  "investigations,"  carried  out,  moreover,  behind  the 
Soviet  Government's  back,  cannot  inspire  confidence  in  persons  of  any  integrity. 

The  fact  that  this  campaign  against  the  Soviet  Union  was  launched  simul- 
taneously in  the  German  and  the  Polish  press  and  is  being  conducted  along  similar 
lines  does  not  leave  any  room  for  doubt  that  there  is  contact  and  collusion  between 
Hitler,  the  enemy  of  the  Allies,  and  the  Sikorski  government  in  the  conduct  of 
the  campaign. 

At  a  time  when  the  peoples  of  the  Soviet  Union  are  shedding  their  blood  in  the 
bitter  struggle  against  Hitlerite  Germany  and  straining  every  effort  to  rout  the 
common  foe  of  all  liberty-loving  democratic  countries,  the  government  of  Mr. 
Sikorski,  pandering  to  Hitler's  tyranny,  is  dealing  a  treacherous  blow  to  the  Soviet 
Union. 

All  these  circumstances  force  the  Soviet  Government  to  infer  that  the  present 
government  of  Poland,  having  fallen  into  the  path  of  collusion  with  the  Hitler 
government,  has  actually  discontinued  relations  of  alliance  with  the  U.  S.  S.  R. 
and  assumed  a  hostile  attitude  toward  the  Soviet  Union. 

In  view  of  these  circumstances,  the  Soviet  Government  has  come  to  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  necessity  for  breaking  relations  with  the  present  Polish  government. 

I  deem  it  necessary  to  inform  you  of  the  above  and  trust  that  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  will  realize  the  inevitability  of  the  step  which  the  Soviet 
Government  has  been  compelled  to  take.  • 

April  21,  1943. 

Chairman  Maddex.  This  next  document  will  be  marked  "Exhibit 
17"  and  received  for  the  record.  It  is  a  message  from  President  Roose- 
velt to  Stalin,  dated  April  26, 1943. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  IT"  for  identifica- 
tion and  is  as  follows :) 

Exhibit  17 — Message  Feom  President  Roosevelt  to  Stalin,  Dated  April  26. 1943 

I  have  received  your  telegram  while  on  my  Western  inspection  trip.  I  can  well 
understand  your  problem,  but  I  hope  in  the  present  situation  you  can  find  means 
to  label  your  action  as  a  suspension  of  conversations  with  the  Polish  Government 
in  exile  rather  than  a  complete  severance  of  diplomatic  relations. 

It  is  my  view  that  Sikorsky  has  not  acted  in  any  way  with  Hitler  gang,  but 
rather  that  he  made  a  mistake  in  taking  the  mutter  up  with  the  International 
Red  Cross.  Also,  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  Churchill  will  find  ways  and  means 
of  getting  the  Polish  Government  in  London  to  act  with  more  common  sense  in 
the  future. 

Let  me  know  if  I  can  help  in  any  way,  especially  in  regard  to  looking  after 
any  Poles  you  may  desire  to  send  out  of  Russia. 

Incidentally,  I  have  several  million  Poles  in  the  United  States,  very  many  of 
them  in  the  Army  and  Navy.  They  are  all  bitter  against  the  Nazis,  and  knowl- 
edge of  a  complete  diplomatic  break  between  you  and  Sikorski  would  not  help 
the  situation. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  ask  the  admiral  a 
question. 

Admiral,  is  this  message  from  Stalin  to  President  Roosevelt  the 
one  that  was  referred  to  in  your  dispatch  when  Molotov  told  you  about 
it  April  21? 

Admiral  Standley.  I  never  saw  that  message.  Mr.  Stalin  told  me 
about  it. 

Mr.  Maciirowicz.  Did  you  see  that  message,  Admiral  ? 

Admiral  Standley.  No. 

Mr.  Maciihowicz.  Now,  I  am  going  to  ask  you.  Admiral:  In  your 
relations  with  the  Polish  representatives  in  Moscow,  did  you  find  a 
desire  on  their  ]iart  to  find  a  way  out  of  the  situation  with  the  Russian 
authorities  ?    Did  they  seem  to  be  acting  in  good  faith  ? 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  2065 

Admiral  Standley.  Do  you  mean  the  Polish  authorities? 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  The  Polish  authorities. 

Admiral  Standley.  Oh,  yes. 

IVIr.  Machrowicz.  Was  there  any  indication  that  they  did  not  act 
otherwise  than  in  good  faith  i 

Admiral  Standley.  Not  the  slightest.  On  the  other  hand,  there 
seemed  to  be  every  effort  of  the  Poles,  Mr.  Kot  and  Mr.  Romer,  to 
get  along,  and  to  solve  the  problem. 

Mr.  ]VIachrowicz.  Was  there  anything  that  you  found  in  your  rela- 
tions with  xVmbassador  Kot,  Ambassador  Romer,  and  the  others, 
which  would  indicate  to  you  that  the  desire  of  the  Polish  Government 
to  ask  for  an  International  Red  Cross  investigation  was  instigated  by 
the  Germans? 

Admiral  Standley.  No.  The  only  information  we  got  about  that 
came  over  the  radio.  We  got  this  word  over  the  radio,  and  then  we 
got  the  news  in  regard  to  Mr.  Romer's  relief. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Your  impression,  based  on  the  negotiations  and 
the  discussions  you  had  with  Ambassador  Kot  and  Ambassador  Romer, 
was  that  this  was  an  independent  request  to  the  Polish  Government, 
with  which  the  Germans  had  nothing  to  do;  is  that  correct? 

Admiral  Standley.  That  was  the  impression  we  had  at  the  time. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Did  you  see  anything  in  this  action  of  the  Polish 
Government  which  would  give  any  reason  to  ask  the  President  to  have 
them  act  with  more  common  sense  in  the  future  ?  Was  there  anything 
tliat  was  not  in  conmion  sense  in  requesting  the  International  Red 
Cross  to  make  an  investigation? 

Admiral  Standley.  Not  that  we  could  see  at  the  time.  There  was 
no  particular  reason  why  they  should  not  ask  a  neutral  agency  to 
investigate,  as  long  as  there  was  a  dispute. 

Mr.  JVIaciirowicz.  Did  it  not  appear  to  you  that  it  was,  on  the  con- 
trary, acting  with  common  sense  in  the  case  of  a  controversy  between 
the  Russians  and  Germans,  both  of  whom  were  equal  enemies  of  the 
Poles,  that  the  Polish  Government  wanted  an  unbiased  organization 
like  the  International  Red  Cross  to  investigate? 

Admiral  Standley.  That  is  how  it  appeared  to  u.s  there,  that  the 
Polish  Government  was  acting  in  good  faith  in  endeavoring  to  get 
an  honest  solution  of  the  controversy. 

Mr.  Machroavicz.  Then,  of  course,  you  disagree  with  the  former 
President's  statement  that  they  did  not  act  with  conmion  sense  in 
asking  such  an  unbiased  investigation? 

Admiral  Standley.  I  do  not  know  whetlier  I  would  agree  with 
that  or  not. 

Mr.  Dondero.  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Dondero. 

Mr.  Dondero.  Before  you  proceed  further  let  me  ask:  Did  the 
Polish  representatives  at  all  times  contact  you  in  regard  to  the  effort 
they  made  with  the  Russian  Government  to  find  these  Polish  officers? 

Admiral  Standley.  I  could  not  say  that  they  contacted  me  in 
regard  to,  or  informed  me  of  every  occasion,  but  they  were  continually 
discussing  the  Polish  question  with  me. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  our  relations  with  Minister  Kot  were  very 
friendly.  He  was  a  great  bridge  player,  and  we  played  bridge  back 
and  forth  continually. 


2066  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

At  these  bridge  tables  we  would  discuss  these  questions.  Of  course,, 
they  are  not  a  matter  I  can  recall,  but  I  know  we  were  constantly 
discussing  the  Polish  question. 

Mr.  DoNDERo.  When  you  speak  of  the  Polish  question  or  Polish 
problem.  Ambassador,  you  really  mean  these  missing  Polisli  officers,, 
do  you  ? 

Admiral  Standley.  Yes.    That  AA'as  the  problem. 

Mr.  DoNDEUo.  Now,  there  is  something  about  which  you  have 
aroused  the  curiosity  of  all  members  of  this  committee. 

Did  you  at  any  time  after  Willkie's  visit  to  Europe  learn  what  was 
the  supersecret  information  that  he  had  which  you  did  not  have? 

Admiral  Standley.  No.  At  least,  if  it  came  to  me,  it  came  to  me  in 
a  way  that  1  did  not  know  it  was  information  through  Mr.  Willkie. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  That  is  all  I  have  at  this  time,  Mr.  Chairnum. 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  O'Konski. 

Mr.  O'Konski.  I  have  one  question.  Admiral,  referring  to  this 
break  that  finally  came  between  Russia  and  the  Polish  Government, 
that  was  not  a  surprise  to  you,  was  it^  In  other  words,  were  you 
not  of  the  opinion  that  Russia's  attitude,  considering  the  situation 
and  the  way  they  had  to  be  babied  by  everybody  with  regard  to  even 
talking  to  the  Poles,  was  it  not  your  opinion  that  eventually  the 
break  would  come,  and  that  if  it  had  not  been  on  this  incident  of  the 
Red  Cross,  that  they  would  have  found  some  other  incident  because 
of  the  plan  they  had  set?  Eventually  the'break  would  have  to  come 
and  they  had  it  in  mind.  It  was  just  a  question  of  falling  upon  the 
first  opportunity  to  do  it  with  grace;  is  that  right?  Is  that  your 
opinion  ? 

Admiral  Standley.  Would  you  state  that  again  ? 

Mr.  O'Konski.  This  break  that  finally  came  between  the  Polish 
Government  and  the  Russian  Government  was  scheduled  to  come  for 
a  long  time,  was  it  not?  In  other  words,  if  Russia  had  not  found  this 
particular  incident  as  an  excuse  to  sever  relations  with  the  Polish 
Government,  they  would  have  found  some  other  excuse  because  it  was 
definitely  in  their  plan  to  eventually  sever  relations,  was  it  not? 

Admiral  Standley.  That  was  not  in  our  minds  in  JNIoscow. 

Mr.  O'Konski.  It  was  not  ? 

Admiral  Standley.  No.  We  did  not  anticipate  a  definite  and  final 
break  between  the  Poles  and  the  Russians. 

Chairman  Madden.  Our  next  document  will  be  marked  "Exhibit 
No.  18."  It  is  a  telegram  to  the  Secretary  of  State  from  Ambassador 
Standley,  dated  in  Moscow  April  28,  1943. 

That  will  be  received  for  the  record. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  as  ''Exhibit  No.  18"  for  iden- 
tification and  is  as  follows: ) 

Exhibit  18 

[I'araiihrase  of  telegram  from  American  Ambassador  in  Moscow  to  Department  of  StateJ 

Moscow,  April  28,  19^3. 

SKCBErrAKY  OF  STATE, 

Washington. 
For  thk  Tuksidknt  and  thk  SKCiuorAUY — Stx^Hicr. 
In  my  conversation  \vitli  IMolotov  wliifli  took  pliK'o  at  .">  o'clock  on  the  clay 
prior  to  tiio  rect'iii't  of  the  I'resident's  message  to  Stalin.  I  want  you  to  know 
that  I  requested  him  very  earnestly  during  almost  an  hour  to  hold  up  publi- 
cation of  the  Polish  note  until  after  the  I'resident  could  reply  to  Stalin's  uies- 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  2067 

sage.  The  President  had  been  absent  from  Washington,  I  exphiined,  and  I 
expressed  the  earnest  hope  that  if  pul^Iication  could  be  dehiyed  for  even  two 
or  three  days  so  that  the  President  could  communicate  with  Stalin,  this  might 
have  an  important  bearing  on  the  unfortunate  developments.  However.  INIolo- 
tov  was  as  intransigent  as  I  am  informed  he  had  been  earlier  with  the  British 
Ambassador.  Later  I  learned  that  the  note  bad  been  read  at  about  the^same 
time  to  the  Chiefs  of  Mission  in  Kuibyshev  and  had  been  released  to  the 
press. 

I  realize  now  that  intercession  on  my  part  or  on  the  part  of  the  British  Am- 
bassador could  not  have  helped,  since  the  Kremlin  policy  was  set  before  my 
interview  with  Molotov.  It  would  seem,  from  what  I  can  gather  here,  that 
hopes  for  reconciliation  were  apparently  destroyed  with  the  publication  today 
in  Izvcstiya  of  an  article  by  Wanda  Wasilevskaya,  the  so-called  chairman  of 
the  Union  of  Polish  Patriots,  editor  of  Wohia  Polska  and  incidentally  the 
wife  allegedly  of  Kornechuk  who  was  recently  appointed  Vice  Commissar  of 
Foreign  Affairs.  "The  Polish  Patriots  are  against  the  (lovernment  of  General 
Sikorski"  was  the  title  of  this  article,  which  held  strongly  that  the  Polish 
Government  in  London,  a  left-over  from  Rydzsmigly's  "Government  of  Poland's 
September  defeat,"  was  not  chosen  by  the  I'olisli  people,  did  not  represent  them, 
and  is  presently  controlled  by  Hitlerite  elements.  The  Army  leadership  under 
General  Anders  is  accused  of  anti-Semetism,  Chauvanism,  anti-Sovietism,  and 
even  cowardice  for  "refusing  to  fight  and  withdrawing  its  forces  from  the  Soviet 
Union."  The  diplomatic  representation  in  the  Soviet  Union  of  the  Sikorski 
Government  are  accused  of  robbing  the  Polish  exiles  of  both  supi)lies  and  money r 
and  the  links  of  the  Polish  Government  with  Berlin  are  said  to  be  as  clear  as 
its  imperialistic  intentions  toward  Soviet  territories.  The  article  concludes 
that  the  Polish  Patriots  Union  has  asked  for  the  organization  in  the  Soviet  Union 
of  Polish  imits  "which  would  proceed  to  the  front  to  fight  shoulder  to  shoulder 
with  the  Red  Army  rather  than  sitting  for  moutlis  in  tents."  A  fuller  summary 
of  the  article  is  being  telegraphed. 

It  may  be  noteworthy  that  whereas  at  first  the  foreign  corre.spondents  here 
had  to  use  the  phrase  "suspension  of  relations."  later  Soviet  censors  allowed 
them  to  call  the  development  a  "break"  or  "rupture"  in  relations.  However,  it 
is  the  con.sensus  here  that  the  article  mentioned  above  has  now  closed  the  door 
definitely  to  any  rapi>roachment  between  Moscow  and  the  present  Polish 
Government. 

Standley. 

Mr.  MiTCHELi.,.  Do  you  acknowledge  having  sent  that  telegram? 

Admiral  Standley.  Yes. 

]\Ir.  Mitchell.  Could  you  explain  to  the  committee  what  went  on 
at  this  time  ^  It  is  evident  from  this  telegram  that  the  breaking  off 
of  relations  had  a  more  important  meaning  behind  it  since  it  looks  like 
they  were  trying  to  form  another  Polish  Government.  Could  you 
explain  that  to  tlie  committee,  please? 

Admiral  Standley.  I  think  that  that  could  be  explained  by  what 
actually  happened,  because  when  these  relations  were  broken  off,  the 
Russian  Government  set  up  a  Polish  representative  government  in 
Moscow. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Plans  for  setting  up  that  kind  of  government  just 
do  not  happen  overnight.  Where  did  they  find  this  Wanda  Wasilew- 
ska  and  where  did  they  find  these  other  people  ? 

In  other  words,  this  thing  must  have  been  planned  long  before  they 
even  broke  diplomatic  relations  with  the  real  Government  of  Poland. 
Do  you  not  feel  that  way :  That  they  must  have  been  planning  for  it 
for  quite  some  time,  otherwise  how  would  they  have  all  these  people 
ready  ? 

Admiral  Standley.  You  know,  hindsight  is  one  thing  and  foresight 
is  another.  You  are  asking  me  what  I  thought  at  that  time.  At  that 
time  I  did  not  have  the  belief  or  feeling  that  the  rupture  was 
imperative. 


2068  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  But  now,  subsequent  developments  convince  you,  do 
they  not,  Admiral,  that  this  thing  was  planned  long  beforehand? 

Admiral  Standley.  At  the  present  time,  with  hindsight,  I  would 
say  "yes" ;  there  is  not  any  question  but  that  that  was  the  plan. 

Cltairman  Madden.  Admiral,  I  will  present  to  you  exhibit  19, 
headed,  "Paraphrase  of  telegram,  Moscow,  April  28,  1943,"  addressed 
to  tlie  Secretary  of  State  at  Washington,  signed  by  "Standley,"  and 
I  will  ask  counsel  to  have  you  identify  it. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  19"  for  identifica- 
tion and  is  as  follows :) 

Exhibit  19 

[Paraphrase  of  telegram,  from  American  Ambassador  in   Moscow   to   United   States  State 

Department] 

Moscow,  April  28,  W.'/S. 
Secretary  of  State, 

WasJiivffton: 

Accordinff  to  many  qualified  oliservers  here,  there  may  be  formed  in  the  near 
future  on  Soviet  soil  a  '"Free  Polish  Government"  which  would  hold  that  it  alone 
represented  the  real  Polish  people  in  Poland  occupied  by  Germany  and  not  the 
"reactiimary"  emigree  Polish  circles  abroad.  This  "Free  Polish  Government" 
would  be  an  offspring  of  the  Union  of  Polish  Patriots  and  as  such  a  satellite  of  the 
Soviet  Government.  I  am  not  convinced  that  these  observers  are  right  although 
it  is  quite  possible  they  may  be.  In  the  lirst  place,  I  doubt  whether  the  realisti<' 
Kremlin  has  forgotten  its  unsuccessful  attempt  at  the  b^uinning  of  the  Finnish 
War  prematui'ely  to  publicize  and  organize  the  Terioki  Government.  Jn  the 
secofid  place,  there  do  not  appear  to  be  any  Polisli  leaders  here  who  irould  hare 
sufficient  stature  to  make  siteh  a  (jovernntent  popular.  It  would  appear  more 
likely  tliat  there  will  be  formed  here  an  organization  similar  to  the  French 
National  Committee  in  London.  We  should  in  any  event  be  prepared,  I  think,  for 
some  move  of  this  sort  whether  it  be  in  the  form  of  a  conunittee  or  of  a  Free 
Polish  Government,  and  we  should  realize  that  an  organization  of  this  kind  on 
Soviet  soil  must  be  completely  under  Soviet  domination.  In  addition,  a  develop- 
ment of  this  kind  is  possible  in  the  case  of  any  Slavic  or  bordering  country  outside 
the  1041  Soviet  fi-ontiers  whi<-h  does  not  agree  to  the  policy  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

Within  tlie  Soviet  Union  can  be  found  the  nucleus  of  any  European  Government 
and  especially  of  those  governments  in  which  the  Soviet  Union  has  strategic  or 
geographic  interests. 

We  may,  it  seems  to  me,  be  faced  with  a  reversal  in  European  history.  To 
protect  itself  from  the  influences  of  P.olshevism,  Western  Europe  in  1918  at- 
tempted to  set  up  a  cordon  sanitaire.  The  Kremlin,  in  order  to  protect  itself 
from  the  influences  of  the  west,  might  now  envisage  the  formation  of  a  belt  of 
pro-Soviet  states. 

(Signed)      Standley. 

Mr.  MrrciiELT..  Admiral  Standley,  this  message,  is  dated  April  28, 
194e3.     Do  you  recall  having  sent  that? 

Admiral  Standeey.  I  recall  having  made  that  rather  military  esti- 
mate of  the  situation;  yes. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Admiral,  I  want  to  compliment  you.  I  think 
you  were  very  prophetic  in  your  statement  there.  I  think  the  facts 
proved  to  be  exactly  as  you  prophesied  at  that  time. 

Admiral  Standeey.  Thank  you,  sir. 

Mr.  MrrciJEEL.  Now,  Achniral,  could  you  briefly  sununarize  the  rest 
of  your  tour  of  duly  in  INIoscow  and  apjiioximately  the  time  that  you 
were  sncceeded  in  the  position,  and  by  whom? 

Adinii-al  St-andeev.  I  would  like  to  give  you  in  summary,  give  the 
committee,  soi-t  of  a  ])icture  ol"  what  happened  there  when  the  German 
broadcast  claimed  the  finding  of  these  10,000  Polish  ofUcers  in  the 
Katyn  Forest  near  Smolensk. 


THE   KATITST    FOREST    MASSACRE  2069 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Please  do. 

Admiral  Staxdlet.  Two  days  after  this,  radio  Moscow  broadcast 
an  indignant  denial  of  the  Nazi  charge.  "At  last,"  it  said,  "these  new 
German  lies  reveal  the  fate  of  the  Polish  officers  whom  the  Germans 
used  for  constructive  work  in  the  Smolensk  area." 

The  next  day,  Tass  explained  that  these  Polish  prisoners  had  been 
captured  alive  by  the  Germans  during  the  Red  Army  retreat  from 
Smolensk  in  the  summer  of  1941,  and  information  which  combined  the 
efforts  of  the  British.  American,  and  Polish  Governments  has  been 
unsuccessful  in  extracting  from  the  Soviet  GoA'ernment  until  that  day. 
The  Poles  were  wild.  They  knew  that  many  of  their  officers  had  been 
removed  from  the  three  prison  camps  in  April  1940.  If  the  Soviet 
Government  knew  that  they  had  been  captured  by  the  Germans  in 
1941,  why  had  the  Russians  let  the  Poles  hunt  and  hope  for  almost  2 
years  ? 

Ambassador  Romer  urged  caution.  The  Polish  Government  in 
London  proceeded  cautiously. 

On  April  17,  the  Polish  Cabinet  issued  a  statement,  of  which  I 
obtained  a  rather  poor  translation.  If  you  will  bear  with  me,  I  will 
read  that  rather  short  statement : 

There  is  no  Pole  who  is  not  deeply  shocked  by  the  information  loudly  pro- 
claimed by  German  propaganda  of  the  discovery  near  Smolensk  of  the  huge 
graves  filled  with  corpses  of  massacred  Polish  officers  missing  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R. 
and  about  their  execution.  At  the  same  time,  the  Polish  Government,  in  the  name 
of  the  Polish  nation,  refuses  to  permit  the  Germans  to  promote  discord  among 
the  United  Nations  by  shifting  that  crime  in  self-defense  to  the  Russians.  The 
hjiiocritical  indignation  of  the  German  propaganda  will  not  conceal  from  the 
world  the  cruel  crimes  committed  by  the  Nazis  against  the  Polish  nation. 

Then  that  statement  went  on  into  a  list  of  a  long  series  of  crimes, 
and  so  forth. 

Now,  that  was  the  attitude  that  was  presented  to  us  over  there, 
and  the  committee  should  realize  that  sitting  over  there  we  were  rather 
also  behind  the  iron  curtain  and  we  did  not  know  very  much  about 
what  was  going  on  except  in  messages  we  got  that  came  through  from 
the  State  Department.  We  had  no  general  news,  no  general  broadcast, 
or  anything  of  that  kind.  So  we  were  in  a  way  sort  of  blanketed,  too. 
And  many  of  these  things  that  possibly  happened  on  the  outside,  we 
had  no  way  of  knowing. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Admiral,  j^ou  mentioned  there  that  the  Russians 
suddenly  announced  the  fact  that  these  Polish  officers  were  taken 
prisoners  by  the  Germans  and  killed  bj^  them.  I  am  going  to  ask  you 
a  question. 

In  the  course  of  your  various  talks  with  Molotov,  Stalin,  and  others, 
did  they  at  any  time  give  you  any  inference  that  these  Polish  officers 
became  prisoners  of  the  Germans  ? 

Admiral  Standlet.  No,  not  the  slightest.  I  never  received  any 
information  as  to  the  location  or  disposition  of  these  Polish  officers. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  The  first  time  the  story  came  out  that  they  were 
taken  prisoners  by  the  Germans  was  after  German  discovery  of  the 
graves;  is  that  not  correct? 

Admiral  Standley.  Yes,  sir. 

And  let  me  give  you  this  instance.  While  I  was  being  briefed  in 
Washington,  a  lady  came  in  and  she  said,  "I  am  the  wife  of  an  officer 
who  was  taken  out  of  Poland  by  the  Russians,  and  I  have  not  heard 


2070  THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE 

from  him.    Tliey  tell  me  lie  is  dead.    I  don't  believe  he  is  dead.    lam 
jtriviii*^  you  this  letter  to  present  to  this  officer  when  you  hnd  him,'' 

I  took  the  letter  with,  of  course,  rather  a  hopeless  feelino;.  And  a 
year  and  a  half  later,  or  a  year  later,  I  was  informed  that  a  civilian 
wanted  to  see  me.  When  he  came  in  and  I  asked  him  his  name,  he 
^ave  me  his  name,  and  I  reached  down  into' the  di'awer  and  pidled  out 
this  letter  from  his  wife  and  handed  it  to  him. 

This  man  was  a  doctor.  1  think  he  was  from  Lithnania.  Tie  had 
been  taken  prisoner  and  he  had  been  sent  to  prison  u})  in  Siberia,  and 
they  had  an  outbreak  there  of  some  sort  and  they  released  this  doctor 
in  order  for  him  to  aid  the  sick  and  disabled.  And  as  a  result  of  his 
efficient  work,  they  released  him,  and  he  came  into  my  office  on  his  way 
home.  I  tried  to  ^et  him  to  tell  me  about  his  story  and  I  <2;ot  nothing- 
out  of  him.  lie  refused  to  talk,  to  say  anything.  But  I  asked  him  if 
there  were  any  Polish  officers  in  this  camp,  and  he  said,  "No,  there 
were  none." 

That  was  really  the  only  positive  information  I  <>ot. 

In  connection  with  that  investigation — this  I  am  telling  you  is  in- 
formation that  came  to  me  there — the  liussians  held  an  investigation 
of  this  murder  case  when  they  took  over  Smolensk  again  on  the  way 
back,  and  they  invited  various  people  down  there. 

Now,  two  newspapermen,  William  W.  N.  White  and  Lauterbach, 
the  men  who  were  over  there  with  Eric  Johnston,  were  invited  down 
there.  Mr.  White  was  rather  anti-Connnunist  and  said  that  the  testi- 
mony given  there  would  not  convince  a  British  or  an  American  jury. 

Mr.  Lauterbach,  on  the  other  hand,  who  had  received  quite  a  few 
favors  from  the  communistic  government,  said  that  the  testimony 
given  there  was  all  convincing  that  the  Germans  did  the  work. 

C^hairman  ISIadden.  Mr.  Dondero. 

Mr.  DoxDERO.  Achniral,  at  that  time,  did  Mr.  Ilarriman's  daughter 
also  go  with  that  grouj)  to  see  the  graves  ? 

Admiral  Standley.  I  have  been  informed  that  she  did. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  were  not  stationed  there  at  the  time ;  were  you  ? 

Admiral  Standley.  I  was  not  there  at  the  time ;  no. 

As  a  final  summing  up,  as  my  summation  there — -well,  I  will  give 
you  this  information.    It  may  be  of  use.    You  might  say  it  is  hearsay. 

But  last  week,  in  Coronado,  the  admiral  who  was  my  naval  attache 
in  Moscow  at  the  time  we  were  discussing  this  very  problem — I  had 
then  received  the  letter  from  the  connnittee — stated  to  me  at  that  time 
that  it  was  the  impression  of  the  people  in  INIoscow  that  the  Kussians 
had  committed  those  nuirders.  That  was  at  the  time  the  Katyn  Forest 
broke.    So,  finally,  when  I  left  there,  I  had  this  question  in  my  mind. 

I  stated  in  regard  to  this,  in  summing  up,  that  there  were  a  few 
questions  that  remained  unanswered. 

First,  if  the  Polish  officers  were  captured  alive  by  the  Germans  in 
December  of  11)41,  why  were  not  the  1^)1  ish  officials  told  at  once  ?  Why 
was  the  cpiest  of  the  Polish  military  authorities  foi-  theii-  lost  officers 
allowed  to  continue  for  over  '2  years ^  Would  the  uniforms  and  boots 
be  in  such  excellent  condition  after  2  years  in  Russian  prison  camps? 
Why  were  there  so  many  letters  and  documents  dated  February  and 
March  11)40,  and  only  a  few  dated  in  1941?  Why  were  the  news  dis- 
patches from  Moscow  so  peculiarly  censored  by  Narkomandil — that  is 
the  censorshi]) — that  all  the  corres[)ondents'  doubts  of  German  guilt 
wei-e  eliminated  from  the  dispatches? 


THE    KAT^-N    FOREST    MASSACRE  2071 

Those  were  my  last  reactions  to  this  Katyn  Forest  murder. 
Mr.  DoxDERO.  I  might  say  to  you,  Admiral,  that  one  statement  does 
not  quite  agree  with  the  evidence  we  received  in  Europe.     The  last 
date  of  any  letter  or  post  card  or  newspaper  found  on  the  bodies  of 
these  men  was  May  1,  1940. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Admiral,  your  suspicions  have  been  verified  because 
this  connnittee,  after  making  a  thorough  investigation,  has  come  to 
the  uiumimous  conclusion  that  there  is  not  one  iota  of  evidence  any- 
where to  prove  that  anybody  but  the  Russians  did  it. 
Admiral  Standley.  I  was  just  going  to  add  one  other  thing. 
The  testimony  I  have  given  is  from  the  best  of  my  recollection  and 
taken  from  extracts  from  an  article  I  have  written  in  the  Naval  Insti- 
tute. These  notes  were  taken  from  stenographic  notes  made  at  the 
time  of  the  interview. 

For  instance,  I  would  go  to  see  Mr.  Stalin.  I  would  come  back  and 
sit  down  innnediatelv  and  make  stenographic  notes  of  my  interview. 
The  information  I  got  and  have  given  you  here  is  from  those  steno- 
graphic notes.  And,  of  course,  they  are  only  extracts.  The  notes  are 
complete  and  I  have  them  for  reference  if  anybody  wants  to  use  them. 
kSo,  as  I  say,  in  addition,  I  have  made  a  complete  report.  I  have 
written  a  story,  and  a  mainiscrii)t  is  completed  of  my  entire  regime  in 
Moscow.  Maybe  it  will  be  published,  maybe  not ;  I  don't  know.  But 
the  complete  story  of  Mr.  Willkie  is  in  that.  So  if  anybody  wants  to 
read  it,  get  my  booii. 

And  as  I  sum  up  these  remarks,  I  conclude  with  this :  There  is  a 
lesson.    Let  my  fellow  citizens  beware  that  they  never  be  caught  like 
the  Poles,  between  the  upper  and  the  nether  millstones. 
Thank  you,  gentlemen. 

Chairman  Madden.  Do  you  have  any  questions,  Mr.  Sheehan? 
Mr.  Sheehan.  No  questions. 
Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  O'Konski  ? 

Mr.  O'Konski.  You  were  there.  Admiral,  when  the  graves  were 
discovered  by  the  Germans;  were  you  not? 
Admiral  Standlet.  Yes. 

Mr.  O'Konski.  You  were  there  when  the  Soviet  Government  broke 
relations  with  the  Polish  Government;  were  you? 
Admiral  Standley.  Yes. 

Mr.  O'Konski.  That  was  a  very  critical  time,  and  it  involved, 
evidently,  the  murder  of  somewhere  between  ten  and  fifteen  thousand 
Polish  officers. 

Admiral  Standley.  Yes. 

Mr.  O'Konski.  Now,  Admiral,  was  there  any  honest  effort  by  your 
superiors  here  in  Washington  to  hnd  out  who  really  was  guilty  of 
this  massacre  by  asking  you,  or  was  there,  in  your  opinion,  an  obvious 
attempt  to  hush  it  up  because  it  was  too  hot  to  handle  and  to  lav  hands 
off? 

Admiral  Standley.  The  reasons  back  of  no  request — I  could  not 
even  offer  a  suggestion — but  I  received  no  intimation  that  I  would  look 
for  that. 

Mr.  O'Konski.  How  long  were  you  there  after  the  graves  were 
discovered? 

Admiral  Standley.  That  Mas  in  April,  and  I  left  there  in  October 
1943.    That  is  about  7  months. 


2072  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  And  you  were  our  representative  there,  our  highest 
representative  there? 

Admiral  Standley.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Durin<>:  all  that  time  you  received  no  communication 
whatever  from  your  superiors  in  Wasliington  askino;  you  to  send  some 
kind  of  report  to  find  out  which  side  is  telling  the  truth ;  no  attempt 
whatever  was  made  to  ask  you? 

Admiral  Standley.  None  whatever. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Did  not  that  seem  rather  strange  to  you? 

Admiral  Standley.  No,  because  the  situation  was  so  turbulent  other- 
wise that  I  would  feel  that  any  effort  of  our  Government  to  inject 
themselves  into  it  would  just  muddy  the  water  so  nuich  more. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  In  other  words,  at  that  time,  your  impression  is 
that,  from  the  standpoint  of  your  superiors,  Soviet  friendship,  even 
if  they  were  criminals,  meant  more  to  them  than  finding  out  who 
murdered  15,000  Polish  officers? 

Admiral  Standley.  I  think  that  is  somewhat  true.  But  take  this 
situation :  The  way  we  felt  there,  when  Mr.  Homer  left,  taking  his 
departure,  the  British  Ambassador  and  myself  went  to  the  depot  to 
see  him  off  and  presented  going-away  presents  to  Mr.  Romer  as  in- 
dicating where  our  sympathies  lay. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Did  you  leave  the  service  voluntarily.  Admiral ;  that 
is,  that  particular  post  at  Moscow? 

Admiral  Standley.  Yes;  and  then  again,  no.  Do  you  mean  leave 
the  Ambassador  service? 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  In  Moscow ;  yes,  sir. 

Admiral  Standley.  Yes.  I  submitted  my  resignation.  The  last 
words  I  said  to  the  President  -when  I  left,  going  back,  as  I  left  the  door 
in  the  White  House,  I  said,  "Mr.  President,  you  got  your  fingers 
burned  with  Mr.  Willkie ;  don't  do  it  again." 

And  when  I  got  word  that  Mr.  Joe  Davies  was  coming  in  with  a 
secret  letter  which  I  was  not  to  know  about,  I  sent  in  my  resignation, 
and  it  was  accepted  in  October. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  The  reason  I  ask  that  is  that  the  history  of  ambas- 
sadors at  that  time  was  that  those  that  evidently  knew  what  was 
going  on,  ])articular]y  Governor  Earle  and  Bliss  Lane  and  a  few 
others,  did  not  last  very  long;  and  I  wondered  if  you  went  the  way  of 
all  those  who  knew  what  was  going  on  at  that  time. 

So,  I  am  glad  to  hear  it  was  the  way  it  was. 

Admiral  Standley.  No.  I  submitted  my  resignation. 

If  you  recall,  there  was  an  upheaval  there  in  my  relations  with  the 
Russians  when  I  made  the  announcement  to  the  press  that  tlie  Russians 
wei-e  not  informing  their  ]:)eople  as  to  the  receij^t  of  Red  Cross  relief 
supi)]ios  and  lend-lease  su])plies.  Tliat  created  an  ujihoaval,  and  I 
think  the  ])ress  in  the  United  States  and  I  think  Mr.  Sumner  Welles, 
wlio  was  i)i'()bal)ly  here,  thought  1  should  be  relieved  at  once. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKT.  In  regard  to  the  lend-lease  negotiation,  here  we  were 
giving  Russia  billions  of  dollars'  Avorth  of  land-lease,  and  do  you 
know  if  an  effort  on  our  part  was  made,  by  our  representatives  in  Gov- 
ernment, to  use  that  more  or  less  as  a  weapon  to  get  the  Russians  to 
treat  the  Poles  a  little  more  kindly  rather  than  just  having  our  Presi- 
dent say  "Well,  if  you  don't  want  the  Poles  in  Russia,  let  me  know, 
we  will  take  care  of  thenr'? 


THE   KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE  2073 

Admiral  Standlby.  No.  As  far  as  I  know,  that  effort  was  not  in 
evidence. 

You  see,  I  was  there  with  the  Beaverbrook-Harriman  Mission,  who 
forced  the  lend-lease  on  them. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  They  forced  it  on  them? 

Admiral  Standley.  We  practically  forced  it  on  them ;  yes,  sir. 

Then  they  received  the  lend-lease  and  we  were  giving  them  the  lend- 
lease  in  an  effort  to  further  the  war  effort.  As  far  as  I  knew,  it  did 
not  have  anything  to  do  with  the  Polish  situation. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  They  were  not  very  anxious  to  take  it;  were  they? 
What  do  you  mean  when  you  say  "we  practically  forced  it  on  them?" 

Admiral  Standley.  Their  attitude  was  one  of  rather  not  wanting 
to  accept  help  from  the  outside.  They  had  four  meetings  with  them. 
In  the  first  meeting,  they  went  in  and  they  came  back,  and  Mr.  Harri- 
man  and  Mr.  Beaverbrook  said:  "I  wish  we  would  have  had  the 
agreement  ready  for  them  to  sign,  and  I  think  he  would  have  signed 
last  night." 

They  had  another  meeting  with  Mr.  Stalin  and  said :  "Oh,  my  God ; 
we  don't  know  what  we  are  going  to  do  now.  We  don't  know  what  to 
give  him  to  get  him  to  agree." 

The  third  night  they  came  back  and  said :  "Get  your  papers  ready. 
It  is  all  over.  We  are  going  to  sign  the  agreement  the  next  morning." 
And  this  was  done. 

We  left  in  a  gale  of  wind  on  Saturday.  No  pilot  in  our  country 
would  take  to  the  air  in  those  conditions,  but  we  went  out.  Every- 
body got  airsick.  It  was  a  terrible  storm.  The  reason  for  it — and 
the  reason,  as  we  realized  afterward,  that  Mr.  Stalin  agreed  to  take 
lend-lease  and  got  rid  of  us — was  the  fact  that  the  Germans  had 
started  their  attack  on  Moscow  2  days  before,  and  he  wanted  to  get 
us  out  of  there  in  order  to  avoid  the  embarrassment  of  having  us 
stranded. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  In  other  words,  they  played  like  the  bride,  hard  to 
get,  because  they  knew  they  would  get  more  ? 

Admiral  Standley.  Maybe  that  was  it.  But  I  think  their  desire 
to  get  us  out  in  a  hurry  was  the  reason  Stalin  finally  agreed. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Admiral,  in  your  reference  to  Mr,  Willkie  and  Mr. 
Davies,  apparently  there  were  many  instances  when  the  President  by- 
passed you  as  Ambassador  to  get  to  other  people  in  Russia, 

Admiral  Standley.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  And  they  never  let  you  know  what  was  happening? 

Admiral  Standley.  Some  parts.  The  secret  letter  Mr.  Davies 
brought  over,  Mr.  Davies  told  me  that  the  President  felt  it  would 
be  better  if  I  was  not  there  when  he  presented  the  letter.  And  I  not 
only  did  not  see  the  letter  to  know  what  was  in  it,  but  I  was  not  there 
to  see  when  the  letter  was  presented  to  Mr.  Stalin. 

And  the  telegi^ams  you  just  read  here,  is  the  first  time  I  have  ever 
seen  those  telegrams,  which  Mr.  Stalin  sent  to  Mr.  Eoosevelt  and 
Roosevelt  sent  to  Stalin,  showing  you  how  I  sat  in  the  dark  behind 
the  iron  curtain. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Only,  of  course,  I  realize  that  both  Mr.  Willkie  and 
Mr.  Roosevelt  had  a  lot  in  common,  both  being  the  so-called  barefoot 
Wall  Street  lawyers.  It  would  seem  to  me  that  as  a  Republican, 
we  have  been  screaming  for  the  last  20  years  about  Government  by 
cronj,  and  I  think  we  have  had  also  international  diplomacy  by 


2074  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

crony,  from  tlie  looks  of  things,  where  individuals  worked  for  the 
President,  reported  to  him.  and  the  rest,  even  the  State  Department 
many  times  did  not  knoAV  what  was  going  on. 

Mr.  Machkowicz.  Mr.  Sheehan.  do  you  want  to  add  Mr.  John 
Foster  Dulles  to  that  group  ? 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Yes. 

Mr.  MACHROwrcz.  Would  both  of  you  gentlemen? 

Mr.  Sheehan.  You  must  remember  all  this  time  Poland  was  an 
ally  of  ours.  We  were  supposed  to  be.  fighting  for  them.  Jimmy 
Byrnes  points  out  that  when  he  was  at  Yalta.  Mr.  Roosevelt,  instead 
of  being  an  advocate  for  the  Polish  cause  was  an  arbiter,  trying  to 
settle  the  dispute  by  giving  away  what  we  had  little  right  to  give. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  I  would  like  to  suggest  to  the  chairman  that  it  is 
past  noon. 

Chairman  Madden.  Is  there  anything  further? 

Now,  Admiral,  on  behalf  of  the  committee,  we  want  to  thank  you 
for  coming  here  today.  You  came  a  long  way  to  testify,  and  your 
testimony  has  certainly  been  very  valuable  to  this  committee.  Since 
it  has  be^n  in  operation  over  a  year,  this  committee  has  been  trying 
its  best  to  bring  out  all  the  facts  regarding  the  Katyn  massacre  and 
some  of  the  incidents  leading  thereto.  Your  testimony  has  been 
highly  valuable,  and  we  wish  to  thank  you  for  your  inconvenience 
in  coming  here  to  testify. 

Admiral  Standi^ey.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Madden.  We  are,  unfortunately,  a  little  behind  our 
schedule. 

Ambassador  Welles,  could  you  be  here  at  1 :  30? 

Mr.  Welles.  Yes,  sir;  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  INIadden.  Thank  you. 

Ambassador  Welles  will  go  on  at  1 :  30  as  the  next  witness. 

(Whereupon,  at  12:20  p.  m.,  a  recess  was  taken  until  1:30  p.  m., 
this  same  day.) 

AFTER   RECESS 

Chairman  Madden.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

I  would  like  to  make  this  announcement  for  the  information  of 
some  of  the  news  reporters.  Last  summer,  before  the  committee  filed 
its  interim  re])ort  on  the  first  phase  of  the  Katyn  hearings,  we  set 
ui>  in  our  re])ort  the  following. 

The  first  ])haso  of  tlie  Katyn  hearings  was  to  establish  the  guilt  of 
tlie  nation  resj)()nsible  f(n"  the  massacre,  and  the  second  pliase  was 
primarily  to  comi)]ete  testimony  regarding  the  facts  and  circumstances 
leading  up  to  and  concerning  the  disa})pearance  of  certain  reports, 
documents  regarding  the  Katyn  massacre.  I  will  set  that  out  by 
I'cading  the  two  ])araa'rn]ihs  as  they  were  ])i'inted  in  our  interim 
repoi't,  to  wit  : 

Fully  awiire  llicu  that  this  was  the  first  neutral  committee  ever  otficially  au- 
(liorized  by  any  finverunieut  to  iuvestiiiate  llie  Katyn  massacre,  tliis  eoiMiuiUee 
divided  its  investigation  into  two  pliases  : 

(1)  Assemltle  evidence  which  would  detcrniini'  (he  suilt  of  the  country  re- 
si(onsil)le  for  the  mass  murder  of  these  I'olish  Army  officers  and  intellectuals; 
in  the  Katyn  Forest. 

(2)  Kstahlish  wliy  the  Katyn  massacre  with  all  of  its  ramihcatioiis  never  was; 
ad<M|ualely  revealed  to  the  Ameiican  people  and  to  tlie  rest  of  the  world.  Tlie 
(•(Uiniiittce  likewise  included  in  lliis  jiliasc  an  dfort  to  deteniiiuc  wh>    this  cr!iuc 


THE  KATYN  FOREST  MASSACRE  2075 

was  not  adjudicated  iu  the  Nuremburg  trials — where  it  should  have  been  settled 
in  the  first  instance  if  the  Germans  were  guilty. 

Now,  the  reason  for  this  second  phase  is  that  when  our  resohition 
was  authorized  by  Congress,  a  great  number  of  the  Members  of  our 
Congress  inquired  as  to  whether  or  not  the  committee  would  go  into 
the  phase  of  the  hearings  as  is  set  out  in  part  two  of  our  investigation. 
That  is  the  reason  for  the  hearings  tliis  week. 

I  will  ask  ^Ir.  Sumner  Welles  to  take  the  stand,  please. 

TESTIMONY  OF  HON.  SUMNER  WELLES,  FORMER  UNDER 
SECRETARY  OF  STATE,  OXON  HILL,  MD. 

Chairman  Madden.  Will  you  be  sworn,  please.     Do  you  solenmly 
swear  that  the  testimony  you  are  about  to  give  the  committee  will  be 
the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 
Mr.  Welles.  I  do. 

Chairman  Madden.  Sit  down,  Mr.  Welles,  please.  Will  you  state 
your  name. 

Mr.  Welles.  Sumner  Welles. 
Chairman  Madden.  And  your  address  ? 
Mr.  Welles.  Oxon  Hill,  Md. 
Chairman  Madden.  And  your  present  capacity? 
Mr.  Welles.  Author,  writer. 

Chairman  Madden.  You  are  a  former  ^Vmbassador  and  Under 
Secretary  ? 

Mr.  Welles.  I  am  a  former  Ambassador  to  Cuba,  and  later  As- 
sistant Secretary  of  State  and  then  Under  Secretary  of  State  from 
May  1937  until  the  latter  part  of  the  summer  of  1943. 
Chairman  JNIadden.  You  may  proceed,  Mr.  Counsel. 
Mr.  INIiTciiELL.  Mr.  Welles,  when  did  you  first  enter  the  diplomatic 
service  of  the  United  States  ? 
Mr.  Welles.  In  1915. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  You  have  held  successive  posts  all  over  the  world; 
is  that  correct  ? 

Mr.  Welles.  That  is  right. 

]\Ir.  Mitchell.  You  became  Under  Secretary  of  State  on  what  day  ? 
Mr.  Welles.  I  think  it  was  May  26, 1937. 

Mr.  IMiTciiELL.  And  you  remained  in  that  position  how  long,  sir? 
Mr.  Welles,  Until  July  1943. 
Mr.  Mitchell.  What  did  you  do  after  July  1943  ? 
Mr.  Welles.  I  then  wrote  a  column  for  the  newspapers  and  wrote 
several  books. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  In  other  words,  from  July  1943  until  the  present 
time,  you  have  been  an  author? 
Mr.  Welles.  In  private  life,  yes. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Were  you  present  in  the  hearing  room  this  morning 
when  Admiral  Standley,  former  Ambassador,  testified  ? 
Mr.  Welles.  I  was. 

Mr.  INIiTCHELL.  You  heard  all  of  the  exhibits  that  were  read  into 
the  record  at  that  time  of  the  communications  that  went  back  and 
forth  between  Washington  and  Moscow  at  that  time  ? 
Mr.  Welles.  I  did. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Mr.  Chairman,  at  this  time  I  would  like  to  intro- 
duce this  document  as  exhibit  20. 


2076 


THE    KATYN    FOREST   MASSACRE 


Chairman  Madden.  This  document  will  be  marked  "Exhibit  No. 
20."  It  is  a  letter  from  Mr.  Sumner  Welles  to  the  Presideiit  of  the 
United  States, 

(The  letter  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  20"  a^         ,  joii,^ 

Exhibit  20 — Letter  From  Under  Secretary  Sumner  Welles  to  •      ''    >  . 

Roosevelt 


•1-1      a     '    ' 


.1.0     .  fil  t   % 


'l^.a  Wilts  House. 


LEnclosure  No.  1  to  Exhibit  120] 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  2079 

of  Polieh  forces,  particularly  to  Iran  or  to  the  Middle  East,  I  think 

(Jpv.prni  «^\'orski  became  as  disconsolate  as  Dr.  Benes  must  have  been 

JNow ,       .   onths  of  his  life  since  he  made  the  same  attempt  without 

was  i\v         .'  "  11- 

C^-  .  ,,,4^fer  in  that  connection  to  a  message  that  was  read  this 
morning  which  I  myself  have  not  previously  seen.  It  was  a  message 
addressed  by  President  Roosevelt  to  Mr.  Stalin.  I  think  the  refer- 
ence in  that  message,  if  I  may  dare  to  interpret,  that  President  Roose- 
velt made  to  Sikorski's  attempt  with  regard  to  the  Katyn  massacre 
was  not  that  it  showed  lack  of  common  sense  in  its  objective  but  m 
its  method. 

It  seems  to  me  that  what  the  President  deplored  was  the  fact  that 
General  Sikorski  had  not  taken  him  or  Prime  Minister  Churchill 
into  consultation  before  taking  the  step  w^hich  otherwise  would  seem 
to  be  altogether  well-advised.  At  that  time  there  was  no  League  of 
Nations ;  there  was  no  United  Nations. 

There  was  no  international  body  of  any  kind  except  the  International 
Red  Cross  that  could  be  regarded  as  respectable,  impartial,  and  inter- 
national in  its  character ;  and  it  seemed  to  me  that  General  Sikorski's 
idea  was  altogether  well  taken.  However,  what  the  President  re- 
gretted was  that  what  had  been  taken  precipitously  was  without  prior 
consultation  with  the  other  two  govermnents  that  had  been  working 
so  closely  with  him  to  better  the  relations  between  the  Soviet  Gov- 
ernment and  the  Polish  Government  in  exile. 

Mr.  Mitchell.  Do  you  care  to  proceed  ? 

Mr.  Machrowitz.  In  connection  with  that,  may  I  ask  a  question, 
Mr,  Welles.  Would  you  consider  that  the  action,  whether  it  was 
ill-advised  or  not,  was  such  an  action  that  would  justify  the  severing 
of  relations  between  Poland  and  Russia  ? 

Mr.  Welles.  Decidedly  not.  And  it  seems  to  me  that  the  point 
that  was  brought  out  in  the  testimony  this  morning  is  altogether 
sound,  that  is,  that  that  step  was  merely  a  pretext  for  a  policy  that  had 
been  determined  upon  some  time  before. 

Mr.  DoNDERO,  Mr.  Welles,  may  I  just  add  my  view  as  to  what  the 
chairman  said.  "Wliat  we  want  to  know  from  you  as  Under  Secretary 
of  State  of  this  Nation  is  what  you  know  took  place  in  regard  to  the 
Katyn  massacre  from  1939  up  until  1943.     That  is  the  point. 

Mr.  Welles.  Unfortunately,  without  having  refreshed  my  memory 
by  going  all  through  the  memoranda  that  are  on  file  in  the  Department 
of  State  and  some  of  which  I  had  hoped  to  see  this  morning,  it  would 
be  quite  impossible  for  me  to  go  into  it  in  any  detailed  way.  There  is 
very  little  I  can  add  to  what  has  been  brought  out  this  morning. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Mr.  Secretary,  did  I  understand  you  to  say  that  the 
position  taken  this  morning  with  reference  to  this  development  of 
the  breaking  of  the  Polish-Russian  relationship  was  of  long  standing? 
Did  you  say  that  position  was  unsound  ? 

Mr.  Welles.  No ;  I  said  quite  the  contrary,  Mr.  Congressman. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  That  it  was  sound? 

Mr,  Welles.  What  I  said  was  that  what  was  brought  out  this 
morning  seemed  to  he  entirely  correct,  that  the  severance  of  relations 
on  the  basis  of  the  attempt  of  the  Polish  Government  to  get  the  Inter- 
national Red  Cross  to  make  a  survey  and  an  investigation  was  merely 
a  pretext  for  a  policy  that  had  already  been  determined  upon  by  the 
Soviet  Government  some  time  before. 


2080  THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Mr,  Welles,  would  you  say  that  if  General  Si- 
korski  had  consiilted  the  United  States  Government  at  the  time,  the 
United  States  Government  would  have  agreed  to  the  request  for  an 
investigation  by  the  International  Red  Cross  ? 

Mr.  Welles.  I  am  quite  certain  that  the  President  would  have  re- 
garded it  sympathetically,  and  insofar  as  I  myself  was  concerned  I 
most  certainly  would  have  urged  it. 

Mr.  Maohrowicz.  Do  you  feel  that  the  British  Government  would 
have  done  so  ? 

Mr.  Welles.  I  am  quite  sure  of  it. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  Then  what  harm  was  there  done  in  making  that 
request  ? 

Mr.  Welles.  Simply  that  it  afforded  the  Soviet  Government  the 
opportunity  for  breaking  relations,  which  otherwise  could  conceivably 
have  been  averted  for  at  least  a  while. 

Mr.  Machrowicz.  You  just  stated  that  they  had  planned  severing 
relations  anyway  sooner  or  later.  It  was  just  a  question  of  finding 
some  pretext. 

Mr.  Welles.  I  said  that  that  had  been  brought  out  clearly  this 
morning,  but  unfortunately  we  were  not  aware  of  that  at  the  time. 

Chairman  Madden.  Mr.  Welles,  you  mentioned  the  assassination 
of  General  Sikorski.     Could  you  elaborate  on  that  somewhat? 

Mr.  Welles.  I  have  always  believed  that  there  was  sabotage.  You 
will  remember,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  he  was  brought  down  in  the  plane 
just  as  he  was  taking  off  from  Gibraltar.  The  plane  crashed.  There 
had  been  two  or  three  incidents  of  that  kind  before.  I  remember  that 
when  General  Sikorski  came  to  the  United  States  the  year  before,  his 
plane,  in  taking  off  from  Montreal,  had  crashed  when  it  was  only 
about  100  feet  above  the  ground. 

To  put  it  mildly,  it  would  seem  to  be  a  coincidence. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  Was  it  not  generally  conceded  that  both  Molotov 
and  Stalin  had  certain  commitments  that  they  had  made  to  General 
Sikorski  and  that  they  knew  that  if  he  were  out  of  the  way  they  could 
jDossibly  get  around  them? 

Mr.  Welles.  I  don't  know  whether  it  is  generally  conceded  or  not, 
but  it  is  certainly  conceivable. 

Mr.  Sheeiian.  Mr.  Secretary,  in  your  position  in  the  State  Depart- 
ment, were  you  informed  of  the  fact  from  various  of  our  Ambassadors 
that  Russia  was  contemplating  this  breaking  off  of  Polish  relations? 

Mr.  Welles.  Not  that  I  recall ;  no. 

Mr.  Sheeiian.  On  May  2,  1943,  there  was  a  telegram  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  from  Ambassador  Winant  in  London,  who  ])ointed  out 
that  as  early  as  January  16,  1943,  when  Russia  declared  all  Poles  to 
be  Russian  citizens,  that  was  the  beginning  of  this  break-off.  The 
Ambassador  in  London  wired  on  April  21, 1943,  pointing  out  that  the 
British  Foreign  Office  felt  all  the  time  that  this  was  motivated  by  Rus- 
sian desires  to  reinforce  and  give  expression  to  her  territorial 
expansion. 

In  other  words,  our  Ambassador  sends  information  in.  Who  does 
it  go  to  ?     Who  follows  through  on  it  ? 


THE    KATYN    FOREST    MASSACRE  2081 

Mr.  Welles.  Mr.  Chairman,  undoubtedly  we  all  of  us  realized  that 
the  situation  was  deteriorating  rapidly,  but  an  innnediate  break  of 
relations  of  that  character  w^as  not  evident. 

Mr.  Sheehan.  Well,  it  seemed  to  our  Ambassadors  and  our  military 
attaches,  who  were  sending  in  information  to  the  Secretary  of  State 
and  to  the  Under  Secretary,  that  these  things  should  be  called  to  your 
attention  because  the  mere  fact  that  Russia  was  going  to  break  off  rela- 
tions with  one  of  our  allies,  Poland,  was  not  a  small  matter.  That  was 
quite  a  significant  matter, 

Mr.  Welles.  We  were  doing  everything  in  our  power  to  avert  it. 
I  was  aware  of  that. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  Mr.  Welles,  when  did  the  item  of  the  Katyn  massacre 
first  come  to  the  attention  of  the  State  Department,  if  you  can  recall? 

Mr.  Welles.  There  again,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  am  sorry  to  say  that  I 
would  have  to  refresh  my  memory  by  looking  at  the  files ;  and  I  have 
not  been  given  that  opportunity. 

Mr.  DoNDERO.  Can  you  fix  it  reasonably  as  to  year  or  month? 

Mr.  Welles.  Well,  I  think  that  what  was  brought  out  this  morning, 
Mr.  Congressman,  by  Admiral  Standley  makes  that  very  clear. 

Mr.  O'KoNSKi.  When  this  atrocity  was  announced  to  the  world  first 
by  the  Germans,  was  there  any  concern  in  the  State  Department  to 
have  liaison,  for  instance,  with  G-2  of  our  military  service  and  other 
branches  of  the  service  that  could  get  some  information  on  it  ?  Was 
there  any  honest  effort  on  the  part  of  the  State  Department  to  pin 
the  responsibility  of  the  crime,  or  was  the  policy  one  of  being  fearful 
that  it  might  further  antagonize  the  Russians  and  that  we  had  better 
not  take  the  chance  ? 

Mr.  Welles.  No  ;  I  don't  think  that  was  the  case.  I  think  that  at 
the  beginning  we  were  rather  definitely  confused  as  to  the  responsi- 
bility for  the  crime.  Certainly  there  is  nothing  in  the  history  of  the 
Nazi  government  nor  of  the  Nazi  authorities  which  would  have  put  it 
beyond  them  to  undertake  such  a  massacre  because  I  must  remind 
you  that  the  facts  came  out  very  slowly  and  that  by  the  time  I  had 
left  the  Department  of  State — and  I  have  forgotten  whether  that  was 
late  July  or  early  August  19-i3 — very  little